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
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EVA SCHAPER (1924–1992)

T. J. Diffey

EVA SCHAPER, President of the British Society of Aesthetics, died suddenly in Glasgow on 11 June 1992 when she suffered a stroke. She was 67 years of age. Her health had not been good for some time but nothing fatal was feared and indeed her health was improving when death struck, to the shock and dismay of her many friends, colleagues and students.

Eva Schaper was born in Iserlohn, Germany on 1 October 1924 and graduated from the University of Münster. She came to Britain from Germany after the Second World War and was in Germany in the war years. At my request she once told me something of her experiences then, but though we were good friends I do not feel that I knew her well enough to judge now what she would be willing to have of this unhappy period of her life made the subject of extended public description. My sense of her is of a reticent private person whose life was in any case devoted and dedicated to philosophy. An adequate tribute to her must therefore focus on philosophy as the centre of her life.

Eva was a woman of wide-ranging intellectual interests whose particular but not exclusive specialisms were the philosophy of Kant and aesthetics. Indeed Eva was a dedicated scholar of Kant; it has been said that she was working on a new translation of the Third Critique into English the night that she died which, if true, is I am sure what she would have chosen to be doing at the end.

Eva Schaper was passionately committed to philosophy, and therefore to those things which she and most of us naturally and traditionally have associated with the study of philosophy, namely democracy and free intellectual inquiry in the universities. These relationships came under some strain in the 1980s in Britain, I know to her alarm and great concern.

Eva spent many years teaching philosophy at the University of Glasgow, where she began in 1952 as Assistant Lecturer in Logic (during much of her time in Glasgow the traditional Scottish division of Philosophy into Departments of Logic and of Moral Philosophy was in force). In 1955 she moved to the University College of North Wales at Bangor, where she spent three happy years before moving back to Glasgow in 1958. In 1967 she became Senior Lecturer, in 1972 Reader, and Professor in 1977. She retired in 1990 but still taught in the Department with which she retained active links. And in the case of Eva, the word 'active' is of exact application. She was a tireless and meticulous worker in every duty which she undertook and was a devoted scholar, tutor and colleague.

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Professor Eva Schaper became President of the British Society of Aesthetics when her friend and colleague in the Society, Harold Osborne who had held that office before her, died in 1987. Eva also held office in the British Society for Phenomenology.

She was a long-standing member of the British Society of Aesthetics; indeed she was one of its founder members, 'in at the beginning', as she put it. She therefore knew well from the earliest years of the Society its prominent members, including Ruby Meager, Ruth Saw and Harold Osborne. It is evident to me that Eva's death marks the end of an era for the Society, which must now face the future without the guidance and wisdom of its leading founder members to call upon.

For some years she ran the annual conferences of the Society in London in what I heard her describe as the beautiful ambience of Hanover Lodge in Regent's Park. By all accounts she ran these conferences with great style and care. I say 'by all accounts' for I did not have the good fortune to be present at these meetings myself but I recall hearing many appreciative accounts of these occasions from members of the Society. I found out for myself when I had the unenviable task of succeeding her as conference organizer what enormous pains she had taken when the task was hers. For example she had made detailed summaries not only of the arguments of all the papers but of the debates the papers had prompted. This was typical, as I was to discover, both of the thoroughness with which she did things and of her sheer love and enjoyment of argument.

In philosophy she was a fearless fighter. Her standards were very high. She would not permit people to cut corners in argument and she always ticked off purveyors of shoddy arguments. I remember suffering her scorn on one occasion some years ago, and once was enough, when, in giving a paper, I was insufficiently robust in rebutting a point made against me in the ensuing discussion. 'If you are content with that answer . . .', she said in a tone of voice which I never forgot and which implied that nobody should be.

She was a regular member of the Thyssen Philosophy conferences in the 1970s and 1980s where she contributed to the high level of discussion expected and maintained at those meetings.

I first met Eva in the late nineteen sixties when the Joint Session of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society was held on a particularly hot weekend in July at the University of Sussex, and remember her as a beautiful woman beautifully dressed. Thereafter we were to meet through working on the business of the Society at its committee meetings and conferences. We journeyed abroad to the International Congress of Aesthetics and were looking forward to having her company at the 1992 Congress in Madrid which she had booked to attend.

Eva was as much respected abroad as at home. She was held in high regard by our colleagues in Europe and in the United States, where consequently she

was invited to address meetings and conferences. She was a wonderful ambassadress for our Society.

By a grim irony our last conversations on the telephone were about the obituary notice she had agreed to write on Ruby Meager for this journal, a notice which was in proof and going through the press when Eva herself died. This notice was not published until several months after Eva's own death and must have been one of the last things she wrote. What proved to be her last letter to me was written to accompany the return of the corrected proofs.

Because of recent deaths in the Society and indeed in aesthetics at large (as I write this in July 1992 I have just received news of the death of Professor Jan Aler, our colleague in the Dutch Society for Aesthetics), and the need on these distressing occasions for editors to get obituaries organized if possible to conform to print schedules, we fell into a general discussion on the telephone of the subject of mortality. In the course of this I thanked her for fine notice which she had written for Ruby and she said, as I thought jokingly, that I could do the same for her. 'Yes, perhaps one day', I said, taking it for granted that the occasion for that sad duty, should it ever fall to me to perform, would be many many years away. It was with disbelief that I learned of her death some three weeks later.

It has been estimated that Eva Schaper wrote two books, *Prelude to Aesthetics* (1968), *Studies in Kant's Aesthetics* (1979), some forty papers and edited several composite works.

The first work of hers which I read was *Prelude to Aesthetics*, a cogent examination of the aesthetic theories of Plato and Aristotle written with a lively awareness of our present problems in aesthetics. Thereafter I followed her work with a keen appreciation.

In the summer of 1976 the fifth University of Bristol philosophy conference was held on the subject of aesthetics. Eva's invited contribution was her paper on Fiction and Belief which, if the proceedings had been published in volume form as had originally been intended by the organizers, would have denied this journal the good fortune to carry the paper. This paper has acquired a distinguished place in the literature on the topic; it is for example quite common for me to receive submissions which refer to it (and editors are in a good position to judge the quality and the volume of citations of particular works in their fields).

Studies in Kant's Aesthetics is not a systematic study of the subject. The accurately chosen title of this rich and successful book, which is not easy to summarize, designates a collection of six papers, five of which had been previously published, and all of which go well together. The topics dealt with include Imagination and Knowledge; Epistemological Claims and Judgements of Taste; Aesthetic Appraisals; Free and Dependent Beauty; Schiller's (mis)-reading of Kant; and the 'As-If' Element in Aesthetic Thought. Not surprisingly, Eva Schaper respects the complexity of Kant's thought. One *canard* she

therefore disposes of is the belief that Kant, as a harbinger of abstract formalism, rated wallpaper patterns more highly aesthetically than great works of art.

The volume, *Pleasure, Preference and Value: Studies in Philosophical Aesthetics*, edited by Eva Schaper and published by Cambridge University Press in 1983, grew out of the meetings held by the Thyssen-Foundation-sponsored group of philosophers when it turned its attention to aesthetics. The volume is interesting for what sophisticated analytic philosophers can do with aesthetics. Eva Schaper's own contribution, 'The Pleasures of Taste', offers an account of the aesthetic judgement which includes an impressive account of the 'antimony of taste' and an acute characterization of the distinction between Hume's approach to the topic of aesthetic judgement and Kant's.

The Spring 1985 number of this journal was a special issue to celebrate the occasion of Harold Osborne's eightieth birthday. Eva offered a paper, 'Towards the Aesthetic: A Journey with Friedrich Schiller', in which she drew a distinction between a 'pure' and an alternative tradition in aesthetics, a distinction which I, and my students, find illuminating and useful, particularly at this time when what the subject-matter of aesthetics is supposed to be is the subject of intense debate.

Many of us have cause to be grateful to Eva Schaper for acts of personal kindness but also for the intellectual enrichment which she brought to our lives. In her death we have as individuals and as a Society lost a good friend and a wise philosopher.

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THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF ANALYTIC AESTHETICS

Lars-Olof Åhlberg

INTRODUCTION

THE EXPRESSION 'analytic aesthetics' elicits two questions: 'What does "analytic" mean in this case?' and 'What is aesthetics?' Since the nature of *analytic* aesthetics is the main topic of my paper, I will content myself with a few introductory remarks about the scope of the term 'aesthetics'. There seem to be, roughly speaking, two main usages of the term prevalent in the artworld today. In the wide sense of the term, 'aesthetics' refers to all theoretical study of the arts; in a narrower usage, 'aesthetics' is used synonymously with 'philosophy of art'. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, for example, which has a pronounced philosophical and analytic profile, uses the term 'aesthetics' in the wide sense. It includes 'all studies of the arts and related types of experience from a philosophic, scientific, or other theoretical standpoint, including those of psychology, sociology, anthropology, cultural history, art criticism, and education'.[1]

Many philosophers, on the other hand, tend to identify aesthetics with the philosophy of art. To take a recent example, Anne Sheppard has entitled her introduction to the philosophy of art, *Aesthetics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art* (1987); and Joseph Margolis speaks in the introduction to his anthology *Philosophy Looks at the Arts* (1987) of 'the philosophy of art—or aesthetics'.[2] I think it is preferable to distinguish between aesthetics and the philosophy of art and *not* to use the expressions 'aesthetics' and 'philosophy of art' synonymously. According to this view the philosophy of art, or philosophical aesthetics, belongs to the wider field aesthetics but is not identical with it.

Since many of the writers I wish to discuss use 'aesthetics' and 'philosophy of art' synonymously, I will, for the sake of convenience, conform to their usage although I believe one should make a distinction between aesthetics and the philosophy of art.

My paper divides into two parts: in the first part I shall discuss the nature of analytic philosophy; the second part is devoted to two recent discussions of the nature of analytic aesthetics.

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CONCEPTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

Since analytical aesthetics, or analytical philosophy of art, is a form of analytical philosophy, the answer to the question what analytical aesthetics is depends on how we characterize analytical philosophy. There is, however, no unanimity about the nature of analytical philosophy, nor of course about the nature of philosophy. All these concepts are philosophically controversial; it would therefore be a mistake to regard them as innocuous labels. It is of course easy to give a stipulative definition of these terms, but that would be beside the point here.

A few years back, some students and teachers of philosophy at Oxford, dissatisfied with analytic philosophy as it is practised in England and America, decided to form a discussion group. The nature of analytic philosophy was naturally an important theme for them. Although they met regularly for three years they were—as they write in the preface to their book *The Need for Interpretation* (1983)—'unable to reach any consensus about just what analytical philosophy is'.[3] The lack of consensus was certainly not owing to any inability on their part to use the standard techniques of definition; they were unable to reach unanimity because the question about the nature of analytical philosophy is itself a philosophical issue.

Since the problem of the nature of philosophy is itself a philosophical problem, different approaches, activities and theories qualify or pass as philosophy. Consider, for example, Quine's remarks about the status of philosophy: 'Philosophy enjoys less firmness and conclusiveness than astrophysics, so that there is some lack of professional consensus as to what even qualifies as responsible philosophy. The astrologer's counterpart in philosophy can enjoy a professional standing such as the astrologer cannot.'[4] Quine obviously distinguishes between rational science and irrational pseudo-science and seems to think that an analogous distinction between rational scientific philosophy and irrational pseudo-scientific philosophy can be drawn, although, apparently irrational and pseudo-scientific philosophy often passes for philosophy. I think Quine underestimates the significance of this lack of consensus. I would also take exception to his view that there is a scientific philosophy that can neatly be distinguished from pseudo-scientific philosophy. Indeed the very idea of a scientific philosophy seems to me deeply problematic.

One way of characterizing a philosophical trend or tradition is to contrast it with a different trend or tradition. The French philosopher Pascal Engel, in the article 'Continental Insularity: Contemporary French Analytical Philosophy' (1987), describes the differences between analytical philosophy, conceived as a tradition and an attitude, and contemporary French philosophy as follows: Analytical philosophers believe that philosophy like science is a common enterprise, and that therefore philosophical theses are discussable and criticizable. Secondly, analytical philosophers are convinced that there can be prog-

ress in philosophy, although not in the same sense as in science. The third characteristic of analytical philosophy is, according to Engel, the belief that philosophy can and should be conducted as a professional and specialized discipline. In sum, one can make worthwhile contributions to philosophy without being a genius. These beliefs and attitudes which resemble what rather loosely could be called 'the academic and scientific attitude', Engel regards as 'rationalistic' in a wide sense. Not all analytical philosophers share this rationalistic attitude, but most of them accept it as a regulative idea, Engel claims.[5] In contemporary French philosophy the dominant attitudes towards philosophy are very different. They are often, Engel says, 'the very reverse of the analytical attitude'.[6] Philosophy is viewed as a solitary enterprise; secondly there is the conviction that progress in philosophy is impossible, since philosophy resembles literature more than science, 'and the use of argument is more a matter of rhetoric and eloquence than a matter of logic and truth', as he puts it.[7] And finally there is the belief, that '[t]here can only be geniüses in philosophy, giants of thought'.[8] If this latter attitude is as widespread as Engel says it is, many French philosophers have reason to worry. A consequence of these attitudes is that French philosophers think that 'it is better to have a great number of confused ideas than to have a small number of clear ideas',[9] as Engel puts it a little maliciously.

This characterization is obviously not exhaustive or very exact. It might even be thought, as Engel himself realizes, that he has given a malevolent caricature of French philosophy. Although he admits that 'the expression of those beliefs is far more subtle and sophisticated', he insists that '[a]s a matter of fact, many prominent French philosophers have held such beliefs quite literally, and far from being ashamed of them, they are quite proud of these opinions, which are for them the expression of their passionate fight against what they take to be the tyranny of reason itself'.[10] Be that as it may, the general picture he draws of the philosophical climate in France is, as far as I can see, not entirely off the mark. He gives a vivid picture of the difference in atmospheric pressure between the traditions of analytical philosophy and French philosophy.

The rationalistic attitude in a wide sense implies an openness to criticism and a willingness to revise one's opinions and theories in the face of justified criticism. This attitude coupled with the conviction that the construction of a philosophical system is very risky, if not altogether impossible, accounts partly for the analytical philosophers' predilection for piecemeal analyses. In consequence the philosophical paper or essay has become the analytical genre *par excellence*. In the world of analytical philosophy the journals play as important a role as book-length studies.

Critics of analytical philosophy often claim that the rationalistic attitude characteristic of analytical philosophy precludes philosophical visions and creative thinking. Analytical philosophers are consequently preoccupied with

trivialities and pseudo-problems. The Polish—American philosopher Henryk Skolimowski, for example, who has been converted from analytical philosophy to something he calls 'eco-philosophy', a metaphysically and religiously grounded worldview, maintains that '[p]resent analytical philosophy is an embodiment of the positivist ethos, which is based on the cult of technique and the avoidance of problems'.[11] Skolimowski thinks that the problems contemporary analytical philosophy concerns itself with such as the problem of 'sense' and 'reference', were once real and interesting. With Frege, Russell, Lesniewski and Tarski, however, 'the creative aspects of the problem have been explored and exhausted', he says.[12] Skolimowski takes, I think, an unduly narrow view of analytical philosophy. Formal semantics and analysis based on the calculus conception of language is just one trend, albeit an influential one, in contemporary analytical philosophy.

Respect for clarity and consistency do not preclude visionary and rhetorical power, as is shown in the work of philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Austin, Quine and Popper, or Goodman, Wollheim and Danto. It could be objected that Wittgenstein is not a typical analytical philosopher or that he is not an analytical philosopher at all. The problems and questions with which he struggled in both his early and his late philosophy stem from the analytical tradition. Moreover, Wittgenstein's thinking is closer to the analytical tradition than to any other contemporary movement.

Respect for logic and argument and the high value set on clarity are perhaps the most general features of analytical philosophy. The very possibility of a philosophy based on these attitudes or principles is denied by many contemporary philosophers and theorists outside the analytical tradition. Consider, for example, the following résumé of Gianni Vattimo's thinking given by his English translator:

> [N]ihilism attacks rationality wherever it is encountered, whether in science, philosophy or art, since the concepts of 'reason' and 'truth' are entirely interdependent in the tradition of Western metaphysical thought. The project of nihilism is to unmask all systems of reason as systems of persuasion, and to show that logic—the very basis of rational metaphysical thought—is in fact only a kind of rhetoric.[13]

Vattimo, who is regarded by some as one of the most important post-modernist thinkers, opposes his own so called 'weak thought' to metaphysical thinking.

The view that philosophy as a rational enterprise is impossible today is widespread among post-modernist theorists. This belief is usually based on the conviction that philosophy proper is and remains metaphysics. And since metaphysical and foundational thinking has lost all credibility and legitimacy, philosophy is impossible, according to this conception.

Here is an example of this attitude to philosophy and philosophizing. The tradition of philosophy is closed, declares the French philosopher Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. He asserts that,

> after the thesis of being, in which philosophizing has its essence, had irreversibly become a thesis on being as thesis, all the theses which succeeded it . . . have been engulfed in the will to a thesis in which has more and more clearly manifested itself the impossibility of any thesis other than the thesis, thus condemning the will to desire nothing other than its own thesis.[14]

Not surprisingly Lacoue-Labarthe arrives at the conclusion that '[p]hilosophy is finished/finite (*La philosophie est finie*); its limit is uncrosssable'; that means, he says, that 'we can no longer—and we can only—do philosophy, possessing as we do no other language and having not the slightest notion of what "thinking" might mean outside of "philosophizing"'.[15] If philosophy in some sense is impossible it has apparently been so for a long time, since Lacoue-Labarthe claims that 'Husserl's [work is] in spite of—or rather because of—its claim to be a "science", doubtless . . . not, properly speaking, a philosophy'.[16] What is and what is not a philosophy according to this writer is not easy to determine; in any case I am sure all analytical philosophy, since it cannot be said to concern itself with being as thesis, however conceived, would not be regarded as philosophy. Those who think that philosophy is impossible and proclaim the end of philosophy think that philosophy worthy of the name must be systematic and metaphysical.

This presupposition comes out clearly in Fredric Jameson's thoughts on what he calls 'contemporary theory'. Jameson thinks that the dissolution of previously unquestioned boundaries and taxonomies is manifest not only in the arts but also in the field of theory. In his article 'Postmodernism and Consumer Society' (1983) Jameson is primarily concerned with the nature of the so-called 'postmodern condition' and the role of theory. 'A generation ago', he says, 'there was still a technical discourse of professional philosophy . . . alongside which one could still distinguish that quite different discourse of the other academic disciplines—of political science, for example, or sociology or literary criticism'.[17] Things have changed, he maintains, and today 'we have a kind of writing simply called "theory" which is all or none of those things at once'.[18] This new kind of theoretical discourse 'is becoming widespread and marks the end of philosophy as such', Jameson concludes.[19]

If we are to believe Jameson, most if not all, social and human sciences as well as philosophy, have merged into so-called 'theoretical discourse'. It is of course true that there are 'discourses' that consciously attempt to transcend the customary and partly conventional barriers between various intellectual disciplines. These discourses can indeed be seen as manifestations of post-modernism. But Jameson's belief that this is a dominant or even a widespread tendency is mistaken. What is true of some humanities departments in

America and some British literature departments is certainly not true of all universities in Western and Eastern Europe. Moreover, Jameson is guilty of a curious equivocation when he speaks of 'the end of philosophy'. For the technical discourses of professional philosophy include according to him 'the great systems of Sartre or the phenomenologists, the work of Wittgenstein or analytical or common language philosophy'.[20] When he claims that the new theoretical discourse 'marks the end of philosophy as such' he obviously thinks that 'the great systems of Sartre', etc., are philosophy as such—a quite indefensible view. There is no philosophy as such and when Jameson implies that there is no analytical philosophy any more, this is wishful thinking on his part.

Because of these fundamental misconceptions and confusions about both the nature of analytical philosophy and the philosophical situation at large a fruitful exchange or even a confrontation with the proponents of this new theoretical discourse is difficult, if not impossible. Equally indefensible is the view expressed by the American deconstructionist literary theorist Hillis Miller that '[i]t's a manifest fact that a great deal of the real philosophy that's been taught recently has been taught out of Philosophy departments'.[21] In view of this it is easy to understand why recent anthologies in the theory of literature, claiming to cover contemporary work and contemporary positions in the theory of literature, do not contain any contributions from analytical aestheticians and philosophers of literature.[22] This also explains why there is so little exchange between literary theorists and analytical aestheticians. As a final example of the lack of communication between continentally inspired 'theory' and analytical aesthetics I quote the characterization of aesthetics given by David Carroll in his book *Paraesthetics* (1987). He asserts that 'aesthetics implies the establishment of a theory of art and literature or the application of a general theory to the area of art'.[23] The objectives of much analytical aesthetics have in fact been the very opposite to this.

In a number of articles Richard Shusterman discusses post-structuralist and deconstructionist theory and tries to find some common ground between the concerns of analytical aesthetics and deconstruction. To my knowledge there has been no response from the other side.[24]

THE NATURE OF ANALYTIC AESTHETICS

The remainder of my paper centres on two publications, whose theme is the nature and limits of analytic aesthetics. They are the collection of essays, *Analytic Aesthetics* (1989), edited by Shusterman, and the book, *Analytische Philosophie der Kunst* (Analytic Philosophy of Art) (1988), by the German philosopher Karlheinz Lüdeking.[25]

The question Shusterman attempts to answer is whether there is 'a distinctive analytic movement, method, or even style in aesthetics'.[26] Shusterman thinks, not surprisingly, that we can legitimately speak of 'analytic aesthetics' although it is not so easy to say what it is. One reason for this difficulty is that

'it remains a developing and valued tradition of thought, and as such its very nature . . . will be essentially contested'.[27] One might say that characterizing analytic aesthetics is not a purely descriptive task; there is a normative aspect to it as well.

Shusterman singles out no less than ten traits he regards as characteristic of analytic aesthetics. He first reminds us that 'analytic aesthetics is a consequence . . . of the twentieth-century analytic approach to philosophy introduced by Moore and Russell', adding that '[p]robably all analytic philosophers would agree with Russell's claim that analysis rather than the construction of philosophical systems is the major aim of philosophy'.[28] If the conception of philosophy as analysis implies that philosophy is exclusively a second-order discipline consisting of logical and conceptual analysis of first-order discourse in science, morals, etc., Shusterman's characterization of Russell and Moore is somewhat misleading. The constructive strain in both Moore and Russell is quite strong.

Russell was probably the first to speak of logical analysis as the method of philosophy, but method is one thing, and what you do with it another. In *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) Russell wrote that '[t]he knowledge [philosophy] aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences'.[29]

Although both Russell and Moore were critical of traditional metaphysics, and analytical philosophy generally speaking is hostile to metaphysical thinking, it is not unreasonable to construe some explicitly anti-metaphysical philosophical projects as metaphysical in nature. Hilary Putnam, for example, points out that the 'attempts by Frege, Russell, Carnap, and the early Wittgenstein [which] were called "attacks on metaphysics", . . . were among the most ingenious, profound, and technically brilliant constructions of metaphysical systems ever achieved'.[30] Nevertheless, it is true that analytic aesthetics developed in opposition to speculative philosophies of art, in particular to the idealist aesthetics of Croce and Collingwood. It is also true that the notion of aesthetics as a second-order discipline was of paramount importance to pioneers of analytic aesthetics such as Beardsley and Weitz.

Shusterman says that '[a]nti-essentialism about art and the quest for clarity (especially through close concern with language) are perhaps the most common and distinctive features of analytic aesthetics'.[31] A similar view is expressed in Anita Silvers's contribution to the discussion on the nature of analytic aesthetics.[32] Lüdeking goes even further. He takes, wrongly in my opinion, anti-essentialism to be one of the definitional criteria of analytic aesthetics. Traditional aesthetics is essentialist, says Lüdeking; its principal aim is to elucidate the nature of art and of the aesthetic experience. Essentialists believe in the possibility and desirability of general theories and definitions stating the necessary and jointly sufficient properties of the phenomena under investigation. Although anti-essentialism has been widespread among analytic

aestheticians, I don't think anti-essentialism should be regarded as a defining characteristic of analytic aesthetics.

Lüdeking chooses Harold Osborne and Monroe C. Beardsley as representatives of traditional aesthetics and consequently he considers them to be non-analytic aestheticians. Shusterman, who seems to take a similar stand, realizes of course that Beardsley cannot be described as an anti-essentialist in the sense that term has acquired in the philosophy of art. He admits that 'Beardsley . . . might seem an exception to this', that is, to the thesis that analytic aestheticians are anti-essentialists, and he also says that 'Danto . . . seems to embrace some sort of essentialism'.[33] If two of the most well-known analytic aestheticians are not anti-essentialists, analytical aesthetics cannot be anti-essentialist by definition. Shusterman should not have accepted anti-essentialism as a criterion of analytic aesthetics. There are as a matter of fact several other aestheticians than those already referred to, who reject anti-essentialism, but who in spite of this cannot be described as non-analytic. Mary Mothersill, for example, explicitly rejects what she calls the anti-essentialism of the 'anti-theorists',[34] but her work is analytic if anything is.

There are grave difficulties in analysing analytical philosophy and a fortiori analytical aesthetics in terms of common doctrines or theses. Some analytic philosophers are realists about knowledge, others espouse some kind of anti-realism. There are relativists as well as anti-relativists in the theory of knowledge. In the philosophy of science both methodological monism and pluralism have their defenders. In moral philosophy the variety of doctrines espoused by analytic philosophers is equally great: there are the classical emotivists, the prescriptivists and the cognitivists. In aesthetics there are intentionalists as well as anti-intentionalists, formalists as well as anti-formalists. In spite of the diversity of theoretical commitments and attitudes among analytic philosophers, there could, of course, still be a common denominator uniting all analytical philosophers and aestheticians, although this common element could not be found at the level of theories and doctrines. The methods used and a certain philosophical style might be the common elements we are looking for.

Whatever analytic aesthetics is, it is analysis of some kind, and the purpose of analysis is to achieve clarity. Shusterman goes on to distinguish between two kinds of conceptual analysis in aesthetics. In constructive analysis the objective is to reshape vague and ambiguous concepts and to reconstruct them. The foremost representative of this brand of analysis is Nelson Goodman. The second form of analysis wants to be faithful to the actual use of concepts in the aesthetic field and aims at a clarificatory overview. Rather than improve our concepts, the goal is to clarify through description. The second kind of analysis could be called 'descriptive' and 'pragmatic'. Morris Weitz is perhaps the best known practitioner of this approach.

Most analytic aestheticians share the quest for clarity and the belief that the

methods of conceptual and linguistic analysis will achieve this end. But what is clarity? In 1954 Nelson Goodman wrote that 'in the absence of any convenient and reliable criterion of what is clear, the individual thinker can only search his philosophic conscience'.[35] And consider what the American aesthetician Arnold Isenberg said in the programmatic article 'Analytical Philosophy and the Study of Art', published in 1950: '[N]obody has a clear idea of what an analysis is'.[36] He further claimed that '[e]very feature of the [analytic] method has become controversial'.[37] In particular it is not clear what the object of a philosophical analysis is. Is it, Isenberg asks, words, thoughts, meanings, judgements or propositions? Many other questions could be asked about the objects and objectives of analysis. It is, however, quite evident that the lack of consensus regarding the goals and methods of philosophical analysis is as great today as ever. A consequence of this is that many methods and techniques that differ considerably from one another are all rightly called 'analytic'.

I have already said that Lüdeking's criteria of analytic aesthetics lead to the absurdity of regarding Osborne and Beardsley as non-analytic aestheticians. Beardsley's *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (1958) is one of the first sustained efforts, on the part of an analytic philosopher, to cover systematically philosophical problems in the arts and like Osborne, who served as editor of *The British Journal of Aesthetics* from 1960 to 1977, he pursued the analysis of art and the aesthetic in the spirit of the classical tradition of analytic philosophy. Göran Hermerén's view that analytic aesthetics consists of 'several broad contemporary traditions, drawing inspiration from as diverse sources as Husserl, Frege, Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein, Austin and others, including Beardsley, Goodman, Sibley and Weitz seems to me reasonable. I also agree that Beardsley and Weitz are among the 'main figures in this tradition',[39] the tradition of analytic aesthetics.

According to Lüdeking analytic aestheticians, in addition to being anti-essentialists, believe that the concept of art is a purely descriptive concept, or rather that there is a descriptive use of the term 'art' which it is the task of the aesthetician to analyse and describe. No analytic aesthetician can, according to him, both be an anti-essentialist and also believe that the concept of art is primarily an evaluative concept. Yet there are philosophers who have thought so, and they cannot be regarded as other than analytical aestheticians. In the essay 'Are Bad Works of Art "Works of Art"?' (1973) Cyril Barrett defends the view that the conept of art is basically an evaluative concept and so does W. B. Gallie in his paper 'Art as an Essentially Contested Concept' (1956).[40] Gallie maintains that the history of the concept of art 'discloses a growing recognition of the fact that the word "art" is most usefully employed, not as a descriptive term standing for certain indicatable properties, but as an appraisive term accrediting a certain kind of achievement'.[41]

Lüdeking arrives at the conclusion that analytic philosophy of art, in wishing to analyse a purely descriptive concept of art, has set itself a task that

cannot be solved. He criticizes Morris Weitz for turning 'the respectable maxim that philosophers should come up with a purely descriptive theory of the concept of art' into the quite different maxim that they should 'formulate a theory of a purely descriptive concept of art'.[42]

If there is no purely descriptive concept of art and no purely descriptive use of the term 'art', then of course the programme is in for trouble. Lüdeking thinks that Weitz has given an analysis of the concept of art that is empirically inadequate, since it is not the case that new works of art are deemed to be works of art in virtue of family resemblances with works that already *are* works of art. On the contrary, the criteria for deciding whether something is a work of art or not are evaluative according to Lüdeking. I am attracted to this view, but I certainly do not think that accepting it necessitates the rejection of analytical aesthetics as Lüdeking thinks.

It has been argued that the avoidance of evaluative issues and the concentration on the purely descriptive use of the term 'art', if there is such a use, is one of the weaknesses of analytic aesthetics. Other complaints concern the ahistorical character of analytic aesthetics as well as the neglect of the social context of art.[43] These criticisms are justified to a certain extent, but I cannot see that the 'isolationist' character of much analytical writing on art is an inherent trait in the analytic approach. An analytical theory, such as George Dickie's institutional theory of art, seems, in fact, to demand that we take the discussions of art occurring in the artworld seriously.

According to Dickie something is an art work if it satisfies the following conditions: It must be an artefact and it must have acquired 'the conferred status of candidate for appreciation'.[44] This status can be conferred on any object whatsoever by anyone who is a member of the artworld. As critics of the institutional theory such as Terry Diffey and Richard Wollheim have stressed, the interesting question is *why* something is accorded the status of art, *why* something is a work of art.[45] If we try to answer this question, we must investigate the evaluations prevalent at a certain moment in a certain corner of the artworld. We will then perhaps discover that something becomes a work of art, and is accepted as a work of art by certain sections of the artworld, because the work is believed to have artistic value.

Dickie's discussion of art is rather antiseptic, and the neglect of the real artworld and its problems is obvious. His discussion of Marcel Duchamp's ready-mades is a case in point. Although Duchamp himself wrote about his ready-mades and also had interesting things to say about the concept of art, Dickie does not pay any attention to his writings. Duchamp's ready-mades have fascinated analytic aestheticians perhaps more than any other works of modern art because of the conceptual challenge they seem to present. Very few have shown any interest in the actual circumstances of the production of these ready-mades.

It seems to me that interest in the question of defining art has diminished in

recent years, although it has been at the centre of the discussion for the last two decades. This may be a sign of change in attitude and perspective on the part of analytic aestheticians. I do not know if Richard Wollheim's treatise, *Painting as an Art* (1987), will inspire others to do similar work, but his work is certainly different from much previous work in the analytic tradition.

Aesthetics, construed as meta-aesthetics is, as Nicholas Wolterstorff points out, 'to place it at a remove from the phenomena of art and the aesthetic'.[46] The excessive interest in the anatomy of the concept of art is a result of this conception and Wolterstorff, whose own writings are not notable for their wit and humour, says with some justice that '[f]or sheer boringness, the results of these endeavors have few peers'.[47] Boringness, however, is no crime and certainly no criterion of falsehood; think of sex manuals for example. The Cambridge philosopher C. D. Broad said a long time ago, that aesthetics is 'boring and . . . largely bogus'.[48] If we compare Broad's statement with Wolterstorff's assessment, we might agree that there has been some progress.

The clarification of concepts remains an important task for the philosopher of art, but clarity certainly is not enough. I would like to think that clarity, consistency and depth are not mutually exclusive. The best works of analytic aesthetics exhibit these virtues, they increase our understanding of art and enhance our appreciation of works of art, and that, after all should be the goal of the whole endeavour.[49]

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ART HISTORICAL VALUE

Alan H. Goldman

I

BOTH METAPHYSICAL and epistemological issues regarding aesthetic or artistic value centre on the question of objectivity. Metaphysically minded aestheticians want to know the degree to which such value is a function of properties inherent in art works themselves, while epistemologists ask whether evaluations of art works are a matter of pure subjective taste or whether there exist grounds that might generate universal agreement among these evaluations. These questions are related but distinct. Artistic value might reduce to or supervene on relations among art works or between art works and other phenomena without being relative to particular tastes of evaluating subjects. In that case value would not be intrinsic to single works, but there might nevertheless be grounds for agreement in evaluations.

These questions arise in an acute way in regard to a particular kind of artistic value, that which derives from the place of an art work in a historical sequence or set of aesthetic traditions. There can be no doubt that some works are valuable and highly regarded because they strongly influence the development of a style, foreshadow much later developments in art, bring an existing tradition or set of aesthetic ideals to its conclusion or ultimate fruition, or alter the course of art history. Especially when a work is historically important mainly because of its relation to later works, the question immediately arises whether this importance could be determined by properties of the work itself, whether the artists could claim credit for this value of their creations. But, as we shall see, even aesthetic properties that do not themselves appear to consist in or include historical relations, properties such as grace or beauty, generate similar questions when their ascriptions by knowledgeable critics change over the course of time and in the face of later artistic developments.

Those philosophers who have addressed this topic recently tend to conceive it in somewhat different terms. Arthur Danto conceives the issue in epistemic terms, speaking of properties of art works and events that can be known only in retrospect (which he calls 'narrative properties').[1] Anita Silvers thinks in metaphysical terms, claiming that value-relevant properties of art works themselves change over time as later works are created. She uses the example of Rubens's figures, coarse at the time he painted them but later recognized as elegant, after acceptance of figures such as those of Picasso. According to her, we cannot say that critics of Rubens's time mistook

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elegance for its opposite, and so we must hold instead that the property in question changed.[2]

An example of a change in the opposite direction, probably more typical if less noted, would be the musical compositions of the earliest Classicists, which sounded graceful at the time but were later revealed by Mozart's perfect grace to be rather awkward and groping. To say, as Danto would, that their awkwardness could only be heard in retrospect, and to leave it at that, seems to imply that the compositions were graceful and awkward at the same time (when they were created), which seems contradictory. At least it seems to imply this contradiction if the ascription of grace to the works of the Mannheim School by contemporary critics was not simply mistaken. To say it was mistaken is to say that these contemporaries should have foreseen Mozart or that their mistake was inevitable given their ignorance. But if Mozart had never composed, would they have still been mistaken? Must critics conceive of every possible ideal composer and piece in order to make correct evaluations? This would be an impossible standard to meet. But we cannot say here either that the tastes of critics simply changed, since in fact a taste for music in the classical style remained constant. Finally, Silvers's alternative description, the claim that the aesthetic properties of the earlier compositions changed when the later compositions appeared, seems to appeal to backward causation or sheer magic.

The metaphysically more conservative aesthetician will maintain that value-relevant properties must inhere in works from the time of their creation even when those properties only come to be noticed or appreciated later in light of further artistic developments.[3] Taking this stand, the contradiction seemingly involved in saying that the works of Stamitz were both awkward and graceful at the time he composed them (although their awkwardness could only be noticed in light of Mozart's more graceful compositions) might be avoided by claiming that they were awkward in some respects and graceful in others. The problem here lies in specifying the distinct respects, since the same passages sounded graceful before Mozart and awkward after him. It is far more natural to recognize grace as a relational or relative property presupposing some standard, such as the property of tallness or shortness in persons. Assuming a standard measure, say feet, height may seem to be an intrinsic property of persons, but a person is tall or short only relative to others. If we say the same of aesthetic properties such as gracefulness, then we must admit that many or most value relevant aesthetic properties are relational in the same way.

The advantage of this position is that it enables us to understand how aesthetic properties of works change over time without appeal to backward causation or magic. Relations change when new elements of the relations come into existence even when the original elements remain the same. A difficulty arises from a difference between properties such as gracefulness on the proposed account and properties such as height. While a tall person in 1300 might

be short in 1950, the standard measures still allow us to know just what height that person is. But in the case of aesthetic properties there seem to be no standard measures that allow us to know at any given time just how graceful or elegant a piece of music is.

It could be claimed that each work retains whatever degree of grace or awkwardness it has when created even though we have no convenient way to specify that degree. But this claim would still presuppose some unspecified standard, and the question remains what that standard could be. Is grace in music to be measured in relation to Mozart's compositions (even before he wrote them) or in terms of what might ideally have been written in the style of the piece under consideration? This demand on critics to be ideal composers themselves is clearly so stringent as to result in full scepticism in regard to correct evaluations. Leaving the standard completely unspecified is epistemically no better. The third and most natural alternative, allowing the standard for measuring grace or other value-relevant properties to change over time as new compositions appear more or less graceful than earlier ones, may seem to leave us still no better off, since it seems that we could then never be sure that future compositions would not falsify our present ascriptions of these properties. It appears then that the best we could do to approach objectivity would be to relativize explicitly ascriptions of value-relevant properties to standards operative at a time, recognizing that new relevant standards will likely emerge in the future.

The historical context for evaluation may not be so bleak, however. First, as time passes we may become more confident that developed standards applied to works of earlier eras will not alter with future developments. This appeal to the test of time remains to be assessed. Second, different styles and traditions of musical composition and painting establish different goals and ideals for artists who work within them. These ideals provide their own standards of evaluation applicable to works within those styles and traditions. Most to the point here, it may be possible at least in retrospect to establish the historical culminations of particular styles and hence be confident that measures of value-relevant properties implicit in the stylistic ideals will not be supplanted. The pure classical style of composition could not improve upon or even extend beyond Mozart. Prokofiev much later could only mimic that style, albeit beautifully, in his first symphony. Hence it seems perfectly safe to measure the value-relevant aesthetic properties of works in that style against now well entrenched if historically relative standards.

II

Before pursuing this line of argument we need to note a further possible difficulty for the objectivist. Thus far we have pointed only to relations among art works themselves as pertinent to ascriptions of value-relevant properties to

single works. This allows for objective if temporally shifting standards for evaluations. The status of such standards does not change when we consider more obviously historical properties such as influencing later artistic movements or developments. So far our problem lies still in the extent to which we may be unable to predict those future movements that might render past works more or less valuable. But it is a short step from recognition of the effects of later works in altering standards for evaluating earlier ones to the claim that the value of works is a function of those narratives that particular art historians devise to classify certain earlier works with certain later ones. If, as is the case, such narratives are original and peculiar to particular art historians, and if evaluation of works depends on their incorporation into one such narrative or another, then such evaluation becomes subjective and not simply historically relative.

Art-historical narratives of the same time-spans differ not only because historians can pick and choose different causal sequences for emphasis, but more emphatically because real causal connections do not seem necessary in order for works or artists of different periods to be related in narratives. It was not necessary for Giotto causally to influence the work of Cézanne for Post-Impressionist critics of formalist bent to see him as a prophet of formalist ideals and to elevate his reputation at so late a time. El Greco stands in a similar relation to twentieth-century expressionist painting according to some art historians' narratives, and again the question whether modern expressionists intentionally sought to extend El Greco's artistic ideals (or those of artists directly influenced by him) seems beside the point. Of course, even if historians had to establish a case for actual influence through some chain of artists' intentions as a basis for their narratives, there would remain much room for diverse narratives, since causal relations spread almost ubiquitously and evidence for intentions is generally sketchy and indirect in any case. But without any pretext of this constraint on art-historical narratives, it may seem yet clearer that selection of art works for inclusion in narratives, and hence for ascription of art-historical value, depends mainly on the interests and tastes of the historians.

In a recent book David Carrier draws such radical conclusions from a convincing survey of vastly different interpretations of the same works in different periods of art criticism.[4] He argues that once critics give up the Quixotic search for artists' intentions, philosophers must settle for critical consensus at a time as the sole criterion for truth in art-historical narratives or interpretations. At least such consensus alone establishes the standards for criticism in terms of which truth or plausibility must be judged. Carrier not only endorses the claim that aesthetic properties of works change with later developments in art, but allows that properties such as a work's containing symbolism change as the result of later criticism. According to him, prior to modern criticism Piero della Francesca's paintings contained no iconography

and van Eyck was only a great naturalist.[5] Now their paintings look different, in relation not only to later works, but to later critics.

It was noted above that relational properties of works will naturally alter when new elements of the relations emerge in later works, and that some properties that may not intuitively seem relational in this sense, such as gracefulness, turn out to be so. It still may not appear, however, that a property such as containing symbolic content falls into this category, or that critics or interpreters can alter a work's properties. But whether or not a work does contain symbolism is a matter of its correct interpretation. I have argued elsewhere that the goal of interpreting art works is to maximize their artistic value for contemporary audiences, and that aiming at this goal can result in equally acceptable but incompatible interpretations that maximize different sets of artistic values.[6] This means that works contain symbolic content only relative to interpretative strategies and tastes for certain sorts of artistic values at a time. A thesis close to Carrier's is vindicated, given my theory of interpretation.

But the theory fails to show that critics themselves can change properties of works. It implies by contrast that consensus among critics is not the only criterion for acceptable interpretation. Critics must explain those coloured shapes they encounter on canvases prior to interpretation in such a way as to maximize the paintings' values. But to enhance values in this way interpretations must be plausible as explanations, and to be plausible they must satisfy certain constraints. When those values derive from the places of paintings in art-historical sequences, there is a constraint mentioned earlier that may be weaker than fidelity to artists' intentions but is certainly stronger than mere adherence to current critical fashions. I refer again to the development of artistic styles that define and sometimes span art-historical periods. Plausible histories must make plausible cases for real stylistic, if not causal, relations among the paintings they connect in their narratives.

Danto's depiction of art history as a series of narratives reflects the fact that styles develop in ways similar to Aristotle's description of good plot developments in tragedy.[7] In both cases later stages in retrospect seem implicit in or necessitated by earlier, even though they cannot be predicted in advance and hence seem novel and exciting when they occur. That such sequences appear logically necessary from later viewpoints means that they constitute real if not wholly objective constraints on art-historical narratives. They are not wholly objective, because the order of such sequences is specified in psychological and aesthetic rather than in physical, causal terms. As Danto points out with only slight hyperbole, beginnings, endings, and turning points are not in the world, but in human stories. Nevertheless, the constraints are real because those ideals established early in the developments of styles, which remain internal to them and constitutive of them, may be unquestionably fulfilled later on.[8] The modern historian of music, and even the moderately knowledgeable listener,

K.P. 1699

cannot help but view the music of Stamitz as a precursor to that of Mozart and hear and judge it in that light. To whomever else Stamitz may be connected in some future and presently unexpected narrative, he will always be connected to Mozart as well.

In virtue of this constraint, the art-historical properties of a set of works may more firmly entrench their evaluative status than their (seemingly) non-historical properties. To take a somewhat unlikely example, we cannot now know that there will not come a time when Beethoven's powerful forms of expression are perceived as simply offensive (isolated critics of considerable renown have described his music as strident or raucous before). But his place in musical history as one who stretched the expressive power of the classical forms to their limits and, along with Weber and a few other composers, formed the transition to romanticism is none the less perfectly secure. This place cannot now be altered, even though Beethoven was not the father of romanticism when he composed and before others extended the new style into a tradition. We need not speculate about the uncertain artistic future in order to make this point. Different times generate shifts in popular tastes even for the most strongly entrenched masters. Simplifying somewhat, troubled times may favour Beethoven, peaceful and prosperous times Mozart, and the turbulent and complex 1960s was a natural time for the popularity of Mahler to peak. But their music historical importance remains more constant. Similarly, whether or not twelve-tone compositions ever find real public acceptance, and whether or not they come to be perceived as expressive of various aesthetic qualities (in relation to works as yet to come), they must retain their place in the historical development of music theory.

If art historians then find rather than invent developmental patterns in art history (which is not to say that such patterns are accessible from every historical perspective), then correct evaluations of works at a given time, which depend partly on recognition of the historical places of the works, are not simply a matter of critical consensus at that time. Nor could they be. Only competent and knowledgeable critics could count towards establishing evaluative standards for acceptable narratives and the works they incorporate. But competent art historians are not simply those approved by other members of some group to which they belong. Instead, they are those who can recognize genuine historical developments when they find them. Similarly, gifted historians are not those who invent the most original narratives or connections among art works. They are those who find (and make plausible cases for) genuine stylistic relations across time where others saw only isolated artistic episodes.

Such relations, once recognized, add value to the works they connect because they enable us to understand features of the later works as logical developments from those of the earlier works. We value such understanding as a successful answer to the challenge to our cognitive powers presented by

many art works. Answering this challenge is part of the enjoyment we derive from the appreciation of art. It is one of the reasons why we study art history. But this source of value disappears if we take purported historical relations to be only clever fabrications of art historians, rather than being determined by (non-relational) properties of the works themselves. The genius of the historically orientated critic or interpreter is to maximize this value for us by revealing unexpected but unmistakable relations among works previously thought unconnected.

III

Real stylistic developments, culminations, deviations, variations, prophesies, all evident only in retrospect, help to explain why the test of time, famously defended by Hume as a criterion for artistic value, should be legitimate. If part of an art work's value derives from its place in an art-historical narrative, and if this place is evident only in retrospect, then only with the passage of time can we become certain of the security of such value. Hence the test of time is necessary for stable evaluations of historical importance or worth.

There are other explanations for the legitimacy of the test as well that relate to identifications of other value-relevant properties. First, whatever the aesthetic property, it seems it can be more readily identified on the basis of broader comparisons among art works. These comparisons can help to pick the property out across a broader variety of works within a style or variety of styles in which it might appear. To judge accurately gracefulness in classical music composition, for example, one had to await the ultimate instantiation of grace in that style in the music of Mozart. Second, with time initial infatuation with a style based on superficial but initially striking features it may possess will fade into a more sober judgement. The charm of a Fragonard, for example, is notoriously vulnerable to such a fate. With yet additional time and familiarity, only a substantial work can overcome the boredom that will infect perception of a lesser one. Third, given my view of interpretation, the passage of time will make available a greater variety of interpretations that can accentuate different sets of values that may be inherent in a work. This will allow a work that is misunderstood at first to receive a more informed and hence truer evaluation.[9]

These legitimations of the test of time may still be suspect to the degree to which, as Anita Silvers maintains, art history itself is constructed through the filter of current tastes. It is compatible with the claim that stylistic developments can be discerned independently of taste to admit that current preference determines which developments are emphasized in a given period, and hence which works have their status enhanced by inclusion in narratives. The influence of taste is perhaps most evident in cases, emphasized by Silvers, of artists' reputations rising and falling in roller coaster fashion instead of

showing continuous improvement or decline with the passage of time. Giotto was considered a great early naturalist during the Renaissance, a lesser naturalist later, and in the twentieth century a great formalist precursor of Cézanne. El Greco's fortunes similarly waxed and waned, to reiterate two notorious examples.

The realist view of art history defended above, focusing on ideals internal to particular styles and their fulfilments, need not depict such history writ large as one continuous Hegelian development in which each stage evolves in linear (or dialectical) fashion from the immediately preceding stage. It suffices that art history reveals a series of overlapping developments in which the same artists can play different roles depending on the stylistic context in which they are considered—for example, Giotto as naturalist or formalist, van Eyck as naturalist or allegorist. Such progressions can be found, not invented, still allowing much room for taste to select one or another for emphasis. And the reputations of various artists will rise or fall with such selection and with different rates of development and hence comparative bases in the different stylistic contexts.

The problem for the test of time posed by such irregular patterns of evaluations can be put in the form of an apparent inconsistency. If an artist is rated highly at t_1, considered mediocre at t_2, and considered first rate once more at t_3, then it looks inconsistent to hold that the judgement at t_2 is more trustworthy than that at t_1, and that the judgement at t_3 is likewise more accurate than that at t_2. Such claims would seem to imply that a low rating is more accurate than a high and a high rating more accurate than a low. Predictions of further fluctuations in the future make matters only worse for the stability and worth of the test of time. That test should seemingly depend on convergence over time of critical judgement, since it implies that judgement at any (significantly) later time is to be preferred to judgement at any earlier time. But there are numerous examples such as those cited above where convergence fails to occur over prolonged periods, or where it is upset after having seemed to be achieved.

From what has been said, however, we may infer several possible explanations for fluctuations in the evaluations of art works over time, explanations that differ in their implications regarding the legitimacy of the test of time. First, and least plausible, is the metaphysically most conservative claim that the value-relevant properties of art works remain constant from the time of their creation, although evaluations may of course be more or less informed and accurate. A proponent of such conservatism could maintain in the case described in the previous paragraph that the judgement at t_2 is indeed superior to that at t_1 and also that t_3's judgement is superior to t_2's by hypothesizing that the judgement at t_1 was only accidentally correct, or correct for the wrong reason, or in recognition of the wrong or less relevant property. Then the judgement at t_2 may be better informed than its predecessor. Even though the

former evaluates incorrectly, it may be the correct judgement in the absence of the information that emerges only later and warrants the judgement at t_3. This explanation removes the inconsistency from applying the test of time to the envisaged sequence, but it fails to legitimate the test without some assurance that future knowledge will not reveal current applications to be based on wrong reasons. (Perhaps all that is needed, however, is some assurance that this becomes less likely with the passage of time.)

Before turning once more to the sources of such assurance, I turn to other explanations for lack of convergence in evaluative judgements over time. The explanation considered above, while occasionally apt, is the least plausible in many cases of this sort because it ignores genuine changes in standards or changes in taste that can result from later artistic developments and result in altered evaluations. In regard to changes in standards for measuring the same properties (such as gracefulness) over time, we have seen that many such properties are really relational, although they may not seem intuitively to be so, and that the relations change with the creation of new works that (together with the old) instantiate them. Thus work A, originally perceived as graceful, may be awkward compared to a later work B, graceful again in relation to a still later C (accepted for its other admirable properties), and so on. Such fluctuations will again destabilize the test of time, but they may be mitigated by relativizing the ascriptions of such properties to particular styles that may be deemed complete (or completed) in retrospect. Grace in the classical style of music is easier to judge at this point than grace in atonal music. This fact attests to the relevance of the test of time. Furthermore, judgements regarding the gracefulness of various classical pieces remain secure even if, as now seems unlikely, new styles may emerge that seem to raise standards for grace across styles.

Changes in tastes for particular styles are a different matter still and explain additional fluctuations in reputations. They may be combined in some explanations with other changes in relational properties of works. Thus a work may be admired as a precursor to or early example of a favoured style that falls from favour, but the work may be reinstated as also having features of a style that emerges as dominant still later, and so on. Here taste must be admitted to influence directly the ascription of art-historical value to works. And this influence once more appears to destabilize the test of time, if there is neither stability nor linear progression in tastes over history. But the negative implications of non-linear changes in taste for the legitimacy of the test of time can themselves once more be partially negated by our earlier recognition that historical importance as a work that helped to shape a stylistic tradition that dominated for a substantial period may be secure even when the style is no longer favoured. As noted earlier, the works of the first romantics retain historical value in periods of anti-romantic reaction.

IV

A brief summary of conclusions may be helpful at this stage. I have recommended one strategy for stabilizing evaluations of art works over time and have defended a factual claim regarding stability as well. The strategy is to relativize ascriptions of non-historical but historically relative properties to particular styles and artistic ideals internal to them. This has two stabilizing effects. The first is to immunize the judgements to a large extent from the diverging influences of different tastes. One can recognize a work as good of its kind, as having properties that fulfil the ideals of a style, even when one does not favour that kind or style of work. The second effect results from the fact that styles can be completed, their ideals fulfilled, which immunizes their internal standards from further alteration in light of later works.

The factual claim concerns explicitly historical properties, such as influencing developments or traditions in art. Such relational properties themselves remain stable once established and once more ground evaluations largely independently of taste. Taste may be important in motivating the search for certain historical connections, but once these have been discovered and a plausible case made for them, the importance they confer on the works they relate is relatively secure. Stylistic connections between earlier and later works may also be more or less difficult to detect. Detection of previously undetected connections can cause evaluations to fluctuate, although such connections remain stable once conclusively established.

Advocating this strategy and pointing to this fact do not completely exhaust responses to the radical revisionist, who can find no ground for stable evaluations over time. Indeed, both of these responses can be extended beyond their presently indicated limitations. In regard to the strategy, recognition of artistic ideals implicit in styles need not always require relativizing ascriptions of value-relevant properties to single stylistic movements. Certain ideals initially defined by particular artists or styles continue to be pursued in later styles as well, and comparisons that span movements are therefore fitting. We can say with some confidence, for example, that the ideal in baroque music of emotional expression was in some ways surpassed in the classical and romantic styles, but that the ideal of creating intricate and clearly audible counterpoint was not. Such judgements allow for considerable stability in certain evaluations that do not relativize aesthetic properties to single styles. The extent of this stability may vary, however, with the probability that future movements will alter the inter-stylistic standards implicitly invoked. But critics may be able to judge that probability in light of the degree to which the ideals in question appear to have been fulfilled in the course of art-historical development up to their time.

A main point of both the relativizing strategy and the emphasis on the stability of stylistic connections once established is to secure the ascription of

artistic value against the vagaries of changing tastes over time. But changes in taste need not themselves always be destabilizing. Tastes can improve or grow more sophisticated with broader appreciation of and comparisons among more diverse styles. Indeed, a further defence of the test of time not previously emphasized here appeals to the tendency with broader exposure over time to a greater variety of works for just such improvement. The claim that there is such a tendency needs itself to be defended, first by supporting a more basic claim that some tastes are better than others.

A full defence of the latter thesis is beyond our scope here. I have made a partial attempt elsewhere.[10] Part of what stands in its way is recognition of the lack of principles for evaluating art works, rules that would link objective properties of works with positive or negative values and hence proper evaluations. But in the absence of such hard rules, we can still make sound generalizations about the sorts of properties—formal, representational, symbolic, expressive, and historical—that tend to ground artistic value when it materializes. Taste based on broader experience of a greater variety of artistic movements and methods, capable of appreciating formal structure, expressive nuance, symbolic content, or historical import that earlier critics could not grasp, is better for the deeper enjoyment and appreciation of aesthetic value it expresses. This is not to say that a favourable evaluation of a work is always to be preferred as expressive of greater enjoyment, since appreciation of works that do not deserve it can block deeper enjoyments from appreciation of more worthy works. It is to say, however, that taste capable of such deeper enjoyment is better, and also that such taste tends to develop over time with broader exposure to diverse styles and works.

We have now added to our list yet another possible explanation for variations in evaluations over time. Evaluations may vary not only because objective properties of old works may be newly discovered, because relational properties or standards may alter with new artistic developments, because new interpretations may alter our understanding of older works, because historical connections among styles and works may be hard to detect and therefore late in being discovered, but also because tastes may become more sophisticated, tiring of the superficial and coming to appreciate the more subtle and difficult works. None of these explanations except the second should threaten a convergence over time of educated opinion that would support appeal to the test of time as a criterion of artistic value. In regard to the second, the strategy of relativizing evaluations to styles, or now groups of styles, is in part to mitigate the effects of changing standards.

But in the end we must recognize also, as Hume, an early advocate of the test of time, recognized, that tastes may vary at any level, from the most naïve to the most sophisticated. Some variations in evaluations will be explained by this fact alone. And this will remain true no matter what mitigating strategy we adopt. It will be true, however, more often in regard to ascriptions of

non-historical properties, as opposed to evaluations based explicitly on discovered connections among historically separated works, and this contradicts the recent trend in argument by those revisionists cited earlier. Given some explanations that point to convergence among evaluations, and some that do not, the truth here, as in many areas of philosophy, is more complex than the extreme positions would indicate.

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[9] Compare Stan Godlovitch, 'Aesthetic Judgment and Hindsight', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 46 (1987): 75–83; also Anthony Savile, *The Test of Time* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). Savile would not allow my third defence of the test of time, since he allows for only one correct interpretation of a work.

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POSSIBLE WORLDS BETWEEN THE DISCIPLINES

Ruth Ronen

THE CONCEPT of 'possible worlds' has served in recent years as an interdisciplinary metaphor, representing a sphere of mutual fusion and interchange between philosophical logic, philosophy of science, literary theory, aesthetics and linguistics.[1] This interdisciplinary interchange is based on the belief that possible worlds can appropriately explicate phenomena in various disciplines: that possible worlds can explain the fictional status of literary worlds, that they can account for the relationship between scientific paradigms in the philosophy of science, that they are relevant to explaining the relations between the actual state of affairs and other modal possibilities as a problem raised within philosophical logic, etc. Yet this exemplary basis for a dialogue among the disciplines is more shaky than it seems. As will be shown in this paper, 'possible worlds' turn out to refer to considerably different concepts in each of the disciplines. In fact, possible worlds present a case where a concept originating in one discipline develops into an interdisciplinary tool, while in the process extending the scope of its application and undergoing substantial changes of meaning.

The purpose of this paper is indeed to expose some aspects of the incompatibility between interpretations attached to possible worlds by philosophers on the one hand and by literary theorists on the other hand. Philosophical logic is the source discipline where the concept *possible worlds* was initially formulated and developed; literary theory is one of the target disciplines which has appropriated and applied possible worlds to its specific needs. To explore the roots of the conceptual divergence evidenced in the use of possible worlds by the two disciplines, this paper concentrates on the literary and the philosophical interpretations of *accessibility*, a concept embodied in the notion of possible worlds. Accessibility is a central concept in any interpretation of modal systems in possible worlds terms, and it serves different purposes in the context of a literary theory of fictionality. I would attempt to explain this conceptual divergence in the interpretation of accessibility in terms of the logic and object of study unique to each of the disciplines involved. Philosophers, by constructing an ontological domain for categories of linguistics and logic, approach possible worlds as a model for substantiating these *abstract categories*. In literary (and art) theory possible worlds serve to name *concrete artistic phenomena*; that is, possible worlds work as a

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lexicon destined to name and explicate a set of referential problems that fiction raises.

THE LOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF ACCESSIBILITY

The question addressed in what follows concerns the *reference world* assumed by accessibility relations, that is, the world in relation to which a given state of affairs is deemed possible. The attempt is to show that in logic, the reference world determining accessibility relations is essentially different from the reference world assumed in a theory of fiction; that in logic the notion of reference world is *relational* (any compossible state of affairs can serve as a reference world) whereas in literary theory the reference world is automatically identified with the *actual world* (whether 'the actual world' is seen as a cultural construct constantly changing, or whether in identifying an 'actual world' the theorist presupposes a stable epistemology enabling our unproblematic access to a 'reality').

Although different philosophers ascribe different degrees of *realism* to possible worlds,[2] they agree on some aspects of the interpretation of *accessibility*. Accessibility relations are defined in logic as *relative possibility*. Accessibility obviously cannot be detached from the notion of possibility; in fact, Kripke introduces the two as equivalent concepts. Accessibility is destined to account for the truth values of modal and counter-factual propositions. Possibility ascribes a concrete content to relations of accessibility holding among sets in that relative possibility determines inference in modal systems. Accessibility among worlds works as a restriction on the range of possible worlds; different models for accessibility define different formalization for quantifying over accessible worlds, that is, each model places different restrictions on the accessibility relation. Modal logic allows a variety of formalizations for modal inferences where each modal system is constrained by another type of accessibility relation. According to an M-Model (*model* in the logical-mathematical sense) accessibility relations are constrained and defined by reflexivity. According to a B-model accessibility in the modal system is restricted to reflexive and symmetrical relations; in an S-4 model accessibility is restricted to reflexive and transitive relations and in an S-5 model, accessibility is restricted to reflexive, symmetrical and transitive relations.[3] Whatever the relation that makes one world accessible from another, possibility is defined by a type of accessibility relation. A state of affairs is possible in one world (W1) only in case it is true at least in one world (W) where W is accessible to W1. Once a world is relatively possible or accessible to another world, it means that every situation that obtains in the one is possible in the other. Without going further into the details of these models for accessibility and into the exact place where possible worlds supply a concrete content or interpretation to the logical categories involved, it is first clear that models of accessibility do not regard possible worlds as being all on a par: a world can be subject to accessibility

relations with another world (they are relatively possible) when they meet the conditions specified in that modal system and under which the one world could be realized instead of the other and hence seen as accessible to the other. Since different modal systems specify different accessibility relations, in each system, 'Only these genuine alternatives really count. Each statement has to be thought of as having been made in some "possible world"; and nothing can be said to be possible in such a world which would not have been true in some world realizable in its stead'.[4] In other words, accessibility defines the various conditions under which the compossibility of worlds is determined.

To explicate further the concept of accessibility as used by logicians, one can look at the problem of counter-factuals and at the principle of similarity with which counter-factuals are handled within the possible worlds paradigm. It should first be noted that counter-factuals are closely tied to the problem under discussion here because counter-factuals most acutely raise the problem of criteria of validation for non-actual situations, and hence the problem of accessibility between incompatible situations. Counter-factuals obey standards of validation determined relative to some notion of 'the actual world'; that is, to explain the criteria of validation relevant to *counter*-factuals, some *factual* state of affairs external to them must be posited to serve as a reference point. Lewis's work on counter-factuals is an attempt to explain why the truth of a counter-factual cannot be determined from knowledge of the truth values of the antecedent or the consequent of the counter-factual itself ('if I drop the glass, it will break'); rather a *relation* between the counter-factual and some other world is needed to account for the truth of a counter-factual. Lewis defines this relation on which the truth of counter-factuals leans as a relation between two proximate worlds: a counter-factual is true at a world just in case the consequent is true at all the *nearest* possible worlds in which the antecedent is true. Problems of inference in non-actual situations are solved by Lewis, as by other possible worlds theorists, by referring to *relevant similarities* among sets determining which other sets could have been realized. Lewis's treatment of counter-factuals shows that we can infer or decide the truth of propositions about possible worlds by relying on their similarity or closeness to the state of affairs actually realized. Two worlds are similar if moving from one to the other entails no change in the laws of probability or in the logic of the world: 'It seems to me obvious that whatever is logically necessary here and now must also be logically necessary in all the logically possible states of affairs that could have been realized instead of the actual one . . . Conversely, it also seems fairly clear that no new logical necessities can come about as the result of the realization of any logical possibility'.[5] This notion of similarity defines accessibility relations in counter-factual contexts and hence determines our ability to make *inferences* from one world to its counter-factual. Comparative similarity is something the frame of possible worlds has introduced into discussions of counter-factuals, induction, etc. Note that some philosophers deny that

possible worlds can account for similarity between worlds. According to the view spelled out by Sanford,[6] for instance, possible worlds only introduce the notion of relevant similarity without solving or explicating the idea of sameness or near-sameness among worlds. In his approach, the weight possible-world treatments place on comparative similarity between worlds suggest that some similarities are irrelevant. Yet, once we can decide what is the theoretical basis for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant similarities between a situation and its counter-factual there will be little further use for possible worlds in evaluating contingent conditionals.

In arguing over accessibility and similarity, philosophers such as Putnam, Hintikka or Lewis (regardless of the very different interpretation each attaches to possible worlds), share the view that the real universe is not to be taken as a world of reference. For Hintikka, for instance, the whole motivation behind possible-worlds theory is to enable us to talk about what is not *this* world, to enable logic to be different from zoology in its concern (that is, a concern that does not lie with the real world but with its more general and abstract features). For modal logicians the real world is, at the most, an *optional* world of reference for accessibility relations. This is evident in the various systems of modal logic describing properties of the accessibility relation described above. A model for accessibility can represent reflexive relations, and/or symmetrical relations and/or relations of transitivity which means that the world at the centre of the system, with respect to which accessibility is measured, changes according to the logical model for accessibility posited in a given context. Although for logicians the reference world is always the 'centre' of the system, a privileged member of the set of all worlds (whether this be 'this world' or any other world), this centre does not entail an ontological differentiation between the *actual* world of the system and worlds accessible to it. The changeability of the 'actual' world is apparent in logical interpretations of accessibility.[7] Philosophers are predominantly preoccupied with the ontology of *possible worlds* as a theoretical entity and not with the ontologies of concrete worlds; that is, they do raise questions and discuss ontological issues, yet these are issues concerning the ontology of the model itself and the ontology of the entities the model introduces. Do the entities the paradigmatic model for possible worlds presupposes (worlds, accessibility, identity) literally exist or are they just extravagant metaphors? Does our modal talk really assume the existence of alternative worlds? Are such alternative worlds indeed relevant to clarifying the problems at hand? Possible worlds carry ontological implications for philosophers only in a qualified sense. Possible worlds do not entail the existence of independent, autonomous ontological domains; the actual world relative to which states of affairs are regarded as possible is of the same ontological order basically as the order of these possibilities. Compossibility or accessibility among worlds does not necessitate an ontologically privileged notion of *the actual*.

The fact that alternative possibilities to the one actually obtaining are of the same ontological order for logicians is reflected in the definition of possible worlds as *maximal sets*, which presupposes that accessibility is determined by and dependent on regions of similarity and overlap between possible worlds. That is, when philosophers assume the occurrence of an alternative possible world, in which a different set of state-propositions obtains (for instance, a world in which the glass fell off the table), all other domains of the actual world which were not contradicted by the occurrence of that possible world continue to obtain. Maximality hence means that the actual world has no 'maximality advantage' over any other possible world. Both the actual and the possible are equally represented by maximal sets.

Yet, the maximality assumed by philosophers is not so straightforward; maximality has raised a fundamental debate over the status of possible worlds since it touches on questions regarding language-world relations. The philosophical definition of possible worlds as maximal sets assumes that each world is a complete world represented by a *complete set of propositions* and not a partial world represented only by those propositions explicitly asserted. This maximality of worlds is not unproblematic in itself: it implies that we can make a hypothetical local change in a world (in which the glass was situated safely elsewhere) and maximize an over-all similarity to the actual world, i.e., we 'tinker' with the actual world at one point and then let the laws of nature operate without further interference.[8] Maximality hence raises a metaphysical problem regarding the possibility of maximizing a state of affairs after a local change has occurred in it. This means that in concrete modal contexts accesibility does not guarantee straightforward relations since a local change in a state of affairs might be claimed to entail an overall transformation of that same state.

Yet maximality further complicates the idea of reference world and the ontic differentiation between the reference world and worlds accessible to it in another sense. What is the status of 'a complete set of propositions' relative to which accessibility is determined? On the one hand, the maximality of a relevantly similar world is logically entailed by the mere notion of accessibility: a world is accessible only if all the propositions composing it are either true or false; that is, if in a world W1 a proposition p is true, and p is indeterminate ('either true or false') in world W2, W2 then cannot entertain *definite* accessibility relations with W1 (it cannot be determined, for instance, whether the accessibility relation between W1 and W2 is symmetrical—that the two worlds are numerically identical—or asymmetrical). In short, accessibility relations among worlds with indeterminate domains cannot be logically valued. On such an interpretation of maximality, a maximal set of propositions does not only stipulate but also *identifies* the determinacy of a world. Yet on such an interpretation where possible worlds are simply reduced to sets of propositions, they can be rejected as redundant. In other words, being thus

interpreted the maximality of sets appears to counteract the *interpretative capacity* of possible worlds for logical relations, because 'worlds' are no longer distinguishable from propositions. These are the grounds on which the problem of world/language relations has entered the discussion on possible worlds. Does maximality refer to the world being maximal or to the fact that all propositions that could be made about a possible world should be determinable? If we refer to the maximality of *worlds* it would mean that states of affairs are not separable from propositions representing them, and since propositions do not in themselves maintain logical relations, how can possible worlds represented by these propositions claim to explicate logical relations of necessity, possibility and accessibility? The debate over maximality of possible worlds hence problematizes and affects the interpretation given to accessibility relations and to the notion of reference world.

The question of whether possible worlds are 'simply possible states of affairs relative to some fixed language' or that possible worlds are 'wholly independent of the linguistic frame we use to talk about possible states of affairs',[9] is one of the crucial areas of debate in the interpretation of possible worlds.[10] The link between the principle of maximality and the question of world-language relations as demonstrated in 'possible worlds' interpretations, was explicitly stated in a recent paper by Hintikka. The idea that 'possible worlds semantics somehow presupposes a Leibnizian framework where the alternatives are entire grand universes . . . is a hangover from the unspoken assumption of language as the universal medium', claims Hintikka.[11] For Hintikka the rationale behind possible worlds talk is that it provides an *interpretation* of our modal discourse and hence operates as a calculus. Our universe of discourse can therefore also be a 'small world', that is, a short course of local events in some nook or corner of the actual world (ibid.). In other words, if we believe that possible worlds can explain accessibility relations among partial states of affairs, the maximality of worlds should be rejected. The rejection of maximality implies that possible worlds are separable from sets of propositions (and their linguistic configurations) used to represent them. Maximality hence poses a more general difficulty before a possible worlds framework, the difficulty of determining the language-world relations which possible worlds presuppose.

What the above discussion clearly shows is that in possible-worlds semantics relevant similarity and logical accessibility have proved to be problematic enough, touching on metaphysical as well as logical problems. Accessibility is open to diverse interpretations because it can be determined relative to fixed logical probabilities or relative to overlaps between sets of propositions. Each interpretation of accessibility reflects on the *reference world* in relation to which accessibility relations can be established (on the ontic status and on the degree of maximality of such a world). The fact that the logical notion of reference world does not take a straightforward and stable interpretation for it but relies

on the variability of the reference world is apparent in the case of worlds created by modal uses of language, as claimed McCawley;[12] in the case of epistemic worlds constructed by modal talk, we do not always depend directly on the real world. The desires, intentions and beliefs a person has and expresses have his belief world rather than the actual world as a reference world.

Thus despite apparent disagreement over possible worlds and over the way to interpret accessibility among worlds, no side of the debate claims that accessibility involves the relations between the real world and its branching unactualized possibilities. It is for this reason that possible worlds cannot guarantee the persistence of the ontology of one world behind a set of possible actualizations. In his interpretation of possible worlds Kuhn[13] supplies a concrete demonstration of why similarity among worlds (each representing a stage in the history of science) depends on a shared ontology. In the absence of such a common ground the history of science becomes a series of possible worlds with incommensurable lexicons. Kuhn shows that the notion of sameness is problematized even before we introduce new concepts into our scientific discourse. What seems like the same term in different states of scientific discourse may prove to participate in different ontologies. When sometime between 1750 and 1950 chemical discovery pointed out that 'water' obeyed the formula H_2O, the term 'water' that was used before that discovery to refer to a natural kind stopped being referential. After the formula for 'water' was discovered 'water' started to refer to a chemical compound. 'Water' in both phases does not fail to refer but in each phase a different world is posited: the movement from one phase to another does not necessarily entail a change of members, but it can result in a lexical and hence conceptual incommensurability between the sets.[14] Likewise in comparing quantum physics with classical physics, the terms 'electron', 'position' and 'velocity' are incommensurable; acknowledging this incommensurability provides a different view on the continuity of the history of science. The reference world of terms in use at various stages in the history of science is a product of the complete scientific paradigm within which the meaning of a term can be decided. The intricacy involved in establishing similarities among worlds is hence due (among other things) to a change of reference world which comes about when one scientific paradigm is replaced by another. Kuhn shows that relevant similarity cannot be decided in a vacuum. There is no point in describing the accessibility relations between two stages in the history of science because the two stages might imply a change of reference world. Likewise in comparing epistemic worlds, x's desires and y's desires each posit a different reference world in relation to which a relevant similarity is established: the belief world of each individual, rather than the actual world, will serve as a reference world in such contexts.

Although in philosophy itself discussions of accessibility transcend the boundaries of logic, accessibility is treated by philosophers as a relational

concept which has nothing to do with the question of what actually exists in the real world. What bothers philosophers in connection with accessibility is whether the reference world is *a world*, a set of propositions, a stable set, a maximal set, etc.

THE INTERPRETATION OF ACCESSIBILITY IN LITERARY THEORY

A very different interpretation of the nature of accessibility relations emerges from literary theories of fictionality which make use of possible worlds terminology. I will show that on the basis of a naïve acceptance of accessibility (that is, by relying on possible worlds terminology only as a spring-board, literary theorists ignore the problems and conceptual implications accessibility involves in logic) literary theorists tend to relate accessibility directly to a set of literary phenomena. In 'literary' interpretations accessibility is viewed as involving the relations between what we know about the world around us and what fiction tells us. Some theorists of fictionality view the actual world as a stable ontology, some hold that the actual world is a (culturally) variable construct based on ideologically determined encyclopaedias. Ryan,[15] a literary theorist who has been employing possible worlds terminology upon literary issues for some years now and who represents the first view, supplies an elaborate analysis of accessibility relations between fiction and the actual world. On her interpretation these relations exceed the limits of logic. Granted that in her view the actual world is an unproblematic stable reference world, she can regard the world of fiction as accessible or inaccessible to such a reference world according to a series of parameters: the identity of properties, the inventory of objects furnishing the world, chronological compatibility, compatibility of natural laws, of world species, of logical laws, of analytical truths and of language. One can say that by expanding the notion of accessibility to include a variety of parameters (and not just logical probability) Ryan actually defines a particular set of conventions for world construction, thereby generating a typology of fictional worlds: each type of world in her model diverges from a potential perfect compatibility with the actual world in one or more domains.[16] A stability of the reference world is unavoidable on such an interpretation of accessibility.

Other literary theorists who do not share Ryan's relatively unproblematic view of the actual world as a stable reference world nevertheless share her conception that accessibility has to do with a relation holding between fiction and the actual world, even if actuality is only equated with what one believes at a specific moment to be the actual world. Eco, another literary interpreter of possible worlds, rejects a naïvely realist conception of reality. Accessibility, he claims, can only hold between two sets of a similar order. Rational constructs (that is, possible worlds) cannot be compared with something which is given, like the world of our experience. The world of reference, and not only possible worlds, therefore has to be postulated and dealt with as a cultural construct.

The notion of the actual is hence replaced with that of propositional attitudes the sum total of which constitutes one's encyclopaedia and hence one's *ad hoc* reference world. Therefore if *a* believes that p, it means that p is compatible with his encyclopaedia. *A*'s world of reference is therefore an encyclopaedic construct (varying historically and culturally), a propositional attitude is dependent on the assumptions of a given encyclopaedia and accessibility is a matter of formally and objectively comparing *two cultural constructs*.[17]

The difference between philosophers' and literary theorists' uses of accessibility relations can be summarized by comparing Lewis's conception of similarity with the principle of minimal departure introduced by Ryan:

> The truth conditions for counterfactuals are fixed only within rough limits; like the relative importance of respects of comparison that underlie the comparative similarity of worlds, they are a highly volatile matter, varying with every shift of context and interest.[18]

> We construe the world of fiction and of counterfactuals as being the closest possible to the reality we know. This means that we will project upon the world of the statement everything we know about the real world, and that we will make only those adjustments which we cannot avoid.[19]

The passages here cited demonstrate the difference in the definition of the reference world for accessibility relations in counter-factual (or other non-actual states of affairs) and in fictional contexts. Lewis, by acknowledging the variability in the reference world and hence the context-dependency of the truth value of counter-factuals, underlines the volatility of concepts such as similarity, comparison among worlds, etc. Ryan, on the other hand, insists that similarity is based on minimal departure from (what we know about) reality thus advancing the idea that the privileged reference world is identified with, in some sense at least, the real world. Note that I do not claim here that modal logicians hypothesize a context-relative reality from which the variability of the reference world is derived, whereas literary theorists promote a 'naïve' view of the real world. The difference between the two conceptions rather emerges from the fact that the problematic ontological status of reality is *not an issue* either in the logical models for accessibility or in the literary ones, but in each case for different reasons. The ontological status of reality is not an issue for logicians because an actual world is another compossible system with no privileged status over other possibilities (the concept of the actual presupposes no ontological gradations among worlds). The ontological status of reality is not an issue for literary theorists because the actual world is identified with 'a reality', and the latter is a privileged reference world ontologically distinguished from fiction, whether by 'a reality' we refer to the physical real, to some version of it, or to a vague context-dependent notion of what we know about reality. In any case 'a reality', of whatever ontological status, seems to be a presupposed belief behind talk about the fictionality of literary

worlds, a belief on which our intuitive distinction between the fictional and the real depends.

CONCLUSIONS

The divergence of interpretations given to possible worlds *within philosophy itself* undermines any attempt to view *possible world* as a clear, straightforward and unequivocal concept which the various disciplines can adopt for their own needs. Yet, although possible worlds do not make a unified concept, the difference of approaches might explain how different disciplines can attach different interpretations to possible worlds.

The above discussion suggests that literary theory and logic differ in their use of 'world', of 'possible worlds' and of related terms such as that of accessibility because of the cross-disciplinary movement of these concepts. That is, one could argue that logic represents the original 'literal' interpretation of possible worlds whereas literary theory deviates from the philosophical use. This deviation is evidenced in the difference in ontological density the literary and philosophical discussions attach to possible worlds, and in the way accessibility is interpreted in the literary versus the philosophical contexts. Thus, in the literary context accessibility is interpreted as a device for comparing actual with non-actual ontologies whereas in logic it is a device for comparing compossible worlds that are not ontologically differentiated. There are of course other differences and similarities between interpretations of possible worlds in literary theory and in logic. I chose to concentrate here on these facets of the dissimilarity between the uses of the concept because these can also serve to illuminate a more profound divergence of interest the two disciplines exhibit. The differences discussed above in the interpretations of accessibility are but symptoms of a significant gap between the 'logics' of the two disciplines in question.

In philosophy possible worlds suggest a framework for linking a metaphysical problem with a problem of language. Possible worlds thus tie 'an exotic piece of metaphysical machinery'[20] to the subject-matter of modal logic. More specifically, possible worlds' terminology supplies logical categories (such as accessibility and possibility) with semantic content, and, conversely, possible worlds supply semantic and syntactic categories (such as tenses, modalities and conditionals) with logico-ontological content. Possible worlds can tie together two sets of problems and show their inter-relations (for instance, that a conditional on the linguistic level can be described as constructing a counter-factual world). On this view possible worlds introduce *a new conceptual lexicon*: two sets of phenomena are interpreted by a common conceptual tool. Possible worlds hence work in philosophy as a theoretical model whose explanatory power results from its hosting and linking two orders: of logic and of language or semantics. It is only in these terms that one can understand why philosophers do not deal basically with the ontology of worlds but with the ontology of the entities that the possible worlds model posits. That is, philo-

sophers either question or strengthen the premiss behind possible worlds that theoretical entities such as 'worlds' really exist or that worlds, posited behind categories of logic and of language, can produce explanations for these categories. Philosophers investigate the question whether categories of logic and semantics indeed carry ontological implications, whether possibility entails relations among alternative worlds etc. Philosophers who promulgate possible-worlds talk acknowledge the importance of these implications, whereas philosophers who reject the possible-worlds framework deny the existence of theoretical entities such as worlds and alternative states of affairs, thereby denying the explanatory power of these same entities.

A significantly different conception of possible worlds is exemplified by the literary theory of fiction. For literary theorists and other art-theorists possible worlds are not presented as a set of theoretical entities used to describe a hybrid of logical and linguistic phenomena, but rather are identified with fictional universes. The latter are regarded *as possible worlds*, and possible worlds hence involve the ontology of concrete artistic worlds. This explains why a logical category such as accessibility is *literally* interpreted in the literary context. Possible worlds are not regarded as theoretical terms but rather as descriptive concepts that work within a descriptive poetics. We can see why in literary theories possible worlds carry concrete ontological content epitomized in the idea of 'a world'.

Note that despite this substantial difference, the fact that possible worlds have proved to be a productive framework for the study of such diverse phenomena as logical relations on the one hand and fictional worlds on the other hand, reflects the translatability among the languages of the two disciplines. Possible worlds enable us to talk about the relationship between different states of affairs, to see worlds, whether necessary, actual or possible, as cultural constructs and to relativize necessity and possibility to changing worlds of reference.

In literature and art theory possible worlds opened the way for examining the ontology of worlds and for investigating the status of imaginary beings. Possible worlds have provided literary theory with the ideological legitimation for turning theoretical attention and energy back to referential questions. In the attempt to understand fiction in ways which were not possible before, and to substantiate previously held intuitions about fictionality, 'possible worlds' serve as a handy new terminology. Although I do not believe that 'possible worlds', in the way they are being interpreted by literary theorists, are indeed necessary or as illuminating for discussions of reference in fiction as might seem to be the case, they have certainly succeeded in creating a theoretical terrain where these problems can be legitimately addressed.

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[1] To this interchange attests, for instance, a recent collection of essays based on the Nobel Prize Symposium on 'Possible Worlds'. See Sture Allen (ed.), *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences: Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65* (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989).

[2] See, for instance, Hilary Putnam, *Realism with a Human Face* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1990), p. 71 and Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1972), p. 44.

[3] See Saul Kripke, 'Semantical Considerations in Modal Logic', *Acta Philosophica Fennica* 16, 1963, pp. 83–94; Michael J. Loux (ed.), *The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality* (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1979), pp. 21–30; David H. Sanford, *If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning* (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 72.

[4] Jaakko Hintikka, 'The Modes of Modality', in: M. J. Loux (ed.), *The Possible and the Actual*, op. cit., p. 67.

[5] David K. Lewis, *Counterfactuals* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), p. 76.

[6] See reference 3.

[7] For Lewis, as has become a commonplace, 'actual' is an indexical term: it can be applied to possible worlds and to their inhabitants, depending on the zero point of reference. That is, 'actual' depends for its reference on the circumstances of utterance.

[8] Hilary Putnam, *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers*, Vol. 3 (Cambridge U.P., 1983), pp. 60ff.

[9] Putnam, *Realism and Reason*, op. cit., 67.

[10] In contrast with Putnam's approach which vindicates the view that possible worlds are related to a fixed language, Lewis advances the view that possible worlds are independent of the language used to denote them. Lewis claims that possible worlds are not to be identified with sets of propositions. His realism means that possible worlds are 'respectable entities in their own right and are not to be reduced to something else', *Counterfactuals*, op. cit., 85.

[11] Hintikka distinguishes between the view of language as a universal medium and the view of language as calculus. According to the former we cannot in the final analysis escape our language and look at it and its logic from the outside; all semantic models are hence language-dependent. According to the latter view we can re-interpret our language; 'you can so to speak stop your language and step off . . . you can discuss the semantics of your language and even vary systematically its interpretation' (in: Allen (ed.), *Possible Worlds*, op. cit., p. 54). On the latter view semantic models hence supply interpretations which are not on a par with the interpreted.

[12] James D. McCawley, *Everything that Linguists have Always Wanted to Know about Logic, But were Ashamed to Ask* (University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 333.

[13] Thomas S. Kuhn, 'Possible Worlds in History of Science', in: Allen (ed.), *Possible Worlds*, op. cit., pp. 9–32.

[14] For Putnam's opposite position on the status of 'water' in the history of science, see his *Realism With a Human Face* (1990), p. 69ff.

[15] Marie-Laure Ryan, 'Possible Worlds and Accessibility Relations: A Semantic Typology of Fiction', *Poetics Today* (1991) 12:3.

[16] Note that Ryan does acknowledge that with certain world-types other worlds as worlds of reference can prove to be fruitful. The accessibility relations of fantastic texts, for instance, should be evaluated within the textual universe, selecting the textual actual world as reference world. This impasse does not contradict her basic idea that parameters of accessibility are valued against 'good old reality' looming in the background.

[17] Umberto Eco, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts* (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1979), pp. 222ff.

[18] Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, op. cit., p. 92.

[19] Marie-Laure Ryan, 'Fiction, Non-factuals and the Principle of Minimal Departure', *Poetics* 8 (1980), p. 406.

[20] Loux, *The Possible and the Actual*, op. cit., p. 30.

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BENNETT'S FIVE TOWNS: A PROSPECT-REFUGE ANALYSIS

Brian J. Hudson

UNREDEEMED UGLINESS; GRIM BEAUTY

MANY PAINTERS, photographers and writers have discovered and portrayed beauty in industrial landscapes which are generally regarded as ugly. Hugo van Wadenoyen, whose landscape photographs include urban and industrial as well as rural scenes, wrote, 'I can find rhythmic pattern in chaos and beauty in what is generally called ugliness'.[1] A particular landscape, therefore, can be perceived as both attractive and repellent, and, as Relph observed, 'many landscapes are themselves ambivalent and paradoxical'.[2] Geographers are among the scholars who have given attention to landscape aesthetics, including ambivalent response to landscape, and in recent years much geographical work has been done which draws on the insights that literature can bring to the study of the human environment.[3] Yi-Fu Tuan, an influential humanistic geographer, noted that, 'the phenomenon of ambivalence in human nature is clearly recognised in the humanities, particularly in literature',[4] and the novel has been shown to be a valuable source of material on aesthetic attitudes towards industrial landscapes which are perceived as both ugly and beautiful.[5]

Novelists writing about the North of England have often dwelt on the landscape disfigurement and ugliness of its industrial areas.[6] Notable among these writers is Arnold Bennett (1867–1931) who immortalized his native Potteries district as 'The Five Towns' of his fiction. This industrial area was, in Bennett's own words, 'long given up to unredeemed ugliness', yet even here the author found a 'grim and original beauty' that is often evoked in his writings.[7]

It is this ambivalent attitude which prompted the present study of aesthetic response to industrial landscapes as revealed in the writings of Bennett. Bennett's verbal portrayal of the Potteries landscape, which he describes as both ugly and beautiful, exhibits to a remarkable degree many of the qualities which geographer Jay Appleton identifies in landscape paintings depicting 'natural' or rural scenes. It is suggested that this may provide a clue to understanding the apparent paradox that a landscape blighted by industry and which may be considered extremely ugly, the very antithesis of unspoiled natural scenery, may, at the same time, be seen to possess a beauty of its own. The study involves the application of Appleton's prospect-refuge theory to industrial

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landscapes to which Appleton, himself, has given little attention.[8] In suggesting that this may enhance our understanding of aesthetic response it is not claimed that prospect-refuge analysis offers a complete explanation of ambivalent attitudes to landscape, industrial or otherwise. It is the purpose of this paper to seek new insights by examining one author's landscape descriptions in the light of a theory which many scholars have found useful and which has been applied successfully in the field of landscape design.[9]

In order to understand human, as distinct from non-human animal behaviour, it is necessary to consider 'private' stimuli, those which are not 'scientifically' observable,[10] and the arts, including literature, provide valuable insights into the private world of human behaviour that may complement the findings of science which focuses on 'public' events. Indeed, Bennett, himself a passionate devotee of landscape beauty, strongly advocated the study of both literature and geography for a fuller appreciation of the human relationship with the environment.[11]

BENNETT AND 'THE FIVE TOWNS'

Recognized, along with Charlotte Brontë, George Eliot and Thomas Hardy, as one of England's major regional novelists, Arnold Bennett has already received considerable attention from geographers.[12] Bennett's literary works reflect his fascination with every aspect of existence, including the most ordinary, and, typically, he found interest and beauty in the 'ordinary' landscapes of residential suburbs, quiet countryside, and industrial districts.[13]

Bennett's interest in the landscape was, of course, secondary to his deep concern with people, but his writings often stress the importance of the environment in which his characters live. His work reveals a keen appreciation of scenic quality, not only in his native Potteries, but in other towns and cities and in the countryside of Britain and the Continent. His landscape tastes ranged from the coastal marshes of Essex to Dartmoor, the Forest of Fontainebleau and the Alps; but it is with the industrial landscape of North Staffordshire that he is most closely associated.[14] It may, therefore, surprise many that only a dozen or so of his eighty or more principal works, including the collections of short stories, are set largely in the Potteries. While the novelist's sense of place permeates his entire Five Towns fiction, this paper focuses on the relatively few extended 'set-piece' descriptions of industrial landscapes which may be readily compared with the visual pictures created by painters and photographers, and which similarly lend themselves to analysis in terms of Appleton's habitat theory.

'The Five Towns' are a fictional representation of the six Potteries towns which were merged early this century and now constitute the City of Stoke-on-Trent. Although, for the purpose of his novels and short stories, Bennett changed the place names, the original towns, villages and the other localities of the district can usually be identified without difficulty. 'Bursley' is easily

recognized as Burslem, 'Hanbridge' as Hanley, and 'Knype' as Stoke, to mention three examples. The Hanley suburb of Shelton, the 'Cauldon' of 'The Five Towns', was where Bennett was born in 1867, and the Shelton Bar Iron Works appear in his fiction as the 'Cauldon Bar Iron Works'.

For Bennett, the Shelton Bar Ironworks at the height of their activity were endowed with a spectacular beauty which is vividly described in the opening chapter of *Clayhanger*:

> To the south of them, a mile and a half off, in the wreathing mist of the Cauldon Bar Ironworks, there was a yellow gleam that even the capricious sunlight could not kill, and then two rivers of fire sprang from the gleam and ran in a thousand delicate and lovely hues down the side of a mountain of refuse. They were emptying a few tons of molten slag at the Cauldon Bar Ironworks. The two rivers hung slowly dying in the mists of smoke. They reddened and faded, and you could see them yet, and then they escaped the baffled eye, unless a cloud aided them for a moment against the sun; and their ephemeral but enchanting beauty had expired for ever.[15]

From the nearby hills, especially at night, the ironworks presented a spectacular scene and among the smoke-wreathed furnaces, pot banks, mines, canals, waste tips and mean houses Bennett recognized beauty where most could see only ugliness and squalor.[16] There, he said, 'Beauty was achieved and none saw it'.[17]

AESTHETIC AMBIGUITY

While sensitive to certain aesthetic qualities in the Potteries' landscape, Bennett was by no means blind to the harshness and ugliness of that environment, and he praised local efforts to beautify and improve the amenities of the area by the creation of public parks, often on the site of former industrial waste land. Recent land reclamation schemes and pollution control measures have now achieved great environmental improvements including the smoke abatement which Bennett anticipated eighty years ago.[18]

From a purely visual point of view, however, the disappearance of the old industrial landscape with its pollution haze and smoke plumes might be regarded as an aesthetic loss. Indeed, today the reader of Bennett, visiting the Potteries in search of the Five Towns of the novels, may experience disappointment to find that so much of what Bennett lyrically described has vanished, including most of the smoke which formerly belched from the pot banks, ironworks and mines.[19]

Even the disappearance of the scars and dereliction inherited from the industrial past is regretted by some, but of such views, landscape architect Nan Fairbrother had this to say: 'There is a current fashion for admiring all spoil-heaps as "exciting", but it is confined to the fortunate who have never had to live with them. Those who have "want to be shot of 'em" or at least their

brutal starkness gentled into the landscape'.[20] Experience in the Potteries tends to support this view, and it is significant that while local opinion was in favour of the preservation of the enormous waste tip which overlooks the Burslem Cemetery where Bennett's ashes are interred, the starkness of the heap has been reduced by shaping and planting.[21]

Bennett, himself, did not learn to appreciate the Potteries' industrial landscape until he left it, never to return save for brief visits. Despite the peculiar aesthetic and romantic qualities of the Potteries which Bennett portrayed in his writings, the district, nevertheless, remained repugnant to him. In 1927 he recorded in his journal that, when on a railway journey from Manchester to London, his train passed through the Potteries, the sight of which made him shudder.[22] How can these apparently contradictory attitudes towards industrial landscapes be explained? What is it about them which can cause the observer both pleasure and distress?

Tuan observed that complex environments such as those of cities were particularly likely to stimulate ambiguous and ambivalent attitudes: 'The city symbolises social order and power, as well as confusion, strain and sterility'.[23] In the case of Stoke-on-Trent ambiguity was, no doubt, heightened by the dramatic impact of industry—the pits, heaps of colliery waste and slag, furnaces, clouds of smoke and the rest—which created a kind of wilderness in which the few public parks and gardens, noted by Bennett, served as refuges.

Like the hero of his semi-autobiographical novel, *A Man from the North*, Bennett left the Potteries for London as a young man. His flight was a normal response to aversive stimuli, 'with no immediate objective save to escape from an intellectual and artistic environment which had long been excessively irksome to me'.[24] His migration south was also a response to the perceived attractions of London, and later, Paris, his love of the countryside enticing him to set up home in rural areas near those cities.[25]

HABITAT THEORY AND PROSPECT-REFUGE SYMBOLISM

Appleton's book *The Experience of Landscape* begins with the question, 'What do we like about the landscape and why do we like it?'[26] Most of his discussion is concerned with 'natural' and rural landscapes, not surprising in view of the English preference for rural settings and their 'passion for the countryside',[27] but reference is made to townscapes and even, briefly, industrial landscapes.

His theoretical discussion draws upon the work of philosopher John Dewey, accepting the view 'that beauty resides neither intrinsically in "beautiful" objects nor "in the eye of the beholder", but that it is to be discovered in the relationship between the individual and his environment'. Pursuing this line of thought, Appleton refers to the work of ethologists on animal behavioural response to the environment, and from his study of scholars and artists who have given their attention to landscape, he attempts to identify symbolic landscape elements of universal significance.[28] 'What [Appleton] was looking

for was a simple model which could relate the idea of preference to a typology of landscapes through the medium of the biological, and more particularly the behavioral sciences.'[29] Appleton sought to explain landscape preferences in terms of habitat theory, and from this developed his idea of prospect-refuge theory.

Habitat theory states that, 'aesthetic satisfaction experienced in the contemplation of landscape stems from the spontaneous perception of landscape features which, in their shapes, colours, spatial arrangements and other visual attributes, act as sign-stimuli indicative of environmental conditions favourable for survival, whether they are really favourable or not'. Prospect-refuge theory is a refinement of this idea which proposes that, 'the ability to see without being seen is conducive to the exploitation of environmental conditions favourable to biological survival and is therefore a source of pleasure'.[30]

Thus Appleton's prospect-refuge theory relates to the biologically advantageous circumstance, for both hunter and hunted, man or beast, which provides concealment while, at the same time, allowing a clear field of vision. A valley seen from a wooded hilltop, an open landscape viewed from a cave mouth, a lane glimpsed from a cottage window, a garden contemplated from a verandah, a cityscape revealed from a high-rise balcony, may all be regarded as views that combine the elements of prospect and refuge which tend to satisfy an innate or inherited need and thus give rise to a sense of aesthetic pleasure which we call the enjoyment of landscape. Appleton discusses variation in arrangement and balance of refuge and prospect elements, and identifies commonly occurring landscape symbols which stimulate emotional response in the observer.

Some critics express doubt about the behavioural foundation of Appleton's theory, particularly his emphasis on atavistic responses related to hunting, but the idea gains in credibility when the role of refuge as 'shelter' rather than 'hide' is stressed.[31] While a 'hide' is 'a form of refuge which provides concealment from animate hazards', a 'shelter' is 'A form of refuge which provides protection against inanimate hazards'.[32] 'Protection against inanimate hazards, such as extreme cold and heat, intense solar radiation, violent wind, rain and snow-storms, is vital for human survival even more, probably, than protection or concealment from animals, including humans. This alone may have endowed refuge features in the landscape with enduring symbolic significance.'[33] Sight being the most important of all human senses, it may be expected, therefore, that people will prefer environments in which they can obtain a clear field of vision secure in the protection of shelter, shade, and occasionally, concealment, or with easy access to such a refuge.[34]

PROSPECT AND REFUGE SYMBOLISM IN THE FIVE TOWNS LANDSCAPE

When Bennett's 'Five Towns' landscape description is examined in the light of Appleton's theory, there emerges an attractive explanation for the novelist's

aesthetic appreciation of a district regarded by others as 'extremely ugly' and 'depressing to the eye', and which Bennett himself often described in similar terms.[35]

Bennett felt that 'a town is just as much a product of Nature as the most remote countryside',[36] and Appleton's habitat theory may be seen to apply equally to 'natural' and 'man-made' landscapes, rural and urban (including industrial) landscapes. Habitat theory, as we have seen, proposes that aesthetic pleasure experienced in the contemplation of landscape, is derived from the spontaneous perception of landscape features which suggest to the viewer environmental conditions favourable to survival (even if they are not). It takes little imagination to perceive that factories, mines, workers' houses and associated features, such as smoke and slag heaps, could easily represent to the observer environmental conditions favourable to survival, for they are as much signs of gainful employment, productivity, shelter and the rest as are game and timber rich forests, fruitful fields and peasants' cottages. This attitude may be discerned in an early descriptive piece by Bennett which, acknowledging the ugliness of the Potteries landscape, emphasizes the activity and products of the inhabitants, and suggests that 'romance dwells even here, though unsuspected by its very makers—the romance which always attends alchemic processes of skilled transmuting labour . . . the nimbus of romance beautifying the squalor, softening the coarseness of all this indispensable work'.[37]

The opening chapters of three of Bennett's best-known 'Five Towns' novels, *The Old Wives' Tale, Clayhanger* and *Anna of the Five Towns*, contain descriptions of the Potteries industrial landscape which can be readily interpreted in terms of prospect-refuge theory. Bennett opens *The Old Wives' Tale* with a sweeping survey of the county of Staffordshire in the broad context of the English Midlands, a grand panorama which contrasts dramatically with the upstairs room where we first encounter the two heroines of the novel looking through the window onto the square below. On a less grand scale, but, for that reason perhaps a clearer example of a prospect-refuge literary landscape composition, is the description in *Anna of the Five Towns*, of the Potteries as seen from 'Bursley's' new park. The reader is invited to 'look down into the valley from this terrace height . . . embrace the whole smoke-girt amphitheatre in a glance' and is shown an extensive prospect from this elevated, but enclosed place, a municipal park. Here the sense of refuge is heightened by the presence of the 'keeper's house, the bandstand, the kiosks, the balustrades, the shelters', as well as trees, grottoes and friendly crowds. In addition, the view from the park contains a number of refuge symbols, including 'huddled red-brown streets', 'a maze of roofs', a farm which still stands amidst 'the wreck of verdure' and a girdle of smoke.[38]

The opening scene of *Clayhanger* is very much the same as that at the beginning of *Anna* except that the point of observation is in the valley bottom,

with the smoky streets, mines and pot-banks rising above on the hill slopes. Nevertheless, here too the refuge-prospect symbolism is strong, for the reader encounters the hero of the novel on the 'steep-sloping red-bricked canal bridge', elevated above the waterway and the towing-path, and commanding an extensive view up and down the valley and up to the crests of the distant ridges. The refuge symbolism of the bridge is strengthened by the stone parapet which affords both protection and support.[39]

Here too, is a classic example of what Appleton, in his elaboration of prospect-refuge theory, calls 'hazard' and 'locomotion' symbolism.[40] Readers of *Clayhanger* will recall that Edwin and his friend are walking home from school along a footpath which crosses the canal by the bridge from which they watch the approach of two horse-drawn narrow-boats, one carrying china clay brought from Cornwall via Runcorn, the other containing crates of locally manufactured earthenware heading northwards to the coast for shipment.[41] It is interesting to consider this scene in the light of the following passage from Appleton's discussion of 'locomotion'.

> Again, the linking of paths with breaches in impediment hazards can strengthen the impression of ease of movement within the landscape and therefore of the achievement of an environmental advantage. A path leading to a bridge conveys a more potent suggestion of movement opportunity than either the path or the bridge alone. Two paths converging on a bridge are even more effective in suggesting potential for freedom of movement within the habitat.[42]

A little later Appleton mentions the satisfaction commonly experienced when gazing from a bridge at railway lines receding into the distance, or watching a boat placidly making its way along a canal, an image which strongly recalls the opening scene of *Clayhanger*.

In this scene the canal is an obvious 'impediment hazard', a barrier on the way to and from home. Appleton identifies and classifies a number of landscape hazard symbols, the two other main groups being 'incident hazards' and 'deficiency hazards'. One incident hazard is fire, and we have seen an example of this in the description of the Cauldon Bar Ironworks where the molten slag pouring down the tip face can also be easily recognized as an 'instability hazard', evocative of the volcanic eruptions and landslides mentioned by Appleton.[43]

Fire, in the form of glowing furnaces and ovens of ironworks and pot-banks, is a recurrent element in Bennett's descriptions of the Potteries. The pyrotechnical industrial scene is particularly dramatic at night when we encounter 'A special type of balance of symbolism . . . in what may be called the phenomenon of *inversion*'.[44] Normally, and particularly during the day, the main source of light in any scene is from above, but Appleton, in his discussion of light and darkness, points out the importance of 'artificial' sources of light, such as fires, lamps and torches, in landscape painting. Later he writes,

'The most common and dramatically effective inversion is to be found in the landscape of night. The sky, which we normally think of as containing, if not constituting, the principal source of light is now deprived of it. The upper part of the field of vision, which is normally to be thought of as prospect-dominant, is now occupied by the extreme refuge symbol of darkness. Where prospects are developed at all they are to be found in pools of light from artificial sources.'[45] Nowhere can this be more vividly illustrated than in Bennett's noctural description of the Potteries as viewed from the highest point in the district from which:

> . . . may be clearly seen all the lurid evidence of manufacture which sweep across the borders of the sky . . . On this night the furnaces of Red Cow Ironworks in the hollow to the east were in full blast; their fluctuating yellow light illuminated queerly the grass of the fields above Deane's house and the regular roar of their breathing reached that solitary spot like the distant rumour of some leviathan beast angrily fuming. Further away to the south-west, the Cauldon Bar Ironworks reproduced the same phenomena, and round the whole horizon, near and far, except to the north-east, the lesser fires of labour leapt and flickered and glinted in their mists of smoke, burning ceaselessly, as they burned every night and every day at all seasons of all years. The town of Bursley slept in the deep valley to the west, and vast Hanbridge in the shallower depression to the south, like two sleepers accustomed to rest quietly amid great disturbances; the beacons of their Town Halls and churches kept watch, and the whole scene was dominated by the placidity of the moon, which had now risen clear of the Red Cow furnace clouds, and was passing upwards through tracts of stars.[46]

Having demonstrated that Appleton's prospect-refuge theory can be applied just as well to an urban industrial landscape as to a rural or 'natural' one, it seems reasonable to suggest that analytical methods which help us to understand why we enjoy 'conventionally' beautiful landscapes, may also explain why 'ugly' industrial landscapes, too, can be seen to possess beauty.

We perhaps ought to consider why, in fact, industrial landscapes are widely regarded as ugly and unattractive. Habitat theory appears able to help explain that question, also. While, as we have noted, much of the industrial scene may symbolize environmental conditions favourable to survival, its often overwhelmingly gloomy, sunless, smoke-darkened landscape of mean houses, squalid streets, mineshafts, canals, waste tips, roaring furnaces and sparse, wizened vegetation—the absence of green—forcefully reminds the observer of the impoverished lives of the inhabitants, the harsh conditions of their employment, the unhealthiness and danger of their environment, indeed, the constant threat to physical and spiritual survival in such a place.[47] In the words of Pocock, 'By association and symbolism, therefore, the North evokes a string of negative qualities—evil rather than good (dark Satanic mills), death rather than life, ugliness rather than beauty'.[48]

CONCLUSION

We have seen that some landscapes can be perceived as both attractive and repugnant at the same time, largely as Tuan suggests, because of the complexity of the environment. The foregoing study of Bennett's industrial landscape description gives support to this view and takes a further step by analysing the author's ambivalent and ambiguous responses in terms of habitat theory as developed by Appleton. This paper demonstrates that prospect-refuge theory can be applied to Bennett's word pictures of the Potteries in a way which offers an attractive explanation of both the beauty and the ugliness which he and others found in industrial landscapes.

Focusing on one author, Bennett, and one theory, Appleton's, this study has been able to show an interesting convergence of art and theory; but of course it might be an exceptional case. To advance the study of this aspect of landscape aesthetics similar examination of the works of other authors, from various societies, is needed. Ideally this should be done in the light of the different theories which seek to explain human response to landscape. Further study of Bennett's writings, too, using other theoretical approaches, might be illuminating.

One may hope that studies such as these, at the interface of geography and the humanities, will be able to complement scientific research on human response to the environment. Perhaps the complexity of human behaviour and of the environment make it unlikely that any one theory will be found to be the 'right' one, but this study of Bennett's Five Towns landscape supports Appleton's view 'that the biological basis of landscape aesthetics as suggested in *The Experience of Landscape* will eventually prove to be aiming in the right direction'.[49]

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FRAMING THE BULLFIGHT: AESTHETICS VERSUS ETHICS

Nathalie Heinich

THE CURATOR of the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Museum was recently accused of obscenity for having exhibited some works by the photographer Robert Mapplethorpe. This is one of those many cases of irreducible conflict between an ethical and an aesthetic perception: irreducible, since those who perceive these photographs as morally shocking, and those who perceive them as artistically worthy of interest, can in no way reach any agreement nor compromise, as the former react on an ethical ground, and the latter on an aesthetic one.

There exist many such conflicts between ethics and aesthetics, which appear to be occasions of very deep emotional investments, either as simple disputes between irreconcilable opinions or leading to formal juridical processes, as in the Mapplethorpe case. Among those various cases, the bullfight provides, as we shall see, a particularly rich example, through a number of books, articles and public debates.[1]

As for the theoretical instruments accounting for those types of value conflicts between ethics and aesthetics, the social sciences seem to be rather poor.[2] The more convenient theory remains, as far as we know, Erving Goffman's *Frame Analysis*.[3] We will try to apply it here to the empirical case of the bullfight, so that the former will help cast some light on the latter, which in turn should illustrate the very power of the theory—as well, maybe, as show its limitations. We shall propose, first, a literal application of *Frame Analysis* to the properties of the object of judgement, that is, the bullfight; second, an instrumental application to the properties of the subjects, that is, those involved in bullfighting, either for or against it; and third, an analogical transposition of a frame-analytical description to the various 'realms' of values—mainly ethical and aesthetic.[4]

LITERAL APPLICATION: TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF INTERACTION

In Goffmanian logic the bullfight appears as a particularly rich example of *frame*,[5] both as a *social* and as a *transformed* frame: in opposition, for instance, to the 'savage', unintended and unformalized confrontation of a bull and a man in a field, which would constitute a *primary frame*. It realizes the two important types of frame *transformation*: that is, *key* and *fabrication*.[6]

The bullfight is a *key* in various ways. On the one hand it is a *performance*[7]—

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which includes, among other necessary components, the backdrop, here made up by the 'patio de arrastre', closed to the public, where bulls are cut up into butchers' meat. On the other hand, its high degree of formalization makes it look very much like a *ceremonial*, characterized by an abundance of rules, with which the spectators are associated by their knowledge of them (a knowledge they display when acclaiming an actor for his exact mastering of the rituals: 'Ole!'). And finally, it also realizes the key of *sport contest* in that it necessarily implies a winner and a loser—even though this peculiar game is not entirely playful, given that what is at stake is no less than the lives of the protagonists.

This last characteristic can also be described as the irruption, into the *transformed frame*, of the *primary frame*, that is, death: the irreducible, untransformable, ultimate event *par excellence*, making it outright impossible to attempt distancing. Such an eventuality means, in Goffman's words, a possible *downkeying*, explaining the high degree of the protagonists' involvement.[8] Anyway, the *rim* of the frame remains that of *performance*, whatever the *lamination* operated between, for example, a pass intended to exhibit the skill or art of the toreador (a *key* within the *rim* of *performance*), and a pass intended to kill the bull, abruptly reintroducing the *primary frame* of *literal experience* into the *keyed frame* of *performance*.

This last distinction between a pass 'as if' and a pass 'for real' leads to another type of *transformation*, in so far as the feint at the basis of each pass is not only destined to dazzle the public but also to mislead the bull, making it mistake the movement of the cape for the body of its opponent, wind for flesh. In other words, if the bullfight represents for the audience a *keying* of the *primary frame*, it nevertheless operates for the bull a *fabrication*, which means a *deception*—and an exploitive one—dividing the actants into those forming the *collusive net* and the *dupes*, excluded from the fabrication.[9]

Among other characteristics of *keyings*, *style* can be applied to the bullfight. Defined by Goffman as *resource continuity* of the actor, it can be emphasized to a greater or lesser extent, depending on how much the interaction is handled by the toreador in an aestheticized way: making the passes last before the putting to death, multiplying effects of self-presentation such as gestures and attitudes that are not indispensable to the movement itself (a form of *upkeying*); or, on the contrary, seeking direct confrontation as closely as possible (a form of *downkeying*). *Upkeying* and *downkeying* represent the two opposite poles of 'classics', who prefer the purity of gesture, and 'tremendists', who privilege emotion. They can also be related to the two fundamental *keys* of bullfighting, 'sport' and 'art'. According to the artistic *key*, a toreador builds on classical 'passes' and creates his own figures that will bear his name and assure his passage to posterity, just as a philosopher or an artist gives his name to a concept or a style.

Being doubly *transformed*, as a *key* and as a *fabrication*, the frame of the bullfight is *vulnerable* to *chain transformations*, in particular to *rekeying*. Such a

transformational vulnerability accounts for comical troupes of toreadors or for museums of tauromachy, introducing additional *lamination* by inscribing the bullfight into another *rim*—that is, parody or fetishized contemplation.

Transformed frames are further characterized by the existence of *brackets*—either temporal or spatial.[10] Spatial brackets are manifold in the bullfight, delimiting several levels of participation: the walls of the arena isolate, from the external world (*primary frame*), all the participants (*transformed frame*); the first barrier or 'talanquera' isolates from the public all the personnel (actors, administrators, workers, doctors, etc.); the second barrier or 'barrera' isolates, from the alley or 'calejon' between those two barriers reserved for the personnel, the whole of the 'cuadrilla', i.e., the team made up by the matadors and toreadors, picadors and horses, banderilleros—and of course, the bull. According to this property of brackets to be neither inside nor outside, like the frame of a picture,[11] the barrier becomes part of the action as soon as an actor (man, or exceptionally bull) transgresses it when in fleeing or in pursuit outside the arena. Thus a succession of circles—or rather of encased ellipses—materializes in a spatial dimension graduated types of participation inside this general *rim* of *performance*, itself materialized by the stone enclosure: a graduation ranging from the most involved (*vulnerable* through *downkeying* by irruption of this *primary frame par excellence*: death), within the *fabricated frame* of the feint by which the man seeks to deceive the beast; to the least involved, within the *keyed frame* of the performance that a man (knowingly) and a beast (unknowingly) give to an audience in an amphitheatre; and finally, to the non-involved people outside the arena (the opponents of bullfighting being virtually present through negative implication).

As for temporal brackets, they are to be found mainly in the musical parade of the overture (the 'paseo'), and in the final march around the arena. But other less formalized and more spectacular rituals delimit the three great passes: 'tercio de varas' (that of the picador), 'tercio de banderillas' (planting of the banderillas), 'tercio de muerte' (pass of the muleta and putting to death). But it is noteworthy that the bullfight is practically *all time-in*, as the beasts represent danger at each moment even though some are more 'in' than others —especially when the bull passes the man as closely as possible. Here lies a difference from a sport such as tennis, for instance, where a considerable amount of time is 'out'. And as Goffman quotes sexual interaction as a typical example of *all time-in* activity,[12] *Frame Analysis*, as a formal grammar of experience, appears to provide a differently motivated reformulation of the analogy between sexuality and tauromachy which philosophy or literature established on their own grounds.[13]

More than any other *strip* of activity, the bullfight consequently appears as an *arrangement*, a *non-literal realm of being*; and the fascination it exerts over aficionados (the very existence of this specific term being a symptom of such a fascination) may be attributed to two reasons: on the one hand, this excep-

tional formal richness, and on the other hand, the eventuality of this most primary frame of all: that is, penetration, either (literally) mortal or (metaphorically) sexual. Such an eventuality accounts for the extremely sophisticated formalization (evidenced by the weight of the costume, up to 10 kilogrammes), keeping at a distance, by enclosing it with forms, a final act which, if untransformed, might appear as equivalent to murder.

INSTRUMENTAL APPLICATION: TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF INTERACTION COMPETENCE

Goffman also evokes the notion of *interaction competence*, as a capacity—more or less developed in each individual—of mastering frames. But what does this capacity consist in? Taking now some distance from this formal grammar of experience, let us try to extend his theory so as to sketch how to bring out the varying individual relations to the bullfight, rather than its invariable, intrinsic characteristics.

This kind of 'differential sociology' might be applied to the different actants (actors, public, critics), and to all those who have to make up their minds about bullfighting. Thus a sociology of sports would describe for each type of actors (toreadors, matadors, picadors, banderilleros, etc.) the type of competences called for by a good management of the fabricated frame: being respectful of the rules and nevertheless individualized or stylized. Then, according to Bourdieu's method, these qualities could be related to the *habitus* and personal trajectories: age, social and geographical origin, education, etc.

A sociology of the public, also based on empirical, monographic and statistical enquiries, would have to be carried out at several levels. On the one hand, one would describe the technical competences necessary to appreciate each of the moments, such as the capacity to recognize and name the different types of passes; this technical competence of the aficionado would then be linked to the social characteristics of each individual, so as to determine to what extent bullfighting touches specific social worlds. On the other hand, one could subject to a similar method the general disposition allowing any individual to live an event on what ordinarily appears as 'second degree', i.e., as transformed frame (performance) rather than as primary frame (confrontation and death): evaluating the basic capacity to establish a distance—that is to say, the capacity of keying the world, aesthetically or ludically—and its relation to the degrees of interest or implication in bullfighting, so as to the types of positions adopted by its partisans and opponents.

The concept of 'interaction competence' could thus be broadened so as to include the unequally distributed faculty to accept the very principle of formalized distanciation and aesthetic approbation, concerning such an ethically disqualified act as the act of killing: in other words, the faculty to transform a primary frame into a performance key.

ANALOGICAL APPLICATION: TOWARDS AN AXIOLOGY OF REALMS

Frame Analysis provides all the formal instruments necessary to describe the duplication of the relation to reality, i.e., the opposition between a spectacularized—or keyed—perception and a literal—or primary—one. But it does not directly allow us to understand whether and how the one and the other might organize value systems. These genuine, deeply invested values appear to powerfully model our relation to the world: much more powerfully than Goffman's formal propositions lead us to believe—particularly in the case of bullfighting, which raises strong and everlasting conflicts between opponents and aficionados. Let us try now to make these value systems become the object of our analysis, focusing no longer on the form of the frame but on its content: not Goffman's 'rim', but what we propose to call the 'realm'.

Bullfighting allows us to distinguish two basic types of realms: the ethical one, peculiar to the immediate relation with the world pertaining of the primary frame as well as to the denunciation of fabrication as a lie; and the aesthetic one, more adequate to keyed frames such as performances, contests, ceremonies, etc. According to the former, an object or an act will be spoken of in terms of morality (good/evil); according to the latter, in terms of beauty (beautiful/ugly). So an analogical transposition has to be performed from *Frame Analysis*: just as reality can be grasped totally and exclusively according to this or that frame, it can also be grasped, just as totally and exclusively, according to this or that realm of values.

There is no exact one-to-one correspondence between a specific frame and a specific realm. A primary frame can be aesthetically or morally invested, or not invested at all: for instance, a sunset or a rainbow might be experienced by the onlooker as beautiful, or as well intentioned if related to a divine will, just as it might be technically analysed in terms of astronomy or physics, or even indifferently, raising no judgement or commentary of whatever order. Moreover, a keying is not automatically aestheticizable: for instance, when the stage play is viewed from the perspective of the backdrop; but a fabrication may be: for instance, when one speaks of an 'admirable machination', a 'beautiful trick'.

There exist, however, evident affinities between certain frames and certain realms—that is, unequal probabilities to see the ones and the others match. Thus, the moral discreditation of a fabrication is a more likely eventuality than its aesthetic evaluation, as well as aestheticization seems to imply a capacity of distanciation which is characteristic of any keying, any transformation performed without victim or dupe.

Now, let us come back to bullfighting. We have seen that it has the rare property of being at once a key, a fabrication and, finally, a primary frame. But it also has the peculiarity of being perceived just as exclusively according to an aesthetic realm as to an ethical one—thus demonstrating the total, sys-

tematic, irreducible nature of those realms of value. So it seems that such a conflict between invested values or expressed opinions lies in the very 'frame-analytical' nature of bullfighting: the multiplicity of distinct frames being precisely what makes possible the de-multiplication of irreducible realms of values—and, correlatively, the general uncertainty or ambiguity of its status.

Consequently, these two types of sociological analysis—in terms of *frame* and in terms of *realm* of experience—appear to be both necessary to understand the types of relations relevant to such a phenomenon as bullfighting: either from the phenomenological or semiological viewpoint concerning the characteristics pertaining to the object (here, a high degree of formalization linked to an equally high degree of emotional investment), or from the psychological or sociological viewpoint concerning the dispositions of the subjects towards the 'organization of experience'. Let us conclude by suggesting that these two sets of conceptual instruments might be different but complementary ways towards the organization of research on human experience: this human experience of the relation between 'individual ordinary implication' and 'organization of society', in Goffman's own terms, to which *Frame Analysis* does supply a precious logical instrument.

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in *Le parler frais d'Erving Goffman* (Paris: Minuit, 1990). Conflicts about the bullfight have been analysed through one precise case in: Nathalie Heinich, 'L'esthétique contre l'éthique, ou l'impossible artitrage: de la tauromachie considérée comme un combat de registres', *Espaces et Sociétés* (1992), n° 1.

[5] Underlined terms refer to Goffmanian concepts.

[6] One being 'the set of conventions by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something quite else' (E. Goffman, *F.A.* p. 44); the other being 'the intentional effort of one or more individuals to manage activity so that a party of one or more others will be induced to have a false belief about what it is that is going on' (*F.A.*, p. 83).

[7] 'That arrangement which transforms an individual into a stage performer, the latter, in turn, being an object that can be looked at in the round and at length without offense, and looked to for engaging behavior, by persons in an "audience" role' (*F.A.*, p. 124).

[8] On this concept see *F.A.*, p. 345 and *passim*, and Norbert Elias, 'Problems of Involvement and Detachment', *The British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VII, n° 3 (September 1956).

[9] 'One party containing others in the construction that is clearly inimical to their private interests' (*F.A.*, p. 103). According to Goffman's definition it is peculiar to a fabrication to be discreditable: here, we have a *discreditation* when, contrary to the regulations, the bull has already been fought, so that it cannot be tricked anymore by the cape and directly charges the toreador.

[10] 'Opening and closing temporal brackets and bounding spatial brackets' (*F.A.*, p. 252).

[11] 'Neither part of the content of activity proper nor part of the world outside the activity but rather both inside and outside' (*F.A.*, p. 251).

[12] 'Activities vary according to the sorts of internal brackets they allow. Tennis interaction involves more time-out than time-in . . . . Sexual interaction is practically all time-in' (*F.A.*, p. 260).

[13] Michel Leiris, in his *Miroir de la tauromachie*, offers a particularly brilliant analysis of the sexual undertones of the bullfight (cf., 'Amour et tauromachie', p. 45). Arguing that taurómachy is more than a sport and more than an art (pp. 30–4), he formulates in other words the very phenomenon of frames superposition evidenced by Goffman's grammar.

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CHESS AS AN ART FORM

P. N. Humble

> It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma: but perhaps there is a key.
>
> W. S. Churchill

WE MIGHT think that the question whether chess is an art form should interest the philosopher and aesthetician. Chess is a game with a long history; it possesses a literature rich in aesthetic interest and it is for many the very paradigm of intellectual activity. Although philosophers are fond enough of using chess as a metaphor they have said remarkably little, however, about a question which bedevils chess literature.[1] To the best of my knowledge, Harold Osborne is one of the few aestheticians to have regarded chess as a subject worthy of comment. In a short but perceptive review-article,[2] he discusses the aesthetics of chess in relation to the concept of intellectual beauty. Although his discussion is constrained by the books under review, he remarks, *en passant*, that chess may rightly be treated as an art form 'since among other things it offers scope for the creation of intellectual objects characterized by beauty'.[3] This remark expresses an important insight; one which I shall elaborate upon with the intention of arguing a case for classifying chess as one of the minor arts. I shall begin by looking at criteria used for evaluating chess games from an aesthetic point of view. I shall then put the case for treating chess as an art form by drawing upon the writings of Grandmaster Bronstein, and conclude by discussing the most powerful objection to my claims.

It is a well-established practice to award brilliancy prizes at chess tournaments for the most beautiful game. (This, incidentally, gives institutional recognition to the aesthetic nature of chess.) With this practice in mind the French chess enthusiast, F. Le Lionnais, stipulated seven criteria for judging a game's aesthetic merit. It is worth summarizing these criteria as they make clear what may not be apparent, namely how a game can reward aesthetic contemplation.[4]

(1) *Correctness* (a). A winning combination (i.e., a unified sequence of moves usually involving two or more pieces) must be correct in the sense that it cannot be refuted by skilful defence. It is not judged beautiful if it succeeds owing to an opponent's blunder. (2) *Correctness* (b). The combination must be the most economical way of winning material or giving checkmate; it should not indulge in pyrotechnics for its own sake. (3) *Difficulty*. A game should be judged beautiful in proportion to the difficulties each player sets the other and

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how well each overcomes the difficulties he has been set. Mistakes on the part of *either* player detract from a game's merit, while dangerous moves enhance it. (4) *Vivacity*. Dull moves diminish a game's merit; spectacular moves increase it. Sacrifices in which a player gives up pieces to obtain a stronger position or attack are especially praiseworthy. (5) *Originality*. A game or combination must be unique. Combinations of a novel, imaginative nature contribute to a game's aesthetic merit. (6) *Richness*. The greater the variety of combinations, the more beautiful the game is to be judged. As well as combinations that are actually played, there are 'hidden' ones or threats. Although these threats being anticipated and countered by the opponent do not materialize, they give a game greater depth and profundity. (6) *Logical Unity*. A game should exhibit harmonious development in which all the moves form part of a larger, overall conception which is itself correct.

M. Le Lionnais regarded these conditions as being necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to be beautiful. This may or may not be true. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that chess is susceptible to aesthetic appraisal and indeed invites it. However, it is one thing to say this and another to say that chess is an art form. Plainly, there are many things we take an aesthetic interest in, including natural phenomena, which are not works of art. Though we may have a clearer idea of how chess can reward aesthetic contemplation, we still lack an argument to show how it is an art form. Such an argument can be extracted from the writings of Grandmaster Bronstein and co-author, Smolyan.

Their book *Chess in the Eighties*[5] is best regarded as a brilliant polemic in which, with passion and wit, they set out to confound sceptic and 'pragmatist' alike by arguing that chess is a creative art. 'Chess is in the highest degree', they assert, 'an individual form of creativity'.[6] 'Everything that appeals to us in a game', they say, warming to their task, 'be it a combination or a manoeuvre, a trap or a study-like ending, the complex logic of a plan or the geometrical harmony of co-ordination—all of these are distinctive *aesthetic* "invariants"' (my italics).[7] Good aesthetic judgement can enable the chess player, they believe, to spot the correct move or hit upon a winning combination.[8] Not only does chess give the player scope to express artistic gifts, the game can be appreciated by the spectator in the same way that paintings, music and architecture can be appreciated, i.e., as art.[9] For our authors, this is no fanciful analogy, and they look forward to a time when chess is properly presented as an (intellectually and morally improving) entertainment for a wider public.[10]

This is good stuff, but it should be said that it is supported by a perceptive analysis of chess creativity; one which may provide the key argument for which we are looking. Let us examine more closely the four important factors our authors think are involved in such creativity.

First, there is the joy the player himself takes in creating 'artistic riches',

which are imperishable (being works of art which are recorded in permanent form, using standard chess notation).

Second, there is the pleasure the audience—the chess public—gets from watching an entertaining game of chess. It is the master's responsibility to ensure that the game is truly entertaining. Our authors write: 'Just as the musician extracts for the public the sounds of a charming melody, so the artistic chess player uses his skill to extract from the material at his disposal the beauty of a chess idea'. The audience must play its part too by creating a sense of occasion (rather like an audience at the theatre). As Bronstein and Smolyan remark: 'Without an audience there is no creative intensity . . . on a deserted stage, alone with himself, the master loses his creative potential, and his torpid soul becomes the prisoner of countless variations from which he no longer has the strength to escape'.[11] We can in turn extract from these writings the all-important notion of an audience, of a spectator. Via this notion we can link chess with the major arts, where we speak of the artist as creating something with the intention of rewarding aesthetic contemplation. Similarly, we can speak of the chess master as playing a game with exactly the same intention.

Third, there is the 'powerful attractive factor' of the game's 'mysterious beauty'. Our authors refer to the views of Le Lionnais, which we noted above, and regret these are not more widely known. They suggest alternative ways of evaluating games, and attach the greatest importance to qualities of daring, imagination and fantasy. They quote approvingly Francis Bacon's observation that 'there is no complete beauty in existence which does not contain a certain portion of strangeness'. And they agree wholeheartedly with Richard Réti, who remarked: 'That which basically delights us in chess . . . is the triumph of a deep, brilliant idea over dull mediocrity, the victory of the individual over the trivial'.[12] In a manner calculated to have warmed Collingwood's heart, Bronstein and Smolyan distinguish between mere craftsmanship and true art.

The importance our authors attach to originality is reminiscent of the attitude of early European avant-garde artists. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Richard Réti, to whom they refer, was one of the leading lights of the wonderfully named Hypermodern school of chess. This school flourished in the 1920s, and its members saw themselves as the artists of the game who would revolutionize how it was played. Their highly original ideas have had a lasting influence.[13]

The fourth and final factor Bronstein and Smolyan mention is that of the medium. Chess is said to afford 'the deep intellectual pleasure of working in a fantastically varied and flexible medium', which enables the player to test the strength of his ideas and of his imagination. As in science new ideas are rigorously tested; mere novelty not being prized for its own sake.

I hope that by examining the views above we are now better placed to understand how chess may be justifiably treated as an art. We may freely summarize those views as follows: chess offers a medium in which players

strive to produce intellectual objects of beauty and imaginative power for a spectator's appreciation. We may on the basis of this define a game of chess as a work of art in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. A game of chess is a work of art if, and only if, it is (a) produced primarily with the intention of rewarding aesthetic contemplation; (b) exhibits aesthetic features[14] and (c) is unique. I shall comment on each condition, taking them in reverse order.

The third condition is the most straightforward. It has been calculated that the number of different legal positions on a chessboard is 2×10^{43}, while the number of different 40-move games is 25×10^{115}. This would seem to afford ample scope to the enterprising player![15]

As regards the second condition, the term *aesthetic features* is used in Frank Sibley's[16] sense and includes both features implying merits in games and those implying demerits. It should be noted that according to the proposed definition games of chess in common with paintings or poems etc. may be good, bad or indifferent works of art, even though it is only masterpieces that are anthologized.

It is the first condition that for many will prove the hardest to swallow. Although it may be readily granted that chess possesses an aesthetic dimension, it may be objected that aesthetic considerations must yield to the imperatives of the *contest*—which provides the game with its true rationale. According to this view, chess is a sport and, moreover, a highly competitive international one in which the world championship is a gladiatorial contest fought with psychological weapons for high financial stakes. This would seem to be a pretty formidable objection, or in chess parlance a crushing combination. I hope to show, however, that the position I seek to defend has hidden resources which may yet blunt the force of the objection.

Osborne himself believed the competitive nature of the game did not preclude its being an art form. His review-article gives two useful hints as to how competitive and aesthetic considerations may be reconciled. He speculates that the competitive features of the game may well 'supply the interest necessary for gripping and sustaining attention before appreciation of beauty can take place'. And he adds these features 'may well colour to some extent the nature of the beauties to which [chess is] susceptible or at any rate modify the conditions under which beauty can arise'.[17] Let me offer a gloss on these remarks.

The first has a rather odd ring to it. I think the point that needs to be made is that we can appreciate a game as a sporting contest or dramatic spectacle. Some of the aesthetic judgements we pass on a game are *directly* related to how satisfying we find it in this respect. We may say that a game is compelling, electrifying, or dynamic. Or less favourably, we may speak of it as being dull, lifeless or lacking in tension. The game's competitive nature may influence also our aesthetic judgements *indirectly*, and this brings me to Osborne's second point.

An example may be helpful. Suppose Black appears to have a lost game. He is a piece down, and must find a reply to a nasty looking threat with only five minutes left on his chess clock.[18] Then Black surprises his opponent and the onlookers by finding a hidden resource in what appeared to be a completely lost position. He plays an elegant combination and brings off a forced win with only seconds remaining on his clock. How should we describe the game from the onlooker's point of view? We would expect him to appreciate, certainly, the combination's formal elegance. But the pattern of moves, pleasing in its harmony and fresh invention, hasn't been laboriously fashioned in the quiet of the study; it has been played at dazzling speed and under the most tense circumstances. For our spectator the combination would assuredly be spectacular in the literal meaning of the word. The circumstances, then, have 'coloured' the aesthetic qualities of the combination.

Such an example does not exhaust the subtle implications of Osborne's point. There are other ways in which aesthetic and competitive considerations may be interwoven in our appreciation of a game. At this point it is worth recalling the criterion of difficulty stipulated by Le Lionnais. According to this criterion, a game is to be judged beautiful in proportion to the difficulties each player sets the other and how well each overcomes the difficulties he has been set. For example, White's combination counts as a beautiful one only if Black consistently finds the best possible replies. In short, we would refrain from praising White's play if the opponent's play is of a poor *competitive* standard. Moreover, the greater the risk White takes in playing the combination, the more highly we praise it. In cases of this sort how we use aesthetic terms is logically tied, as it were, to the criterion of difficulty and therefore to competitive considerations.

In trying to answer the objection stated above, I have looked at matters from the spectator's point of view and have argued that how we judge a game aesthetically may be influenced by its nature as a contest. What I wish to do now is to look at the relationship between sporting and artistic aspects from a player's perspective and show how the latter can influence the former.

It will be recalled that Bronstein and Smolyan attach importance to the role played by aesthetic considerations in a master's conduct of a game. Here is what they say:

> But in chess, as in mathematics, there is harmony of form, geometric beauty and expressiveness, and free play of the imagination. And there is a multitude of examples of how the choice of the best plan or move in chess is guided by beauty. A harmonious idea is almost always correct. Without exaggerating greatly, it can be said that it is *aesthetic feeling* which attunes the intellect towards searching, and leads it there.[19] (my italics)

What is being claimed, among other things, is that a player with acute aesthetic judgement can see what the requirements of a given position are. He can

devise a plan which exhibits logical unity, or home in on the correct move, or spot the dynamic combination latent in a position. In the case of the latter, the master does not carry out long, complex calculations of every possible variation (which may involve computing hundreds of moves) and arrive at a winning combination by elimination; he sees a pattern. That is to say, the master sees how individual elements can be fitted together in the right way, i.e., a beautiful way. And what our authors are suggesting is that seeing how the elements can be fitted together in the right way requires a highly developed sense of aesthetic judgement. (Though once the master has found the combination he will then check its soundness by calculating the *relevant* variations.) In my view the psychological research which has been carried out on chess, while not establishing the authors' claims, goes a long way to doing so.[20]

The upshot of this is that aesthetic considerations are not of secondary importance, not merely icing on the cake. At the very highest levels of the game the successful competitor is one whose play shows a feeling for the aesthetic.

We may compare the view expressed by our authors regarding the importance of aesthetic considerations with similar ones voiced by modern mathematicians and scientific thinkers in relation to their own concerns. In 1908 the great mathematician, Henri Poincaré, observed that: 'It is true aesthetic feeling which all mathematicians recognize . . . the useful combinations are precisely the most beautiful'.[21] Substitute 'chess-players' for 'mathematicians', and it might be Bronstein and Smolyan speaking. The distinguished mathematical analyst, G. H. Hardy, characterized the mathematician as 'a maker of patterns' which 'like the painter's, or the poet's must be *beautiful*; the [mathematical] ideas, like the colours or the words, must fit together in a harmonious way. Beauty is the first test: there is no permanent place for ugly mathematics'.[22] J. C. Polkinghorne, sometime Professor of Mathematical Physics in the University of Cambridge, remarked: 'It is a recognized technique in elementary particle physics to seek theories which are compact and mathematically beautiful, in the expectation that they will then prove to be the ones realized in nature'.[23] We will not, however, let the moderns have the last word. Aristotle said: 'Those who assert that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful are in error. . . . The chief forms of beauty are order, commensurability and precision'.[24]

We may recap what has been said in reply to the objection that chess is not an art form as aesthetic considerations are at best of secondary importance. I hope to have shown that on the contrary they are of the first importance. I argued that it is wrong to suppose that aesthetic and competitive considerations are somehow incompatible, or that the latter take precedence over the former. I suggested that a game could be appreciated as sporting contest or dramatic spectacle, and that some of our aesthetic judgements refer explicitly or implicitly to the game understood in these ways. Moreover, I claimed that a

player's aesthetic judgement could be a crucial factor in determining how well he plays and whether he wins or loses. I referred in this connection to the fundamental importance of aesthetics both within and without chess in order to show that this was not something peculiar to the game.

Whatever else it may, chess is first and foremost an art form whose games are to be enjoyed as works of art. But however beautiful or profound the masterpieces of Alekhine, Bronstein and Kasparov may be, I doubt whether we would wish to describe them as *great* works of art. (There is an interesting asymmetry here—chess masterpieces: minor art works.) Perhaps this is because chess by its very nature cannot comment upon the deep human themes characteristic of great art—but this is a question I shall leave for another occasion.

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[1] See, for example, the introduction to William Hartston's *The Kings of Chess* (Pavilion Books, 1985). It begins: 'The game of chess occupies a curious, perhaps unique niche in the realms of man's leisure activities. Too serious and mentally demanding to be dismissed as merely a game, yet too inherently trivial to justify its pretensions to be considered anything higher, chess has absorbed the minds of its practitioners for centuries .... Whether we view the game of chess as a harmless and unimportant pastime, or a field of serious study, or a *minor art form*, it is the competitive aspect of the game which has remained paramount' (my italics).

The controversy is neatly encapsulated in a story Richard Eales tells in his *Chess: The History of a Game* (Batsford, 1985). The Sports Council and Arts Council debated at length which should be held responsible for subsidizing British chess.

[2] Harold Osborne, 'Notes on the Aesthetics of Chess and the Concept of Intellectual Beauty', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 4, No. 2. The books he discusses are: *Chess Problems: Introduction to an Art* by M. Lipton, R. Matthews and J. Rice, and *Les Prix de Beauté aux Echecs* by F. Le Lionnais. My remarks above refer strictly to Osborne's review-article. There is evidence to suggest he may possibly have changed his mind about chess being an art form. See his editorial introduction to *Aesthetics* (Oxford U.P., 1972), p. 13.

[3] Osborne, 'Notes on the Aesthetics of Chess and the Concept of Intellectual Beauty', op. cit., p. 163.

[4] The summary below is based upon Osborne's own summary of Le Lionnais' criteria. See Osborne's review-article, op. cit.

[5] D. Bronstein and G. Smolyan, *Chess in the Eighties*. Trans. K. P. Neat (Pergamon Press, 1982).

[6] Ibid., p. 26.

[7] Ibid., p. 24.

[8] Ibid., pp. 27–8.

[9] Ibid., p. 27.

[10] Ibid., pp. 29–30. Chapter 7 has far-sighted and practical suggestions about how to improve the manner in which chess is presented as entertainment.

[11] For both remarks see, ibid., p. 29.

[12] For both quotations see, ibid., p. 31.

[13] The historical parallel with the visual arts is instructive, for as we noted above chess had its own avant-garde. Both the avant-garde artist and chess master valued originality

highly. But the notion of progress in the history of chess differs in certain respects from its counterpart in art history. Innovations in chess have rendered some earlier practices and even principles obsolete. For example, standard openings have been greatly refined over the centuries and opening theory is now much more elaborate and sophisticated than previously. Principles of positional play familiar to the strong club-player of today would astound the eighteenth-century master. In this respect, the notion of progress in chess resembles its counterpart in science more closely than anything else. Despite this, the games of Philidor (1726–1795) are still artistic masterpieces and are rewarding in just the same way that the masterpieces of, say, David are. In short, the notion of progress in chess exhibits features of both the artistic and scientific conceptions, and this points to the very complex nature of chess itself and the many changes it has undergone during its long history.

For more on the Hypermodern school see Richard Eales's *Chess: The History of a Game*, chapter 6 and Richard Réti's own brilliant work, *Modern Ideas in Chess* (Dover Publications, 1960), trans. John Hart.

[14] For more on the conditions see P. N. Humble, 'The Philosophical Challenge of Avant-Garde Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 24, No. 2.

[15] See Mike Fox and Richard James, *The Complete Chess Addict* (Faber & Faber, 1987), p. 166.

[16] F. N. Sibley, 'Aesthetic Concepts', *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. 68, No. 4. For a recent discussion of Sibley's seminal views, see Marcia Eaton, *Aesthetics and the Good Life* (Associated University Presses, 1989), chapter 1.

[17] Harold Osborne, op. cit., p. 163.

[18] Tournament games are played according to strict time controls. The players have to make a specified number of moves in a specified time. If a player fails to complete the moves in the allotted time and has not checkmated the opponent or agreed a draw, he loses the game automatically. A chess clock is two clocks in one, connected together. When a player moves he presses his clock which stops it and engages his opponent's. The introduction of clocks for this specific purpose in the latter half of the nineteenth century had the effect of making the game more exciting and entertaining.

[19] Bronstein and Smolyan, op. cit., pp. 27–8.

[20] W. R. Hartston and P. C. Wason's *The Psychology of Chess* (London, 1983) attempts to explain in clear terms the nature of chess ability. One interesting conclusion they reach is that to play the game well requires visual-spatial skills of a high order and an ability to remember a very large number of constantly recurring positions or patterns of a visual nature.

[21] Quoted by Harold Osborne, 'Mathematical Beauty and Physical Science', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 291.

[22] Quoted by Gideon Engler, 'Aesthetics in Science and in Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 30, No. 1, p. 25.

[23] Quoted by Harold Osborne, op. cit., p. 291.

[24] Quoted by Harold Osborne, op. cit., p. 293.

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ON FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF ART: A RESPONSE TO ROWE

Graham Oppy

IN 'WHY "Art" Doesn't Have Two Senses',[1] M. W. Rowe claims: (1) that the expression 'work of art' can be given a functional definition; (2) that it follows from (1) that there can be no merely classificatory sense of the expression 'work of art'; and (3) that it also follows from (1) that any attempt to define the expression 'work of art' which fails to accord an important role to the value of works of art is necessarily defective.

Rowe is surely right to insist that a definition of the expression 'work of art' will need to accord an important role to the notion of the value of works of art. However, I propose to argue that Rowe fails to identify the most likely form which a functional definition would take—and, moreover, that it is perfectly compatible with a more plausible functional definition that there is a merely classificatory sense of the expression 'work of art'.

I

Rowe's main argument in defence of (2) relies on a tripartite classification of common nouns into three classes, viz: (i) *common nouns which are 'functionally defined'—i.e., defined wholly or partly in terms of a function* (e.g., 'doorstop', tin-opener', 'knife'); (ii) *common nouns which are not functionally defined, but whose referents have either one or a limited number of socially acknowledged functions* (e.g., 'coal', 'apple', 'mule'); and (iii) *common nouns which are not functionally defined, and whose referents do not have socially acknowledged functions* (e.g., 'rock', 'fluff', 'crumb'). Rowe argues (a) that 'art' and 'work of art' belong neither to (ii) nor to (iii), and hence that they must belong to (i); and (b) that in the case of terms which belong to (i), there can be no merely classificatory use of such terms. Both parts of this argument are suspect.

The argument for (a) is suspect because Rowe provides no reason to suppose that the tripartite division of common nouns is exhaustive. Moreover, it is clear that common nouns such as 'person' and 'nation' fit none of Rowe's categories (given the criteria which Rowe provides for admission into each category). Consequently, Rowe's eliminative argument does not show that 'work of art' belongs in class (i). However, for now let us grant that 'work of art' does belong to class (i).

Rowe's main argument for (b) is given in the following paragraph:

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> What the referents of this class are good for is already contained in their definitions. Thus, if I say, 'This is a good tin-opener' then I will be taken to mean that the object in question is good for opening tins or good as a tin-opener. . . . From this it follows that an object must live up to a certain standard if it is to be called a tin-opener at all. . . . All that 'good' placed in the attributive position does is enhance the evaluative component contained implicitly in the word or explicitly in the definition.[2]

There are at least three reasons why we should not be persuaded by this argument: (A): Even in the case of artefacts which are defined in terms of a single function, the evaluation of those artefacts can proceed along many distinct lines (not all of which need to be at all relevant to the present or continued ability of the artefacts to perform those functions). Consider tin-openers. If *Choice* magazine were to do a survey of tin-openers, it would almost certainly rate them along all of the following dimensions: price, strength, durability, resistance to rust, ease of operation, safety of operation, energy-efficiency. Moreover, it might well rate some tin-openers poorly even though those tin-openers can be used perfectly well to remove the lids from tins. Consider, for example, a tin-opener which always removes the lid from the tin perfectly well, but which often also removes a few fingers from the hand of the person who operates it! So: it is not true that a tin-opener is good just because it is good at removing the lids from tins—even though it is true, by definition, that a good tin-opener will be good at removing lids from tins. (B): Rowe's argument that broken tin-openers are not (properly speaking) tin-openers has utterly counter-intuitive consequences. Suppose that I buy a tin-opener, use it for a while, break it, and then repair it. How many tin-openers have I owned? According to Rowe, it seems that the answer must be at least two, since Rowe holds that a broken tin-opener is no tin-opener at all. At the very least, Rowe owes us some story about how the later tin-opener gets to be identified with the earlier one—a story which, I suggest, is most plausibly filled out through the concession that really there was just one tin-opener all along! (C): Rowe's argument involves a *non-sequitur*. Even if it were true that the properties of a good tin-opener could be deduced from the definition of a tin-opener, it would not follow that an object must live up to a certain standard in order to be a tin-opener at all. To suppose that it would follow is just to beg the question about the nature of the definition under scrutiny. However, in order to show this, we need to investigate the kind of functional definition which Rowe espouses.

II

Rowe suggests (at least implicitly) that the following is an adequate functional definition of art: 'A work of art is an object of sight, hearing, or—to a lesser extent—touch, created in order to hold the interest of an audience'.[3] Thus,

Rowe suggests that the function of works of art is to serve as objects of 'disinterested aesthetic contemplation in the widest sense'.[4]

However: (*i*) it is obvious that there are many objects which serve this function yet which are not works of art; (*ii*) it is not clear that there is any non-circular way of specifying what is to count as 'aesthetic contemplation'; and (*iii*) it seems clearly wrong to suppose that the creator of a work of art *must* explicitly intend that the work will serve as an object of disinterested contemplation in the widest sense.

(The screen-saver on my computer illustrates (*i*); I overheard one student say to another that she could spend hours looking at this screen-saver—thereby engaging in an activity which is surely 'aesthetic contemplation in the widest sense'. None the less, there is no doubt that neither the screen-saver programme nor its physical manifestation is a work of art.

In defence of (*iii*), consider the possibility that some art is created without the intention that it will ever be disinterestedly contemplated by anyone. A writer such as Kafka might have written without intending that anyone should read his work; and, indeed, perhaps even intending that no-one should ever read his work. And, in any case, it doesn't seem to be too hard to imagine cases in which art is created in the absence of any intentions concerning the future disinterested contemplation of the work.)

But perhaps some of these worries can be met. The crucial question concerns the best way to interpret the claim that a work of art is created *in order to* hold the interest of an audience. On the one hand, the problem about the screen-saver suggests that it won't be correct to suppose that anything which actually performs the function of holding the interest of an audience is thereby a work of art. And, on the other hand, the problem about absent intentions suggests that it won't be correct to suppose that anything which is a work of art is thereby intended to perform the function of holding the interest of an audience. But is there any other way of interpreting the definition?

Some recent work in philosophy of biology makes use of the notion of the 'proper functions' of artefacts and biological entities. Very roughly, the proper function of an artefact is the function which it performs when it is working properly, and the proper function of a biological organ is the function which it performs in properly contributing to the healthy functioning of the entire animal. Moreover, in most cases, the proper functions are precisely those functions upon which the continued use or reproduction or survival of the entities in questions has depended. (The proper function of the heart is to pump the blood; and the reason why given animals have hearts is precisely because of their genetic inheritance from ancestors in whom the proper functioning of hearts promoted evolutionary success. The proper function of tin-openers is to open tins; and the reason why we have the kinds of tin-openers which we do is—at least in large part—because those kinds of things have proved to be very suited to the task of opening tins.)

One crucial feature of the notion of a proper function is that an entity can have a proper function even when it is not able to carry out that function. A heart in which the main arteries have been blocked by fatty deposits is no longer able to perform its proper function. But, of course, that does not mean that it is no longer a heart. (We have heart attacks. We don't have 'what used to be a heart' attacks.) Similarly, as I claimed in section I, a broken tin-opener—even though no longer able to perform the proper function of tin-openers—remains a tin-opener. For it remains true that the proper function of this object—i.e., that which it would do if it were working properly—is to open tins.

What this suggests is that functional kinds have a two-stage definition. First, the proper function of objects of the kind is identified. And then the kind is defined to be anything which has that proper function. (In some cases, there may not be anything much more informative which can be said to indicate how one determines what entities have the proper function in question.) Consequently, it is true that the definition of functional kinds does incorporate a judgement about what those kinds are good for—and yet it is not true that anything which belongs to the kind must exhibit the value in question. (So: even if it were true that the properties of a good tin-opener could be deduced from the definition of a tin-opener, it would not follow that an object must live up to a certain standard in order to be a tin-opener at all. And, while it is not true that the properties of a good tin-opener can be deduced from the definition of a tin-opener, it is true that one property of any good tin-opener can be deduced from the definition of a tin-opener, namely: that it fulfils its proper function, and hence can be used to open tins.)

In sum, then, I am suggesting that Rowe ought to be claiming that it is the *proper* function of works of art to serve as objects for disinterested aesthetic contemplation in the widest sense. While this suggestion is incompatible with much else that Rowe says, I am fairly confident that it is the most plausible way to fill out the idea that 'art' and 'work of art' can be given functional definitions. Moreover, it is plain that terms which have 'proper-functional' definitions can also have purely classificatory primary uses—so that one who adopts such a view need not give up the intuitive idea that there is a purely classificatory use of the expression 'work of art'. (Of course, there are problems which face the idea that it is the proper function of works of art to serve as objects for disinterested aesthetic contemplation in the widest sense. However, exploration of these problems cannot be carried out here.)

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PITIFUL RESPONSES TO MUSIC

Aaron Ridley

IF ONE conclusion of an argument is that we attribute 'sadness' to a piece of music in virtue of the pity it arouses in us, then this should tell us at once that something somewhere has gone wrong. Pitying a piece of music? Feeling sorry for a series of sounds? Surely this must be the absurd part of a *reductio*. Derek Matravers thinks otherwise, however; for in his defence of an 'arousal' theory of artistic expression, he makes exactly the claim that I have mentioned ('Art and the Feelings and Emotions', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, October 1991, p. 328).

The nub of Matravers's argument—which yields the conclusion in question—may be summarized as follows: (1) Words such as 'pity', 'sadness', 'joy', etc. are, in their primary uses, the names of emotions, where an emotion is a complex state involving cognitive, phenomenological and physiological aspects. Thus to say that something is sad is, primarily, to say that a thing is in a state having whichever cognitive, phenomenological and physiological aspects are characteristic of sadness (pp. 323–324). (2) But we also attribute, e.g., sadness, in a secondary sense, to things which are not themselves in such a state: specifically to things (e.g., facial expressions) which are the *effects* of such states; and to things (e.g., failures) which are the *causes* of such states (p. 322). (3) But there is still another sense of sadness: 'sadness' may name a *'feeling'*—where a 'feeling' is an emotion without its cognitive aspect. Thus someone 'feels' sad when he is in a certain phenomenological and physiological state, but is in no particular cognitive state, i.e., when there is nothing in particular that he is sad *about* (pp. 324–325). (4) Someone's sadness may make us sad; but more often we will respond in some other way, for example with pity. Thus our responses very often have a different emotive character from the things which they are responses to. From this, two kinds of arousal theory of expression can be distinguished. According to the first, we attribute sadness to a thing when we respond to it with sadness. This is rejected on the grounds that we need not attribute, e.g., irritation to the things that irritate us. According to the second, by contrast, we attribute sadness to a thing when the character of our response, though different from sadness, is none the less 'related' to sadness, e.g., when we respond with pity. The arousal theory is accepted in this second form (pp. 327–329). (5) Thus we attribute sadness to a piece of music in virtue of the pity it arouses in us; but because there would be something odd about pitying a piece of music, i.e., about having it as the object of the cognitive aspect of the emotion pity, it is claimed that our pitiful response to the music must instead be a *'feeling'*. It is on the basis of our

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'feeling' of pity, then, we attribute sadness to a piece of music (pp. 328–329).

Now it is clear that several things have gone wrong in this argument. For instance, Matravers incorrectly generalizes the claim in (3). Sadness may exist as a 'feeling', i.e., as an emotion shorn of its cognitive aspect; and so, for example, may cheerfulness, depression and exuberance, as generally cheerful depressed and exuberant 'feelings' about nothin in particular. But not every emotion can exist, without its cognitive aspect, as a 'feeling'. Specifically, pity cannot so exist. It makes no sense to talk about experiencing pity, but for nothing in particular; and nor, for example, can grief, jealousy or remorse exist merely as 'feelings', as generally grieving, jealous or remorseful 'feelings' about nothing in particular. These emotions are emotions or they are nothing. Thus in the unlikely event that we should respond pitifully to a piece of music there would have to be *something* that we pitied. The music? Absurd. The composer, perhaps, or else a composer-'persona' whom we construct as we listen to the music? Maybe; but that would require a very different argument from the one we are given here.

So if it is unclear how we could experience the *emotion* pity in response to a piece of music, it is certainly a mistake to claim that we experience the *'feeling'* pity in response to it. But the incorrect generalization noted above is not the only reason Matravers makes this claim. He is also led to make it because of a confusion about (2), where the causal language he favours is not appropriate. It is true that there are senses of the word 'sad' in which failures and facial expressions are sad—but these are *not* sad in virtue of being, respectively, causes and effects of sadness (in its primary sense). Rather, they are aspects of particular episodes of sadness: a failure may be the object of an episode of sadness (i.e., the object of the cognitive aspect of the emotion), and so may be related conceptually to that episode, i.e., as what the sadness is *about*; and a facial expression may also be part of what a particular episode of sadness is (perhaps as one of its physiological aspects). These are the reasons why we attribute sadness to failures and faces. Mere causes and effects of sadness (e.g., sad-making drugs and sodden hankies) aren't sad at all, unless, of course, they become the objects of further, distinct, episodes of sadness (or perhaps are seen as putative objects of such episodes). It is the failure fully to appreciate the distinction between objects and causes of emotion that leads Matravers to espouse the strange theory in (4). He seems to think that from the fact that we experience ('feelings' of) pity we *infer* that something must be sad (as if something's being sad were merely a cause of pity); whereas of course something's being sad is the *object* of pity, which is an emotion, and so is not inferred at all: for the cognition of sadness is an essential part of the pity itself. Therefore, in as much as we infer from our response a *cause*, we have no reason to attribute to that cause any emotive quality (so that even if pity *were* sometimes a 'feeling', the fact that it had been caused by a piece of music would be no reason to call the music sad—or pitiful); and in as much as we do attribute

emotive qualities to the *object* of our response, we do so on the basis of nothing we have inferred from the response aroused in us. Which means that arousal, as Matravers construes it, is wholly irrelevant to the attribution of emotive qualities (to music, or to anything else). Thus his analysis does not, and cannot, capture our reasons for calling sad music sad.

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BOOK REVIEWS

To the Rescue of Art: Twenty Six Essays. By RUDOLF ARNHEIM. University of California Press. 1992. pp. 248. $16.00; clothbound, $38.00.

WHAT CAN science tell us about art? This question was answered confidently in the 1950s and early sixties by both artists and scientists and Rudolph Arnheim was foremost in answering it through his earliest and most influential book *Art and Visual Perception* (1954). Psychology was the connecting link and the common belief was that in so far as artists and scientists are concerned with truth, the crux of this concern lay in a common interest in the way the world is perceived. The abstractionism of the period helped to foster this belief in a common purpose and, indeed, it was flattering to artists to be studied by scientists and to be made to feel that they had a significant part to play in an age increasingly dominated by science and materialism. Meaning in art had yet to be seen as essentially a matter of symbolic reference, a development which has led inexorably to the present situation where the substance of art is represented typically as a form of language.

In *To the Rescue of Art* Rudolph Arnheim's complaint set out in the first essay 'In Favour of Confrontation' is about the direction art has taken since this earlier period and the following essays demonstrate his alternative approach. The nub of his disagreement centres on the supplanting of scientific interest in art by various forms of post-structural analysis which are rooted in the arbitrariness of the sign, and on the idea of truth as socially constructed and thus of essentially relative significance. Post-Modernism, according to this reading, is simply the artistic expression of a state of mindless acceptance of anything and everything with only the criterion of commercial value as the final arbiter of significance.

The problem, as Arnheim sees it, lies with philosophy and in particular with the British philosophical tradition which through empiricists such as David Hume sees truth as lying not 'in the efficiency and energy of causes . . . nor in the Deity' but belonging entirely to the soul; and with Nietzsche 'the other ingredient of this toxic philosophical concoction' as he describes it, who gave strength to those who would mould the world in accordance with individual wishes and needs. Richard Rorty receives a rap in passing for stating that 'we understand knowledge when we understand the social justification of belief, and thus have no need to view it as accuracy of representation', and 'Once conversation replaces confrontation, the notion of mind as a Mirror of Nature can be discarded'. Arnheim comments that 'when I, as an outsider, light on the scene of today's philosophy and read such statements, I am seized of the suspicion that the work crew charged with erecting the edifice of our principles is infiltrated by termites'.

On the broad issue of the decline of art one has much sympathy with Arnheim's view. The contemporary scene does not have much to commend it but his criticisms seem to spring more from regret at the passing of Modernism and of the interpretation of art which Modernism established than from a willingness to follow changes in artistic style even though they might cast doubt on previous theory. 'I, as an outsider', hints also at pique over the dismissive attitude of Rorty and other deconstructionists towards the opinions that many scientists hold of the importance of their concerns. Artists, I suspect, are reluctant to accept the idea that at the end of the search for understanding they will find a door behind which will be seated a scientist, an opinion which Arnheim seems content to hold.

I say 'seems' for one is not sure. There is no doubting his concern for art nor his profound knowledge of the subject. His essays are stimulating and full of original and perceptive observations, each bringing with it the evidence of long-standing commitment to art

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and to the understanding of it within the context of life as a whole. But he speaks as a scientist and in as much as recent philosophical developments have been about the power embodied in language and much art about rendering that power inert, in the absence of any idea where science is taking us we must allow that a function of art in the present age might be to oppose science's more unreflective assumptions.

There is, of course, science and individual scientists as there is art and individual artists and one of the results of taking a scientific view of art is that the very individuality of art is lost in the reductionist tendencies of the scientific method. For the most part, it must be said, Arnheim avoids this and is, indeed, conscious of it, but if art has been provoked by science to head off in another direction and philosophy with it in order to mark out a place it can call its own, scientists must not be surprised at the ensuing results. Nor must they sit pat on the assumption that when all men are reasonable (i.e., when all are familiar with the ways of science) life will be found to conform to the scientist's picture of it. To know the mind of God is to risk draining from life the mystery and wonder which it is the function of art to celebrate. Recent deconstructionist arguments, however unappealing to authority in whatever capacity, have at least made room for the aesthetic to enter as a criterion of judgement in assessing claims to truth. (It is significant that Arnheim quotes Wölfflin's injunction that 'First of all stay clear of the pernicious contact with aesthetics' in this regard.) One is conscious of the dangers of this but the scientist of sensibility, upon which the true meeting of minds will stand, will be conscious of its significance.

As one whose approach to art was largely fashioned in the hopeful atmosphere of the fifties and sixties I am naturally sympathetic to Arnheim's message but a concern for meaning implicit in structure does now seem from theperspective of the present to be, as Rorty suggests, just an episode in the course of conversation. Is one's feeling that, nevertheless, this approach to the visual arts is the most illuminating simply a matter of taste or of stylistic predilection? I would like to think not as I would like to think that the substance of art is not to be found by drawing analogies between it and language, except at a superficial level.

This book casts an oblique light upon philosophical developments relating to art as they have unfolded since the 1960s as well as being of particular interest to readers with a psychological concern for the visual arts. As an avowed outsider to the philosophical arguments which he disapproves of but with a profound knowledge of art, Rudolph Arnheim is well placed to indicate where they may be losing touch with our most significant and satisfying experiences of art.

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The Symbolism of Habitat: An Interpretation of Landscape in the Arts. By JAY APPLETON. University of Washington Press. 1990. pp. 113. £8.95; *The Aesthetics of Landscape.* By STEVEN C. BOURASSA. Belhaven Press. 1991. pp. 168. No price given.

IT IS not often that a book is published which sets out to create a framework for our aesthetic appreciation of landscape. To have two appear at the same time is, or should be, a rare treat. How much of a treat depends on how far they extend our understanding. The starting point for both books is Appleton's habitat theory—the notion that our primaeval habitat, hunting strategies and need for shelter predispose us to prefer certain types of landscape. Bourassa seeks to place this theory in the context of a range of approaches while Appleton sets out to develop it further by demonstrating its applicability.

Bourassa begins by reviewing what it means to view landscape as an aesthetic object. The discussion is wide ranging and, at times, idiosyncratic. Some of the discussion, for example the use of 'environment' as an alternative to landscape, must seem a little opaque to readers who have no understanding of the philosophical lurches that geography has undergone. None the less he exposes important issues in landscape aesthetics, in particular the place of insider and outsider experience and the tension between landscape as a cultural or biological experience. Bourassa's particular contribution

to landscape aesthetics is an attempt to fuse the cultural and biological. By assembling evidence he builds a case that we have three modes of landscape experience, biological, cultural and personal, which are based in primitive and higher centres of the brain.

Bourassa places Appleton's work within the biological mode of experience. Appleton would probably not challenge this but I doubt he would see eye to eye with Bourassa in terms of the relative importance of the biological, cultural and personal. Certainly his view is that habitat theory is fundamental to understanding our landscape values. His book is a collection of three lectures in which he takes forward habitat theory and expresses it in terms of a symbolism which links environmental form with biological reaction. His argument is, at one and the same time, both an analysis of biological and cultural controls in landscape values and a synthesis within a symbolic framework. The whole is replete with examples taken from natural and designed landscapes, buildings, townscape and landscape art.

How then should we judge the two texts? There are two principal criteria. The first is 'how far do they extend theory?'. Are they leading us towards a conclusion which others will find both philosophically acceptable and practically useful, or are they taking us down a cul-de-sac? The second criterion concerns the quality with which the argument is expressed.

The problem with Appleton's habitat theory is that it requires an act of faith as much as the logic of the argument to accept that evolution has not wiped out our hunter past but left it as instinctive behaviour. I am uneasy about this not because I do not accept that instinctive behaviour exists but because I cannot see how affective, aesthetic reactions constitute an instinctive reaction. Even if they did I am not sure I could accept that this behaviour should not itself have been modified by evolution. The argument that we like parkland because the savanna was our original home makes it difficult to understand how we, as west Europeans, ever came to like mountains. I wonder what landscape judgements the people of Tierra del Fuego or Tibet would make? The Savanna is so far outside their experience that I doubt even an instinctive memory would influence them to value it.

Bourassa would not, I suspect, be as sceptical about Appleton's ideas. We both accept the importance of Appleton's contribution in stimulating debate but Bourassa goes further and sees a role for Appleton's views as part of a meta-theory to explain our aesthetic judgements of landscape. He presents a case that the biological mode of aesthetic experience gives rise to laws (which include Appleton's ideas), that the cultural mode gives rise to a set of culturally defined rules (which he demonstrates through empirical research) and that the personal mode gives rise to personal strategies for seeing, designing and understanding landscape. He evaluates his meta-theory in the final chapters. In one he explores its contribution to landscape evaluation, a procedure used by planners to protect and enhance landscape. His criticisms of the inappropriateness of some quantitative approaches would be generally accepted—but they are not strongly based on his theoretical position. Elsewhere his conclusions are weak or timid. He argues that natural landscape (without discussing at what point a landscape ceases to be natural and becomes a product of social intervention) might be experienced in the biological mode and urban in the cultural. 'All humans', he states 'probably share some innate preferences for certain types of natural landscapes (e.g., savanna), but preferences for urban landscape may depend to a greater extent upon membership of a cultural group for which those landscapes hold some meaning' (p. 121). I can accept the latter part of this argument (though it is not particularly new) but I find the assumption that the Bushmen of the Kalahari and the Innuit of the Arctic both see and judge the natural landscape in the same way and would both place Savannas at the top of their pecking orders too extreme.

The final chapter, on post-modernism, seems out of place. A theory has to be applicable in all circumstances, so, for this reason, a focus on buildings is appropriate. However, for a theory to be influential it should be demonstrated across the whole range of landscape forms. To pick out architectural post-modernism says, I suspect, more about the author's interest than the applicability of the

theory. The range of material considered clouds the link between building form and theory. Indeed on the basis of the discussion of 'critical regionalism' and 'sense of place' (p. 139) it would be possible to construct a compelling interpretation of post-modernism within a framework of information theory. Again, one has to put the criticism that the conclusions are weak. I can accept a statement that 'experience of landscape is some kind of synthesis of the three models [biological, cultural and personal]' (p. 142). However, the conclusion that 'it is quite difficult to determine in most instances precisely what aspects of landscape experience are biological, cultural or personal' makes me wonder whether a theory that is incapable of evaluation is really much of a conceptualization.

What of the other basis for judging the books—the quality with which the argument is expressed? Appleton's is an elegant style. It travels well from its lecture origins. Without recourse to subheadings the argument is clear and easily followed. His words are well chosen and convey taxing ideas without too much pain on the part of the reader. Bourassa makes fewer concessions in this regard. His task is more difficult and the scale of his undertaking more wide ranging. The key difference between the two is that while both assemble evidence, Appleton internalizes it and expresses it in his own way. Bourassa's style is that of a social scientist, justifying a point of view by reference to others. The text is liberally sprinkled with references that break up the flow. The inclusion of information seems, at times, to reflect the process of thinking as much as the conclusion itself. He does show, however, in the area of communicability that while he may lack Appleton's elegance he is a model of clarity in comparison with others. In arguing that cultural development is bound up with the development of signs he quotes Wertsch as saying that this is the 'deconstructionalisation of mediational means'. This becomes only slightly less opaque with the rider 'or the process whereby the meanings of signs become less dependent on the unique spatiotemporal context in which they are used' (p. 54). I think it means that signs have meanings in situations other than the one where they developed.

There is one other contrast which I should draw between the two books. Appleton's is 'an interpretation of landscape in the arts'. Over half of his illustrations are of naturally evolved, unplanned landscapes and townscapes rather than artistic representations. Bourassa's book is on 'the aesthetics of landscape'. Of his landscape illustrations 26 are paintings—and the one that is not is an architect's drawing. It takes some explaining when a book on the arts has most of its examples drawn from the real world and one on landscape has all of its examples drawn from the pictorial arts.

In summary, then, where do these books take us? Well written though Appleton's is I remain profoundly sceptical of his arguments. I remain unconvinced that my biological heritage and mankind's origins in the Savanna play as central a role in establishing my scale of landscape values as he might suggest. Bourassa's, though more difficult to follow, especially if you are not a social scientist, offers a framework that is possibly capable of further development, particularly in the fields of cultural and personal modes of experience. In my judgement the quality of his argument goes into decline in the final chapters and he would have been better advised to write two books—the first on the theory and the second exemplifying and testing it. As it stands I suspect the book has been written too soon. The theoretical position is well argued in chapter 3 but the development, particularly of cultural rules and personal strategies, needs a fuller treatment. It is surprising, for example, to find that information processing is considered to be a biological law when the very notion of information and its redundancy is culturally and socially determined. I do not argue that creativity (both in terms of design and perception) should not find a place in a discussion of personal strategies but equally we need to explore the role of psychological states and preconditions. Ultimately it is these factors and the social and cultural conditions in which we operate which I believe determine our aesthetic standards, not some remnant of a primaeval past.

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Hellenistic Sculpture: A Handbook. By R. R. R. SMITH. Thames and Hudson. 1991. pp. 287. 387 illustrations. Paperbound, £6.95.

IN THE heyday of Modernism, Greek sculpture, apart from that of the Archaic period, was out of fashion, and Hellenistic sculpture in particular was condemned for being too realistic and not 'true' to its materials. The phrase 'erotic ninepins' was used by one critic. In Roman times, too, Hellenistic sculpture suffered from a bad press. Educated Romans, Professor Smith tells us, preferred the Classical style, and 'Pliny the Elder says flatly that the art of sculpture died in 296 BC and was then reborn in 156 BC'. In post-Renaissance Europe, however, Hellenistic sculpture was greatly admired and 'dominated much of the art language of the Western tradition'. Some of its surviving products—the Victory of Samothrace, the Laocoon, the Belvedere Torso, the Venus de Milo, the Dying Gaul, the Farnese Bull, the Barberini Faun—are among the most familiar images in Western art. If for no other reason, the period should interest aestheticians as an illustration of the vagaries of taste.

The main purpose of Professor Smith's 'handbook' is to present a balanced survey of the sculpture produced between the death of Alexander and the reign of Augustus, the period, that is, which connects the arts of Classical Greece and Rome. It was a time of great complexity and diversity in the arts, during which sculptors extended the expressive range of their art to take in new states of body, mind and emotion. The author departs from the historian's usual sequential arrangement partly because there is a lack of reliable chronology, but chiefly because there is little continuous stylistic development. What happens as the period progresses is not so much a change of style as an increase in the diversity of form and subject—a growing sculptural pluralism. The first part of the book is therefore arranged to give an account of the principal 'statue types' with such headings as: Goddesses and Women; Athletes; Reliefs, Friezes and Stelae; Philosophers, Orators and Poets. The second part organizes its material geographically and 'looks at the surviving sculpture found in the major centres and royal capital of the Hellenistic world—Pergamon, Alexandria, Seleucid Syria, Macedonia and Greece'.

Readers interested in the aesthetics of sculpture will be interested in the author's discussion of the value and role of copies, a crucial issue in connection with Greek sculpture: 'To some modern eyes', he says, 'they are all inferior because not original, inauthentic because in a different material. But some Roman copies were clearly the work of the best sculptors of the day commissioned by the richest patrons .... They are to be regarded less as "slavish copies" than as brilliant translations'. Those who are primarily concerned with sculpture as an art form and are not looking for excuses to reject a tradition that has become oppressive will agree with this and perhaps even go further. When we enjoy African woodcarvings, Indian bronzes or Mayan stonecarvings as works of art, we have no idea whether they are copies of unknown previous works, and it does not matter. Why, then, should it affect us when we are in the Vatican or the British Museum looking at Greek and Roman sculpture? It is irrelevant aesthetically, an issue for the historian or, in modern times, the lawyer.

The book also contains an interesting discussion of the role of the female nude in sculpture. 'With the Knidia and Hellenistic Aphrodites, the female nude entered its dual role in the history of art as the object of both ideal composition and male voyeurism.' Professor Smith is perhaps a little overanxious to appear 'politically correct' on this issue: 'we are dealing with a society in which men controlled almost all aspects of art production and in which statues were oriented primarily to male viewers. Hellenistic women of course looked at works of art, but what they might want to see expressed in male and female statues, in so far as they might be different from a man's viewpoint, was not a consideration in their creation'. Again, one could go further. Isn't the whole basis of Greek culture—its concern with rationality, clarity and the 'ideal' in philosophy, art and other areas—what would nowadays be called 'masculine'? In terms of today's fashionable dichotomies what is 'male' in Greek art goes much deeper than a mere preoccupation with nubile young bodies, whether female, male or hermaphrodite.

The book's generous well-chosen illustra-

tions are placed in batches at the end of the chapters that refer to them, an excellent arrangement that suits a 'handbook'. My own main regret is the lack of a chapter on the techniques of the workshops—the methods by which they achieved some of their most powerful baroque effects of form and composition. And a map or two would have been useful to help readers find their way around the widespread kingdoms and cities referred to in the text.

Finally, if I may be permitted a little flippancy, philosophers may be somewhat envious to learn that their Hellenistic forebears were a popular subject for sculpture, and that copies of their portraits were 'essential appurtenances in the villa of a cultivated Roman'. Their envy may well evaporate, however, when they learn that they were usually portrayed in unfashionable dress, with 'hunched shoulders, protruding stomachs, flabby chests' and a flat-footed stance.

L. R. ROGERS

Ford Madox Brown and the Pre-Raphaelite Circle. By TERESA NEWMAN and RAY WATKINSON. Chatto and Windus. 1991. pp. 226. £50.00.

DESPITE HIS famous scowl, immortalized in *The Last of England*, he was, in his grandson Ford Madox Hueffer's words, the 'most lovable, the sweetest of men' (p. 194). He was also a sturdy, independent spirit who refused to bow to the Royal Academy or to Ruskin, and conducted experiments in painting which put him ahead of his time despite the stigma 'old-fashioned' attached to him in the 1880s. In this, the first biography this century of Ford Madox Brown (1821–93), Teresa Newman and Ray Watkinson make out a good case for his being 'the most underrated figure in British art of the nineteenth century' (p. 1).

The book is particularly illuminating in its examination of Brown's relationship to the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood and Pre-Raphaelitism. Central to this discussion is his enduring friendship with Rossetti, whom he taught; from whom he learnt; with whom he discussed poetry and painting; and to whom he remained staunch through Rossetti's periods of breakdown and despair. In return Rossetti helped Brown find purchasers of his work, for example, introducing him to Thomas Plint of Leeds who commissioned *Work* ('Brown's essay in contemporary life—the first by a Pre-Raphaelite', p. 67), and to William Morris, who bought *The Hayfield* and later commissioned stained glass and furniture for the Firm.

His constant search for 'truth' in painting inclined him favourably to the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood with its watchword 'truth to Nature', although he did not admire the botanic-geological version of Nature encouraged by Ruskin (who disliked his 'ugly' subjects; Brown was in good company, Ruskin criticized Constable's subjects as insufficiently 'noble'). Brown, who was never a member of the PRB 'and it never mattered to him' (p. 49), developed his friendship with Rossetti, was interested in the processes tried by the younger painters such as painting on wet-white ground to achieve brilliancy of colour, and went on with his own experiments in colour, light and mass in an attempt to solve 'the perennial problem facing painters before impressionism—how to capture the fleeting, ever-changing effects of nature, or of human activity in the landscape, on canvases which by their nature suggest permanence' (p. 82). He broadened the meticulous Pre-Raphaelite landscape, made it evocative of fleeting mood and atmosphere and, following in one tradition of English Romanticism, saw poetry in the ordinary, the familiar, as Wordsworth had done. This biography is particularly admirable in showing the innovations of Brown's work: '*Carrying Corn* is a revolutionary small landscape; its ordinariness, brilliant colour, bold technique and firm structure have more in common with Pissarro and Seurat's divisionism than with Victorian art of the 1850s' (p. 82). He not only struggled with the problems which would later obsess Cézanne; he also founded the short-lived Hogarth Club which provided exhibition space for his first stained-glass cartoon and the early designs for stained-glass by Edward Jones, later Burne-Jones, together with architectural drawings by the Gothic revivalists Bodley and Street. This effected the union of the decorative and the fine arts later characterizing Morris's Firm and the Arts and Crafts movement. By organizing independent group exhibitions

Brown helped establish Pre-Raphaelitism as the English avant-garde; he was responsible for the first Pre-Raphaelite exhibition in Fitzroy Square, January 1858. By this time the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood was no more. The intense realism of the early Pre-Raphaelite paintings (a mode in which Rossetti had never felt easy) was superseded by the psychological symbolism of Rossetti's later paintings, which had an influence on Brown's own work, and by the Rossettian aesthetic which came to be described as 'Pre-Raphaelite'.

This biography clarifies the relationship of Brown's work to many important considerations in the assessment of Victorian British painting: the subjects appropriate to 'high art' (Brown showed originality, and also expressed his socialistic ideas, by making a navvy the central figure of *Work*); the nature of 'public art' (the Manchester murals involve ordinary people and often comically ordinary incidents—the impeding pig and the mischievous dogs in *The Expulsion of the Danes*, for example—they do not depict heroic abstractions); the complex nature of 'realism'; the important part played by provincial collectors, galleries, exhibitions in popularizing painters and painting fashions; and the often unrecognized power of patrons in determining the nature of the finished canvas: Plint, for example, was responsible for the inclusion of the lady distributing tracts in *Work*, and the exclusion of the figure of the observing artist in favour of F. D. Maurice so introducing 'religious and philanthropic elements which made Brown's class-based critique of English society acceptable' (p. 122).

Brown was an eccentric in British art. A passionate admirer of Hogarth and the British moral tradition; of Benjamin Robert Haydon and the British historical tradition, he was born in France, was trained as a painter in Antwerp, and did not settle in England until 1846; his work always had a strain of Flemish grotesque in it. A patriot, he was acutely aware of British class-consciousness and convinced that the nation underestimated the worth of its working classes, feelings he dramatized in pictures such as *Work* and *The Last of England*. He brought a different perspective to the deliberations of the youthful group, the Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. In their determination to get back beyond the idealizations of Raphael to the directness of Giotto and Fra Angelico they studied engravings of the masters. But Brown had actually seen their works and had first-hand knowledge of them. A man of feeling, which shows in his canvases; ambitious; generous; touchy; damaging his own interests by refusal to cultivate influential people; industrious; witty; above all, a man of integrity, both personal and professional.

This biography does him justice both as a man and as a painter. There is a fine range of illustrations although the colour reproduction, as usual, is often unsatisfactory. The book is generally free from error, but numbers 70 and 71 of the illustrations facing p. 55 are transposed, and Dr Primrose is not a character from Sterne's novels as is implied on p. 18 but is Goldsmith's Vicar of Wakefield.

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The Destruction of Tilted Arc: Documents. Edited by CLARA WEYERGRAF-SERRA and MARTHA BUSKIRK with an Introduction by RICHARD SERRA. MIT Press. 1991. pp. 287. £14.95; clothbound £33.75.

FOUR YEARS after the installation of *Tilted Arc*, which it had commissioned and approved, US General Services Administration decided to dismantle and relocate it. This decision was taken despite the opposition of Richard Serra who argued that to 'relocate' his site-specific sculpture would be to destroy it. After a protracted legal battle, GSA had its way and the sculpture was dismantled, appropriately, under cover of darkness on 15 March 1989. This book, which consists almost wholly of documents of one kind or another, casts much light on this shameful episode and at the same time raises issues of wider importance.

It might be helpful if we begin with some straightforward facts. Richard Serra was commissioned in 1979 to make a sculpture for Federal Plaza, New York City. His proposal for a tilted cylinder 120 feet long and 12 feet high was approved by GSA in 1980 and the sculpture was installed the following year. Uncompromising and imposing, *Tilted Arc*

drew much criticism, though this seemed to die down after a while. In 1984, William Diamond, the GSA's New York Regional Administrator, suggested a public hearing in order to determine whether the installation should be relocated. Despite the fact that two-thirds of those who testified spoke in favour of the work staying put, the panel chaired by Diamond recommended that it should be relocated. The acting administrator accepted the recommendation with the consequences we have noted.

One of the broader issues which this case raises concerns whether public opinion is susceptible to manipulation. Serra believes that Diamond, a Reagan appointment, had his own political reasons for wanting to get rid of a subversive work such as *Tilted Arc* and manipulated public opinion in order to do so.

This may seem far-fetched, not to say paranoid. But why did Diamond suggest a public hearing so long after public criticism had seemingly died down? Donald Thalacker, Director of Art-in-Architecture and Historic Preservation Programmes in a memo to the Acting Director of GSA stated that there was 'a widespread perception that the official GSA-sanctioned actions affecting the prehearing activities, the hearings themselves, and the post-hearing activities have been manipulated' (p. 154). The interested reader can consult the relevant documents and make up his own mind as to whether this 'perception' was justified or not. The point I wish to elaborate upon is the work's subversiveness.

In common with much other minimal and conceptual art, *Tilted Arc* sets out to undermine the notion of an art work as commodity. By virtue of the fact that it can exist as a sculpture only in relation to the site for which it was specifically designed, the work cannot be bought or sold in the way that a Henry Moore can be bought or sold. (For an explanation of what it means to say that a work of art is site-specific, see Serra's own account, pp. 180–87.) Once removed from the Plaza and architecture to which it refers, Tilted Arc loses its sculptural identity and reverts to being 'a rusted steel wall'. In this sense the work is and was intended to be subversive of capitalist practices which turn cultural artefacts into commodities.

Many of the work's critics seem to have sensed its subversiveness, and their language reflects an exaggerated unease. Judge Edward Re, who conducted a letter-writing campaign against *Tilted Arc*, spoke of the installation as a security risk; a point later taken up by a security specialist, Vickie O'Dougherty, at the public hearing. She testified that the massive steel sculpture could be used as a blast wall by terrorists wishing to bomb the nearby courthouse, and added darkly that it 'could be a place that would foment criminal activities' (p. 118).

In addition to being seen as providing shelter for criminals and bomb-toting terrorists, the art work was even held to be responsible for an increase in the local rat population. In unconsciously identifying avant-garde art with rats and garbage, Judge Edward Re echoes a letter-writer of an earlier generation who compared post-impressionists to rats. It is surely the work's own subversive nature that has given rise to these displaced images, rather than some external threat.

Serra and his many distinguished colleagues and supporters see the art work's destruction as raising questions concerning freedom of speech and censorship. Its fate highlights also the fact that under federal copyright laws artists and writers do not enjoy the same moral rights as their European colleagues. The Berne Copyright Convention (1986) empowers European artists and writers to retain authorship after the work has been sold, to receive subsequent royalties and to disclaim authorship if the work is distorted or mutilated. The last point is vital, as Serra had hoped that when the US government eventually signed the Berne Copyright Convention he would then be able to stop GSA from relocating *Tilted Arc*, on the grounds that this would destroy *his* site-specific installation. The government did sign the convention in 1988 but not the key moral rights clause; an omission that seems to confirm Serra's claim that works of art are treated as commodities.

It is hardly surprising that the debate should have focused on the artist's rights and interests, given that Serra was fighting to save his work. But this case raises questions about the artist's responsibilities to the public as well. It obliges us to consider how to strike a balance between the artist's rights and the interests of the public.

It raises questions about the role of public opinion, which historically avant-garde artists have either scorned or mistrusted.

(Reading the artists' and art experts' testimonies, one could be forgiven for thinking that nothing has changed.) Finally, *Tilted Arc* poses the question whether public art can or should serve subversive ends.

This collection of documents enables the reader to reconstruct events leading up to the destruction of a major work of art and is urgently recommended to all those who are interested in art's welfare.

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Così?: Sexual Politics in Mozart's Operas. By CHARLES FORD. Manchester U.P. 1991. pp. 262. £30.00.

'THE COMBINATION of music in its magic semblance as an experience too abstract to be predicated, with divided representations of sexual desire and relations, is a heady brew, and when this is imbued with all the intensity and excitement of the Viennese Enlightenment . . . we are easily seduced into absolutism . . . Mozart's operas seem to instil new life into stale and oppressive contradictions, flattering us into thinking our common-sense assumptions universally valid. The literature that continues to accumulate around these works rarely addresses the music directly, but only uses it to fetishise an antagonistic sexual morality. This book aims to relieve Mozart's operas of this, the affirmative function by which they are customarily demeaned, and to render their extraordinary beauty provocative' (p. 9). These are brave words, especially given the adulatory blather that mostly passed for criticism in the recent bicentenary celebrations for Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (1756–1791). But why have we, in turn, fetishized Mozart? His fraught career and untimely death certainly help. And his divine (some would use the word literally) music has ineffable beauty and power. But there is another source of fascination explored by Peter Schaffer in *Amadeus*: such music of innocence and dreams hardly squares with Mozart's clownish (and worse) behaviour and scatological proclivities (read his letters). They suggest—or so it can seem today—a man at odds with his music and often with the aristocratic patrons whose approval he so desperately needed to further his career.

In professional and financial terms, Mozart did much better than we like to believe, but not as well as his talents surely merited. One can resort to the conventional trope of the misunderstood genius or explore the more intriguing idea that Mozart's alienation was that of the proto-bourgeois in the dying decades of the aristocratic Enlightenment. Either way, although Mozart was surely of his time, he appears in some real sense to stand outside it, transcending his own world to speak to the future. But this poses crucial problems. Any attempt to contextualize the composer—to place him within one or more histories of the late eighteenth century—can easily be accused of missing the point. And any attempt to analyse his music to show 'how it was done' threatens precisely what many see at the heart of Mozart, that unknowable essence of creative genius.

My colleagues in musicology will doubtless berate me for overstating the case. Now that the discipline has finally entered the professional world of humanist scholarship, we think—hope—that we can contextualize, historicize and analyse the art work to the heart's content while acknowledging, indeed buttressing, our sense that a great artist's achievement can never be fully explained. And music itself colludes in letting us have our cake and eat it: the essentially abstract nature of musical 'language' offers the art work a safe haven against the onslaught of positivist scholarship. For many, this notion of abstraction is something to be deconstructed as part of the scholarly game. For all of us, however, it points to a breathing space beyond the reach of academic voyeurism, where our admiration—love—for a sonata, symphony or opera can flower untrammelled by historical or analytical angst.

The notion of transcendence is particularly problematic for critics of a Marxist bent for whom the art work must be decoded as a text indissolubly linked to its specific context(s). Charles Ford's new book on sexual politics in Mozart's operas takes precisely this view,

placing these works in the context of shifting political, economic and social structures in the enlightened Vienna of Habsburg emperor Joseph II. Still more crucial, however, are the intellectual currents of Mozart's time, seen in terms of Enlightenment thought (both Anglo-French and German varieties) and its dialectics between Reason and Nature, Desire and Feeling, and Masculine and Feminine. The notion that these operas also belong to a richly cross-referential musical world passes for naught. They are essentially instantiations of a complex world of ideas and ideologies—a world populated by the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire and the Marquis de Sade, and by the novels and plays of Sterne (*Tristram Shandy*) and Laclos (*Les Liaisons dangereuses*)—which comes to life in and through Mozart's music.

The approach is less novel than Ford's 'hard'-Marxist discourse makes it sound. And for some unexplained reason, Ford's attention rests more or less entirely on the composer's three collaborations with the Italian librettist Lorenzo da Ponte (1749–1838), *Le nozze di Figaro* (1786), *Don Giovanni* (1787) and *Così fan tutte* (1790). We can perhaps do without Mozart's early operas, but there are 'sexual politics' aplenty in *Idomeneo* (1781), in *Die Entführung aus dem Serail* (1782) and *Die Zauberflöte* (1791)—surely test-cases for German rather than Anglo-French Enlightenment ideas, and indeed for the proto-bourgeois in a changing world—and even in the much maligned *La clemenza di Tito* (1791). In particular, for a book focusing to so great an extent on Mozart's female operatic characters, it seems strange to lose Ilia, Elektra, Constanze, Pamina and Vitellia, to name only the most obvious.

These omissions raise other issues. For all Ford's lucid treatment of the Anglo-French and German Enlightenments, his chosen operas are essentially Italian works to texts by an Italian librettist for an (at least notionally) Italianate audience. Ford is by no means unusual in refusing to broach the question of an Italian Enlightenment, but his failure to confront the librettos of these operas is somewhat problematic. Ford's 'text' is clearly the music, not the words, but Da Ponte's own texts evoke a richly literary world resonating the sounds and ideas not just of the eighteenth century but also of classical antiquity and the Renaissance: the point is often lost on non-Italianists oblivious to the tradition that Da Ponte lived and breathed. How Mozart (mis-)understood these resonances is, of course, another matter: witness the dramatic (indeed, 'moral') problems of *Così fan tutte*, where the composer quite literally missed Da Ponte's pastoral point.

Other difficulties follow. Ford fails to solve the perennial problem of exactly how specific texts relate to broad contexts: for him, the processes of mediation between the *Zeitgeist* and its instantiation seems scarcely an issue, whereas Da Ponte's texts—and for that matter, Mozart's views on the matters they raise—act as prisms the refractive effect of which at least merits consideration. The problem is all the more acute given that music is notoriously slippery when it comes to questions of meaning. Ford rejects previous attempts to establish a semiotic system for music of the Classical period via musical *topoi* denoting specific emotional and other states (see Wye J. Allanbrook, *Rhythmic Gesture in Mozart's 'Le nozze di Figaro' and 'Don Giovanni'*, Chicago University Press, 1983). He prefers structural rather than topical systems of signification—in terms, that is, of a composer manipulating the structural norms (phrasing, key-schemes, forms) that are rightly said to operate in music of the period—laced with networks of musical motivic relationships. This notion has strong merits. But all too often, Ford can only guess how music represents, in whatever sense, the ideas invoked here. Signifying 'masculine' and 'feminine' is a good example: it should—indeed must, for present purposes—be straightforward, but short of a rather too facile association of dominant sharpward modulations with the masculine and subdominant sharp ward modulations modulations with the feminine, the arguments tend towards a dangerous circularity (female characters have feminine music signifying female characters . . .).

Nevertheless, Ford's attempt to decode representations of gender in Mozart is one of the most provoking and rewarding features of this book. These are issues newly arrived in Anglo-American musicology, and with explosive results. To his credit, too, Ford

attempts to support his undoubtedly powerful insights into the music with precise analytical observations. (But sadly, the detailed examples are left to Ford's DPhil thesis, *Così?: Enlightened Sexuality, Logic and Music* (University of Sussex, 1989.) And no less refreshing is his insistence on granting the recitative—often dismissed as the padding between the musical substance of the arias and ensembles—a significant role in the musical and dramatic argument. There is much to admire in Ford's treatment of Mozart's operatic characters and the complex situations in which they find themselves.

Even here, however, there are problems. The men are handled well enough (particularly Don Giovanni), but the women raise more difficulties that in turn may or may not be a product of their unsettled status in eighteenth-century society. Ford (like his Enlightenment models) seems happiest in dealing with well-documented feminine types such as the sexual minx (the maid Despina in *Così*) or the hysteric (the Countess in *Figaro*—or at least, its first two acts—and Donna Elvira in *Don Giovanni*). But female characters who fail to conform to such crude taxonomies raise distinct problems. Fiordiligi, the *prima donna* in *Così*, is one such example. Ford's analysis of her aria 'Come scoglio immoto resta' leaves one a little uneasy: 'Whilst Fiordiligi's musical integrity demonstrates the conviction of her moral intentions, her muddle-headed dividing up of da Ponte's verses, her seemingly confused intermediate returns to the tonic, her variants of the "love motive", which alone remain unchanged on their recapitulation, and above all else, the passionately over-stated quality of her final rejection of the intruders, must all be thought to challenge her psychological stability' (p. 163). Even if the analytical facts of the case are correct, their interpretation ('muddle-headed', 'seemingly confused', 'passionately overstated') seems forced by ideological strains that certainly were on the eighteenth-century agenda but which may also reflect curious prejudices on Ford's own part.

Of course, women were not expected to come out well in the Enlightenment scheme of things, but Ford's (and for that matter, Mozart's) scheme could, perhaps should, be a different matter. The whiff of injustice becomes still stronger given the apparent inconsistencies and omissions in his arguments. For example, in her aria 'Una donna a quindici anni', Despina 'takes her delights from the musical moment, with no thought to larger structural considerations' (p. 178)—the typical woman's role—and yet in the Act I finale she 'articulates the musical structure . . . all the time that she is on the stage' (p. 176). Similarly, when a female character does somehow reach a point of emotional and dramatic stability, the achievement is either dismissed as 'caricature' (p. 180, on Fiordiligi) or entirely ignored (the Countess's crucial aria 'Dove sono i bei momenti' in Act III of *Figaro*). The absence of Ilia, Constanze and Pamina distorts the picture still more. And in the end, Ford's account is much more chauvinist than one would like to believe possible of Mozart himself, whose search for a free-standing women's music may well be one of the most significant features of his late operas.

Of course, my argument plays right into Ford's hands, with precisely the idealistic appeal to some universal quality in Mozart's music that he deplores in his introduction and seeks to counter in this book. But for all his worries about 'the fraud of aesthetic transcendence' (p. 78), he, too, eventually softens his rhetoric. The new-found love of Fiordiligi and Ferrando in *Così* does indeed emerge as 'transcendent' (p. 210) as the characters shift to inhabit a 'timeless, placeless realm' (p. 227). Thanks to 'Mozart's more progressive, proto-idealist, middle-class German sensibilities' (pp. 210–11), 'Such matters are no longer simply *sciocchezze di poeti* (poetic nonsense), but transcendent objects of belief, which have no place in the world of Enlightenment reason' (p. 232). Ford is no less seduced than the rest of us. As a result, he is left somewhat at sea, resorting to a last-ditch notion that this is all a cunning part of the game: breaking the rules only affirms their oppressive presence.

Ford sets out to produce a controversial book to shake up the complacent world of much Mozart scholarship. His publishers should have done more to help him: misspellings and typographical errors abound; the notes and bibliography are inadequate; and the

whole text needs extensive editorial attention. But one has to admire his bravery for articulating issues that clearly must be on any agenda for future work on Mozart, and indeed on questions of gender in music of the Western classical tradition. That alone merits recognition.

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Eduard Hanslick and Ritter Berlioz in Prague: A Documentary Narrative. By GEOFFREY PAYZANT. University of Calgary Press. 1991. pp. 139. Can. $12.95.

MUSICOLOGISTS AND all those interested in the aesthetics of music are indebted to Geoffrey Payzant for his excellent translation of one of the central texts of nineteenth-century aesthetics of music, Eduard Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (*On the Musically Beautiful*, Indianapolis, 1986). Apart from this translation he has contributed a number of periodical articles dealing with various issues of Hanslick studies. In addition to all of his qualities as a commentator and translator, Payzant is a tireless detective tracking down textual allusions, spotting differences between printed versions and plotting maps of mutual influences between various members of the Prague and Vienna intellectual circles in which Eduard Hanslick moved. The present monograph is a *tour-de-force* of an especial kind. In 1846, when Hanslick was twenty-one, Hector Berlioz came to Prague to direct several concerts of his own music. Those who welcomed him there included the then friends, August Wilhelm Ambros and Hanslick, both at the time much influenced by Schumann's brand of music criticism in which judgements of taste were intermingled with statements of a moralistic nature involving the imaginary opponents of progress, the Philistines, and the carriers of progress and righteousness, the members of the League of David. Hanslick was a precocious youth, well read and with a penchant for a witty turn of phrase and in some of his early Prague writings his sympathies waver between a censure and endorsement of Berlioz's music. It is not difficult to see that, once he found himself in Berlioz's vicinity and acting as a translator for the French composer who spoke no German, Hanslick would have been won over. His reviews cast aside his earlier reservations and he gives enthusiastic approval to Berlioz's manner of supporting the symphonic structure by a textual programme which is supposed to explain what the music is 'about'. Of course, in his later music criticism he was vehemently opposed to anything but a purely 'musical' understanding of musical works of art: viewed against this well-known image of Hanslick his early enthusiasm for Berlioz appears as an aberration. Payzant positively relishes his task of reconstructing the musical life of Hanslick's Prague. He dips into Berlioz's writings, into Hanslick's autobiography, provides pen-portraits of Prague conductors of the time and illustrates his narrative with ample quotations. The final point of Payzant's study is his contention that an important catalyst in transforming Hanslick from an enthusiastic *Davidsbündler*-type to a musical 'formalist' must have been one Bernhard Gutt whose sceptical attitude towards the narrative element of Berlioz's music is later embraced by Hanslick so closely that he in fact cribs Gutt in crucial passages of *On the Musically Beautiful*.

Payzant's attractive style and the variety of interesting detail make this book a good read but they also conceal the fact that the crucial critical issues have been bypassed. By concentrating only on the Berlioz episode of Hanslick's life Payzant omitted to give any account of the impact of a wider array of literary and philosophical sources that might have contributed to the formation of Hanslick's intellectual position in *On the Musically Beautiful*. Hanslick's reliance on B. Gutt is an interesting revelation, but *On the Musically Beautiful* also reflects the ideas of Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich Theodor Vischer. The influence of the latter may be ascertained from Hanslick's biography as well as from the early versions of *On the Musically Beautiful*. It is interesting that in the later editions Hanslick tended to play down his sympathies for the Hegelian Vischer, strengthening the impression of fidelity to the 'formalist' Herbart-Zimmermann line. Professor Payzant is well placed to undertake a closer investigation of the influences on the young Hanslick in Prague in

the 1840s and to provide an account of the transformation of his thought during the years 1850–52, which he spent as a civil servant at Klagenfurt. Such a study would ultimately be of far greater service as an aid in interpreting the roots of Hanslick's philosophical stance than the anecdotal, even if vibrant and captivating, account of his youthful enthusiasm for Berlioz.

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Tragedy: Contradiction and Repression. By RICHARD KUHNS. University of Chicago Press. 1991. pp. 180. £21.95.

IT IS difficult to see for whom this book is intended. Few psychoanalysts would be interested in the literary texts Kuhns treats in such detail, or would appreciate the 'philosophical' questions the author tackles. Yet he makes no effort to render his approach acceptable or even intelligible to literary theorists—for Richard Kuhns doesn't mean by 'tragedy' what a modern literary scholar means, or what Aristotle anatomized in the *Poetics*. Kuhns's chapter-headings seem each more unexpected that the one before. Chapter 1 is about *The Persians* by Aeschylus, less a tragedy than a dialogue lamenting a disaster of what was then recent history. Chapter 2 is about *The Merchant of Venice*, usually accounted a comedy. Chapter 4 deals chiefly with Kant. Ch. 5 is on a narrative work, *Michael Kohlhaas* by Heinrich von Kleist; 6 on the *Confidence-Man* by Herman Melville—a satire. The Epilogue deals with poems by Walt Whitman and Emily Dickinson. There are various passages about *Oedipus Rex* but most of the book is not about tragedy.

The blurb makes Kuhns's aim clearer than he does in the whole text. It claims he 'shows how the genre has changed from loss and mourning to contradiction and repression'; how 'a' culture's concept of Fate evolves along with its concepts and forms of tragedy'. Even granting that such a broadly anthropological undertaking might indeed undermine the concept 'the genre of tragedy'—I find that Kuhns at most suggests, but fails to 'show'.

In proposing that typical painful experiences in human life, especially public loss and mourning, require socially sanctioned aids and rituals that are psychoanalytically appropriate (Ch. 1); and thence, that anything serving such a purpose is 'tragedy', however disguised by 'contradiction and repression', Kuhns leaves a theoretical gap between the functioning of a society and the structure of an individual psyche. This is especially noticeable when he draws on the view of the origins of art in general proposed by the psychoanalyst D. W. Winnicott, from whose writings Kuhns takes the doctrine of 'transitional objects' (Kuhns, pp. 69–70, 90, 112ff.). Here the gap between the first item that the individual infant experiences in the objective world, and a tragedy—or other very advanced and complex item of cultural inheritance, largely confined to the medium of language—is mostly left to take care of itself. The (promising) theory of 'transitional objects', Kuhns's remarks about mothers and small children (p. 70) and the concept of 'enactments' (pp. 128, 131) are intended to bridge it. But as aesthetic theory this remains very incomplete.

According to Kuhns, human 'fate' is tragic, firstly because human beings are unregenerate creatures of selfish instinct, and for them to live in societies involves a large measure of repression; also because the human spirit may transcend space and time, but the flesh cannot (pp. 86–7). Thirdly, because (for western man in the 'modern' era) a scientific view of life on earth has shown that nature is indifferent to humankind and its needs. Fourthly, the consolations of religion (at best, partial), that may have seemed effective in Christendom, ceased to be so by the nineteenth century; and when clung to in encounters with the 'heathen' proved inhumane (pp. 82, 86, 137, 148).

The first reason is implicit in Freudianism. For general rational-humanist purposes and for literary contexts it goes too deep: it belongs to pathology. Kuhns's commitment to it as a Freudian is strengthened by his concern with ancient Greek thought. When he writes on p. 2 that 'Tragedy addresses ... the conflict between private psychological need and public political obligation', the reader doesn't yet know how the words 'need' and 'political' are being used. The sentence quoted may look like an allusion to a representative tragic situation—

e.g., the conflict between Egyptian dalliance and stern Roman political duty in *Antony and Cleopatra*. But it turns out (pp. 26–7, 69) that Kuhns means no such thing. The 'private psychological need' he writes of is deep (i.e., unconscious); the 'political' is wide (i.e., what would ordinarily be termed 'social'). Both, and the conflict between them, are common to all humanity. Heroes such as Mark Antony, Coriolanus, or Othello, as created by Shakespeare on arguably Aristotelian lines, don't interest Kuhns, who says next-to-nothing about Renaissance tragedy. Kuhns's chosen texts may perhaps be regarded as studies in 'the heroic', but his underlying pessimism tends to reduce 'the heroic' to a mere delusion, and in the main, he treats Literary Representations of Failure. If the Confidence-Man seems only too successful, Kuhns explains that he chose Melville's book because 'In it, tragedy sinks down almost to oblivion under the repression of American optimism'. 'Within it the logical and psychological strategies of contradiction and repression in a repressed tragic setting are closely examined' (p. 121).

Kuhns's discussions of *The Confidence-Man* and his other literary texts are full and methodical, with many subtle and ingenious details. As psychoanalytical interpretations they seem entitled to a place in that accommodating free-for-all, 'the critical literature' on those texts. But of course Kuhns claims more.

His book is certainly original. But the author's psychoanalytical approach seems attended by disqualifications. First, as I have suggested, he is not a humanist. He is not impressive as a moralist, or as an 'ordinary' psychologist of the conscious mind; this latter is especially noticeable in Chapter 3: '. . . Why We Find Tragic Representations Pleasurable', and in Ch. 6, pp. 119–134. Also, he doesn't demonstrate convincingly those further elements he claims are proper to tragedy: riddle, paradox, contradiction, splitting, mask. This is partly because in depth-psychology, anything observed can be evidence of itself or of its negation (as Kuhns mentions, pp. 41, 125). It doesn't make for rational argument, and Kuhns doesn't try to overcome the difficulty; he taunts 'philosophers' (logicians, rather) about their inability to deal with repressed subject-matter (p. 120). This kind of detachment makes him appear self-satisfied, especially in his treatment of Kant, whose undertaking in writing the *Critique of Judgement* is seen as quixotic and doomed to failure from the start. The argument is interesting but I find the tone arrogant and condescending.

The book is attractively produced, but there is little bibliographical information and the Index is very incomplete.

OLGA MCDONALD MEIDNER

Writing and the Moral Self. By BEREL LANG. Routledge. 1991. pp. 182. £9.99; cloth-bound, £30.00.

A COLLECTION of essays, and by a philosopher. Whatever next? A revival of the essay? Could it again become a major literary genre? Not likely, for there is no form that more cruelly exposes an author's faults: language without character, triviality of interests, an incestuous intertextuality, a devotion to detail which covers for slackness of thought, all the familiar academic vices. The demise of the essay has a number of socio-cultural causes, not the least of which is that few people, even among those whose views one might wish to know, are capable of writing one. It is a form which, as Berel Lang points out, falls between, or combines the qualities of, two other forms which are nowadays kept strictly apart: the newspaper article, and the academic paper. The essay is a democratic form; it addresses Everyman, and must please and instruct whichever Everyman may chance to pick it up. But it must also be of permanent interest and value, unlike the instant consumables purveyed in journalism.

Lang's essays are presented in three groups. The first group, entitled 'The Ethics of Language', deals with such topics as literacy, black English, censorship, and gender. A common concern, or motif, is what might be called the morality of language, that is, the requirement that it be clear and direct, and aim to communicate and reveal, rather than to obscure and manipulate. In 'The Rights of Black English', he contrasts this kind of 'honest' language with 'correct' language, meaning the grammatical orthodoxies which

are sanctioned by a dominant group or class. The most amusing essay, 'Politics and the New History of Truth', is a caustic analysis of the conception of truth adopted in the Nixon and Reagan administrations. In this brave new world, truth is ascribed to statements whose contradictory is deniable; or, in the memorable phrase of a Presidential spokesman, what 'might as well have been true'. Lying vanishes, and is replaced by 'misspeaking'.

The second group of essays, entitled 'Rewriting in the Academy', focuses on several issues in higher education, mostly connected with the humanities. One issue is, again, the language employed in academic writing. Couched in a rhetoric borrowed from the sciences, much given to specialist jargon and the pretence of authorial neutrality, the supposedly impersonal style of the academic is, according to Lang, loaded with questionable assumptions about the human subject and human purposes, and the questionable belief that academics are engaged in a disinterested search for knowledge.

This is territory that Lang has to some extent made his own, for instance in his *Anatomy of Philosophical Style* (1990). In general, he believes that 'the selection of any rhetorical instrument presupposes decisions of substance and content' (p. 62). Here, where his target is academic writing in the humanities, he argues that the consequences of an impersonal rhetoric are threefold. Firstly, it leads to the exclusion of evaluative judgements; secondly, it leads to a reluctance to consider purposiveness in human behaviour, to the replacement of final by efficient causes; and thirdly, it leads to a conception of truth as whatever can be established by empirical verification alone, without reference to moral and aesthetic values. Some of the greatest figures in the humanities, he argues, were anything but impersonal in their style and in their representations of mankind: Tacitus and Gibbon, Plato, Descartes, and Kierkegaard. 'Whatever their conceptions of the relation of the writer to the world written, it is hardly the relation between a reporter and a neutral or intransitive object, a reality simply waiting to be annotated' (p. 64).

The question of evaluative judgement surfaces constantly in these essays. 'Tolerance and its Discontents' considers a problem which every teacher of the humanities has faced: how to encourage and reconcile a tolerant respect for all points of view with a commitment to praise the good and condemn evil. The problem is particularly acute in the case of ethics, and most particularly when an unquestionable evil such as the Holocaust is under discussion. Such situations, Lang writes, make us sharply aware of 'the difference between teaching ethics and teaching *about* ethics, between the role of the philosopher and the role of the *professor* of philosophy' (p. 78).

The final group of essays, entitled 'Politics at More than its Word', turns to more general questions of language, value, and the person. There are essays on Orwell and Thoreau, on the claim that we can somehow discover what human nature 'really' is by comparative genetics, on Hannah Arendt's conception of evil, and on the uses of language in Nazi Germany. Lang's convictions are precise: human beings are not objects, and, in descriptions of human beings, the fact-value distinction fails; morality is more important than law; there are dimensions of human existence which fall outside the scope of the political; corruption in people and in politics goes hand in hand with a corruption of language.

It is this last issue which, more than any other, knits the essays together, and which ties them in with the current revival of interest in rhetoric, with the question, for instance, of whether rhetoric has a determining influence on propositional content. This is not a straightforward issue, and Lang is skilful in avoiding the temptation to oversimplify. What is even more striking, perhaps, is an affinity with Plato's *Republic* 400c–401e, a passage which declares that there is a causal connection between the aesthetic and the moral. For Plato, bad art (bad style, bad rhythm, bad harmony) corrupts, and good art encourages goodness in the soul. We are so often anxious to reject Plato's arguments for censorship that we overlook the philosophical basis upon which it rests, although its value is quite independent of questions of censorship and freedom. For Plato, corruption of language was beyond question a corruption of the soul, and corruption of the soul found its mirror in speech.

Plato is rarely mentioned in this collection of essays, but his spirit is never far away. Plato would also have approved of a book which so happily answers to his prescription for excellence, a book which weds stylistic grace and clarity to intellectual rigour and philosophical wisdom.

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Re-Thinking Theory: A Critique of Contemporary Literary Theory and an Alternative Account. By RICHARD FREADMAN and SEUMAS MILLER. Cambridge U.P. 1992. pp. 296. £35.

AFTER FINISHING this book I am provoked to puzzlement: how is it possible to agree with seventy-five per cent of the content of a book and yet find it profoundly depressing and exasperating? The answer to this riddle can be given after this work's contents are broadly outlined.

Freadman and Miller offer a critical survey of current fashionable approaches to critical theory. In an introduction and six chapters they outline the shift to grand theories as the basis of literary studies and exemplify this by commenting in detail on the work of such critical theorists as Catherine Belsey, Terry Eagleton and Stephen Greenblatt. These and other authors are used to illustrate various schools in contemporary critical theory, including Althusserian Marxism, Derridean post-structuralism and Foucauldian post-structuralism. In a final chapter they sum up what they think is possible and impossible in the way of critical theory and illustrate their own critical theory via a reading of *Mr Sammuel's Planet*. Their introduction and first six chapters are severely critical of contemporary literary theory.

They contend that a common thread of 'constructivist anti-humanism' runs through the generally left-wing orientated critical theories they reject. This standpoint is characterized by deterministic accounts of how literary works are produced, which are tantamount to a rejection of the importance of authorial responsibility, intention and creativity in literature. Whilst anxious to proclaim their political virtue ('We ourselves are wholly committed to social justice', p. 8), they none the less defend a version of liberal humanism as essential to critical theory and practice. They offer a detailed critique of many of the key notions of radical critical constructions (viz., ideology, discourse, power, logocentrism), suggesting as they proceed that varieties of Marxist and deconstructionist thought provide no clear, let along sure, foundations for the study of literature.

Another strand in the book's argument is its defence of the necessity of basing literary criticism on theory construction. What is wrong is that incorrect theories have been used. This part of their case is made in a brief (five-page) dismissal of Leavis's 'paradigm' for criticism and in parts of the final chapter, which discuss contemporary 'against theory' stances in literary studies.

What is objectionable in all this? Are not all of Freadman and Miller's arrows against the radicals well aimed? Well, much as I agree with a good deal of their argument, my overall impression is that they are quite incapable of grasping the significance of the issues before them.

In the first place, if their summaries of the authors they attack are correct, then they are exposing a state of affairs in English studies which cries out for deeper and more searching comment. They are describing a group of writers who consider that literary criticism can only thrive if imbued with large-scale philosophical theories. Yet, on their own account, it would appear that the authors concerned are quite incapable of raising the simplest of philosophical questions about the ideas they take over and apply. Despite this, such folk have their books published. Their academic careers prosper. Furthermore, Freadman and Miller note the problems in basing the business of literary criticism on political ideas of a questionable nature, but appear to want to continue with the search for some political dogmatics or other that will serve as the foundation of critical practice. Surely, we need to reflect here on the rank impossibility of basing an academic discipline on *any* political dogmatics at all—while allowing (indeed, welcoming) the possibility that an individual critic's political ideas will be reflected in his or her criticism.

Freadman and Miller are unable to raise the issue of why we need a theory on which to found criticism in a fashion I can take seriously. Of their 'account' of Leavis the least said the better. In their last chapter they consider only one paper which argues against the need to base critical practice on a critical theory and the main argument of this is easily brushed aside because it tends to a general scepticism about the usefulness of theories on any subject-matter.

Here the authors' thought displays extreme poverty, *Contra* Freadman and Miller's implied assertion on p. 206, it would not take a miracle for critical practice to be exempt from the intellectual methods of the exact sciences. They appear to have heard nothing about Aristotelean ideas on the priority of experience and of the person with the wisdom born of experience in reasoning about the practical; nothing about Wittgenstein on following a rule; nothing of Wisdom on 'case-by-case reasoning'; nothing about Oakeshott on the alleged failures of rationalism. A debate about the role of theory in humane studies has been going on under their noses. It is unforgivable that they cannot think of a simple and illuminating parallel case, such as the discussion of the role of theory and general laws in the study of history. An important issue in that debate has of course concerned the (dis)analogies between the *subject-matter* of historiography (human acts in the past) and the *subject-matter* of the natural sciences. In other words, if we are interested in how far knowledge can be ordered in theories we might draw some distinctions between types of objects of knowledge.

The book does not endear for one further reason: it is written in a style of mid-Ocean English in which 'critique' is a verb, 'theorise' takes a direct object, people have problematics and ideas impact on one another. Poor stuff, for what is presumably the English Studies department of C.U.P.

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Intimations of Postmodernity. By ZYGMUNT BAUMAN. Routledge. 1992. pp. 232. Paperbound, £10.99; *Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies.* By BARRY SMART. Routledge. 1992. pp. 241. Paperbound, £10.99.

THESE TWO books are the work of sociologists. My own background is in English literature. I am writing here for philosophers. This in itself points to a 'post-modern condition': the impact of 'theory', in which the arduous interpretation of Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Habermas has become a common concern across the Humanities. Why this should be so is a question rarely explored, and certainly not directly in these two books, but I intend to consider it briefly, because it points in turn to wider features of post-modernity, which are the concern of these books, and of many others.

There is, first of all, Theory's curious, uneven crossing of cultural boundaries, of language, discipline and level. That of cultural level is particularly interesting. Many theorists have taken a close interest in popular film, for example, and Theory has in turn itself acquired sex-appeal, with major theorists in starring roles. But the boundary can still resist certain popular encroachments: Theory is a difficult and privileged pursuit, and the Humanities now require the same academic access and initiation as the physical sciences have done for almost a century.

All this brings us closer to the central paradoxes of post-modernity: in which, for example, apparent universality, mobility, immediacy turn out to have erected newer and higher barriers and divisions than ever before, and the celebrated, or lamented disappearance of the classical proletariat has coincided with the triumph of capitalism, and its extraordinary, and presumably inexplicable, penetration into all parts of public and private life.

Can the paradoxes of post-modernity be neatly and fairly summarized? I read with particular interest the chapter of Smart's book entitled 'The Postmodern Paradox', but I still cannot say what it is (unless the chapter, a brief survey of Habermas, Lyotard and Jameson, should be retitled 'The Ambiguities/ Uncertainties of Post-Modernism'; for example, is it reactionary? is it irrational?)

Smart has several lucid, engaging chapters on the present and future of post-industrial society, and on the power of the media and the image. He takes mildly to task those theorists, such as Daniel Bell, Alvin Toffler, or Marshall McLuhan, who are on the whole the apologists of current change, for their political vagueness as to how the development of democracy, which they see as so desirable, is convincingly to be achieved. Smart is more sympathetic to ecological, anti-productivist theorists, such as Ivan Illich or André Gorz, and he has clearly been influenced in a general way by the critical pessimism of Foucault.

But the more sweeping pessimism of Baudrillard he resists. In a detailed account, he first of all points out how Baudrillard has gone beyond McLuhan's dictum that the medium is the message, to elaborate a critique of the present totality of the image: that all products and processes share a common, impermeable depthlessness. This critique has frequently been read as a trivial and opportunistic celebration of the post-modern triumph of the image. But Smart has no difficulty in reading Baudrillard as deploring these developments, accepting them only in the sense that he sees little hope of resistance to them. Baudrillard's style of continuous, obscure hyperbole must make the question of tone and attitude, perhaps deliberately, highly indeterminate.

Smart also defends Lyotard as the analyst rather than advocate of the post-modern condition. Lyotard has notoriously characterized post-modernism as the break-up of the familiar, totalizing meta-narratives of religion, history, the Enlightenment, and science.

Smart's own style and attitude are characterized by a firm sense of balance, which only topples, regrettably, in my opinion, in his concluding chapter, where he engages in the difficult task of defining a post-marxism which will not be a simple denial of Marxism. In his final paragraph, he advocates strategies of change which are modest and local, as '[w]e are not able to predict, control, or design our future'. As individuals, yes, the world will no doubt often appear to be 'beyond our control', but a Marxism which has lost its belief in the collective possibility of rational decision and reconstruction is indeed post-marxist.

For Bauman, it is consumerism which characterizes post-modernism. In contemporary capitalism, the consumer has largely replaced the producer. This forms a link (not made by Bauman) with Fredric Jameson, and his own very tenuous links, via advertising and the media, between cultural post-modernism and late capitalism. Whereas Smart affiliates himself to the post-Gramscianism of Laclau and Mouffe, Bauman is sympathetic to the deconstructive ambivalence of Derrida. He opposes the 'legislators' (Kant, for example, in philosophy, or Talcott Parsons in sociology), in favour of the 'interpreters' (an appropriately loose grouping, including Freud, Heidegger and Richard Rorty). He sees seduction and repression as the twin, and mysteriously all-pervasive forces of contemporary society: the seduction of consumers, and the repression of marginalized non-consumers.

Like Smart, Bauman writes in a clear and agreeable style, but is perhaps often bolder and wittier. His brief chapter on Baudrillard's despairing account of hypersimulation, for example, is an exhilarating antidote, and all the more enjoyable in that he calls upon Rabelais and Baudelaire to suggest its limitations.

Smart's book, being specially and continuously written for the occasion, reads inevitably more coherently than Bauman's, which is in origin a collection of essays. Smart offers a particularly useful and encouraging introduction. Bauman, as an older and better known writer, can offer more of a name and a career. Indeed, his book concludes with a helpful retrospective interview.

However, after recommending both books strongly, my conclusion will remain sceptical.

Television, the computer, shifts in employment away from large-scale manufacturing industry, the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe—these are the main conditions of post-modernity, and I agree that they are all considerable changes, which it would be too pessimistic or conservative to describe simply as decadence. But that they amount, positively or negatively, to the end of order, progress, meaning and truth, or that they have very recently revolutionized cultural production and our ways of seeing the world, are different stories. Modernity, either as capitalism or as

Enlightenment, seems to me to be alive and well, and to have great tasks still before it, such as the overcoming of nationalism, of the poverty of the Third World, and of environmental catastrophe. Modernity confronts these tasks with of course no certainty of success. Capitalism is itself the cause of poverty and environmental destruction. But the responsibilities of its world order cannot lie elsewhere, nor can the blame for its failure.

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Buttons. By DIANA EPSTEIN and MILLICENT SAFRO. Thames and Hudson. 1991. pp. 176. Clothbound, £25.00.

THIS BOOK presents a vast visual array of buttons from Europe, the Far East and America from the eighteenth century to the present. Each illustration is in colour. In this aspect the book is an advance on other books on buttons, such as an earlier one by Diana Epstein *Buttons* (Studio Vista, 1968), where the illustrations are predominantly black and white. Most of the buttons included are reproduced at their actual size. In cases where they have been enlarged to show details this has been indicated.

All the buttons included are from 'Tender Buttons' which is both a museum of buttons and department store opened by the authors in Manhattan, New York, in 1964. A second shop was opened in Chicago in 1990.

The authors' collecting began in the sixties when they were interested in contemporary art and had admired the collages of Joseph Cornell and Kurt Schwitters and the object paintings of Claes Oldenburg and Jim Dine, who provides a foreword to their book. To quote the authors, 'buttons, like Andy Warhol's soupcans, seemed the perfect focus: irreverent and commonplace'. They called their shop 'Tender Buttons' borrowing their name from Gertrude Stein, giving, as they express it, 'our statement and our contribution to the avant-garde'. Gradually, however, their ideas expanded beyond their interest in contemporary art and they became involved with the realities of running a business. Eventually, they bought the entire collection of the 'Just Buttons' museum at Southington, Connecticut, which was run by Sally Luscomb, the editor of the journal *Just Buttons* (1942–79), and also the author of *The Encyclopedia of Buttons* (Crown, 1967). Their collection is also the result of nearly thirty years of collecting from many sources, from a cave in Brussels and the head of a fjord in Finland to a souk in Cairo.

The activity of button collecting originated in America during the 1930s depression. In 1938, the National Button Society was formed and collectors and clubs developed in different states. After World War II American collectors extended their range to European buttons and button collecting became a more international pursuit.

The collecting of buttons is interesting in that it can be related to the collecting of other things. For example, Wedgewood buttons and Art Nouveau buttons could also be seen as aspects of Wedgwood and Art Nouveau. Similarly, Kate Greenaway buttons may be looked at in the context of her book illustration. Buttons may also be related to historical developments. For example, there are a whole range of buttons relating to the French Revolution.

Diana Epstein and Millicent Safro in their book present us with buttons from the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Each section gives an illustrated history followed by many other illustrated examples which are accompanied by detailed references giving the date, place, method of production and other aspects of each button.

Button collectors have generally ignored buttons prior to the eighteenth century. Button-like objects have been found in Egypt, Iran and Greece but they were probably not used to fasten clothing but as ornaments, seals or badges. Buttons appear in mediaeval effigies and in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century portraits. Also, there are literary references to the button in the twelfth-century *Chanson de Roland, Gawaine and the Green Knight* (1340), Langland's *Piers Plowman* (1377) and in Shakespeare's plays. However, few, if any, buttons of this earlier period remain.

Buttons for collectors' purposes date from the eighteenth century which the writers describe as 'the golden age of the button'. There were a great variety from the fabric-covered

and embroidered, precious metal and paste buttons to the jasperware buttons with cut-steel borders made by the industrialists, Josiah Wedgwood and Matthew Boulton. Buttons also depicted different subjects such as Rococo scenes, portraits, events, views and minutely observed insects. The nineteenth century saw not only the continuing process of industrialization, with the reorganization of the button industry and a greater variety of materials from which buttons could be made, but also the survival of artisan production.

Diana Epstein and Millicent Safro's book lacks a discussion in any depth of the relation of buttons to changes in fashion. Also, detailed accounts are not given of different buttonmakers and firms. However, much information is given with each illustration given. Text and illustration are not separated and information can be gained through the visual entertainment which this fascinating book provides. This is a sumptuous edition which would enrich any public library or art library.

HELEN JAMES

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Dept of Visual and Performing Arts
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Burton Street
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British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 33, No. 2, April 1993

ASSESSING ACHIEVEMENT IN THE ARTS

Malcolm Ross and Sally Mitchell

> 'It is, however, the task of criticism to establish principles; to improve opinion into knowledge; and to distinguish those means of pleasing which depend upon known causes and rational deduction from the nameless and inexplicable elegancies which appeal wholly to the fancy, from which we feel delight but know not how they produce it, and which may well be termed the enchantresses of the soul.'
>
> Dr Samuel Johnson (THE RAMBLER No. 92)

INTRODUCTION

THE RESEARCH reported here addresses the role of subjectivity in the assessment of pupils' creative work in the arts. Perhaps it would be more accurate to speak of two, interacting subjectivities: that of the pupil and that of the teacher. Subjectivity has traditionally been regarded as invalidating the legitimacy of educational assessment. On the one hand the pupils' subjective experience has been seen both as inaccessible to the teacher and as private to the pupil. On the other hand the subjective judgements of teachers have often been thought to be irrelevant and alien to their pupils' artistic purposes.

Claims for validity and reliability in arts assessment are most often made to rest upon the twin notions of connoisseurship and consensus: teachers, by virtue of their experience and expertise, coming together to provide an agreed yardstick of aesthetic value, applied more or less exclusively to the impact of the pupil's art work or product. We have sought to offer a contrary view: to focus upon process rather than product, upon pupil understanding rather than product impact, to promote the pupil as the principal assessor, and talk as a medium not only of aesthetic communication but of artistic insight and judgement. Above all we argue for the recognition of the proper and indispensable function of subjectivity in artistic appraisal and in the Project Report (in press) have attempted to demonstrate, through the case studies, how the interplay of subjective responses, expressed in reflective conversation, can yield substantial qualitative evidence for both formative and summative assessments in arts education.

Work began in the schools in January 1990 and was concluded in June 1991. Field work was carried out in a number of secondary schools in Cornwall, Devon and Dorset.

The whole study rests upon a process model of aesthetic understanding that

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identifies a sequence of four transitional operations characterizing each aesthetic encounter in terms of the two complementary dimensions of 'realization' and 'display'. This model (adapted from the work of Rom Harré)[1] also serves as the instrument of data analysis and to articulate an argument in favour of qualitative assessment in the arts. The model—presented below—was developed in the course of the research, as a means of communicating our perceptions and our position to our partners in the schools and of establishing a common conceptual position as the basis for collective, practical discussion and policy making.

ASSESSMENT AND THE ARTS

Curriculum practice in the arts, including assessment, tends to focus on the productive mode of the pupil's experience: making art and grading what has been made. The criteria deployed in respect of pupil's arts products are largely derived from the conventional wisdom of arts teachers—sometimes heavily dependent upon their so-called 'gut reactions'—about what constitutes a good picture, poem, musical composition, dance or drama. Recent innovations in the GCSE examination have extended this emphasis upon 'making' by demanding more practical, creative work from arts subjects such as music and English which, in the past, have tended to adopt a more academic stance. Not that the academic study of the arts has been abandoned: students are still expected to write essays about the arts.

Largely absent from current assessment practice in the arts is any serious encouragement of the pupil's own act of self-appraisal: it is not usual for the teacher to make time to sit down with her/his pupil to talk upon her making and help her weigh up her achievement. Indeed, our research strongly suggests that many teachers might experience considerable difficulty with such an approach. Nevertheless, this is our proposal. The word 'assess' is derived from the Latin *ad+sedere* meaning 'to sit down together'. *We are proposing that teachers and pupils should indeed sit down together in regular shared acts of assessment through talk.*

The Project aims to give the pupil a voice, a place, in the assessment of her aesthetic activities and, at the same time, to allow the teacher's assessment to take full account of the pupil's subjective world—that world where her particular aesthetic projects are conceived and her unique aesthetic judgements are made. Traditionally, 'subjectivity' (of the pupil and of the teacher-assessor) has been a problem for teaching and assessment in the arts. This is because arts teachers operate largely outside their pupils' expressive acts. We, for our part, have made subjectivity central in our account of assessment in the arts. Our chosen vehicle is pupil-teacher *talk*: assessment in and through conversation.

ASSESSING THROUGH TALK

> Because the spoken word is such a natural form of communication, building in opportunities for oral assessment is a powerful way of ensuring that pupils are given increased access to the curriculum and a greater range of opportunities to demonstrate what they know, understand and can do. Assessment through talk increases the *educational validity* of assessment by providing pupils with a way of revealing their abilities that can closely match the way talk is used outside school. If pupils are able to discuss, cross-question, present and review ideas, in contexts which are *authentic*—with audiences which are genuinely involved, and for purposes which are to do with learning, as well as with assessment—then they will be using and developing language 'for real'. In addition, they will be assessed using contexts which match pupils' experiences in the classroom. As a consequence of this, more pupils will have the chance to reveal a wide range of ability than would be likely if assessment was solely based on written tasks.
>
> 'Assessment Through Talk in Key Stages 3 & 4 and Beyond', *National Oracy Project* (1991)[2]

Arts teachers have always used talk in the classroom to promote learning and reflection. They have not, on the whole, exploited the potential of talk to reveal the quality of a pupil's aesthetic understanding, either in the context of instruction or of assessment—tending to rely overmuch—as the Oracy Project claims—upon written and—we would add—practical tasks. In the Project, we have chosen to focus upon pupil-teacher talk as providing what the National Oracy Project calls 'a window on learning'. Talk, especially when it is intimate, exploratory and conversational, is especially suitable as a vehicle for subjective encounters, i.e., as a medium for engaging with another's feelings, ideas, perceptions and values. We use conversation for just such purposes every day.

It might be that arts teachers will decide that pupils ought to be able to talk intelligently and intelligibly about their art work and the works of other artists—in which case they may want to draw up criteria for the assessment *of* talk. Our concern, however, has been with the potential of talk as a medium for assessing knowledge, understanding and practice in the different arts subjects—with assessment *through* talk. With the National Oracy Project we believe that talk not only provides a rich and highly appropriate means of learning more about our pupils' learning; it also serves to empower the pupil, to engage and involve her directly in the assessment process. The Project goes further and proposes that the emphasis in the evaluation of arts practice should pass (and indeed may confidently be passed) to the pupil herself. At the very least we would expect a 'negotiated' outcome to what has to be a collaborative undertaking in which formative appraisals—the very stuff of the teaching-learning process—provide the living ground of summative assessments.

The Project's proposal re-positions the pupil's creative art work in the assessment process. It becomes the subject of an ongoing conversation

between pupil and teacher the purpose of which is to prompt an expansion and deepening of the pupil's self-understanding and to give the teacher a unique opportunity to explore the pupil's capacity for thinking in the arts. The art work is no longer required to serve as an exemplary, conclusive instance of the pupil's competence. Rather, it forms the basis of an illuminating encounter, yielding deep insights into the pupil's aesthetic understanding, through the medium of 'sensible' (feelingful) talk.

At the end of the Project Report we touch upon the practical implications of allowing greater weight to the role of talk in developing and assessing aesthetic understanding—both in terms of the content and balance of the arts curriculum, and of the behaviours and inter-relationships of pupils and teachers. New practices demand new inter-personal structures. The Project is concerned to break up the monopoly rights currently exercised through assessment by the teacher upon the pupil's personal creative work—exercised as much during so-called formative as in summative assessment.

THE ARTS CURRICULUM CYCLE—A PROCESS MODEL

The notion of the 'aesthetic' is sometimes unjustly dismissed from educational discussion as belonging either to abstract philosophical discourse or as culturally high-falutin: some divine state of grace granted only to the most sensitive and refined of souls, beyond comment or criticism by ordinary mortals. We have not found this view helpful to our understanding of children's subjective experiencing in the arts. The 'aesthetic', to our understanding, is not so much the reward of some esoteric practice or a blessing bestowed upon a chosen few but rather a quest in itself: it is not a condition of being, but a process, an operation, a way of engaging with the world, a form of work. *We do not experience the aesthetic so much as experience aesthetically.* Thus we talk about aesthetic *knowing*, aesthetic *responding*, aesthetic *perceiving*, aesthetic *understanding*: all these activities are ways of becoming as well as ways of being. We have turned in developing our account of aesthetic development and of learning in the arts to Rom Harré and his book *Personal Being* (1983). He attaches importance for personal development to the expressive dimension of human behaviour, to what he calls 'identity projects'. Harré's appeal to us is his emphasis on the *processes* of individual growth. In his model the several dimensions of experience are dynamically inter-related. In accordance with this view of identity, our thinking focuses precisely upon *the development of the pupil and not the fate of the product.*

As we have already said, we see aesthetic education contributing crucially to the development of individual identity, especially to that sense we may have of one's expressive and creative self at the core of being.


Harré proposes three dimensions to social reality: public/private *display*, individual/collective *realization* and active/passive *agency*. He represents them as a matrix. Harré suggests that personal 'development' occurs as a series of

'identity projects' involving a clockwise progression around the matrix from quadrant 1 to quadrant 4 and on to quadrant 1 again. He describes the four transitions as an invariant sequence of operations:

Conventionalization—Appropriation—Transformation—Publication

These operations and the sequence in which they occur may be applied, in our view, both to individual aesthetic projects and as a framework for mapping a pupil's aesthetic development throughout the years of schooling.

The Arts Curriculum Cycle



An assessment profile in the aesthetic domain would need to allow for graduated attainments in respect of each of the four transitional operations. Such a scheme could be developed quite quickly based upon the witness of experienced teachers. A further research project would be needed, however, to test and perhaps adjust and elaborate it.

Each transitional operation becomes the focus of curriculum provision at every stage of the child's aesthetic development. Converting Harré's four operations into 'aesthetic' formulations, i.e., into statements applicable to arts education, we arrive at four aspects of the pupil's expressive experience: (1) The Conventionalization of Feeling; (2) The Appropriation of Feeling; (3) The Transformation of Feeling; (4) The Publication of Feeling.

The model we are about to elaborate is a cyclical, process model: the sequence runs from Quadrant 1 to Quadrant 4 and then begins again. At every phase there is a degree of reciprocity between adjacent quadrants. As we have said already, we are focusing precisely upon the development of the pupil and not the fate of the product, and this is consonant with our earlier statement concerning the arts curriculum and personal or individual development. These ideas now need elaborating.

CONVENTIONALIZATION

This quadrant of the model is both the beginning and the end of an unceasing cycle—the process of problem-formulation and resolution that Harré designates 'identity projects'. All expression derives from and draws upon the cultural stock, tradition. The child is born into a cultural matrix and must first establish herself there—accommodate to the prevailing rules, conventions and forms. The pupil's feeling responses—her sensate orderings—must first find expression within the general discourse of feeling as conventionalized by the culture. Then in terms of her own emergent identity, having published herself and submitted herself to praise, having proposed a role for herself, she must be granted the right to participate (to transact and traffic) in what Oakeshott (1977)[3] called 'the conversation of mankind'. This she will do within and by means of the conventions available, conventions that are constantly under review and subject to alteration, substitution and degradation as the culture protects and renews itself. The child's products and responses are offered as additions to the conventional wisdom of society, and she herself becomes a bearer of the culture, a transmitter, a reformer, a guardian. She comes to perceive herself as authentic, as a maker-of-meanings among other such makers—as a member of the wedding. She aspires to feeling as judgement.

It is in this sense that the arts are about personal development. Knowing, which comes perhaps as a flash of inspiration, a moment of enlightenment, an intuition, an intimation of the process of Transformation, and is verified in the process of Publication, is now realized as viable behaviour, available as a form for the management of feeling, as a construct for the ordering and elaboration of the life of feeling within the public world. This is the practical benefit of an experience recognized and cherished primarily for the distinctive pleasure it gives us—a pleasure we are correctly inclined to imbue with much richer, even spiritual, values. To know aesthetically is to know yourself as transcendent and yet grounded at the same time, corporeality being at once our curse and our blessing. It is only by our fruits—by the fruits in this case of our aesthetic understanding—that we may know ourselves, know the truth in us and take our place in the community of public discourse.

APPROPRIATION

Feelings arise in a cultural context. They find expression and realization in ways and by means available in and acceptable (meaningful) to that culture. We appropriate the conventions available within our culture for the expression of personal feeling, for the transaction and communication of personal meaning. It is clearly of the utmost importance that children should be schooled in such forms, customs, conventions and practices as will permit and facilitate the legitimate expression of feeling. Much of such 'schooling' goes on outside the school itself through processes of 'natural' or informal socialization and

acculturation, but often much remains to be done if the individual child is to have access to the means of expression she needs to live a balanced, full and healthy emotional life. It is also reasonable to expect schools to extend such awareness and such opportunities way beyond what might be acquired casually, given the resources available in our society for extending children's knowledge and experience and for accelerating development and compensating for deficit. Children should be given the opportunity to appropriate the expressive forms they need from the full range now available in the modern world, both contemporary and traditional, and to convert them into a personal style, signature or autograph.

TRANSFORMATION

Transformation is the creative search for personal knowledge through the representation of feeling impulse—it suggests not so much the adoption of received conventions as the generation of images 'closer to the heart's desire'. The pupil's aesthetic project is an identity project in this particular sense, its main purpose being the representation of sensate experience in imagery that is unique, particular and owned. Schools seem only weakly to appreciate the full import of this aspect of arts education, despite the prominence given to the production of art work and, supposedly, to the pupil's 'personal' imagery.

The Transformative principle applies not only to the pupil's feelings but to the conventions available for their expression and, of course, to the pupil's sense of individuality. As has already been said, for work to be genuinely transformative, the teacher must be able to identify (and identify with) the pupil's (identity) project, i.e., with her creative-expressive action by means of which feeling and medium fuse in a process that transforms both. The teacher may not directly enter these private worlds of Appropriation and Transformation. Her only access is through the child's act of Publication. But then she must find a way of comprehending the personal expressive character of the work so as to be able to supply her own responses to what the work is about. She must however be able to see, to hear what is going on for the pupil in the work—and the pupil can help her to do so.

Since understanding Appropriation and Transformation lies at the heart of good arts teaching, we elaborate upon it more fully in the Project Report in the analysis of pupil—teacher talk. In particular we try to demonstrate that the pupil's (essentially private) acts of sensate ordering may indeed be located, identified and evaluated in (public) discussion with the teacher. We show how the aesthetic response is constituted of observable 'feeling ideas', of palpable structures or elements which embody and convey the feeling dimension of the work. By taking sensate ordering as evidence of intelligent feeling, of aesthetic understanding, we remove assessment from the domain of the teacher's personal preference and base it firmly in the pupil's perception of her own performance. Assessment thereby transcends the mere grunt of satisfaction, the

dumb hunch, the feeling in the gut. Teachers can learn to concentrate upon discovering the character of the pupil's sensate ordering, i.e., her capacity for making meaning in the arts. The child's underlying, even unconscious, world of feeling (her particular loves, hates and obsessions, i.e., all that is strictly private) safely remain her own business. Teaching need not be intrusive. But *evidence* of Transformation is available if the teacher knows where to look for it and how to recognize it.

PUBLICATION

The Publication of Feeling (hence its social ratification and validation) is the destiny, in fact constitutes a reasonable definition of expression in the arts. Contrary to the stereotype, the expressive impulse is in fact unsatisfied in most of us until the work is placed in the public domain, albeit anxiously and with some trepidation, as an effort of communication with and an invitation to validation by others. The work will then be judged in terms of its power to sustain aesthetic contemplation. It is in this special act of public sharing—especially through the neglected dimension of creative and imaginative talk—that pupil and teacher foster Publication together. The teacher is the pupil's first (and privileged) public. They meet in Winnicott's 'potential space' and on very special terms. It is through the pupil's act of Publication that the teacher is able to connect with the work, provide support and make appropriate and relevant formative assessments. As with Conventionalization, Appropriation and Transformation, we have more to say about Publication in the Case Studies in the Project Report since our understanding of all these concepts has largely evolved from that process. It is in Publication that feeling becomes vision—where the so-called aesthetic emotions manifest themselves: wonder, awe, reverence, delight—transfiguration.

Teachers instinctively wish to reward their pupils with public praise and acknowledgement, indeed many arts teachers see this kind of personal endorsement as perhaps the only contribution they can make to their pupil's development. Praise is indeed a principal duty of the teacher as first receiver of the pupil's work. Formative assessment will only work if it is non-judgemental, even celebratory. For the teacher's endorsement of her pupil to carry any weight the pupil must feel that the teacher has been able to grasp the direction, character and thrust of the creative and expressive experience she has undergone. Where the teacher's endorsement seems alien to the pupil's own experience of Appropriation and Transformation the experience of Publication is robbed of its formative power.

LANGUAGE AND AESTHETIC RESPONSE

The research conversations collected during the fieldwork were analysed with two dimensions in mind. In the first place we were looking for evidence that the pupil's aesthetic understanding had been aroused and that the work under

scrutiny could function as the site of intelligent feeling and of sensibility at work. At the same time we were examining the dynamics of the conversation, looking at the types of language used by the participants, the nature and bearing of their personal relationship and the quality of the experience engendered through talk. This second dimension has proved richly interesting and scarcely separable from the first.

Reading what others have written about the arts and language, it seems that we are not alone in the observations we have made. Lesley Perry (1987),[4] in an essay entitled 'The Arts Judgement and Language', distinguishes between two forms of communication open to individuals. In the public world there is standard and conventional communication, 'a *generalizing* thing' based on the idea of resemblance between individuals. And there is private communication by which the individual both tests linguistic meanings (*appropriates* them rather than merely accepting them as standard) and uses them to articulate an inner state of mind. He argues that these forms are not neatly separated but overlap to varying degrees according to the specific context of language use.

In the Case Studies presented in the Project Report language frequently tends towards the private kind. The speaker struggles to realize her meaning, her very individual sensing, but within a form of language which will be recognized and responded to by her conversation partner. There is a tension between personal discovery of significance through speech and the need to share, to converse, and thus, inevitably, to orientate towards the other person's point of view. The conversation partner (the teacher) plays an important role in determining the mode in which the speaker (the pupil) is permitted to operate; whether she is free to use the emergent meanings of private speech or whether she is bounded by an expectation that her meaning will be finished and public (i.e., that she will supply 'correct' answers). To state this another way: whether she is permitted to respond aesthetically or non-aesthetically. Perry writes:

> Aesthetic experience is very much personal and often uniquely so in its origins, and it shares the general difficulty that arises whenever an individual, utilizing the generalizing medium of language, wants to communicate what is peculiar to him to others and to make them aware of his inner state.
>
> (p. 23)

As we have done, Perry locates the arts 'in the borderland of articulation' (i.e., between the public and the private domains of speech) where 'the pressure on language becomes extreme'. It is precisely here that our conversations have their place; between the purely Public and Private polarities of the process model, between Transformation and Conventionalization—i.e., in Publication.

The Russian linguist and psychologist, L. S. Vygotsky (1962)[5] also distinguishes two forms of speech resembling those described by Perry. The very

individualized activity of 'inner' (Private) speech is characterized by abbreviation and the condensation of meaning, the use of idioms and predicates which appear, in comparison to 'external' (Public) speech, 'disconnected and incomplete'.

There are occasions, says Vygotsky, when external speech comes to resemble inner speech; this is when both speakers know what is going on, when their thoughts coincide or are sufficiently orientated towards one another. The private use of speech (inner speech) can be nurtured by a context which is sympathetic to its use. The Case Studies certainly show that where conversation partners achieve a closeness of understanding, where they begin to establish a rapport, then the distinction between inner and outer, private and public speech begins to blur. Intimacy leads to intimation, to aesthetic response.

In our conversations—in aesthetic talk—intimacy is achieved through the shared contemplation of the art work. As we discuss below, this sharing is crucial to our notions of Publication and of Praise. The quality of the speakers' attentiveness to the art work is witnessed by language which adapts itself to the particularities of the object addressed, and to the particularities of present time and present place—by utterances, gestures and the responses of the other speaker. (See Bakhtin 1981.[6])

Aesthetic understanding manifests itself *in*—and *as*—a complex, multiple, dynamic, contingent and 'always recent' (Perry, p. 29) response. Each utterance changes the context of which the arts object is, in this sense, a 'living' part. Public forms of language (the purest form is writing—out of time, final draft, immutable) tend to militate against such fluidity. According to Vygotsky one of the main semantic peculiarities distinguishing inner (private) speech from external (public) speech is 'the preponderance of the *sense* of a word over its *meaning*.' Sense is 'a dynamic, fluid, complex whole, which has several zones of unequal stability. Meaning is only one of the zones of sense'. In examining occasions on which pupils are talking about their unique and individual engagement we have noticed a particular kind of language in operation–more tentative, less conclusive, but often carrying more conviction than that which they use in response to a closed line of questioning or a purely technical enquiry. And where coherent talk breaks down, it is often supplemented by eloquent gesture. This, we came to feel, is language used aesthetically, at times even poetically, both to generate and convey understanding.

SEARCHING TALK FOR EVIDENCE OF AESTHETIC UNDERSTANDING

In order systematically to explore the two related dimensions which correspond roughly to the content and the form of the conversations we had to devise a framework that would allow us to identify, distinguish and evaluate the various elements in which we were interested. It made sense to tie the

analysis to the conceptual matrix developed to describe the arts curriculum. The four operations identified in the model now become the principal categories for sorting the data contained in the conversations. An example of how this was done is shown below.

Following Osbourn (1988)[7] we distinguish between sensate surface and sensate resonance in a work of art. Here we have in mind the way sensuous constructs operate simultaneously as ways of ordering meaning at the level of direct attention (primary perception) and, metaphorically, as ways of evoking imaginative meanings (resonance). So, for example, cool colours and warm colours may be contrasted at the surface to constitute one aspect of the *body* of the work whilst at the same time evoking a mood or atmosphere, an imaginative ambience. It is the direct experience of this fusion, this oscillation of attention between surface and resonance, form and feeling, that constitutes what we mean by the experience of aesthetic understanding—the aesthetic response. The sensate surface will include every appeal to sensory apprehension offered by the work. Colours, for example, may be strong/weak; shapes, concave/convex; light, dim/brilliant; lines, heavy/light; movements, sudden/slow; smell, pungent/bland; texture, rough/smooth. 'Surface' will also include other elements such as story or narrative material, the traces left by certain techniques and instruments, the use of conventional formulae–in short, surface is everything we see, touch or hear that constitutes the body of the piece. Resonance is the operation of those self-same sensate structures to evoke and order feeling and imagination. Resonance identifies that sense we have of the 'presence' of a piece. If surface delights us, resonance is what moves us. In searching for evidence of the aesthetic response in talk we must hold to the primacy of perception of the sensate dimension. It is only and exactly upon the sensate dimension that aesthetic understanding operates. Every art work is constrained by its sensate parameters.

For a work to evoke imaginative meanings, to have what we call resonance, one must have apprehended its surface, picked up its sensate qualities, its sensate orderings. Resonance is cognition operating upon perception; its meaning is connotative; it is the realm of imagination, of mood, character, symbol, metaphor. Resonance meaning (or, as Vygotsky would have it, 'sense') is generated across fields of knowledge. When a work is explored as depth, then memory, sensing, imagination, personal associations, intuition, dream, cultural inheritances begin to interweave, to create an increasingly dynamic, volatile and mesmerizing texture of significance and experience; the personality, ambience, distinctive flavour of the piece emerges; its 'feel', its 'real presence' (Steiner, 1989).[8]

Aesthetic development or maturation in terms of Transformation occurs as the ability to respond to the growing complexity and intensity in the way surface generates resonance, not by becoming more transparent, more separate, but by becoming more opaque, more self-sufficient, more fused. The

mature aesthetic understanding is increasingly obsessed with and satisfied by surface-as-resonance, experienced as unresolved and inexhaustible. The perception of resonance is the condition of disinterested interest and distanced attachment that characterizes mature aesthetic judgement.

One final observation and the discussion of analytical framework is complete. Constructs are made in respect of what Kelly (1955)[9] calls 'elements'. These are the constituent factors or conventional features of a particular work; in music, for instance, rhythm, tone, harmony, tune, tempo. The greater the pupil's awareness of the range of sensate material available in respect of the different elements that characterize a particular art form, the richer her experience of depth in the making process and of depth in aesthetic contemplation. Again, as we have indicated earlier, Osbourn's research has been very helpful as we have sought an effective method of analysing our own data. She too used talk in exploring her subjects' aesthetic responses.

In the example which follows we illustrate our analytic method. 'Spread sheets' like the one illustrated here were used to sort the contents of each of the case studies. This brief extract is taken from the analysis of Case Study 7 (Project Report). Jack (J), aged 12, is talking about his own painting with one of the research team (R).

R: If we look at the picture, what bits of the picture do you feel happiest with, do you like best?

J: Um. . . I like these bits down at the bottom, where you can see the water and the rocks, and there's dark shadows in the water. Um . . . and I like it where, here where there's, um, like it's a sheer drop, it's straight down . . . and you can actually see that [points to a 'stack' of rock rising sheer out of the water]. And usually I'm not very good at drawing those things . . . Uh . . . I also like this bit up here where . . . um . . . [points up to the left hand side of the picture. He was originally pointing down to the bottom right. He's pointing up now to the sort of middle left where there is a high cliff face.] . . . where there is a contrast between the jagged rocks and the grass and the earth and the shrubs up at the top, which are on . . . like the hill.

R: Is it the feel of it or, or the colours you've got, or, or the shapes of it, or, or because you really feel you've caught, you know, that, that contrast?

J: I feel I've caught that contrast, yeah, between . . . the . . . browny nice greeny, browny earthy colour and the grey . . . rock face.

In the opening section (lines 3–9) Jack happily attends to the representational elements in his painting. He is pleased with the way he has rendered rock, water and shadow and points them out happily and confidently to his conversation partner (Publication). His approval of what he has done signals ownership (Conventionalization). He confides his lack of drawing skills (Appropriation). In the next section (9–16) the representational elements are similarly pointed out and the painting approved of. He offers the concept 'contrast' which indicates both Appropriation and resonance (the structure

Line No	Elements	Transformation		Appropriation	Publication (Praise)	Conventionalization
		Constructs				
		Surface	Resonance			
3–9	2D surface 'these bits at the bottom'	water – not water rocks – not rock shadows – not shadows		'I'm not very good at drawing these things'	He points and describes. He says he likes these 'bits'.	He owns the work and is confident in himself as its author
9–16	2D surface 'this bit up here'	jagged rocks – grass earth shrubs	contrast	contrast		
19–21	colour	greeny browny, 'earthy' colour – grey rock face	contrast		the green 'nice'	

carries feeling). The third section (19–21) shifts from representational features to more purely sensate elements (colour). Again the feeling and form of the contrast are noted by Jack and he is confident of his achievement as a painter. He expresses a certain personal pleasure in '*the nice greeny, browny, earthy colour*' that, later in the conversation, transforms into a strong depth construct carrying much of the imaginative meaning of the piece.

Though the categories above are an invaluable tool for understanding the data, they do not on their own reflect the overall sense of integration.

> The first principle in music hearing is not, as many people presume, the ability to distinguish the separate elements in a composition and recognize its devices, but to experience the primary illusion, to feel the consistent movement and recognize at once the commanding form which makes this piece *an inviolable whole*. Even young children can do this when they listen delightedly to a tune.
> *Feeling and Form* Langer (1953)[10]

There is no content to the conversations that is not part of the language in which it is expressed. The medium is, in this sense, also the message (just as the meaning of a dance is not to be abstracted from its realized living form). The aesthetic focus of the conversation is embedded in the language structures themselves: language used aesthetically to evoke 'an inviolable whole'. It therefore follows that appraisal based on arts talk will be holistic and qualitative rather than mechanistic or quantitative. The advantage we see in the use of conversational talk to explore and elicit aesthetic understanding is that it furnishes the

appraisers (both teacher and pupil) with relevant, subjective yet public evidence upon which to base their judgements.

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FROM ORIGINAL TO COPY AND BACK AGAIN

James Elkins

WITHIN AESTHETICS, exchanges about the nature of forgery have been made largely in response to Nelson Goodman's *Languages of Art* (1968). In his original scenario we are invited to contemplate two paintings: one is authentic and the other is forged, but we cannot distinguish them by 'merely looking', without the aid of X-Rays and chemical analyses. Our different aesthetic response to the two paintings is used to argue, in the words of Joseph Margolis, that 'there are bound to be aesthetically relevant considerations in the appreciation of art that are not directly accessible to perception or to any other relevant mode of experience'.[1] Historians have been largely silent during the debates on Goodman's claim: not, I think, because it is not an important problem, but rather because what matter to historians are the imperceptible considerations in any given case, rather than the simple existence of such considerations.

Here I would like to open the limited dialogue between art history and aesthetics on this subject by exploring the ways that forgeries, copies and originals function within historical and critical discourse. I hope to show that the art historical way of ordering such concepts intersects the distinctions made by aestheticians in a mutually illuminating manner. A useful step in this direction has been taken by Crispin Sartwell, who has questioned the assumption that it is possible to distinguish authentic and inauthentic art works.[2] In place of the dichotomy authentic/inauthentic he has proposed a twenty-one-step sequence of works from those that are most clearly inauthentic (and to which we would want to attach the label 'forgery') to those that are most clearly authentic.[3] The list, which need not be repeated here, begins with copies that are represented as originals, and ends with paintings that have been cleaned. *En route* it passes through such problematic intermediaries as the 'masterful copy of a particular painting to which a [forged] signature has been added by another hand'.

What I would like to do here is propose that Sartwell is not quite correct in historical terms when he says that 'the authentic and the inauthentic are continuous with one another'. The fact that 'cases can be adduced to any desired degree of intermediacy' (Sartwell's next sentence) does not imply that there is a mathematical continuity between the poles of authenticity and inauthenticity. I agree that it does not make sense to speak of authenticity as a

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well-defined term, but I think that the path from one to the other is made in discrete steps. Those 'steps' are historically determined categories and habits of thought. Such criteria are relevant here since history has given us the terms 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' to begin with, and it is therefore plausible that it has given us other terms as well. To rephrase Sartwell's claim: there are only a few 'degrees' that we know how to 'desire', and historical practice has given us their names. Sartwell's twenty-one steps, in other words, cannot be made infinite upon demand.

The particular sequence that I will propose has a second difference from Sartwell's continuum and from Goodman's dichotomy. Instead of comparing authentic and inauthentic, I will be comparing imperceptible difference with immediately obvious difference. The reason for this change also lies in the realm of historical response. In most cases, historians and critics do not find themselves wondering about nuances of forgery: the intention to deceive is far less common than the intention to emulate.[4] Goodman's problem, of seeing the difference between two apparently identical paintings, may never have taken place. Even when Van Meegeren's paintings were thought to be Vermeers, there was no single painting that matched any of Vermeer's authentic works. In saying this I do not mean that Goodman's problem might not be a good test case: simply that to achieve it, he has to leave the realm of history. The history of art is marginally concerned with forgery, but centrally informed by the progression from the student working 'in the manner' of the master to the independent artist working 'in his own manner'. Questions of the aesthetic component of imperceptible differences arise whenever one looks at a second- or third-rate picture, and wonders if it is sufficiently different from its models to be experienced as an original in its own right. Forgery, in this view, is a special case of all artistic work, a perversion or failure of the normal process of increasing distance between student and master.

So I wish to point out that forgery itself may be defined as a special case of a more general phenomenon, and that the sequence from original to copy is not continuous but proceeds in historically determined stages. My third contribution to this question is to point to the fact that the sequence forms a loop. Original and copy are not well-defined terms: not only because they are linked by intermediaries, as Sartwell says, but because they contaminate one another by forming a cycle that repeats through history. We can begin with the 'given term', the original work itself.

1. In art history, an *original* work may or may not be an authentic work. The *Virgin of Vladimir*, an early Russian icon, has been overpainted at least five times in the last seven centuries. Art historical texts tend to assign the concept of originality to works that possess one or more of three further properties: originality (which I will call *originary* to avoid confusion with the general term *original*), primacy, and uniqueness.

Originary works are those that appear to be without antecedent. The smile

in Leonardo's *Mona Lisa* (1503–05) inaugurates a tradition of enigmatic smiles from Leonardo's pupil Bernardino Luini onwards (as in the *Madonna of the Rose* in the Brera in Milan), but Mona Lisa's smile can be understood as part of a tradition that goes back to Leonardo's teacher Verrocchio and ultimately to archaic Greek sphinxes (6th c. BC).[5] Note that originality is constrained by the contextual uses of tradition, and not by a fixed definition. If we search for the history of polka-dots, we can trace them to a nineteenth-century dance, or all the way back to panthers.[6] According to George Steiner, whatever is *primary* refers mostly to itself, and whatever is secondary refers mostly to what is primary. Hence Shakespeare is primary, and Shakespeare criticism is secondary.[7] An originary work might not be primary, and vice versa. *Uniqueness*, the third non-essential property of originality, distinguishes originals clearly from certain kinds of copies, but only blurrily from most terms we will be discussing. None of the three properties of originality taken individually is sufficient to distinguish originals from copies, and we will see traces of each idea in the categories that follow.

2. Next are *strict copies*, works made in exact emulation of originary works.[8] In the strictest sense the strict copy is a modern invention. Baroque copies were seldom line-for-line, and Baroque academics had a well-developed aesthetic of copying that did not involve 'photographic' copywork.[9] A *reconstruction* is a particular kind of strict copy, in which the work is made again in the same way it was originally made, perhaps including layers of gesso, *imprimatura*, *grisaille*, body colour, glaze, and varnish. It need not look any different from a strict copy that only mimics the surface layer of paint (as is done in contemporary conservation). The different aesthetic responses provoked by reconstructions and strict copies mirror the responses provoked by Goodman's original and forgery, except that the successful reconstruction casts doubt on the original by making us wonder if all the layers were really necessary.

Given the large literature on forgeries[10] and the extensive investigations of the Van Meegeren case,[11] I will make only two points here regarding forgery. First, though it is true that in this sequence most forgeries are strict copies and reconstructions, pictures called 'forgeries' can also be found among the looser copies we will consider below.[12] Forgery, in effect, is dispersed through several categories and loses its primary value: as is appropriate for a category that is historically marginal in comparison with originality and copying. And second, the detailed historical study of forgeries might augment Sartwell's twenty-one examples.[13] Much of this literature has gone unnoticed in the philosophical debates, though some philosophers have stressed the historical aspect of our understanding of forgeries.[14] The historical material demonstrates that the problem of forgery is seldom equivalent to the problem of achieving an indistinguishable strict copy. For example, a strict copy might refer to a forgery, without being a forgery. Adrian Kovacs has made copies

of Cézanne's self-portraits, which he calls self-portraits of himself.[15] But the artist's advertisements show that he refers to forgery rather than exemplifying it. This is like the difference between the word forgery and the word 'forgery', and it opens the possibility of reorganizing the topic of forgery in terms of quotation rather than intention or authenticity.

3. A *reproduction* is a copy that is readily distinguished from the original, but is meant to reduce or avoid an appearance of originality. Hence reproductions are works that are taken to have the same absence of originality that strict copies have, but with an appreciable formal and aesthetic distance from the originals. A reproduction is therefore one step further from an original than a successful strict copy. In art criticism there is a well-developed dialogue on originals and reproductions, and among its claims is the idea that the 'age of mechanical reproduction' has served to bring out the concept of originality latent in previously 'unreproducible' works.[16] Reproductions can be mechanical or hand-made, and that difference can be used to modify the reference to originality. An example of the former is Sherrie Levine's photographs after Walker Evans photographs. By rephotographing from copies of Evans's negatives, Levine avoids the issue of skill and stresses the theme of copying: as she sees it, everything is a copy, and the world is 'filled to suffocating' with copies of copies. The open, obvious, unskilled nature of her copies is meant to underscore the universal impossibility of originality.[17] Handmade reproductions may be exemplified by Mike Bidlo's paintings of Picasso paintings. Since he actually paints them, his works are more complicated than Sherrie Levine's (and arguably also more aesthetically confused): he also refers to the skill and the genius that went into Picasso's works as well as to the difficulty, irrelevance, undesirability, or unimportance of originality. A work such as Bidlo's *Not Duchamp* (1984), which is an assemblage designed to mimic Duchamp's earliest ready-made, the *Bicycle Wheel* (1913), shows how complex these references can be.

Some reproductions approach or depart from originals in terms of quantity rather than skill or quality. *Multiples* and *limited editions* are sets of objects that preserve the idea of the original's uniqueness. Joseph Beuys's multiples have this double reference: in part they are anonymous works of machine production, and in part they are originals. In paleography this is known as the difference between signatures and autographs. The latter are unique, and are by the signator's hand; the former can be reproduced or signed in absentia, by contracting a surrogate signator. Ottoman *tughras*, elaborate calligraphic Sultans' signatures, were drawn by calligraphers and sometimes also signed in autograph with the calligrapher's name, as one might sign a painting.

4. *Imitation* is a word introduced by the poet Robert Lowell; he used it to describe his poems 'imitated' from originals rather than translated in the usual sense.[18] Part of the concept of imitation is the construction of a new entity comprised of the imaginative fusion of the new and old works or artists.

Emulation and *free copy* are synonyms, since such works are typically engaged in 'conversations' with the original that paradoxically involve alteration in the name of greater fidelity. Imitations evoke the Italian distinction between imitation (*imitazione*) and imagination (*fantasia*).[19] In historical terms, Lowell's position is that a work must be re-created by the *fantasia*, rather than slavishly imitated, in order to be 'really' or 'truly' true to the original. The opposite to this, and the privileging of *imitazione*, is provided by Vladimir Nabokov's translation of Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin*. Nabokov stresses absolute precision in transcribing individual words and his translation is frequently unreadable; in our terms his is an attempt at a strict copy.[20]

5. *Variations*, *variants*, and works 'after' or 'in homage to' an original are allied to imitations but stress divergence from the original rather than the affinity. The catalogue of an exhibition held at Nuremberg in 1980 lists over one hundred variations on Dürer's work, many shown side by side with the originals.[21] Though they span the full range of styles that were possible in Germany in the 1970s, most are primarily variations, as the catalogue suggests: they argue that style and relation to the past are independent. Picasso's works based on Old Masters are the best-known modern examples of variations. He made variations on Velasquez's *Maids of Honour* (1656), Jacques-Louis David's *Rape of the Sabine Women* (1799), Eugene Delacroix's *Women of Algiers* (1849), and others. Caricature, parody, and persiflage (light-hearted parody) are variants because they do homage in an ironic or critical fashion. A pastiche, for example, is an uncomprehending or simplifying variation. Canaletto and others made *capricci* for tourists which are pastiches in this sense: if someone visited Italy and wanted mementos, but could not afford separate paintings of each city, he could buy Canaletto's paintings, which juxtaposed monuments from different places.[22]

6. Moving farther along we come to *version*, which is almost an independent work: almost a second original. A famous example is Manet's *Dejeuner sur l'herbe* (1863), whose original may be said to be Marcantonio Raimondi's engraving of *The Judgement of Paris*. We do not always think of Marcantonio when looking at Manet, but we are invited to experience a divided consciousness: on the one hand, Manet's painting is an original, and on the other, it is not. *Le Dejeuner sur l'herbe* is poised between primary and secondary, imitation and original. It is this ambiguation that is partly the reason for Manet's fascination to art historians: his works occupy a particularly difficult position in the sequence we have been following.[23]

Several of Sartwell's twenty-one entries belong here (especially numbers 10 through 21). His number 20 includes the states of a print, which are partly determined by earlier states but not necessarily dependent on them. When Rembrandt erased the figure of Tobit and the Angel from a landscape by Hercules Seghers, he made a pure landscape scene out of a Biblical scene. The ghostly outlines of the Angel and Tobit remained, but they are too faint to

be noticed except by a close examination executed by someone who knows where to look. Again we meet Goodman's dichotomy in a setting that refigures its meaning: in this case, the aesthetic appreciation of both original and version is changed.

7. We now approach the place where we began, since works that edge the original entirely out of mind approach the status of original. But to be exact, this seventh category is not equivalent to the first category, because the existence of a seventh category (of 'originals' derived from originals, to use the quotation marks I employed in speaking about reproduction) undermines the possibility that the first category might be pure and distinct from those that follow. In light of the seventh category, originals must be redefined as works related to and derived from copies, and copies must be also reconceived as originals *in statu nascendi*. This is historically appropriate and exemplary of the conceptual reduction that is required in order to contrast authentic and inauthentic works.

Though each of these stages suggests further problems, I think that the underlying, and most interesting, question is the conceptual rule of history itself, which appears from our vantage to have dictated the terms of the debate itself by providing us with these stages. For artists and aestheticians alike, these possibilities show the restricted meanings that obtain in the apparently trackless domain between original and copy. An artist is not free to work towards independence by achieving 'any desired degree of intermediacy'. One does not make an original by sliding away from a great work, but by proceeding in stages from apparent slavery to apparent independence, and it is ultimately the interplay of stages in this sequence that provides the richness of meaning that painted traditions routinely achieve. That structure of our understanding, it seem to me, can enrich philosophical exchanges by fleshing out the harsh difference between original and forgery.

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[3] C. Sartwell, 'Aesthetics of the Spurious', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 28 (1988): 360–362.

[4] This point is also made by W. E. Kennick, op. cit., 8.

[5] This is crucial in the critique of Freud's *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood*. See Elkins, 'Psychoanalysis and Art History', *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought* 9 (1986): 261–98.

[6] See also H. Hutter, 'Original, Kopie, Replik, Paraphrase', in *Original—Kopie—Replik—Paraphrase*, Bildhefte der Akademie der Bildenden Künste in Wien, Doppelhet 12/13 (Vienna, 1980).

[7] G. Steiner, *Real Presences* (Chicago, 1989).

[8] See J.-P. Niemeier, *Kopien und Nachahmungen im Hellenismus: Ein Beitrag zum Klassizismus des 2. und frühen 1. Jhs. v. Chr.* (Bonn, 1985), and B. S. Ridgway, *Roman Copies of Greek Sculpture: The Problem of Originals* (Ann Arbor, 1984).

[9] See D. G. Karel, *The Teaching of Drawing at the French Academy of Painting and Sculpture from 1760 to 1793*, PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1974, unpublished; L. Tavernier, *Das Problem der Naturnachahmung in den kunstkritischen Schriften Charles Nicolas Cochins d. J., Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der französischen Kunstteorie* (Hildesheim, Zürich, New York, 1983), esp. 60 ff.; and P.L. Price, 'Learning Through Imitation: Some Examples', in *Children of Mercury, The Education of Artists in the 16th and 17th Centuries*, exh. cat., Department of Art, Brown University (Providence, Rhode Island, 1984).

[10] Among sources I have found useful are *The Forger's Art, Forgery and the Philosophy of Art*, edited by D. Dutton (University of California Press, 1983); H. Steele, 'Fakes and Forgeries', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 17 (1977): 254–58; M. P. Battin, 'Exact Replication in the Visual Arts', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 38 (1979): 153–58; D. F. Stalker, 'Goodman on Authenticity', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 18 (1978): 195–98, M. Sagoff, 'Historical Authenticity', *Erkenntnis* 12 (1978): 83–93; C. B. Cebik, 'Forging Issues from Forged Art', *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (1989): 331–46; M. Wreen, 'Counterfeit Icons and Forged Paintings; Caveat Emptor', *Analysis* 40 (1980): 156–61; and G. Bailey, 'Forging Art', *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (1989): 319–29.

[11] For Van Meegeren's technique see H. Van de Waal *et al.*, editors, *Aspects of Art Forgery* (The Hague, 1962), 44 ff., with references to W. Froentjes and A. M. de Wild in *Chemisch Weekblad* (1949), 267, and P. Coremans, *Van Meegeren's Faked Vermeers en de Hooghs* (Amsterdam, 1948); *Imitationen: Nachanmung und Modell: Von der Lust am Falschen*, edited by J. Huber *et al.*, exh. cat., Zürich, Museum für Gestaltung (Basel, c. 1989), 140 ff.; and H. B. Werness, 'Han van Meegeren *fecit*', in *The Forger's Art*, op. cit., 1–57.

[12] This is acknowledged in some philosophical work; see D. Dutton, 'Artistic Crimes: The Problem of Forgery in the Arts', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 19 (1979): 302–14.

[13] For historical information on forgery see first *Fake? The Art of Deception*, edited M. Jones *et al.*, exh. cat., British Museum (London, 1990), and then *Gefalschte Blankwaffen: galvanoplastische Kopien, Probleme der Authentizität*, ed. I. Baer *et al.* (Hannover, 1980); A. Andren, *Deeds and Misdeeds in Classical Art and Antiquities*, Studies in Mediterranean Archaeology, Pocket-Book, 36 (Partille, 1986); K. Turr, *Falschungen antiker Plastik seit 1800* (Berlin, 1984); *Falsifications and Miscreconstructions of Pre-Columbian Art: A Conference at Dumbarton Oaks, October 14th and 15th, 1978*, edited by E. H. Boone (Washington, D.C., 1982); and J. Huber, op. cit.

[14] See I. MacKenzie, 'Gadamer's Hermeneutics and the Uses of Forgery', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 45 (1986): 41–8, and see also U. Eco, 'Fakes and Forgeries', *Versus, Quaderni di studi semiotici* 46 (January–April 1987): 3 ff.

[15] For Kovacs see J. Adamovic *et al.*, editors, *FRA-YU-KULT, Collection of Franciscan Monastery*, exh. cat., Mazej, Museum Siroki Brijeq (Yugoslavia, 1990), 90 ff.

[16] For reproductions as the 'repressed' condition for the existence of originals, see R. Krauss, 'The Originality of the Avant-garde: A Postmodernist Repetition', *October* 18 (Fall 1981): 47–66.

[17] See P. Nagy, moderator, 'From Criticism to Complicity: *Flash Art* Panel', *Flash Art* 129 (summer 1986): 49, and Yve-Alain Bois, 'Painting', in *Endgame: Reference and Simulation in Recent Painting and Sculpture*, exh. cat., Boston, Institute of Contemporary Art (Boston, 1986), 29; and J. Siegel, 'After Sherrie Levine', *Art Magazine* LIV/10 (summer 1988): 141–4.

[18] R. Lowell, *Imitations* (New York, 1961).

[19] For imitations see also *The Counterpoint to Likeness: Essays on Imitation and Imagination in Western Painting*, edited by S. Howard (Davis, 1977), which is a selection of graduate students' papers from a seminar on imitation; and *Imitation and Inspiration: Japanese Influence on Dutch Art*, edited by S. van Raay (Amsterdam, 1989).

[20] Nabokov, *Eugene Onegin: A Novel in Verse* (Princeton, 1990).

[21] M. Mende, *Dürer A-Z, Zeigenössische Dürer-Variationen von Anderle bis Zimmerman*, exh. cat., Stadtgeschichtlichen Museen Nürnberg and the Albrecht Dürerhaus Stiftung (Nürnberg, 1980).

[22] For Canaletto's *cappricci* see T. G. Links, *Canaletto* (Ithaca, 1982).

[23] See J. Huber, 'Imitative Strategien in der bildenden Kunst', in *Imitationen: Nachahmung und Modell: Von der Lust am Falschen*, op. cit., 144.

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THE LOGIC OF REPRESENTATION

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THIS PAPER is concerned with showing a possible way of dealing with representation in pictures. We know that a painting (except an abstract painting) represents or stands for or refers to something different from itself. This obvious fact involves several problems. The first is: how do we perceive an object?

The problem of perception is central to Michael Polanyi's epistemology. He elaborated a post-positivist theory of science which focused on perception and tacit knowing that proves useful if applied to solving the problems of representation.

I. PERCEPTION AND TACIT KNOWING

'An object becomes invisible if its particulars cannot be picked out against a distinctive background.'[1] Polanyi called this process an instance of tacit knowing. Tacit knowing consists of two kinds of awareness: when we focus on an object we pick it out against a neutral background. While the background is perceived subsidiarily, we are focally aware of the object of perception. Our ability to perceive objects depends on a 'from-to' relation between the foreground and the background of these objects. But the tacit process of perception can be performed only in the knower's mind. Thus we have arrived at the structure of tacit knowing, which consists of three components: the subsidiary term, the focal term, and the observer or the knower. According to Polanyi, perception is produced by these three terms. Perception makes an outside thing internal since its outcome will be a part of our knowledge of the world.

In perception Polanyi's starting-point was Gestalt psychology. The structure of tacit knowing was established with the help of this theory. He adopted from Gestalt psychology the idea that our power of perceiving real objects is a result of learning achieved, not by definitions or rules, but by tacit coefficients. Therefore, if we look at particulars in terms of a whole (i.e., subsidiarily) then we will look at them functionally; but if we look at each particular separately the functional aspect will disappear. Unless we look at particulars from the point of view of a joint function, they will not turn from a set of items into a comprehensive entity.

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II. PERCEPTION OF PICTURES

We know from Gestalt psychology that perception is a kind of learning. But what kind of learning is the perception of pictures? According to Polanyi, if we look at a picture we are subsidiarily aware of the presence of its flat canvas and we are focally aware of the thing represented and its model in our mind. Thus we recognize that a painting does not belong to reality but is an artefact. It is a part of the world of imagination. Therefore, a picture is not a simple copy of reality, and it follows that it cannot produce the complete illusion of it either. That is the final conclusion of M. H. Pirenne's book,[2] which follows Polanyi's argumentation on perception as a kind of tacit knowing. But Polanyi goes further than Pirenne, when he claims that 'the painter must aim, from the very start, at producing an image essentially different from nature'.[3] According to Polanyi's theory, in a painting we meet something 'beyond all that exists in nature or human affairs'.[4] In normal cases, as Polanyi and Pirenne put it, the perception of a picture precludes the possibility of deception, because we are subsidiarily aware of the flat surface of the picture, which protects us against the illusion. Our awareness of the plain surface of the picture thus solves Gombrich's problem,[5] namely, that we either perceive a painting which represents something different from itself or we perceive a flat canvas with blobs arranged on it. On the contrary, unless we see the painting's plain canvas with blobs on it we will not recognize it as an object which represents something different from itself. It is false to think that representational pictures achieve perfection if they are deceptive. Illusion is a failure: it could happen only if the knowledge subsidiarily embedded in our mind is missing behind the focused item. If, when perceiving a picture, we fall into the trap of illusion, we are falsely identifying the framework to which it belongs: we consider a part of the transnatural world as a part of reality.

III. TYPES OF INTEGRATION

In his volume written together with Harry Prosch, Polanyi distinguishes three types of integration in tacit knowing.

The first kind is *indication*. Here subsidiary clues bear upon focal items which claim our intrinsic interest. In normal cases of this integration the subsidiary clues are without intrinsic interest. Indication is called 'self-centred' integration by Polanyi because here the self is never 'carried away' by the focal object.

There is a second type of integration, that of *symbolization*. Here subsidiaries stand for or symbolize the focal object. They do not function (as they do above) merely as indicators, but they are of intrinsic interest to us. In this second case the subsidiary clues are of greater interest than those of the focal object.[6] They do not merely bear on a focal item but they are embodied in it. We are 'carried away' by the subsidiary items. Symbolization is called 'self-giving' integration by Polanyi because in it not only does the symbol become

involved in the process, but also the self, which is carried away by the symbol, becomes involved.

If a symbol embodies a significant thing which is significant by itself, then the result is a *metaphor*, the third type of integration. We define 'metaphor' as a case where both subsidiaries and focals are of intrinsic interest. Here the subsidiary clues consist of our experiences and these are related to both parts of a metaphor: the tenor and the vehicle. Therefore, the *from-to* relation is *doubled*. We see it in the focal position once again. In spite of the fact that both tenor and vehicle are equally in the focal position, one of them is subordinated to the other: the tenor is transmitted by the vehicle. But these are two constituent parts of a metaphor, and they bring about a joint novel meaning. It is precisely this novel joint meaning that is focused while its starting-points, its subsidiary clues, remain in the background. Subsidiary clues, in a metaphor, are on two different levels: we find them both in the subsidiary and in the focal position. Hence if we look at the one from the point of view of the other they can be focused.

IV. MEANINGS

A problem may arise here. We have already seen that the vital condition of recognition of a work of art lies in the fact that we have to be subsidiarily aware of its flat canvas. In this way we are reminded that instead of being part of reality, paintings are parts of a transnatural world. Therefore, the integration of a work of art results in an artificial coherence. Polanyi emphasizes that there are two kinds of coherences: *natural coherences*, which we meet in nature, and *artificial* ones, which are *contrived by man*. From this point of view not only works of art but all other products of man are artificial coherences. But if we hear of artificial and natural things as two different kinds, we will think that while the latter by all means has ontological relevance the former–the artificial coherence–has relevance only in a knower's mind. Polanyi recognized this connection when he emphasized that we consider works of art as artefacts, hence as parts of a transnatural world. However, he was also aware of the fact that other products of man, e.g., those of scientific or religious thought, or tools, also have ontological relevance in spite of our awareness of them as products of man. Man acknowledges not only the products of nature as parts of the real world but also his own products. But if all coherences produced by man are artificial we will not know how the artificiality of a work of art is different from that of a tool. If we go further, we will see that although they do not differ in their original artificiality, they differ in their use.

Thus we have recognized that the same structure of integration may induce different kinds of meanings. According to Polanyi, *artificial* coherences are connected with *semantic meanings* whereas *natural coherences* are related to *natural meanings*.

'In general it may be said that to be a meaning is, epistemologically speak-

ing, to be an object of focal awareness and, ontologically speaking, it is to be a comprehensive entity; to have a meaning is to be an object for subsidiary awareness and, ontologically speaking, it is to be a subsidiary component of a comprehensive entity.'[7] Meaning and coherence are two sides of the same phenomenon: if we look at a thing epistemologically it *is* a meaning, or something which *has* a meaning; while if we speak of it ontologically, it *is a coherence*, a comprehensive entity or a *subsidiary component of it.*

We see that from the epistemological point of view a coherence can be considered as something which *is, in itself, a meaning.* In contrast to this, if an object *has a meaning* then this object will function as a tool in order to reach this meaning, but the object is not a comprehensive entity in its own right. Therefore, an artificial coherence which has a meaning is a subsidiary component of a comprehensive entity. In contrast to this, there are natural meanings which are the results of tacit processes of indication and they can be starting points to produce artificial coherences or semantic meanings. In this fact lies our ability to reach semantic meanings, which are on a higher level than the natural ones, and this helps us to come to know the stratified coherence of the universe, though not to exhaust its meaning.

V. THE MEANINGS OF INDICATION AND SYMBOLIZATION

We have seen that the different kinds of integration produce different kinds of coherences: the outcome of a process of indication is different from that of symbolization. In indication the result of the process is a piece of information. We obtain some new particulars of this information by integrating words or retinal images into a new joint meaning. The object which is produced by this process *has a meaning.* What we create in this manner, therefore, is *semantic and self-centred meaning.* Here we attend from the self as a centre of information to the object of our focal attention, in order to achieve new information. Epistemologically speaking, we can assert that the outcome of a process of indication is a transparent object. It is transparent because it bears on something else that is outside of it. Therefore, ontologically speaking, it is a subsidiary component of a comprehensive entity; hence, if we look at it in itself, disattending from the item it bears on, it will lose its meaning. So it is clear that in indication, when our integration produces a transparent object, the result of the process of indication *has a meaning but is not a meaning.* Indication produces an object which has to function subsidiarily in order to refer to its meaning that bears on an outside thing or on a coherence.

We have also seen that there exists another kind of coherence which is produced by the process of symbolization. We have also noticed that in this case subsidiary clues are of greater interest that those of the focal object. In contrast to indication, here subsidiary clues do not refer to anything, but they denote or rather stand for their focal objects. In this way we do not acquire new information about these focal objects; they are of interest to us only

because of their symbolic connection with the subsidiary clues. When regarded from the point of view of indication, a flag is only a piece of cloth, while from the point of view of symbolization, it is the symbol of our country. In the former case the self as a centre of acquired information points to this piece of cloth which is actually a flag. In the latter case the self is already aware of the essence of the flag and in the process of symbolization his or her awareness of the flag becomes embodied in the focal object, i.e., in the flag. Here we are not interested in the object of our focal awareness, i.e., in the flag or in its meaning, because we already know it. These are our diffuse experiences which are of interest to us as things which become embodied in the focal object. Therefore the relation between subsidiary clues and focal objects is mutual: subsidiary clues denote or stand for the focal object, while they are becoming embodied in it. Thus in the symbolization process we create a meaning which is inseparable from the object, in contrast to indication, where we produce a transparent object which has a meaning. Therefore, ontologically speaking, the result of a symbolization process is a comprehensive entity and, epistemologically speaking, is an object of focal awareness. It is a coherence in its own right, hence it does not bear upon an outside thing. And by the same reason *it has no meaning* in contrast to the object of indication. The meaning of a process of indication is something outside of the object it refers to, while in the case of symbolization the object symbolized is inseparable from its meaning or, more precisely, *meaning is incarnated in it.* Therefore, ontologically speaking, in symbolization the object embodies its own meaning while epistemologically speaking, it has no meaning. Symbolization produces an object which has to function focally in order to be able to incarnate its own meaning. Thus we have recognized that the result of symbolization is 'self-giving' integration, because we are embodied in it. Symbolization produces an artificial coherence which incarnates a semantic meaning.

The features of symbolization and indication may become clearer if we remember Gombrich's treatment of a hobby horse.[8] Does a hobby horse refer to a living horse or stand for it? If we choose the latter, we will see that if a child calls a stick a horse 'then the stick is neither a sign signifying the concept of horse nor is it a portrait of an individual horse'.[9] The stick serves as a 'substitute' for the horse and in this way it becomes a horse in its own right. In the case of indication, the stick would serve as a name or a sign which bears upon a certain horse or the concept of horse, and thus it would refer to an outside thing. But in the case of *representation*, as Gombrich calls it, the common factor which connects a stick to a horse 'is function rather than form . . . , for any' ridable 'object could serve as a horse'.[10] Therefore, the stick will be connected to a coherence, i.e., to a whole which includes all kinds of horses, hence the stick will become a part of this whole. The concept of representation in the sense in which Gombrich uses it does not depend necessarily on formal similarities but rather on requirements of function.

We can go further and assert that Gombrich's notion of representation does not differ from Polanyi's concept of symbolization. The common component between the symbol and the thing symbolized (e.g., a flag and the country it symbolizes) is rooted in the common world of imagination of a given group of society or of a given culture. The flag is not a sign of the country it represents because it does not stand outside of it; rather it is part of the whole it incarnates (i.e., the country) because it can stand for it.

Does a metaphor differ from a symbol from the point of view of meaning? In a metaphor, subsidiary clues also do not merely refer to the focal objects but incarnate them. Their relation is similar to that of a part and a whole. But in a metaphor subsidiary clues may possess intrinsic interest as well. In a metaphor, the tenor and the vehicle which are found in the focal position are both meaningful even though they are subordinated to each other. But in spite of the fact that the tenor is transmitted by the vehicle, and not inversely, the vehicle is at the same time embodied in the tenor. This process does not differ from what we have seen in symbolization. Thus not merely the 'from-to structure' but also *the whole structure of symbolization* is *doubled* in a metaphor. We can notice the process of symbolization not only in the whole structure, but in the focal position as well. To recapitulate, in Gombrich's sense of representation we may assert that, in a metaphor, in the focal position the tenor can be substituted for the vehicle as readily as the vehicle can stand for the tenor. We have acknowledged that the result of a process of symbolization has no meaning because it is a meaning itself. This description fits very well for the outcome of a metaphor. A metaphor does not refer to something else, since it is detached from outside things. Therefore the meaning of a metaphor is incarnated in itself. According to Polanyi, the structure of a metaphor is a key both to the effects of different branches of art and to discovery in science.

VII. THE FOURTH TYPE OF INTEGRATION

Is the structure of symbolization or that of indication more suitable to accounting for the process of integration in a representational picture? We have already mentioned a kind of integration, that of symbolization, which could be suitable to account for this. But if we use 'representation' only in the sense in which Gombrich uses it, we will not be able to account for the fact that there are different genres of painting, e.g., portrait, landscape, still life, where we do not meet a symbol but see only formal similarities between the painting and the object represented. In this case we use *'representation' as depiction*, while in contrast to depiction, *'representation' is used as substitution* in Gombrich's terms. The common factor which connects a painting to a thing it depicts is first of all formal similarity. Therefore, if a picture represents (depicts) an outside thing or a person, then it will refer to this item. But if representation is substitution then representation does not suppose an outside thing to refer to, because it can stand for it by its power of symbolization. In symbolization (in representation,

in Gombrich's terms) the symbol becomes absorbed in the thing symbolized/represented and so both of them will be detached from the outside world. In contrast to symbolization, a representative or illusionistic picture needs the outside world to build into its frame and so bring about similarity between them. So we can assert that representational pictures indicate outside things or persons, and unless we are able to recognize their relation to each other we cannot perceive the picture.

But how does a naturalistic painting become a representation of its subject? We have already seen that, according to Polanyi, we have to be subsidiarily aware of the flat surface of a picture in order to be able to perceive it as a painting. The world of the picture then appears in an artificial, transnatural framework which is detached from the outside world, although not in the same way (as we have noticed) in the case of symbolization. If we recognize the similarity between the things represented in the painting and their counterparts in reality, or if we perceive a three-dimensional picture on a flat canvas, the processes of integration are roughly the same as those mentioned above under the name of 'self-centred' integrations. There is a slight difference between them: in the case of indication both components of the integration belong to reality; and so the coherence produced has no frame of its own which would detach it from the outside world. But in a representational painting we integrate two incompatible elements into a whole: one of them belongs to reality while the other to a transnatural frame. Their difference is emphasized precisely by the artificial frame of a painting. It is produced by the quality of 'flat-depth', which is an indispensable coefficient to promote both perception and reception of a painting. We encounter a phenomenon such as this neither in nature nor in human affairs; therefore, it is transnatural. The immanence of a work of art is established by its artificial frame, while this immanence is violated by the similarity relation holding between the things represented and their real counterparts. We attend from our subsidiary awareness of the flat surface of the picture both to the things represented and their real counterparts in nature. Otherwise we will not be able to compare the items represented with their models from the point of view of their verisimilitude. So in a representational painting we find two items in the focal position, though not in the same way as in a metaphor. The tenor of the focal position is the picture itself, which is a coherence bearing upon real things in nature or in human affairs. The real counterparts of the things represented serve as vehicles; therefore they are subordinated to the tenor. They can be focused from the point of view of the tenor, though in ordinary perception of a picture their relation cannot be changed, and the vehicle remains in the background. So the real counterparts of the things represented are situated in the focal position although they function subsidiarily. It is only the picture itself which has intrinsic interest in this fourth case of integration. So we can notice that in the process of integration of a representational painting the structure of

indication is doubled: we recognize it in the whole structure and in the focal position as well. In the focal position we have the structure of indication, because the real counterparts of the things perceived in reality do not possess an intrinsic interest, they are approached only in terms of the painting. The real counterpart of the things represented has to function subsidiarily in order to produce a similarity relation between itself and the items in the picture. And we can also notice the process of indication in the whole structure: the self attends from the flat surface of the picture to the items depicted on it and in this way it produces a coherence, a painting in his or her mind. This is an artificial coherence because it is contrived by man, and hence we cannot fall into the trap of the illusion. This is the fourth case of the process of integration, which remained unnoticed by Polanyi. It is suitable to account for perceiving illusionistic or representative pictures or photos. We can describe representation as a fourth case of integration.

The common denominator between the things represented and their models *is formal similarity* and *not* requirements of *function*, as we have seen in symbolization. But without the difference between the field of representation, i.e., the transnatural world, and the world of reality this relation cannot be produced. From the point of view of verisimilitude the tenor, i.e., the picture, is aimed to achieve identity with the vehicle, i.e., its real counterpart, but this cannot be reached completely, because of the difference of their respective fields. So the verisimilitude has to be judged between the picture and its real counterparts in reality from the point of view of formal appearance. This means that the things represented and their real counterparts have to remain different from each other, while at the same time they have to be compared concerning their shapes. With regard to formal similarities the equality sign should be inserted between the tenor and the vehicle. The tenor (i.e., the picture) and the vehicle (i.e., its model) refer mutually to each other, whereas they are also each other's meanings. The meaning of a picture is established through representation, while the thing represented is of interest only in terms of the painting that represents it.

We have noticed that there are several common features between the normal process of indication and the process of representation/depiction. First, in both only the focal object has intrinsic interest. Secondly, these are self-centred integrations: 'they are made *from* the self as a centre (which includes all the subsidiary clues in which we dwell) *to* the object of our focal attention'.[11] In the self-centred integrations the self does not embody an item which is interesting in itself. The self here may be regarded as rather transparent, like a word or a sign. *In normal indication* the meaning of the coherence can be natural or artificial. But in both cases the *meaning* of the coherence produced by indication is *information*.

VIII. THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF ART

Our last problem to solve is whether we can reach information through perceiving pictures, or should we claim with Polanyi that: 'the factual information content of art is slight'?[12] We have ascertained that we get factual information through indication, in contrast to symbolization. In symbolization 'our main purpose to evoke our participation in its utterance'.[13] Artificial coherences that belong either to symbolization or to representation can equally be components of the transnatural field of art. But we reach another kind of meaning through the former from what we can reach through the latter. The artificial coherence produced by symbolization is detached from the outside world, so that neither its subsidiary clues nor its focal objects bear upon an outside thing. Its immanence is much stronger than that of the coherence produced by representation. In contrast to symbolization in representation unless we are able to recognize the formal similarity between the painting and the things represented, we will not perceive the picture. The artificial coherences of symbolization embody meanings. Epistemologically speaking, they are meanings, while the artificial coherences of representation have meanings but these meanings are not incarnated in their coherences. We should claim, rather, that in *representation meaning is embedded in the route from the model to the picture as they mutually refer to each other and establish each other's meanings.* Since we find these two things (the picture and its model) in focal position, we have to rely on their 'from-to structure' in order to understand their meanings. But in contrast to symbolization, where the symbol becomes absorbed in the thing symbolized, the realm related to the picture, i.e., the reality, remains an independent component of the reception of a picture. We can leave and return again to this realm while we recognize formal similarities between reality and the picture. We cannot reach factual information through this process, but we may learn from it to perceive reality in a new way. As we are returning from reality to the picture, we get to know a new aspect from which reality can be viewed. Reality in a picture functions in the same way as those words in a sentence which do not convey factual information but depict the situation in which something happened. We reach information through them because we already know the situation or the persons, i.e., the frame in which the thing in question happened. The meaning emerges from this background by means of some other words conveying information. We also do not come to gain factual information, e.g., of a well-known person portrayed in a picture. If this picture is a valuable artefact we will notice in it a so-far unknown viewpoint from which we have not seen him or her before. So the meaning of a picture emerges from the relation between the thing represented and its real counterpart with respect to their formal similarities. If a picture has factual information then it is used as illustration, a tool outside the transnatural world of art. Then the picture fulfils a function (e.g., illustration) which is important in life.

But this function has to be wiped out from the relation between a thing represented and its real counterpart if the painting is meant to belong to the transnatural field of art. From the fact that formal similarity is a universally holding relation between reality and the objects represented, it follows that it can be extended to every possible subject of representation. In contrast to representation, in symbolization the function connecting the symbol with the thing symbolized is non-universal but particular. This function can change from object to object or from person to person, and its change depends on requirements of everyday life. Our relation to a particular thing depends on its function in our life and it is repeated in front of the thing symbolized (as we have noticed in the case of Gombrich's hobby horse).

Let us take an example! Does our relation to a flag depicted as a symbol change compared with the real flag considered as a symbol? Our relation to a symbol, e.g., to a flag, is that it stands for its meaning, in this case, for the country symbolized; therefore, our relation to the flag has to be the same as to the country symbolized. If the flag in question is depicted, provided we consider it as a symbol henceforward, our relation to it will not be changed. From the fact that the meaning of the flag depicted as a symbol is the same as that of the flag of the real world, it follows that both can stand for the country symbolized. The difference between the picture and the real thing will not be a significant component of their meaning because in both cases they are regarded as symbols. We have already recognized that the symbol becomes absorbed in the thing symbolized and so, epistemologically speaking, they are meanings. These meanings are inseparably absorbed in each other; we cannot point at the meaning of the symbol and at the meaning of the thing symbolized. The emphasis is placed on their functions in life, since their meanings are absorbed completely in them.

But our relation to a flag depicted is not necessarily the same as our relation to the real flag. We can consider a depicted flag primarily as a depiction and only secondarily as a flag. Then our relation to it will be the same as to other things represented. If we place the emphasis on the formal similarity between the thing represented and its real counterpart, then we will disregard everyday functions. Formal similarity can only bring about a connection which is universal, which is equally suitable for anything that is depicted. Therefore the meaning of the picture is not the same as that of its model in reality; the painting has a meaning which emerges from the relation between the thing depicted and its counterpart and it is different from the meaning of the thing in reality. Their meanings are not absorbed into each other. So in spite of the fact that symbolization produces a coherence which has stronger immanence than that of representation, we should claim that representation produces a coherence which always has to be regarded as a part of the transnatural field of art. The coherence of symbolization can also be regarded as a work of art but only in certain cases. The coherence of representation, provided that it is not

used as a tool, offers us a possibility to perceive the world related to the picture in a new way. So we can claim that in contrast to symbolization or factual information, the meaning of a representational painting can only change the frame in which we have seen the world before.

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POST-MODERNISM AND THE CONSTRUCT OF THE DIVISIBLE SELF

William V. Dunning

CURRENT EURO-AMERICAN society is aware of a profusion of alternative modes of thinking and consciousness, derived from other cultures, as no other people or civilization has ever been. The mere awareness of these other points of view enables this society to investigate many alternative realities—expanding consciousness in a manner that has never been available to any other people. Such expanded consciousness seems to shift the contemporary sense of individual identity: more and more we suspect that the twentieth-century Euro-American sense of self is no longer truly unified or indivisible but is instead composed of parts and pieces common to other people and other cultures.

Late twentieth-century thinking, art, science, and world view, are all eclectic. Our concepts and ideas are littered with parts and pieces from other civilizations, past and present, and Suzi Gablik maintains that the ability to 'recognize the existence of a plurality of perspectives . . . is to be already in some sense beyond all of them'.[1]

This abiding awareness of pluralist realities—multiple points of view—prompts informed viewers to question the completeness, if not the veracity, of any world view that can be fully depicted from a single viewpoint.[2] 'I don't think there is one Western culture', insists Jacques Derrida—who gave us deconstruction, the word and the strategy—'It's plural'.[3]

Consequently, the indivisible Cartesian self seems to be an anachronism at the close of the twentieth century. Consciously or unconsciously, current painters and critics insist on a new structure in painting, a pluralist structure of fragmentation that reflects beliefs and understandings which relate to a more timely construct of identity and self.[4]

Modern artists, as a last tribute to their disappearing sense of continuity and their Cartesian sense of an indivisible self, composed paintings in a manner that was structurally similar to traditional composition as practised since the Italian Renaissance. These paintings were designed to be viewed from a specific location; compositions were cohesive and monolithic. Fredric Jameson maintains that modern artists insisted upon the creation of an image as personal and as unique as a fingerprint: this signifies, he concludes, that the modern aesthetic was irreversibly linked to the concept of a unique and separate self and a private identity, which could 'be expected to generate its own unique vision of the world'.[5]

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One of the major differences between the post-modern image and that of its predecessors is described by what Leo Steinberg calls the 'flatbed picture plane'. One of the two primary characteristics of the flatbed picture plane is the post-modern tendency to fragment the painted image by structuring multiple perspectives around pluralist viewpoints.[6] These multiple perspectives generate a series of fragmented Derridean apostrophes, digressions—footnotes rather than a unified indivisible central text—each in turn turning away from the main body or text. Each visual apostrophe generates another viewing location, or a separate spectator, thus presuming a divided or pluralist viewer, rather than a single indivisible viewer.

Where did the idea of a single indivisible self originate? In *Recent Philosophers*, John Passmore explains that the historic European idea of 'self' equated personal identity with the continuity of memory: 'identity' was linked to our ability to think of ourselves as being one and the same indivisible self at different times and different places.[7]

In the seventeenth century, René Descartes offered *Cogito ergo sum* as an analytical rationale for the existence of the mental self; existence of the physical body was proved by extension of the body in space.[8] This Cartesian concept—the continuity of a thinking 'self'—characterized the society of Europe and America and its important painters until the middle of the nineteenth century. European and American paintings, from the Renaissance through the first half of the nineteenth century, presume a Cartesian viewer: the perspectival system of these paintings creates a cohesive monolithic structure that implies they are to be viewed from a specific location by a single viewer.[9]

Then, in the late nineteenth century, Freud split the image of self into multiple facets: the conscious, the unconscious, and so forth. In this century, Derrida expanded on the Saussurean linguistic metaphor to propose a new concept of identity, one which is never fixed or determined, but is forever shifting because it is generated by the individual's perception of the différance between herself or himself and others within a particular system.[10]

Even the concept of ownership depends on the concept of continuity and the indivisible self. Consequently, structuralists and post-structuralists insist that ideas and language can belong to no one. Therefore, Derrida insists, structuralism promotes the end of private property; and John Passmore has taken this notion to its logical, and disturbing conclusion: Post-structuralism portends the 'death of the private self'.[11] I have returned again and again to this particularly disturbing quotation from John Passmore, and—after lengthy consideration of the implications—I believe it is an inchoate interpretation of the post-structuralist agenda, which instead might better be explained as: the death of the *indivisible* self.

In this age of pluralism and fragmentation, it is the *indivisible* self that rings anachronistic. Claude Lévi-Strauss insists that any unique sense of self tends to vanish within the social structure in favour of a collective self.[12] Con-

sequently, the concept of a divisible self is the mortar necessary for us to fashion a rigorous and consistent edifice out of recent areas of common interest such as: the relationships between a collective identity, a cyclical (rather than a linear) sense of time, and myth as a replacement for narrative and history.

Historically, one of the principal differences between Western-European-based consciousness, since the sixteenth century, and the consciousness of various tribal societies has been that the European perceived identity as one self, indivisible, communicating with indivisible others; whereas, in most tribal societies—which predate the European, as well as those that co-exist with it—each individual member of that society is associated with something outside the boundaries of his or her own body and mind: an animal, a mountain, or a plant. Thus each individual identity is divided.

The ancient Aztecs were a typical example of such a divided sense of identity, and perhaps the difference between the tribal concept of self and the indivisible European concept of self was most evident and is best explained by the sixteenth-century confrontation between these Aztecs and Cortés. In *Augury*, Philip Garrison explains the difference between the Aztec and the sixteenth-century Spaniard:

> The essence of the Spaniard is a soul, a sliver of existence both immortal and immaterial. The soul is also simple, seamlessly unified, indivisible into further components. But the nature of the Aztec is double: each is not just himself or herself, but is also a *nahualli*. At the moment of birth, each Aztec gets associated with a specific bit of plant or animal life, or maybe with a few inches of dirt, or a glimpse of sky. Each of the gods, even, is bound to this kind of other: to an owl or to an eagle, say, to a coyote or a coati.[13]

To proliferate this divided sense of self even further, those Aztecs who are associated with a particular animal must also associate themselves with all other Aztecs who are associated with that animal; they must also identify with any divine entity who might be associated with that same animal, thus dividing their identities into still more complex parts and fragments. Lévi-Strauss tells us most tribal cultures tend to sense an analogy between totem animals and gods or dead ancestors.[14]

Such pre-literate tribal societies gradually translate the narrative of recent history into myth by telling and retelling stories. And myth, with its accompanying sense of cyclic time, tends to compress past, present and future into one inseparable body. Richard Slotkin has observed that what is lost when history becomes myth is the fundamental prerequisite for history—the distinction between past and present. Myth is understood as timeless: it transcends historical possibilities; thus the present emerges as a repetition of 'persistently recurring structures identified with the past'.[15] And Derrida maintains that to know the present is to know infinity: 'To think of presence as the universal form of transcendental life is to open myself to the knowledge that in my

absence, beyond my empirical existence, before my birth and after my death, *the present is*'.[16]

John Boslough, writing about 'The Enigma of Time', notes that many scholars believe all people once perceived themselves as living in a state of 'timeless present'; they did not discriminate between past and future. They pictured time as circular: it turned back upon itself, and all things were possible at all times.[17] Buddhists and Taoists have retained this perception of circular time, and they consider history to be a fiction, because things always return to a former state. Because of differences in human perception, the struggle to affix numbers to the passage of time has been one of humanity's 'most elusive and protracted pursuits' and the achievement of this goal parallels our evolution into a 'complex modern world'. Clocks were devised so that individuals might understand what time belonged to their employers and what was their own. The globe was not divided into time zones until 1884.[18]

Recent changes in concept even encourage scientists such as Stephen Hawking to avoid linear concepts of time, and thus history. Hawking finds 'imaginary time'—which is necessary in the unification of quantum mechanics with gravity—to be a more useful construct. He explains that when measurements are determined in real time 'singularities' are established that demand a beginning and an end to the universe, and this creates boundaries that breed contradictions in the laws of science.

In imaginary time there is no important difference between going forward and going backward; consequently, recent scientific laws 'do not distinguish between the past and the future'.[19] Hawking suggests that 'imaginary time is really the real time, and that what we call real time is just a figment of our imaginations'.[20] In short, recent scientific constructs seem more supportive of the pre-modern and the tribal constructs of cyclical time than of the European construct of linear time. Post-modern cultures have come to accept the fact that history changes with each point of view and have so rejected history as 'truth' that Richard Stengel was incited to write in *Time* magazine: 'History becomes a minstrel show glimpsed through a musty lens distorted by tradition, popular culture and wishful thinking'.[21]

In *Fire on the Earth*, John Gilmour explains that universally those cultures that conceive of time as cyclic can easily think of having 'contemporaneous relationships with earlier generations': on the other hand, a linear Cartesian construct of time allows individual experiences only in the present.[22]

It is clear that before the twentieth century, the Euro-American sense of identity differed from that of tribal societies in the following manner: the Euro-American perceived an indivisible self existing within one physical body in linear time, while many other cultures inferred a split self that might exist in more than one place or body in cyclical time. But, in the nineteenth century, Freud had suggested that perhaps even this Euro-American identity was not, after all, so monolithic and indivisible. Perhaps the unconscious, with its own

separate language, was an entity separate from that consciousness with which humans had associated their identity. More recently, Jacques Lacan, the post-structuralist Freudian psychoanalyst, insisted: 'the question of an initial error in philosophy imposes itself as soon as Freud has produced the unconscious . . . and accords it the right to speak'.[23]

Lacan goes on to expand Freud's concept of the split self into an even more elaborate and divided concept: the I, the moi, the other[24] and the Other.[25] In short, the self, as Lacan perceives it, is divided between four aspects, permutations and 'doublings' (note Garrison also used the word 'double' to explain the totemic identity) of the conscious and the unconscious, each complexly compounded by the influence of two oppositionary categories: the 'I am' of existence, which is separate from the 'I am' of meaning;[26] and the 'Imaginary' and the 'Symbolic'.[27] Consequently, Euro-American identity can no longer be perceived as monolithic and indivisible; nor can Western culture itself: the concept of self must agree with the culture in which it dwells.

Certainly Freud and Lacan were well motivated to understand the fragmentation of identity. Hindsight renders obvious the fact that identity could not have remained indivisible in this late twentieth-century fragmented society. And if—as the post-structuralists insist—art is a legitimate key to the ideology of a period, then the obvious reason for fragmentation in art must be that—in the current Euro-American world view—culture (and thus identity) is more fractured and fragmented than ever before. Euro-American cultures suddenly appear fragmented in terms of race, ethnic background and gender, and each separate group sees the world from a different point of view. The current view of the external world is physically fragmented. Values, stories and myths are volatile, changing, infinitely mutable, new each day.

Even time is savaged—constantly fractured into ever smaller and smaller fragments. The twentieth century has seen the old empires—the Spanish, the British, and the Dutch—gelded and divided. The world has been astounded by the sudden shattering of the Eastern bloc, and we have watched the Soviet Union itself swiftly rent asunder.

Consider for a moment just the visual fragmentation experienced during the time spent driving. People in today's American cities average driving *more* than twenty thousand miles every year. Speeding down the road, the driver's visual attention is focused on that narrow band of paving laid flat across the surface of the world. Drivers merely *glance* in other directions. They snatch quick glances out of the right-side windows, out of the left-side windows and out of the back window, then glance hastily into the left rear-view mirror, the centre rear-view mirror and the right rear-view mirror—which has written across the bottom, 'OBJECTS IN MIRROR ARE CLOSER THAN THEY APPEAR'. Thus, the ever-present automobile, perhaps our most common shared experience, offers a myriad of narrow disjointed and distorted views of the world around us.

People in the twentieth century do not experience the world in one piece. Rather than tell the same stories and myths again and again as people did in the past, today's stories and myths are now quickly told and discarded in movies and on television—new ones each day. A movie runs a scant hour and a half, and most rarely watch the same movie twice; stories on television are often completed in a minuscule half an hour, and even this is fragmented into several small increments sandwiched between commercials—a life in a nutshell. This current high-tech world seems to have little continuity. The only constant that can be taken for granted is the accelerating constancy of change.

In such a fragmented world, is it any wonder that a writer as alert as Leo Braudy might observe that people now develop their identities by emulating well-known personalities? After making this observation Braudy concludes that late twentieth-century identities are a collage of multiple personalities:[28] a smidgen of John Wayne here, some Ava Gardener there, now a little Tom Cruse, then a pinch of Madonna.

Jacques Lacan was a product of this fragmented culture when he proliferated Freud's split self into a kaleidoscopic collection of fragments. Such fragmentation restores us in some respect to the ancient sense of a divided identity, similar in many ways to the sense of identity prevalent in many tribal societies.

Many post-modern paintings reflect such a post-Cartesian sense of self. Rudolf Arnheim explains that the position of the self determines the spatial aspects and accommodations of art works. The self, he insists, is the centre of the forces between the viewer and the work of art.[29] Arnheim's explanation leads to the conclusion that the concept of a divisible self might help to account for the fact that while many white male modern artists were still defending the status quo and assuming a single viewpoint—thus composing in a traditional cohesive monolithic image, dominated by visual and perceptual aspects—the more revolutionary Hispanic and African-American street artists, as well as women artists, had already started using a more fragmented and linguistic approach to painting in order to lend more impact and immediacy to their political messages.

These revolutionary artists shifted their perspectives to generate a pluralist viewpoint, which fragmented composition and shattered the painted image. The growing awareness that identity is divisible accounts for the creation of linguistic and fragmented images, as well as for the art world's quick appropriation of such images into the post-modern idiom.

Gilmour insists that Anselm Kiefer, like many other post-modern painters, links human identity to text and tradition, rather than to creativity and the genius of the artist's consciousness. Kiefer appropriates historical material (visual quotations?), takes them out of their historical context, and transmutes them to create conflict and ask questions about his time. Kiefer is not so certain of his single viewpoint and unique identity as were past artists. He uses his medium discursively, to explore his own deeper points of view and

sentiments and their relationship to the collective sentiments of his society. In an earlier interview—before he was likely to have encountered recent scientific concepts such as chaos theory, imaginary time, or fractal geometry, with which he might have held more sympathy—Kiefer stated: 'In those early pictures, I wanted to evoke the question for myself, Am I a fascist? . . . To say I'm one thing or another is too simple. I wanted to paint the experience and then answer'.[30]

These thoughts and images are an attempt to tap the resources of a collective rather than an individual consciousness. Kiefer insists that his intent 'is to perceive as precisely as possible that which goes through me as an example for that which goes through others'.[31]

Thus Kiefer's discursive approach is a product of his awareness of a collective identity rather than the continuity of an indivisible individual identity. Perhaps this marks an awareness of a new and more linguistic relationship between the contemporary self and its culture, a self defined more by its relationship to other parts within the whole, as Anselm Kiefer's more collective sense of self seems defined by its context and its relationship to others within the culture.

Furthermore, Kiefer combines his more linguistic approach to painting with a 'tendency to portray a cyclical view of existence rather than one organized according to the causal and linear time structures'.[32] This cyclic view allows him, like a tribal artist, to use his historical and mythic images to imply 'contemporaneous relationships with earlier generations'. Ernst Cassirer insists that myth, art, language and science are forceful symbols; each functions to produce its own world.[33]

Because Americans and Europeans centre their thoughts and interests around themselves as individuals, separate and indivisible, they see themselves and their acquaintances advancing from birth to death in an irreversible linear direction, from beginning to end; it is difficult for them to comprehend the experience of cyclic time. But people who subordinate their interests to a larger extended family or tribal unit experience that unit as permanent; birth balances death in a continuous cycle, and the unit abides forever. It is unusual for them to understand time as anything other than cyclical.

Gilmour maintains that Kiefer's paintings demonstrate that the chosen mode of representation is related to identity, and he does not trust the modern reliance on reason, visual presence, and the expression of the unique individual. Thus, his mythic images, which spring from a more collective consciousness, imply a more complex relationship between creator and art work.[34] Gilmour reasons that the human perception or premonition of such preternatural powers undermines individual identity, because such a Cartesian identity 'presupposes the orderly background of a rational world'.[35]

Recent emphasis on fragmentation (particularly its relationship to synec-

doche, metonymy, and the indexical sign) connected with a renewed interest in mythic structures suggests a return to the mythic principle of *pars pro toto*, or as Ernst Cassirer explains it: a part has power over the whole; its function is not important. For instance, a piece of hair, a fingernail clipping, or even a person's shadow is enough to grant power over the person's body. Cassirer insists that all mythic thinking, so characteristic of totemism, is 'governed and permeated by this principle'.[36] This may be seen as further evidence of a fragmentation of identity.

Exemplary of the post-modern attitude, Kiefer's approach is less controlled by reason and less scientific than the moderns, who had turned to science and related disciplines—perception, optics, physics—in place of religion; Gilmour labels Kiefer's approach 'prescientific'.[37] In a particularly revealing statement, Kiefer himself has said: 'I think a great deal about religion because science provides no answers'.[38]

This interest in religion and myth is inescapably woven into the infrastructure of post-modernism. Post-structuralist strategy—which is the foundation of post-modernism—demonstrates that complete truth is unattainable in any text owing to the specific point from which any issue is viewed. Furthermore, each single point of view is both biased and predetermined because of the priorities and established hierarchies of the viewing society.

Post-structuralist strategy traces these biases and predetermined positions by ferreting out foundational concepts and ideas that are mutually exclusive, binary, or polar opposites (such as absence/presence, linear/painterly, unity/multiplicity); this strategy then indicates which pole of these concepts or ideas society tends to grant a privileged position.

This strategy of spotlighting opposites quickly focuses attention on that area that separates the two polar opposites, that area that is both or neither: absent and/nor present, linear and/nor painterly, unified and/nor fragmented. And Edmund Leach tells us these areas of aporia, 'the boundary, the interface layer which separates categories of time and space, is the zone of the sacred', and thus is linked to magic, taboo, and religion.[39]

Post-modern perceptions appear to be moving away from the Cartesian deterministic scientific rational indivisible self towards a more ancient pre-scientific stochastic fragmented identity. This pluralist identity is more readily affected by powers that are not entirely rational, and pursues meaning through the following: myth rather than history; religion rather than science; and a sense of time that is cyclic rather than linear. Thus, the well-heralded fragmentation of society, coupled with renewed interests in a collective identity, myth, religion, and cyclical time all demand an idea more complex than the 'death of the private self'. They demand acknowledgement of the rebirth of a divisible self. Andy Warhol's well known one-liner, 'Someday everybody will be famous [or infamous?] for fifteen minutes', was a harbinger of the era

now upon us when even celebrity is collective: fame and infamy are as divisible as identity.

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[4] Walter Benn Michaels explains that the Cartesian self is primary and autonomous; it exists independently. But the twentieth-century construct, as developed by Peirce and Lacan, holds that the self is a linguistic sign, and like all signs it must distinguish itself in relation to some other. That is the nature of a sign ('The Interpreter's Self: Peirce on the Cartesian "Subject"', in *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, ed. J. Tompkins [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1980], 194).

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[9] William V. Dunning, 'The Concept of Self and Postmodern Painting: Constructing a Postmodern Viewer', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 49:4 (Fall 1991): 332.

[10] John Passmore explains that Saussure insisted that both a sign and an identity were defined by distinguishing differences between itself and others, but Derrida replaced the word 'difference' with 'différance', which suggests both a differing and a deferring. Such an identity is never fixed, or determined: 'our "nature" is always "deferred"' (31).

[11] Ibid., 33.

[12] Anthony Wilden, 'Lacan and the Discourse of the Other', in *The Language of the Self* (Johns Hopkins U.P., 1968), 178–9.

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[17] John Boslough, 'The Enigma of Time', *National Geographic*, 177, no. 3 (March 1990): 111. For example, Boslough points out that: 'Hopi verbs make no distinction between past and present' (129).

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[24] Hazel Barnes notes that the idea of the other has a long history: it starts with Plato in the *Sophist*; Sartre expands the concept towards Lacan's, but he recognizes that his concept is still not too far removed from Plato's (Hazel E. Barnes, 'Introduction', in Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology* [New York: Philosophical Library, n.d.], xxiii).

[25] James Mellard explains that Lacan's concept of the other and the Other involves two forms: 'The other is the figure of the double or antagonist in whom we project our best and worst selves. The origin of this other is the mother. . . . The second form is the [Other] of the unconscious. . . . In Lacan, this Other/*Autre* resides in the place of the father' ('Flannery O'Connor's Other: Freud, Lacan, and the Unconscious', *American Literature*, 61, 1989: 626–7).

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[34] Ibid., 82.

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AESTHETIC CRITICISM AND THE POETICS OF MODERN MUSIC

Roger W. H. Savage

MODERN MUSIC, it has been said, has lost its way. In the course of its own development, it seems to have drifted off track, and to have condemned itself to a strange fate. There is little question but that the specialized languages and esoteric styles of music composed since the Second World War have placed modern music at a distance. For many listeners accustomed to the Classical and Romantic repertoire, the music of the avant-garde is virtually incomprehensible. Its often dissonant quality is far removed from those works they feel they understand. Yet how is it that a music which is historically more distant appears to be closer, while the music which is contemporaneous is the one from which they are most estranged? Too often, I think, this estrangement has been attributed to a pathological nostalgia for traditional values that have long since been surpassed. The question I would like to consider then is this: can recourse to a theory of modern musical poetics help to explain the estrangement of the public at the same time that it brings the claims made on behalf of modern music into question?

The estrangement of the concert-going public from the music whose progressive stature, it is claimed, is representative of its specifically modern character, was anticipated in a remark by Arnold Schoenberg. Dismissing the metaphysics of beauty that dominated nineteenth-century aesthetics, Schoenberg opposed a theory of musical craftsmanship to an outmoded aesthetics used by the guardians of tradition to defend the status quo. He wrote in his *Harmonielehre*: 'If I should succeed in presenting to a student our art's craftsmanship as thoroughly as a carpenter can always present his, then I should be content. And I should be proud if I could declare . . .: I have relieved composition students of a bad esthetics but given them instead a good theory of craftsmanship'.[1] The separation of aesthetics from a theory of craftsmanship, however, has since gained a significance far beyond that which it had for Schoenberg. The schism between the public's lack of aesthetic interest in modern music and what might be called a professional preoccupation with technical matters has widened to the point where composers have been accused of mathematizing art, and listeners have been denigrated as dilettantes who presume to rise above a situation which they no longer understand. Many concert-goers tend to regard modern music as symptomatic of the decay of traditional aesthetic standards and even moral values. Its protagonists,

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on the other hand, have dismissed public opinion for its failure to come to terms with avant-garde music's monumentally historical advance. Clearly, the point of agreement in these otherwise divergent and conflicting points of view is that in the course of its development, modern music has left tradition behind. Beyond that, only the thread of its own developments links the world of modern music with that from which it took its leave.

Why, then, does a music which claims to be specifically modern fail to engage the public imagination? To my way of thinking, any answer formulated solely on the basis that the public has failed to keep pace with the avant-garde would be inadequate. But neither do I think that the summary dismissal of this music does justice to its culturally specific claims. On the contrary, modern music challenges the public and the expert alike only when it puts their presuppositions into question. Favouring the modern, as Theodor Adorno has argued, 'is not an a priori correct musical consciousness, nor is a critical view of it a false one. On the contrary, summary standpoints are signs of reified thinking in which the sense for specificity has withered'.[2] That which is specifically modern in music, it might also be said, is that which challenges those precepts which have formed our musical tradition.

In this respect, Schoenberg's emancipation of the dissonance and his discovery of the twelve-tone method mark a revolutionary turning point in the history of twentieth-century music. Freed from the normative requirement of resolution, dissonance ruptured the traditional language of tonality from within. Modern art gains its unique significance in that through its disruptive moment it consciously participates in the emancipatory project of modernity. To the extent that the modern establishes itself over against the tutelage and authoritarianism of tradition, its project of emancipation conflicts with the entrenchment of the status quo. As the *locus* for the aesthetic redemption of a subjectivity surrendered to the hegemony of an instrumentalized life world, modern art prefigures a true reconciliation of humanity by critiquing the social and cultural conditions under which it lives. Analogically speaking, dissonance in the modernist art work takes the form of protest by shattering the illusion of harmony in a modernized world. This quality of dissonance, consequently, has become a kind of constant in modernism. Yet by acquiring a normative status, does the disruptive moment that dissonance introduces not work against itself? If, on the one hand, the public distaste for the dissonant character of modern music can be attributed to its proximity to their own life experiences, the paradox for the composer is that modern music has become something of an institution. Its specifically modern character undoubtedly alienates a public whose tastes in music are geared towards the classics. But have modernist compositional practices not also succumbed to ideological entrenchment in a similar, if contrary, way? Has the schism between aesthetics and the technical craft of composing been given a new formulation that diffuses the critical force of the modernist work of art?

It might be objected that since the emancipation of the dissonance, the dynamics of which dissonance was a part have been surpassed. But can the role of dissonance be confined to one delimited terminologically by functional harmony? Has the meaning of dissonance not itself been enriched when, freed from the normative requirements of resolution, it retains its disruptive force in relation to the hegemony of a socially coerced reconciliation? Dissonance, in this sense, is more than a surface phenomenon; it is the negative moment of a resolution that forms the social horizon of the modernist work of art.

The specific problematic that originates with the intentional aesthetic horizon of the modernist art work gives rise to what I will refer to as the aporia of modern music. At one level, this aporia can be defined in terms of the conflict between a listening public for whom modern music has no aesthetic appeal and a sphere of expert culture. Yet the failure of avant-garde music to engage the public imagination is not only the result of the schism between traditional and modern genres. On the contrary, I suspect this schism is also symptomatic of the failure of the avant-garde to come to terms with its specifically modern condition. To the extent that modernist aesthetics has embraced dissonance as its hallmark, its distinguishing feature is one of discord. Yet does discord not presuppose a relation to or a tension with its possible resolution? At a level deeper than that of the polarization of opinion concerning the cultural status of modern music, the problematic raised by the emancipation of the dissonance delimits the aporia of modern music in a more precise way.

In this view, modern music's distance from the normative aesthetic content of tradition becomes critically telling. On the one hand, the rejection of modernist aesthetics from either a neo-conservative or a post-modern perspective marks only the abandonment of the modernist project, and not its fulfilment. Emancipation, on the other hand, is an anticipatory mode of reconciliation that in the modernist work of art takes on an expressly dissonant character. As negative, dissonance is more than the truth of the hegemonic harmony of the life world; as the negative moment of a positive resolution, it anticipates a reconciliation which it cannot itself achieve. Although the repudiation of a modernist aesthetic in post-modern works seems to have partially closed the gap between the concert-going public and an expert sphere of modern culture, it is questionable whether it has resolved the problematic of dissonance which is central to modernist aesthetics. The minimalist music of composers such as Steve Reich and Philip Glass generally is more accessible. Yet repetitive music's significance as a cultural phenomenon is in no way vindicated through its achieving a wider popularity and a broader public reception. Reconciling post-modern music's aesthetic and stylistic achievements with the idea that the modernist project of emancipation itself has been outmoded, it seems to me, only oversteps the stylistic problematic of dissonance in modern music without resolving it.

It is in relation to the stylistic problematics of dissonance that we can introduce the notion of a poetics of modern music. Poetics, from the Greek *poiesis*, is a human activity that involves making or producing something. Works of art are as much products in this sense as are other signs of our culture. And yet they are more. Poetics in a work of art is a construction or a creation which is productive not simply in terms of making an art object, but also in the sense that in the work of art truth makes an appearance. If art is true in a way that cannot be reduced to the truth of its empirical facticity, it is because the work has the quality of verisimilitude. Poetic activity is creative not only because in the construction of a new work something different comes into being. More importantly, a poetics mediates existing problematics in productive and meaningful ways. If a stylistic innovation gives the solution to a particular aesthetic or technical problem, then the poetics is the productive mediation through which the verisimilitude of the work is related to the solution it provides.

A theory of modern musical poetics, then, would need to reconstruct the problematics for which the stylistic innovations that give modern music its particular character provide a response. Adorno, who saw the work of art as a '*force-field* [*Kraftfeld*] organised around a *problem*',[3] develops his critical interpretation of modern art within an aesthetics of dissonance. No music, he claims, 'has the slightest esthetic worth if it is not socially true, if only as a negation of untruth; [and conversely] no social content of music is valid without an esthetic objectification'.[4] Informed by the theme of enlightening the enlightenment about itself, Adorno's critical hermeneutics aims at demystifying the contradictory, enigmatic impulses that give to modern art and music its authentic character. Motivated by the catastrophic exigencies of the modern life world, Adorno's aesthetic theory was directed towards developing a critical understanding of the social content unfolded by works of art. Yet his normative understanding, that in modernist works of art dissonance is symptomatic of the language of disaster, seems to have concealed the lingering problematic of the aporia of modern music from him.

Theories of art that subscribe to the notion that art works in some way reflect the realities of the world at large raise the question of aesthetic truth in terms of a work's verisimilitude. Adorno's attempt to mediate critically between the modernist work of art and the apocalyptic vision to which it attests has contributed immeasurably to contemporary music criticism. The verisimilitude of an art work was for Adorno the objectification of a social truth in an aesthetic form. In his analysis of post-war avant-gardiste music, he identifies the aporia of modern music with the blind spot of instrumental rationality. This blind spot, through which means-ends rationality acquires its irrational quality, was for him the key to understanding the interweaving of progressive and regressive forces in a supposedly enlightened, modern world.[5] He attributed the ageing of the new music to the fact that in the face

of the continuing encroachment of purposive reason upon the life world, modern music was 'falling into contradiction with its own idea'.[6] The paradigm of systematicity that governs the structures of high serialist works undoubtedly reduces music's semantic content to a formal exposition of serial functions. The extension into the work itself of the instrumental purposiveness that drives societal modernization clearly indicates the possible collapse of modern music as a critical social force. The formal reduction of the language of music to its zero-point can be understood as representing the '[t]otality, atomization, and the opaquely subjective act of uniting antitheses—an act which rests on principles but leaves them arbitrary'.[7] On this reading of Adorno's, the aesthetic precepts of a high modernist serialist style have a correspondent in a form of reasoning that is both purposive and instrumental. Yet is an aesthetics of dissonance adequate to the critical relation between the modernist work of art and the unresolved antagonisms of administered society? It seems to me that if the blind spot of rationally administered society is the sole point from which modern music takes its bearing, the emancipatory possibility of aesthetic experience is marginalized in the continued separation of aesthetic reflection from the theory that motivates compositional practices.

Providing technical solutions to aesthetic problems is undoubtedly symptomatic of the ageing of modern music. Yet Adorno's insight into the relation between the blind spot of rationality and the aporia of modern music, in my opinion, does not fully do justice to its poetics. The meaning of this aporia in the end cannot be reduced to the significance of the blind spot through which the systematically rational construction of a formal schema acquires its irrational character. The blind spot of rationality is only symptomatic of the aporia of modern music, and not the aporia itself. To my way of thinking, interpreting the significance of high modernist works rests upon the possibility of deciphering innovations in relation to the way they resolve stylistically the aesthetic problematic that dissonance poses.

Explaining how an artistic problem is resolved stylistically by the musical work such that it is aesthetically meaningful falls to the task of a theory of poetics. Specifically, it falls to the task of a theory of modern musical poetics to reconstruct the significance of those stylistic innovations which configure dissonance in new and different ways. I will discuss briefly three works by Pierre Boulez which I think are exemplary of a high modernist poetics. I will then conclude with some comments on the significance of this approach for music criticism.

The three works by Boulez that I will refer to are well known: *Structures 1a*, *Le marteau sans maître* and the *Third Piano Sonata*. *Structures 1a* is exemplary of a high serialist style. The reduction of the musical language to its zero-point and the systematic construction by which it is formally re-integrated coincide. The compositional automatism at work corresponds to the way that parametric elements are formally integrated. In the light of subsequent developments, Boulez

viewed *Structures 1a* as a necessary experiment. The model of systemic integrity undoubtedly can be seen as having antecedents in Webern's *Concerto* op. 24. Notwithstanding, only a reading of history that invokes the inevitability of rational progress, it seems to me, can be used to justify the moral integrity of the serialist project. Boulez's well-known condemnation of Schoenberg's failure to recognize in the discovery of the twelve-tone method the future of modern music is at the same time a failure to come to terms with the aporia that the emancipation of the dissonance brings to light. *Structures 1a* resolves the problematic of dissonance by harmonizing it conceptually. The rigours of the serial method, rigours Boulez formalizes as the principle of the series, provide for a rational system that subsumes music's fragmented, elemental components at a higher level. In this respect the stylistics of this high serialist work, it might be said, do not so much resolve the aporia of modern music as displace the problematic of dissonance onto a technical level.

Le marteau sans maître, a work that has been heralded as a masterpiece of twentieth-century serial composition, overturns the one-dimensionality that gives to *Structures 1a* its aurally indeterminate quality. Adorno rightly sees in *Le marteau* the polemical repudiation of formal precepts codified in the language of the series. He understands the work as a musical critique of the 'notion of making an absolutely new beginning'.[8] On his reading, the work's indebtedness to *Pierrot lunaire* conforms to his understanding of the normative role that dissonance plays in Schoenberg's expressionistic works. Yet sympathetic as he was to the critical possibilities of new music, Adorno did not recognize that the stylistics of *Le marteau sans maître* are an advance upon and not a return to the modernist theme of the emancipation of subjectivity. The apparent recourse to a subjective mode of expression in *Le marteau* in fact conceals the way that the serial principle becomes more deeply embedded at a formal level. Shifting relations between elements resolve the problematic of a one-dimensional unity by making each serially structured figure unique. Co-ordinated by the serial matrices from which they are derived, sound figures differentiated in this way create an aura of compositional spontaneity that seemingly dispels their functional integration. At this level, the stylistics of *Le marteau* distinguish its innovative response to the problematic of dissonance in a way that is markedly different from that in *Structures 1a*. Yet is the poetic content of *Le marteau*, informed by the polemical repudiation of the aesthetics of *Structures*, a repudiation of the serialist paradigm? To my way of thinking, the poetics of *Le marteau* are more in line with the art of discipline that Foucault in his analysis of penality describes in terms of a world of techniques that 'individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations'.[9] Clearly, the interpretation of this poetics is critical to an understanding of the significance of the work. For ultimately, a poetic analysis is that upon which an aesthetic critique finally comes to depend.

In the *Third Piano Sonata*, the notion of the labyrinth provides an aesthetic rejoinder to the poetics of *Le marteau*. In the central movement for example, *Constellation*, the operative principle encoded in *Le marteau* is transposed onto the level of form itself. The kaleidoscopic reconstruction with each new performance corresponds to the way that all possible episodic movement through the material is mapped out in advance. Is this not the function of a labyrinth—to imprison those who move about in it by giving to them the illusion that the path they choose is one of their own making?[10] Is the aura of freedom in *Constellation* then itself not predicated on a poetics that encodes a technical solution in response to the aporia of modern music?

If it is true that a poetics can be interpreted in terms of the productive mediation in works themselves of problems for which they provide solutions, then their aesthetic significance is unfolded by the stylistic innovations that encode the answers that they provide. The aesthetics of the three works briefly discussed, it seems to me, attest to the condition of cultural modernity in a way that marks its failure to achieve its emancipatory goals. Yet is the meaning of these works exhausted by this critical remark? Or does an aesthetic interpretation also open up the possibility that the meaning of these works is related reciprocally to their disclosure of a truth that otherwise might have remained concealed?

It is here that recourse to a theory of modern musical poetics distinguishes between aesthetic critique and an interpretative understanding of the claims that a work makes.

There is no question in my mind that dissonance in modern music provides for an aesthetic experience the possible referent of which is the modern experience of a fragmented and alienating life world. In view of the hegemony of administered society, dissonance in modernist works of art discloses the lack of a truthful reconciliation in a coerced one. Because for Adorno dissonance is tied negatively to the modernist project of emancipation, it remains bounded by its normative, perennially critical function. Adorno's claim that a work opens itself up to interpretation as it 'begins to be grasped in its interrogatory form'[11] is itself circumscribed by the critical perspective he develops in his critique of instrumental reason. The lack of an anticipatory reconciliation in the work of art that could meaningfully refer to a possible world for praxis ultimately marginalizes the possibilities for critique itself. The hope of a reconciled reality is the utopian counterpart of modern art's apocalyptic voice. But under prevailing socio-historical conditions, according to Adorno, '[n]o artist can anticipatorily collect the antagonisms into meanings any longer, no more than the simultaneous, hardened society lets us envision the potential of the right one'.[12] But if the voice of modern music has 'contracted into a speechless, imageless gesture',[13] as Adorno claims, so that the modernist work of art no longer has the power to address the world from which it takes its bearing, what is it that modern art says?

The proximity of modern music to and distance from the cultural ethos from which it takes its bearing gives to aesthetic critique its hermeneutical orientation. Hermeneutics, Paul Ricoeur explains, 'aims . . . at making explicit the movement by which the text [or work] unfolds, as it were, a world in front of itself'.[14] A poetics that reconstructs the aesthetic realities given by stylistically innovative solutions to artistic problems provides a critical point of access to understanding a work. The meaning of the work, however, cannot be confined to a poetic determination of the aesthetic reality in question, but also refers to a world proposed by the work and which I could appropriate as a possible world for my ownmost being. Art, if it truly has something to say to us, is more than the fictive counterpart to our every day reality. Is this not also the claim that has been made on behalf of modern music? Boulez writes that because '[m]usic is a way of being in the world, . . . it is an ethical category, and no longer merely an aesthetic one'.[15] John Cage, whose use of indeterminacy as a compositional means seems to be antithetically opposed to serialist paradigms, makes a similar kind of claim. The world proposed by his work, however, is one of transparent immediacy in which the 'relationship of things . . . spontaneous and irrepressible.' . . . is you yourself in the form you have that instant taken'.[16] Perhaps Schoenberg's remark concerning the separation of the craft of music composition from outworn prescriptive aesthetic norms anticipated, however indirectly, the hermeneutical realignment of aesthetic criticism within a theory of modern musical poetics. It seems to me that in the *rapprochement* of technical and aesthetic considerations, a theory of modern musical poetics finds its proper correspondent in the appropriation of the meaning that a work unfolds.

Just as a theory of poetics provides a critical point of access to understanding the productive forces upon which a work draws, a theory of interpretation is called upon to mediate between the verisimilitude of the art work and the realities, present and possible, to which it attests. Perhaps raising the question of what modern music offers for appropriation has become the foremost task facing contemporary music criticism. Interpretation without some form of appropriation in the end marginalizes critique itself. Every authentic art work constitutes a poetic mediation of the life world. Yet the meaning that a work unfolds, in my view, cannot be interpreted in terms of a singularly utopian vision of a reconciled reality. If the *work* of art consists in configuring the antagonisms and aporias that bear upon its historical genesis, is the appropriation of the world it unfolds in front of itself not also a continuation of the work itself? Every authentic interpretation is one in which the claims made by the work make claims upon those to whom the work is addressed. Perhaps the failure of the public to recognize the apocalyptic advance of enlightenment in the dissonant language of modern music could be attributed to the failure of music criticism to raise the question that modern music puts to us. But at the same time, is the question of modern music's significance not one which

raises anew questions concerning the aporia of modern music and the poetic solutions that music might provide?

However much it falls to music criticism to facilitate interpreting the meanings unfolded by new works, it seems to me that this task follows from the productive and imaginative schemas provided by the works themselves. Perhaps the emancipatory project that is the hallmark of aesthetic modernism can be understood more radically as a moment within the dialectic of the productive imagination. Aesthetic redemption is not a fictitious solution to the antagonisms and injustices of a world given over to its instrumental purposes. On the contrary, it is the disclosure of a reality through the work of art that gives to us the possibility of understanding the world in which we live in a different way. This capacity of art to reconfigure reality by referring to an alternative one is inseparable from the poetic activity involved in the creation and production of new meanings. Ultimately, the question that presents an aesthetic critique of modern music with its interpretative task is one that encompasses the poetic task facing the composer. If, as Ricoeur suggests, we are 'ready to recognise in the power of imagination, no longer the faculty of deriving "images" from our sensory experience, but the capacity for letting new worlds shape our understanding of ourselves',[17] then perhaps we are also ready to recognize the challenges contemporary music composition presents. The challenge to contemporary music criticism, on the one hand, is to be adequate to the task of interpreting the world-disclosive significance of new musical works. New music, on the other hand, is itself confronted with the poetic task of configuring the problematics and aporias that come to it in new and imaginative ways.

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[9] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 146.

[10] See Pierre Boulez' comments in 'Sonate, Que me veux-tu?', *Perspectives of New Music* 1:2 (Spring 1963), p. 34: 'Everyone creates

his own labyrinth; he cannot move into one that already exists because it is impossible to conceive of an architecture not related to his own secretion'.

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'WHAT STRETHER KNEW': 'THE NOVEL' AS ART FORM

Olga McDonald Meidner

IN 1942 when I was very young and impressionable, my Professor of English cautioned us undergraduates: 'Hamlet is not a man—Hamlet is a piece of dramatic poem'. His form of words, more sceptical than saying Hamlet is a part in a play, served not only to direct attention to poetic use of language and its difference from other uses but also, in the long term, to suggest to me possible extensions implicit in Aristotle's *Poetics*,[1] e.g., that in the same sense as a tragedy is the imitation of an action, so a fictional character is the imitation of a 'real' one. Further, perhaps, some kinds of literary works may be viewed as institutionally stylized utterance, the formal and elaborate imitation of a speech-act:[2] e.g., lyric poetry as imitating impassioned utterance; and fictional narrative as partly imitative of testimony or, in some cases, of gossip. Even thirty years ago, one saw it was not easy to define the relationships between the three concepts: a flesh-and-blood person, a 'real character' and a fictional character. Since then, of course, the role of language, and more recently the role of the society surrounding 'the subject', have been focused on very sharply and deemed so important that a 'real character' seems as much the product of linguistic fictions as an invented one, and the distinction between fiction and 'fact' is thought to be untenable. There is a place for such radical views, but not in every context.

The characters of Shakespeare served as a paradigm for literary critics, both in practical commentaries and in attempts at theory, about the whole galaxy of imaginary people in prose fiction from Shakespeare's day to our own. But literary critics' understanding of the notion of 'a character in fiction', instead of being advanced and deepened by twentieth-century ideas about language, has remained ill defined; and as 'realism' in the telling of tales, including psychological realism in the portrayal of character, ceases to be the aim of advanced novelists, and ceases to interest critics, the concepts of fictional events and characters seem in danger of being declared obsolete without ever being fully explicated. If the status of literary characters is no longer that of 'living creations', as romantic nineteenth-century readers might loosely have acclaimed them, nor are they viewed as I believe they should be. I would propose that we must acknowledge a prevailing convention—a widespread, elastic, accommodating cultural convention about extended prose narratives,[3]

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which ensures that novelists are taken as entertainers not liars, and which overlaps (through recognized institutional activity) with a literary genre. Plots and characters are (or were) built out of various further elements: the writer's powers of invention and of shaping what he has invented; his sympathetic imagination; and his craftsmanship as an exploiter of the prevailing convention, as an observer and recorder of life around him (even if realism is not his aim) and as a master of his particular language.

Without these simple matters ever being fully recognized, a 'subject', whether flesh-and-blood or imaginary, is currently viewed[4] as the mere product of its society's language or its ideology. Some critics aim to expose the 'fallacy' of individuality, the 'cardinal error' that there is any such thing as 'the substantial self'.[5] This seems to say to me, 'You are not a person. You are a piece of social fabric.' I shall not try to defend 'the substantial self', but attempt something more strictly literary.

For the purposes of this essay in literary theory I shall consider Henry James—willingly, but not because I hope to say anything new about his novels, or am expert in the vast corpus of work by and about him; rather because academic critics still choose to discuss him, and their writings raise issues of literary theory. To discuss those issues raises others. I shall focus on two critics, and on *The Ambassadors*, a novel they both write about, as I believe literary theory should deal in actual examples.

James is among the most skilful tellers of tales and creators of characters in the nineteenth-century sense (though not typical) and an unsurpassed stylist (though guilty also of mannerist excesses). There might well be by now a reaction against him, if only because the nature of our society and most people's moral ideas and tastes in fiction have changed so drastically since he wrote. But instead of mere neglect, he continues to receive academics' attention, some of it high-handed, unqualified, irrelevant or hostile. Of the two I have chosen, the more recent is far less sympathetic to James. I shall illustrate how these two recent academic critics who offer interesting and language-conscious studies of James, show an indifference to theory. The lack of attention to theoretical foundations is one reason why literary criticism responds uncritically to every change in intellectual fashions in the 'human sciences' and is helpless to repel highjackers whose aims are subversive of literature as a valuable institution.[6]

The earlier of my two critics is the simpler: Ruth Bernard Yeazell, author of *Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of Henry James*.[7] In spite of her title, the author proves to be no more sophisticated than most literary scholars about the workings of language in imaginative literature.[8] Nor does Yeazell consider on what grounds it may be claimed that some works of fiction (e.g., the later novels of Henry James) are not merely entertainments but works of literary art—a topic important to aesthetics.

In her comments on *The Ambassadors*, Yeazell, like every appreciative

reader, is much concerned with the relationship between Chad Newsome and Madame de Vionnet. As readers will recall, it is only towards the end of the book that the protagonist Lambert Strether comes to recognize (tardily, as he himself admits) (XI:4 p. 468)[9] that the two are lovers, and that their other Parisian friends, now Strether's friends too, have been aware of this all along, though nobody has spelt it out for Strether. This brings us to one seemingly minor point of theory, when Ruth Yeazell says, 'For Strether, and for us as well, the question of what Little Billham "really" meant' (by speaking to Strether of Chad's relationship with Mme de Vionnet as 'a virtuous attachment'—A. IV:2 p. 187; V:1 p. 204) 'remains unanswered' (Y. p. 76). This question is a rather tactless and uncomprehending one, as the whole book is devoted to making such a judgement acceptable. And, to do her justice, Yeazell does comprehend the judgement: see her pp. 72–6, on goodness in women, as viewed from Woollett, Mass. and from Paris, and her remarks on the history of the word 'virtuous' (Y. p. 75 and Note 6). But for purposes of theory, we need to be sticklers, and recognize also that such a question is not even permissible, because Little Billham is not a man but a piece of prose fiction. If the whole text doesn't happen to include what he 'really meant' or thought when his creator had him speak that phrase about his friends—then that's that. We have exhausted the fiction. When we say any more, we are turning aside from the work as fictional invention to the sphere of the work as a total utterance (i.e., this novel as James's literary speech-act, where we acknowledge that this writer chooses words with great care). Yeazell doesn't observe this distinction and her discussion of some related issues (Y. pp. 12–13) is brief and sketchy.

Her book suggests that the language makes the later novels 'exciting' and 'disturbing' in ways which other critics have failed to recognize, especially those who stress that the same themes can be found in James's earlier books.[10] These effects or affects seem to depend on many things. A certain state of affairs, a central 'fact' of the fiction, is felt to be painful and immensely important. And this 'fact' is uncovered so very subtly that guessing is not replaced by knowing, but rather the two states of mind are present together, almost as much for the reader as for the central character.[11] Thus the 'excitement' that Yeazell finds is perhaps not due to the intellectual stimulus of James's complex syntax, but to the way it serves the story. The reader not only probes for a concealed 'fact' of the fiction, but experiences a conflict between good and evil, and a search for truth. Furthermore, the good and evil are ambiguous, the 'truth' portrayed is not simple in the end, and the implied moral judgements leave room for further argument.[12] The disturbing effect that Yeazell finds seems due to this well-attested moral ambiguity.

Yeazell's commentary is very good, but she is apt to write about the 'facts' of the fictions James so elusively presents as if they were real-world facts. It is true that the plain words that would represent the 'bedrock' of the plot are

not in the text, but supplied by James's readers—and some readers supply plainer words than others do. But even the bluntest words don't name facts. They reduce to its lowest terms a projected fiction. This is liable to be lost to sight because, for literary critics, what artists project in their imaginations is as real as other experiences, and if the difference is noted at all, it seems too obvious to mention. But if we want an account of how language operates in the novel, the distinction is important.

Novelists, acting within the broad convention I mentioned at the beginning, use language to *project illusions* of men, women, relationships, events, surroundings. The language in a novel creates these by seeming-to-represent them. As soon as this process begins, whatever has initially been projected by the opening sentences is built upon by further textual references (just as in any other text). Much depends, of course, on what sort of fictions an author chooses to project, and in what sort of language; and on who seems to testify or to gossip. We must remember how far the contents are illusion, though (I repeat, and Yeazell knows well) the total work is significant as the author's stylized (literary) utterance and the whole has bearing on life at first hand, i.e., on reality as perceived by individual readers.

Recent theorizing about language has tended to obscure this aesthetic use of prose for fictional inventions, by stressing the role of our language in structuring all our experience. To view fictional texts as indistinguishable from some purporting to be fact (as, *qua* text, some are) is to ignore the convention within which James wrote. Like any convention, this one may eventually lapse again; if we don't define it clearly, we may not notice. But meanwhile it still fills miles of library and bookshop space, and yards of book-review columns, labelled in English-speaking countries 'Fiction', and doesn't seem threatened by occasional problems as to whether a given book belongs in those shelves and columns or not.

Another basic matter which Yeazell glosses over needs to be spelt out. It concerns the nature of a novel as a long work. Yeazell suggests (Chapter 1) that the activity of critics in expounding Henry James's later works has tended always to reduce the artist's creation to something simpler than it is, not only by 'translating' (her loose term) the later novels into the terms of the earlier, simpler ones, their supposed counterparts, and thus under-rating the complexity of the later works—but merely by the critics' act in offering their own accounts of the contents. Yeazell only fleetingly acknowledges (Y. p. 2) that it is of the essence of the novel as a literary form that critics have to do that.

Summarizing and encapsulating are unavoidable, simply because novels are so long compared with most other art works, whether literary or in other media. If some extended fictions are works of art—not merely ephemeral entertainments on a large scale, which would not repay re-reading; nor accepted items in a canon, nor texts exhibiting recognized narrative structure—then, like any other art work, a novel demands that those who appreci-

ate it strive to gather the whole work together as if for contemplation in one co-ordinated act of apprehension, even though this can't necessarily be achieved.

Any reader who has enjoyed a novel may find herself mulling over whatever it has projected in her mind, but an expert reader, if the work was impressive, feels the urge to arrest and capture the whole experience; to re-read so as to do that better; and to study how the text brought it about. Articulating the work's 'contents' (in the widest sense of that term) and one's own responses, and comparing notes with other qualified readers, are valuable activities. Practising critics need to be able to summarize and characterize any novel economically, judiciously and with grace[13] (and the same procedure is needed in dealing with selected parts a critic may wish to comment on). Further, the critic must recognize explicitly what her account has left out or left over, whether this last is perceived as subordinate details of the fiction or as some overall characteristic of the utterance achieved by the work as a whole (e.g., that disturbing effect to which Yeazell testifies).

For such reasons, I find that Yeazell's book (being advanced academic criticism, not elementary literary theory) skips over most of its essential argument and begins near the end. If set out fully, the argument would show that there is no objection in principle to comparisons between James's earlier and his later novels; that some 'translation' into the critic's own terms is bound to appear; and that Yeazell, who seems to deplore such activities really makes a claim to do better at them than her predecessors. (See her pp. 2, 77, 131 n. 1, 138 n. 7.) The claim seems largely justified.

I turn now to an essay on *The Ambassadors* by a far more up-to-date critic. There is wit, imagination and intellectual brilliance in Maud Ellmann's essay, '"The Intimate Difference": Power and Representation in *The Ambassadors*',[14] but two of the same basic matters are neglected. Ellmann, even more than Yeazell, writes as if she forgets that Lambert Strether is not a man, not even a man of the 1880s,[15] still less a man of the 1980s—but a piece of narrative fiction. Startlingly but illegitimately, Ellmann writes about the important day in his life (A. XI:3–4 pp. 452ff) when he sets out by train from Paris, aiming to find a landscape like the one represented in a certain painting by Lambinet that he once wished to buy when a young man. He finds several such scenes, he enjoys the countryside immensely, he thinks over all his experiences in France; and in addition he unexpectedly meets Chad and Madame de Vionnet in circumstances that make clear to him they are lovers. In Maud Ellmann's very striking formulation, 'Strether leaves Paris still believing that a picture represents reality, but by the time he returns he knows it is a net to trap desire' (E. p. 110).

This takes one's breath away. But recovering, one protests.

He 'knows' nothing of the kind. Nor does Ellmann.[16] As a theorist in our own time she may entertain such an idea; a novelist might too, and portray

an imaginary man who entertains it or even illustrates it; but James did none of these. I may seem to carp enviously at a critic's inventive stroke. But aside from the question whether inventive strokes are the critic's business, Ellmann's sentence is both a rather bald way to allude to modern ideas of reality, and also a very bold way to interpret various other things in those two dense chapters (loc. cit.). They range from James's light suggestion that in such a river scene as Strether finds himself looking at, when he fetches up at a picturesque inn for dinner at the end of his day's wanderings, a rowing boat containing a pair of young lovers seems just what is needed to render it complete—to more serious suggestions about the spiritual content of the day's scenes and of Strether's sojourn in France, and his own relationship to Mme de Vionnet. These cannot, without great loss, be reduced to Ellmann's psychoanalytical (Lacanian) glossing, and nothing psychoanalysis can offer could make the hero more movingly self-aware than James's text shows him to be.[17]

Like Yeazell, Ellmann also mistakes the depth of the fiction when, making a good technical observation on James's method (namely that some of Strether's experiences are told only in retrospect) she says, 'The prose itself is missing its appointments with reality [*sic*] so that it may represent the substance of their loss' (E. p. 107). If the prose has 'appointments', they are with the chronological sequence of mock-events which readers construct for themselves, out of whatever is projected by the words.

Ellmann's deconstruction is ingenious: she dwells (far more than James ever did) on the concept of an ambassador (or rather, envoy)—a trusted representative to whom a task is delegated. This leads her to make some doubtful political generalizations about ambassadors, spies, double agents, arising from the idea of an ambassador who repudiates the power that sent him; and to introduce quite gratuitously Holbein's picture *The Ambassadors* as commented on by Lacan. Also, more challengingly, she brings in the notion of 'representation' where a signifier represents a signified. She is at pains to show the signifier as necessarily treacherous.[18] More acceptable is the train of thinking: as an ambassador represents his country, and Strether represents Mrs Newsome, so, Ellmann suggests (an original, relevant and valid perception) Little Billham is made to represent Chad when it suits the latter gentleman, and Mme de Vionnet in some measure 'represents' Paris.

But a critic should fully apprehend a text in the way I have described, and 'appreciate' it (though not necessarily in the sense of judging it favourably, either overall or in every part), before she is entitled to deconstruct it. Maud Ellmann is cavalier with Henry James's text: e.g., Mrs Newsome doesn't send Newmarsh or delegate anything to him (E. p. 100);[19] and to write of the New Englanders and the Parisians as 'missionaries' and 'savages' is not only to introduce a stridently false note (a failure of grace—see n. 13), but it seems unaware of extending the ingenious argument about representation to church mission-aries. Most importantly, this critic is guilty of (deliberate?)[20] vulgarity

on the subject of Madame de Vionnet and Chad. Ellmann inappropriately ridicules a view which is precisely that of Strether and of his creator James, and must be allowed by a reader, at least in a sympathetic suspension of disbelief, if she is to do justice to the text. Ellmann writes, 'It is as if equivocation were a verbal form of fornication, and adultery a fleshly form of double-talk' (E. p. 101). Of these seemingly counter-factual or outrageous suggestions, the second appears to hold up to ridicule a moral truth about personal integrity in the world of Strether. Strictly speaking, Mme de Vionnet commits adultery, and as James explicitly points out,[21] the double-talk, lying, equivocation to which she finds herself thereby committed (given the society she belongs to) are repugnant to Strether's 'spiritual stomach' (A. XI 4 p. 468). And yet she is for him 'the finest and subtlest creature' he has ever met (A. XII 2 p. 483), 'the most charming woman in the world' (p. 493). Both sides are true, and this makes the book's final chapters very poignant.

It may seem strange to stress what is common to a critic whose style is of the mid century and whose vast scholarly apparatus is purely literary—and a modern post-structuralist. I have done so to make the point that neither critic is as vigilant about the workings of language as I believe literary theory requires. I want now to comment on the differences between the two styles.

Post-structuralist criticism selects elements from a standard acclaimed literary text and comments on them as if their function in the context of the work were either to illustrate the post-Saussurean view of language, especially the supposedly endless deferral of meaning that is thought to follow from the endless operation of difference; or to be the bearers of a doctrinaire content, economic, political or psycho-analytic, that is seen as forming a sub-text to the words on the page and more important than they. Further, post-structuralist commentary plays on words, both those the commentator introduces and those he or she finds in the text, and in deliberately riddling fashion calls on incidental, centrifugal, even accidental associations of the words. This is self-indulgent, and from the aesthetic point of view perverse. The resulting commentary may be bizarre,[22] or comparatively reasonable and even brilliant, as in Ellmann's essay on *The Ambassadors*; but it doesn't serve to define or assess (still less to applaud) an author's achievement—for as we have all heard, the Author is Dead.[23]

In the theory behind this loose slogan, the important part is not about authors and their reputations, but about texts: in relation to their authors and readers and to the language at large. 'The text' has been declared open to 'the language'—to what has *not* been selected. This is new, and disruptive. Not only the author is demoted, but also the general principle of a total meaning that depends on the contribution of parts to a whole. (So far as it is an aesthetic principle, some Marxists would reject it anyway, along with aesthetics.)[24] Certainly, mid-century literary critics overworked the principle. For them, Homer never nodded. Influenced by the powerful metaphor of 'organic' unity,

they tacitly attributed to canonical authors godlike powers of making every slightest detail or aspect of a large work serve an overall design, even if the critic writing was the first to appreciate that design, or to apprehend whatever rarefied quality he saw as unifying the work. This was at best romanticism; in some cases mere self-delusion or self-aggrandizement on the part of the critic. But the principle is valid. To scrutinize further our idea of a literary 'whole' and become wary of 'closure' should not destroy the principle (or aim) of unity, which is not confined to aesthetics but important to all extended uses of language. In any well-composed text, the words are chosen to serve the aim of the whole, which is often more nearly disinterested than recent invidious protesters about 'power' would admit. A completely disinterested text would have no interest for readers.

Whereas formalist critics merely neglected to define verbal art and its place among uses of language, structuralists and post-structuralists refuse to do so. When it became accepted that everything in the human sciences should be studied in terms of language, the distinction between literary art and other verbal productions was denied in order to stress the structures common to different texts and later the roles of ideology, the unconscious and rhetoric in supposedly 'objective' writing. I certainly don't mean to deny that texts in philosophy, history, sociology, politics or economics may have literary qualities, employ rhetorical techniques, embody ideology, or that it is profitable to analyse them or even psychoanalyse them. (Students did it in the 1940s too.)[25]

In studying literature 'proper', deconstruction of poems and fiction may offer a fresh approach to canonical texts (if they *must* be endlessly subjected to detailed re-interpretation at whatever cost). It is doubtful whether innovative literary texts can be approached with the deconstructive principle.

I seem to have suggested that criticism is the humble handmaid of artistic creation—a view much in disfavour.[26] Ellmann obviously scorns such a view. But a critic is also a judge; and while a measure of humility may be becoming in anybody, even a judge, the act of judging is not humble. Critics' judgements cumulatively help to shape the institution of literature. Enthusiastic appreciation—which mustn't be uncritical and must be genuinely felt and well informed—is the best impulse for writing about works of imaginative literature, just as it is the best indication of the value of anything offered as art.

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REFERENCES

[1] I was helped in this by Humphry House's book, *Aristotle's Poetics* (London: Hart-Davis, 1964). See espec. pp. 121ff.

[2] See *Speech Acts* (Cambridge U.P., 1969); 'The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse', *New Lit. Hist.* 6/2 (1975), both by John

Searle. See also 'Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature' by Richard Ohmann. *Phil. and Rhet.* 4/1 (1971), espec. pp. 13–19. The errors which Stanley Fish pointed to in Ohmann's later work on speech-acts are not inherent in the theory: *Is There a Text in This Class?* by Stanley Fish (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1980) Ch. 9. See also 'Master Speech-Acts' by N. Fotion. *Phil. Q.* 21/84 (1971) 232–43. *Toward a Speech-Act Theory of Literary Discourse*, by Mary Louise Pratt (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 1977) is disappointing, being more linguistics than literary theory. The topic persists, rightly; see e.g. 'Searle on Fictional Discourse . . .' by Steven Mandelker, *Br. J. Aes.* 27/2 (1987) 156–68.

[3] I omit literary structuralism from this paper. That movement taught us to speak of 'extended prose narratives' and offered apparatus for formal analysis of their texts, but it sacrificed 'characters' to their abstract functions and was irrelevant to literary art in other ways also. As a theory it was far simpler than post-structuralism, though as practised by Barthes or Génette it was complex enough.

[4] E.g. by Catherine Belsey (following Althusser and Lacan). See *Critical Practice* (London: Methuen, 1980) espec. Ch. 3.

[5] Richard Godden, contributor to *Henry James: Fiction as History*, ed. Ian F. A. Bell (London: Vision Press, 1984), discusses 'the metaphysics of the substantial self' in relation to Henry James and to the characters in *The Bostonians*. Bell, pp. 175–6.

[6] James seems a particularly challenging choice for neo-Marxists, who in four of the seven essays in Bell's collection (op. cit) place his highly wrought works (handling them as it were by remote control) in economic and social history, ignoring literary values. Cf. 'Usefulness in Literary History' by Ian Small and Josephine Guy, *Br. J. Aes.* 31/3 (July 1991) 259–64. See also *Professions of Taste: Henry James, British Aestheticism and Commodity Culture*, by Jonathan Freedman (Stanford U.P., 1990), and my review in *Br. J. Aes.* 32/1 (Jan. 1992) 83–4; the book includes economic history and purely literary history, with no attempt to integrate them.

[7] *Language and Knowledge in the Late Novels of Henry James*, by Ruth Bernard Yeazell. (Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1976; pb. ed. 1980.) Hereafter Y. in text.

[8] That the book is the work of an amateur in language, neither philosopher nor linguist (though a good literary critic and scholar) is seen in Yeazell's casual use of terms such as 'referential' (p. 2), 'facts' (pp. 2, 3, 15 and elsewhere) and especially in her chapter on Metaphors. As to 'referential', Yeazell is not alone. From the mid century on, theorists on the novel were apt to describe its language as 'referential', because they saw it is often not emotive. But it only *seems* referential. cf. *Beyond Deconstruction: The Uses and Abuses of Literary Theory*, by Howard Felperin (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985) pp. 91–2.

[9] *The Ambassadors* (first pub. 1903). My page numbers refer to the Penguin p/b ed. with an introd. by Harry Levin (1986), but I give Book and Chapter numbers first. Hereafter A in main text.

[10] E.g. Europeans are repeatedly contrasted with Americans, and (as in *The Ambassadors*), someone vitally concerned is kept long in ignorance as to the relations between a couple at the centre of the plot, in *The Portrait of a Lady*, *The Golden Bowl*, *The Wings of the Dove*.

[11] This is most striking in *The Golden Bowl*, where the reader and the central character Maggie gradually realize that Maggie's husband the Prince and her 'best friend' Charlotte Stant are lovers and were so before the Prince's marriage to Maggie.

[12] Again, Maggie in *The Golden Bowl* is the clearest example—how do we judge her and her role? But Yeazell also presents interesting new observations about Kate Croy in *The Wings of the Dove*, in terms of the deceiver's imaginative needs and desires (Y. pp. 15, 80–3).

[13] By 'grace' I mean the ability to be full and accurate as well as concise; and the rhetorical skill to control vocabulary and 'tone' so that they express economically the perceived and felt character of both the work and the

critic's response to it, which is personal but appeals to others' assent. If to all this, wit is added, so much the better. Someone who I think achieves grace is Marcia Jacobson in *Henry James and the Mass Market* (Univ. of Alabama Pr., 1983), especially in writing of *The Awkward Age* (Ch. 7).

[14] In Bell's collection (op. cit.). Hereafter E. in main text.

[15] Harry Levin (A. (op. cit., p. 16)) purports to know that the first marriage of Strether (whom readers know only as a widower) took place in the 1860s. He doesn't explain, but if so the action of the novel would be in the 1880s, not the time immediately before its publication in 1903.

[16] Nobody *knows* it. Even if we grant that a representational painting, such as Strether's remembered Lambinet would have been, may also serve as 'a net to trap desire' (but whose desire? The painter's? Or the viewer's?) we are accepting a metaphor (net, trap) that needs to be replaced by more nearly literal terms.

[17] Even with the end of Book XI, James hasn't finished. See for instance, how wryly Strether, in his altered state of mind next morning, standing in the Post Office replying by telegram to Mme de Vionnet's note requesting that he visit her, regards the Parisian public, and himself among them (A. XII:1 471–2).

[18] Ellmann says, 'As soon as there is representation there is treason, for nothing can be doubled unless it has already double-crossed itself' (E. p. 99). This seems to give extravagant expression to a mere fashionable prejudice. How would the clause about 'doubling' apply to numbers? Or in biology, to creatures whose method of reproduction is to multiply by dividing?

[19] See A. I:2 74–6; II:1 92ff.

[20] This may be intentional. See her remarks on 'tact' in James (E. p. 105) and her essay, full of disgusting interpretations of details of Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*: 'Disremembering Daedalus', in *Untying the Text*, ed. Robert Young (Boston and London: Routledge, 1981).

[21] See A. XI:4 465–6, especially the expressions 'something to put a face upon', 'blinking it', 'fiction', 'a performance', 'simply a *lie* in the charming affair'; also Mme de Vionnet's speaking volubly in French at the inn, although she has always spoken English to Strether (p. 464).

[22] For example 'Ozone; an Essay on Keats' by Richard Rand, in the collection *Post-Structuralist Readings of English Poetry* ed. Machin and Norris (Cambridge U.P., 1987).

[23] 'The Death of the Author', by Roland Barthes. In *Image, Music, Text*; essays sel. and trans. by Stephen Heath (Glasgow, Collins, 1977); see also Belsey (op. cit.) pp. 3, 134–5, and a welcome protest, 'The Death of the Author: An Analytical Autopsy', by Peter Lamarque. *Br. J. Aes.* 30/4 (Oct. 1990) 319–31.

[24] See for example *Formalism and Marxism* by Tony Bennett (1979. Repr. London: Routledge, 1989) pp. 98ff.

[25] I described this in 'Semantics and Literature', *J. Lit. Sem.* 7/2 (1978) 78–89, Section II; but as I have indicated, the concept of 'text' has changed. A modern account can be seen in *Untying the Text* (op. cit.): a contribution by Roland Barthes, entitled 'The Theory of the Text' and translated from *Encyclopaedia Universalis*. It owes much to Kristeva, expressly incorporates ideas from Marxism and psychoanalysis, and stresses that 'semanalysis' is more advanced than 'literary semiotics'. But it has a strong irrational element.

[26] Christopher Norris, in *Deconstruction: Theory and Practice* (London: Methuen, 1982) pp. 92ff. regards Geoffrey Hartman (with reason) as the post-structuralist who first and most explicitly proclaimed that the literary critic should not defer to the literary creator. But being concerned with prose fiction, I would emphasize the disrespect for Balzac, paraded in a book that seems more widely known in Britain than Hartman's writings and must also have contributed: *S/Z* by Roland Barthes (first pub. 1970). Trans. Miller (New York: Hill & Wang, 1974). The tone of the two critics, in declining to defer, is vastly different.

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F. R. LEAVIS: INTUITIONIST?

Anthony Haynes

I

'I CALL myself an "anti-philosopher"' wrote F. R. Leavis:[1] but was he accurate or is this a case of a great reader misreading his own texts? The latter possibility was implied by Peter Byrne when he argued in this journal that Leavis's conception of philosophy was based on the assumption that 'philosophy as such is committed to the search for generalized theories and that philosophical reasoning must be modelled on that found in mathematics or the more developed of the natural sciences'.[2]

Byrne argued that this assumption was mistaken and that, in opposing one kind of philosophy, Leavis was merely putting himself on the side of another. I would like to use Byrne's insight in order to provide some philosophical bearings on Leavis's work and so to establish that there are indeed philosophical criteria by which it can be evaluated. Byrne himself invokes the later Wittgenstein, but two other philosophies of Leavis's period also lie outside Leavis's conception of what philosophy is. These were existentialism and intuitionism, of which only the former has previously been related to Leavis's thought in any detail.

II

Before considering intuitionism, however, it is worth considering Catherine Belsey's argument that Leavis's criticism, at least in *The Great Tradition*, constitutes a form of empiricism.[3] The question of empiricism provides a test of the accuracy of Byrne's attribution of the above assumption to Leavis, because it is a borderline case. That is, in its emphasis on perception and induction, empiricism does indeed generalize and does resemble natural science but in its hard-headedness and suspicion of deduction it eschews theorizing and is quite unlike mathematics.

Belsey argues that *The Great Tradition* is thoroughly empiricist because it not only promotes empiricist texts but uses an empiricist method to do so. Belsey's warrant for saying that it promotes empiricist texts lies in its emphasis on 'classic realist novels', for:

> Empiricism, the conviction that experience is the source of knowledge, is one of the main determinants of narrative structure in the classic realist novels of the

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> canon. Dorothea Brooke, Gwendolen, Isabel Archer and, in a rather different way, Conrad's Marlow, all learn from experience, moving in the course of the narrative towards an enhanced awareness of themselves and the world. This learning process, which propels the redistribution of the relationships between the characters, constitutes the core of the classic realist story. Ignorance, misunderstanding and misrecognition generate a series of crises (episodes) which finally produce a new and more stable pattern of relationships (closure).[4]

I have to say that Belsey's argument is defeated by the looseness of the prose. Her glossing of 'empiricism' hardly facilitates rigorous thought, while the way in which novels are grouped together on the grounds that their characters 'all learn from experience' comes close to banality. On Belsey's terms it is difficult to understand why Leavis says in *The Great Tradition* that 'life isn't long enough to permit of one's giving much time to Fielding' or that 'it's no use pretending that Richardson can ever be made a current classic again'.[5]

Belsey claims that Leavis's criticism is empiricist in method because it provides 'extensive quotation' from the novels under discussion in order for readers to *experience* the texts for themselves.[6] This empiricist method is, however, apparently jeopardized by the critic's need to include commentary between quotations. Such criticism only manages to preserve its empiricism by choosing to work, 'not by *analysis* of the passage quoted, which would interfere with the notion that the correct reading is a matter of recognition, but by prompting the reader to share the view that the passage is self-evidently ("plainly") an instance of the author's "sureness of touch"'.[7]

I do not understand the supposed opposition between analysis and empiricism, because in my own experience of reading Leavis it is his analyses that are most successful in changing my perception of the texts or in leading to a 'recognition' that there are qualities in them that I hadn't noticed before. Thus analysis can constitute that most empiricist of things—vigilance. I would agree with Belsey that there isn't much analysis in *The Great Tradition*, but I suggest that the conclusion should rather be that the book is *insufficiently* empiricist.

Yet awareness of such weaknesses does not entirely remove the impression that I had when first reading Belsey's essay, namely that she was clearly 'onto something'. Almost in spite of her hypothesis, she does raise a number of interesting features about Leavis's method (certainly more than I have quoted). What is needed is a hypothesis that can account for these phenomena with less difficulty. What that hypothesis might be was suggested to me by Belsey's use of the terms 'recognition' and 'self-evident', for this, surely, is the language of intuitionism.

III

That Leavis was a moralist is a commonplace, yet curiously there has been little attempt to relate his work to British moral philosophy of the same

period. The development of intuitionism in the first half of the century provides us with at least one point of comparison. The relevance here is that intuitionism, in its belief in fundamental and uninferred knowledge, is clearly beyond the conception of what philosophy is that Byrne attributed to Leavis.

I will use as a *locus classicus* of intuitionist philosophy a passage from an essay by H. A. Prichard entitled 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?'.[8] In it he discusses what grounds there might be for obligations:

> Suppose we ask ourselves whether our sense that we ought to pay our debts or to tell the truth arises from our recognition that in doing so we should be originating something good, e.g. material comfort in *A* or true belief in *B*, i.e. suppose we ask ourselves whether it is this aspect of the action which leads to our recognition that we ought to do it. We at once and without hesitation answer 'No'.[9]

No, I don't! My answer is 'Sometimes'. I often, for example, feel like taking a day off work, but tend not because I know that my students won't get taught if I'm not there. The important point here, however, concerns not the accuracy of Prichard's judgement but the nature of his argument. For even if we did all 'without hesitation answer '"No"', it would remain to be shown that we were *justified* in feeling that way. Prichard, in other words, is substituting social psychology for philosophical analysis.

We may compare the passage from Prichard to one from 'Why *Four Quartets* matters in a Technologico-Benthamite age'.[10] Nobody familiar with Leavis would expect the sort of theoretical discussion that such a title would have elicited from, say, I. A. Richards or Raymond Williams. What Leavis actually says is that one cannot read Eliot's poem and:

> take it in as a poem in a detached intellectual way. In taking the 'communication' of the 'idea' . . . one goes through a different process from the mastering of a logical disquisition; the whole being is involved, and one is compelled, in the taking, to achieve a new realization of the nature of experience. And that realization isn't, and couldn't be, a mere matter of interest in theory. It involves one's basic attitudes and one's habits of thought and valuation. That is what I mean by saying that no one could take the communication of 'Burnt Norton' and not know, with decisive force, that the spiritual Philistinism of the world we live in is menacingly anti-human.[11]

So why *do* the *Four Quartets* matter? Well, it turns out the answer is to come from the poem itself, not from Leavis's criticism of it, and that if you had read the poem ('take[n] the communication') you would just *know* it ('with decisive force') without needing to be told.

As with the passage from Prichard, I want to question both the accuracy of the judgement and the nature of the argument. I happen to agree that 'the spiritual Philistinism of the world we live in is menacingly anti-human'; but the point is that I can imagine other people reading the poem and not agreeing.

And even if all readers did come to feel as Leavis did, it would remain to be shown that they were right. Again, psychology is short-circuiting analysis.

It is, I think, apposite here to quote the conclusion of Prichard's essay:

> if we do doubt whether there is really an obligation to originate *A* in a situation *B*, the remedy lies not in any process of general thinking, but in getting face to face with a particular instance of the situation, and then directly appreciating the obligation to originate *A* in that situation.[12]

The parallel between the two writers continues. How do you know that in a particular situation you have an obligation? Well, get face to face with the situation and you'll see. How do we know that Eliot's poem matters: well, get face to face with it and you'll see.

IV

Having identified a parallel between Leavis and intuitionist philosophy, I would like to develop it in order to account for some well-known features of Leavis's work. To do this, it is helpful first to establish a few points about intuitionism in general.

The view that intuitions are trustworthy implies that they won't change over time. Each time you find yourself in a given situation, your intuition will tell you the same thing. Similarly, intuitions will not vary between people. It follows that if, in a given situation, your own intuition were to conflict with reports from other people, one of the following must hold: either (i) those people have failed to relate the situation to their intuition, either because (a) they have not bothered to consult their intuition or (b) they have misperceived the situation and so brought their intuition to bear on something other than what is in front of them; or (ii) they have used their intuition, but they have failed to report what it told them.

Examples of each of these categories may result from moral failings: (i) (a) may result from laziness; (i) (b) from lack of vigilance; and (ii) from dishonesty. It follows from this that, if you are an intuitionist, you might well suspect that someone with whom you disagree is morally at fault, in which case you could be forgiven for adopting an angry and puritanical tone. This is precisely what Leavis tended to do when engaged in controversy.

It also follows that you may have difficulty in understanding a change in your own way of thinking. It is possible that this accounts for the apparent lack of candour in Leavis's change of attitude towards Dickens. The charge relates to the shift between *The Great Tradition* and *Dickens the Novelist*.[13] In the former, Leavis's belief that Dickens was 'a great genius' was qualified by the claim that 'the adult mind doesn't as a rule find in Dickens a challenge to an unusual and sustained seriousness',[14] whereas the whole force of the latter

works against such qualifications. Some reviewers of *Dickens the Novelist* objected to Leavis's failure to acknowledge openly, let alone account for, this revaluation.[15] It is notable, however, that Leavis included no analysis in *The Great Tradition* in support of the qualifications made about Dickens's value. It is likely, therefore, that Leavis was relying on hunches. The doubts about Dickens's value, that is, are those of Leavis-the-intuitionist, rather than Leavis-the-empiricist. Now if you share the intuitionist view that intuitions are reliable over time and you then find that your intuitions change, you will not be able to offer an account of that change precisely because it will appear incomprehensible to you. My conjecture, therefore, is that Leavis simply could not understand his own change of mind on Dickens.

The categories given above, by which intuitionists may account for disagreements between people, provide a convenient way of relating Leavis to the leading intuitionist philosopher in the Cambridge of the time, namely C. D. Broad. In particular, (i) (b) resembles Broad's concept of 'misplaced emotion': 'An emotion may be said to be misplaced if either (i) it is felt towards an object which is believed to exist but does not really do so, or (ii) it is felt towards an object which really does exist in respect of qualities which do not really belong to it'.[16]

One of Broad's explanations as to how people may come to misplace emotion is given by his concept of 'second-hand emotion'.[17] Broad argues that it is possible to use words 'consistently and correctly' without always bringing to mind the objects to which they refer. Moreover, we often come 'through early training' to associate a particular word with a particular emotion, so that the subsequent use of the word alone may be sufficient to excite that emotion. When this happens, there is a danger that we come to believe that the emotion thus excited is directed towards the qualities of the object to which the word refers, whereas 'really we are not thinking of the object or its qualities at all'.[18]

Broad's concepts apply directly to some of Leavis's central concerns. For example, Leavis often criticized texts on the grounds that an attentive reading would reveal that the emotions they describe are inauthentically related to the objects that were supposed to have aroused them. Sebastian Moore remembers Leavis commenting on a sonnet by Christina Rossetti: 'she thinks she feels like that; but she doesn't feel like that'.[19] The significance of what Broad would have termed 'misplaced emotion' may be seen in the reasoning behind Leavis's preference for Hardy's 'After a Journey' over Emily Brontë's 'Cold in the earth'. Hardy's poem 'could . . . have been written only by a man who had the experience of a life to remember back through',[20] whereas the Brontë poem is 'betrayingly less real' because 'she is dramatizing herself in a situation such as she has clearly not known in actual experience'.[21]

Finally, Broad's concept of 'second-hand emotion' applies not only to Leavis's analysis of literary texts, but also to his criticism of criticism. This is clear, for example, in Leavis's comment on the reception given to Stephen Spender's

autobiography. There Leavis condemns the book's reviewers because they 'assume that the book is of great importance because of the established literary distinction of the author, and they find the high distinction of a gifted writer brilliantly present in the book itself',[22] whereas the 'patent enough reality' is that the book confirms Spender's lack of talent.

V

I have not sought to show that Leavis was wholly or consistently intuitionist. Reference to other schools of thought, such as existentialism, would be needed in order to give a complete account of the philosophical bearings of his thought. My concern, however, has been to establish that his work contains an intuitionist core.

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THE INCOHERENCE OF THE AESTHETIC RESPONSE

Hartley Slater

AFTER ALL the discussion since Colin Radford's paper on emotional response in 1975,[1] it seems there is still a temptation to believe that fiction is fact, and so to go on rationally to be moved by it. Indeed R. M. J. Dammann has recently told us that, at the appropriate scene in the play, the belief that the *character* Desdemona is about to be suffocated is 'quite simply true'.[2] Such a view about characters being the target of the emotional response goes back at least to Miss Macdonald,[3] but Dammann notably adds some new wrinkles. Thus he also tells us[4] that the belief that the character exists, and indeed is there on the stage in front of one, is 'not obviously false', although 'Desdemona' is not just, or even importantly, a perceptual object. We also learn some more about what such a character consists in, and just how it affects us. Dammann points out that a character is not (just) an imaginary person, since our response is to a character in a story, which is related in a certain way. Dammann concludes: 'It is not the *truth* of the story which moves me, but the way I tell it to myself'.[5]

A somewhat similar account of our 'mixed' response was, of course, given by Michael Weston in his original reply to Radford. Our response is not just to what is represented but also to the representation of it, and it is through the mix of the two targets—the one we might call an idea, the other an empirical object—that the special characteristics of the aesthetic response arise. It has clearly taken us some while to see the virtue of this account. But Dammann's recent paper, I believe, by putting the case into a theatrical setting, perhaps, has forced it into prominence.

I

Now in the theatre, in reply to a pure Idealist account one is very tempted to take a strict Empiricist position. The pure Idealist (as I understand him) does not attend to the real world at all but just to the illusion created. So one is irresistibly drawn to 'bringing him down to earth'. One's thought, with him, will be that the only perceptual object in the case is the actor in her make up, playing Desdemona, so the belief that *who she is playing* is, instead, perceived, is obviously false. Like the depth seen in representational paintings,

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the person played by the actor is an illusion, and so is not really there. As a result, no one is about to be suffocated on the stage and, realizing this, that is why, for instance, we do not call the Police or interfere in some other way. If one is even led to fear or despair at the supposed occurrence that is still quite inappropriate: what happens on the stage may causally initiate such sentiments, but it cannot be their rational target.

Radford, in this way, located the incoherence of the emotional response in the inappropriateness of being taken in by the illusion. Pure Idealists who go on maintaining the direct opposite are perhaps then like Bedford's pretenders,[6] who will stop at nothing to try to clinch the deception they are joining in. But seeing the justice in Dammann's less pure position leads us now to locate the incoherence of the response in a different place from Radford. Dammann recognizes that the response is to something somehow on the stage, and so not an other-worldly object; he likewise allows there is some perception, even if it is not complete. Recognizing the aesthetic qualities of the production, even just its live presence in front of us (unlike in the literary cases Macdonald and Radford concentrated on) puts us, we may now say, *in two minds*. We take a quasi-Idealist, and a quasi-Empiricist position, attending at once to the character and to the way the story is told, as Weston suggested. But it is these two states of mind as a pair which are incoherent, not just the pure Idealist's stance, as on Radford's account. Indeed the pair are *contradictory*, surely, although, in the right circumstances, they clearly may both be sustained, without consequence, at once.

II

Now I have, in an earlier paper,[7] given an account of the full emotional response to fictions which clears *it* of incoherence. So I will first go over that point again, both for its own sake and because it will allow me to demonstrate the present point more clearly. Let us use 'δ' for some arbitrary propositional attitude taken towards the supposition that

$$(Ex)(Sx.Fx),$$

i.e., that there is a suffocation taking place in front of us. Then my main point earlier was that, since this supposition is false, then we have

$$-(Ex)(Sx.Fx),$$

i.e.,

$$-[S\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx).F\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx)],$$

i.e., the 'suffocation in front of us' is not both a suffocation and in front of us.[8]

As a result, the falsity of the supposition forces its target to be indetermin-

ate, *but* by judiciously identifying that target with some real object in our emotional memory, it can quite easily be true that

$$S\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx),$$

and so quite appropriate that

$$\delta S\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx),$$

where 'δ' is 'belief', with the resulting emotional consequences. The scene before us then brings present to our mind some real suffocation from elsewhere, and there is nothing irrational in being in full fear or despair of that.

But Dammann's new paper shows that our response in the theatrical case is to something in some way in front of us, which shows that the above cannot, in that case, be all that is going on. For another element of the form

$$\delta F\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx)$$

must be involved as well. In fact the formal point above merely gives us a resolution of Radford's puzzle in his fifth category,[9] whereas, as we shall now see, we should be happier with his conclusion—if not for the same reason. The point from my previous paper shows how there may be a quite rational 'under-distancing', in Bullough's phrase.[10] We must now balance this with some 'over-distancing', and so end up realizing there is indeed a proper *antinomy* of distance.

III

Now, as Radford himself centrally pointed out with respect to Anna Karenina: we weep *for her*, and what is equivalent to that in the theatrical case is being moved by *what is represented in front of us*. Hence the thought is not just that that character is being suffocated but, as Dammann nearly says, that that character is being *suffocated on the stage*. As a result while at a later time we may be inclined to believe the reverse of this, i.e., that no one was being suffocated on the stage, the general conventions of the theatre forcibly induce us, at the time, to 'suspend disbelief' (what else?) and at least *think* things are just as they seem.

It is interesting to speculate why the theatre is particularly forcible in this regard. Is it because the medium is itself three dimensional as opposed to the two dimensionality of paintings (even film), and the one dimensionality of literature? Short of dropping our tears on the appropriate page there is no *place* we can associate with Anna, which is no doubt what helps Radford's fifth solution to apply quite well to novels: we are almost obliged to re-target our response elsewhere, and so more easily produce a full emotion. But with the lowered lighting, strange surroundings, directly focused attention, in the theatre the image is brought more forcibly in front of us than when looking

at pictures (where there is just the frame, and the chosen distance from the colour patches), or when reading a book (where there is just the social isolation, and the necessary silence). We are, therefore, in the theatre, inescapably involved not with a part but with *the whole* of

$$\delta[S\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx).F\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx)],$$

and for a very specific 'δ', as well.

For, whatever may be the case with any one part, it would clearly be going too far to say that we *believe* this whole is true, since as Wollheim[11] has pointed out, our response contains an equal recognition of the medium, and so we are inevitably 'distanced'. But Dammann forgot this when he said we had a *belief* that the character was about to be suffocated in front of us. The sophisticated do not *believe* this—one sign is that our emotions towards the supposed scene are accordingly weak. But the character of our mind is still an attitude towards this same supposition, (Ex)(Sx.Fx). The attitude instead is one properly called 'thought': indeed thought when we also think the reverse.

In short, with the house lights up, and other '*Verfremdungeffekts*' we would be over-distanced and believe there was no suffocation in front of us:

$$B-(Ex)(Sx.Fx).$$

But we are induced by the occasion into another frame of mind, where we do not believe but merely *think* the reverse of what is so:

$$T(Ex)(Sx.Fx).$$

On the other hand, by attending to the representation as well as what is represented, we also retain a trace of acknowledgement of the facts, at the same time:

$$T-(Ex)(Sx.Fx).$$

Such 'aesthetic' attention to the representation, indeed, is what stops us from being so gripped by the piece as to believe completely in it.[12] Recognizing, minimally, that we are in a theatre balances our mind, and puts us into the necessary motor-inert state of indifference.

Certainly, therefore, as Radford would claim,

$$B(Ex)(Sx.Fx)$$

is 'incoherent' (in the sense of quite inappropriate, for adults), while, against him, as I previously said,

$$BS\varepsilon x(Sx.Fx)$$

may be quite appropriate, and rational, with the attendant full response. But a more complete analysis of the case shows such under-distancing to be not central—merely a relaxation of *belief* is required. Instead of under-distancing

we then reach a happy mid-way stance from which over-distancing is also excluded. So there is indeed an 'Antinomy of Distance', exactly as Bullough described it. By thinking both a proposition and its reverse are true we are (in a certain limited sense) being logically inconsistent.

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[8] See op. cit., Reference 7 for an elementary explanation of the epsilon calculus; also, for instance, my 'Hilbertian Reference' in *Nous* 22 (1988), or 'Descriptive Opacity' forthcoming in *Philosophical Studies*.

[9] Op. cit., Reference 1, p. 75.

[10] E. Bullough, 'Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle', *British Journal of Psychology*, 5 (1912–13).

[11] R. Wollheim's shift from a 'seeing-as' to a 'seeing-in' account of Representation recognizes this; see his Supplementary Essay V in *Art and Its Objects* 2nd Ed. (Cambridge U.P., 1980). It is, of course, the central point I draw from Dammann, and Weston, though Wollheim's treatment is perhaps the *locus classicus* for it.

[12] Roger Scruton's account also involves a lessening of 'belief', so that, in his case, the thoughts are 'unasserted', see *Art and Imagination* (London: Methuen 1974), e.g., p. 120. But Scruton does not consider the mechanism which reduces the belief's force, namely the thought of the reverse. I have given a formal account of thought which allows Tp and T-p to be equally possible in 'Probabilistic Foundations for Operator Logic', forthcoming in *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*. Briefly, if 'Bap' is 'pr(p/a) $>\frac{1}{2}$', then the state of indifference where 'pr(p/a)=pr(−p/a)=$\frac{1}{2}$' is not one of belief but 'wonder'. Note that this latter state is not so incoherent that pr((p.−p)/a)=$\frac{1}{2}$. Indeed, always pr((p.−p)/a)=0, so the contradictory thoughts obtained in an aesthetic context do not combine to produce an absurdity.

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MOUNCE AND COLLINGWOOD ON ART AND CRAFT

R. T. Allen

IN HIS 'Art and Craft'[1] H. O. Mounce has raised certain difficulties regarding Collingwood's account, in *The Principles of Art*,[2] of the differences between art and craft. Mounce tends to argue that Collingwood's distinction between art and craft is erroneous because a work can be both craft, intended to produce a specific effect in the audience, and also 'art proper', the *expression* of emotion, the bringing to full consciousness in its full individuality of what is as yet vague and inchoate. Because it is expression, the activity of art *cannot* be a craft aiming at the production of a definite and reconceived end result, and so it cannot have any *techniques* or means to preconceived ends (*PA* p. 111). And this is true to artistic experience. The work does unfold itself to the artist as he creates it. But Mounce seems to misunderstand what Collingwood meant by 'expression' and therefore also his precise reason for distinguishing art proper from craft. Consequently, he appears to assume that, according to Collingwood, art is simply that which is not craft. Mounce then cites features which either (a) appear in instances of the practices, producers and products of art and craft, or (b) are shared by some intances of both and yet are absent from other instances of both. From these examples Mounce concludes that there is no real distinction between art and craft.

1. Mounce's first objection, of type (b), is that both sculptors (artists) and boxers (craftsmen) have no specific plans, sculptors otherwise being just like craftsmen, and that performing artists do have specific plans just like most craftsmen. Hence there is no clear distinction between art and craft in this respect. Performing artists may well set a special problem. But the lack of a specific plan is not, in itself, that which distinguishes the artist proper. Rather it is his activity of expression, of which his lack of a specific plan and goal is a consequence. Boxers and other sportsmen may also have no definite goals but they are not engaged in the specifically artistic activity of *expression*.

2. Developing his initial objection, Mounce states that Collingwood, wrongly severing art from the schema of ends and means which belongs to craft, would then have to admit that it would have to be excluded from many crafts or skills, such as selling ice-cream and playing football. Again, whether or not it is absent from these activities, which in some cases I would certainly dispute, this point does not blur the distinction between art and craft. For art is expression of emotion and whatever else those activities are, they are not that.

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In Collingwood's view sports are 'magic', designed to arouse and sustain emotions needed for practical life by means of life-like situations or practices (*PA* p. 73). (Nowadays, spectator sports are usually 'amusement'.) Hence the footballer does not after all, contrary to what Mounce states, possess all the qualifications required by Collingwood to be an artist. For he is not endeavouring to express his emotions, though today footballers all too often betray, exhibit and feign them (see *PA*, pp. 122–3).

3. Mounce's next objection is to Collingwood's alleged claim that art may fail in its effects and still be good art. To this Mounce counters that it may fail simply because the audience fails to grasp the effect intended, just as a potato-peeler is not shown to be a poor one when the user fails in doing something else with it, for the fault may be his. But for Collingwood any distinct and separable effects of art proper are irrelevant to its value, whereas they are precisely that at which craft is aimed and in the achievement of which its (technical) value resides. Hence his rejection of 'technical' theories of art as 'amusement', 'magic', 'instruction', advertisement, exhortation, and the like. Mounce himself recognizes this when he refers to a machine which produces feelings of pleasure. One would not need to attend to such a machine or be in any way aware of it.[3] Collingwood is surely right in maintaining that external effects are aesthetically irrelevant. A crude caricature is likely to be more politically ('magically') effective than a subtle portrait.

4. Mounce next turns to Collingwood's rejection of representation as irrelevant because representation is a craft. Mounce argues that Collingwood's theory of art as the expression of emotion requires representation in art, because emotions have objects and therefore are about the world, situations and what one believes to be happening. Art cannot be expression of emotion without representing some part of the world. But Collingwood did suggest that all art is representational in one of three ways (*PA* pp. 55–6). His point, a correct one, is that it is expression and not representation which makes art into art proper. There are many purely utilitarian representations of many degrees of literalness and distortion, with no pretensions to be art. Conversely, as Mounce rightly states, there are non-representations of the world, such as football, which may or may not be crafts. But it does not follow, contrary to what Mounce suggests, that they are art. They are art only if they are expression. Art and craft do not necessarily exhaust the range of human activities.

5. Again it is no objection to Collingwood, as Mounce goes on to imply, to state that Rembrandt's whole aim was to portray human character by artistic means. His emotions must have an object, a subject-matter, as Collingwood makes clear (*PA*, p. 278), although Collingwood often uses 'emotion' to mean only the emotional charge, the felt positive or negative attitude, towards the object of emotion, rather than the whole experience of an emotion. The question is, what makes Rembrandt's portraits *art*? It cannot be that they are representations, for there are representations which are not art. It is that they

are expressions, that in them Rembrandt is exploring in detail and individuality what he feels about humanity and the individuals portrayed. Mounce partly recognizes this when he says that what matters for Collingwood is Rembrandt's ability to express his emotions and not his ability to represent the character of the sitter and to communicate that character. But Mounce therein implies a separation of feeling from its object which, despite some of his language, is not made by Collingwood. Mounce then argues that in art, as in some crafts, we are interested in the means as well as the end (cf. the pleasure machine), so that the work of art is, apparently, a means but not just a means since it is also a focus of interest. Hence again there is no clear distinction of art from craft. But if the work of art is in any way a *means* of communication, then it is not, in Collingwood's terms, a work of art at all. For, in such a case, the artist has already expressed his emotion and so knows what it is. If he then constructs a second work to communicate it, such as a prose paraphrase of his poem, that work is necessarily one of craft and not art.

6. Mounce's example of Vainö Linna's *The Unknown Soldier*, far from supporting his objections, exactly fits Collingwood's differentiation of art from craft, that is, if it is really like what Mounce states it to be. On the one hand, the detail which Mounce mentions is presumptive evidence of full and concrete expression. It is, Mounce states, presented without comment. The artist, according to Collingwood, does not state his emotion, for that presupposes some explicit knowledge of what it is and thus some degree of previous expression (*PA*, Chap. VI, §7). On the other, Mounce also states that Linna wrote the book in order to show that the point of view of the soldier in the Finno—Soviet wars was not that of those who later glorified those campaigns, and in order to change people's attitudes. The latter would make it also a work of craft. But the former does not necessarily do so. 'In order to' does not entail acting with the schema of ends and means. For if Linna were writing, *inter alia*, in order to *express* his feeling about the war, he would not have had a definite idea of the difference of the two attitudes but an inchoate one which would have become definite in the course of his writing and for the realization of which he could not have adopted any 'means'.

I have not dealt with every one of Mounce's objections, but I think that I have made it clear that they are mostly beside the point because he fails to grasp what Collingwood meant by 'art' and 'craft', and he wrongly takes Collingwood to have made this distinction into a exhaustive dichotomy such that the same work cannot be both and that every activity, if not the one, is therefore the other.

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[1] 'Art and Craft', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July 1991).

[2] Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1938. References will be given in the text using the abbreviation, *PA*.

[3] When we speak of the 'effect' of a part of a work of art, we mean its *contribution* to the whole of which it is an organic part, and likewise when we speak of the 'total effect' of the work, we mean simply the whole work itself as an organic whole. Therefore what look like means to ends in art proper—e.g., lighter tones added 'in order to' balance darker ones, incidents inserted 'in order to' reveal more of the protagonist's character—are organic parts of a whole and not disposable means to something other than and beyond themselves.

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THE TRUTH IN FICTION

Richard Gaskin

THIS IS a wide-ranging and ambitious book.* Harrison aims to give a theory of narrative fiction, taking into account both work on the theory of meaning in the analytic tradition, and continentalist—in particular Derridean—approaches to literature. Structurally, the book consists of an initial chapter setting out the theoretical position, followed by nine chapters whose role is to elucidate and defend that position by detailed discussion of individual texts.

There is much of interest in these supportive chapters, which contain discussions of texts as diverse as the synoptic gospels and the novels of Muriel Spark. Some of Harrison's analyses I found illuminating: I would especially single out his treatment of three of Christ's parables, and a terse but brilliant demonstration of how much more there is to *The Taming of the Shrew* than is allowed for in the standard slanging match between feminists and traditionalists. But I was less sympathetic to Harrison's attempt to enrol Sterne in the cause of Lockean nominalism: the mere fact that a writer dwells on the particularity of his characters is not sufficient to commit him to a rejection of the existence of universals. Indeed at one point (p. 99) Harrison correctly observes that characters in a novel are not to be assimilated to 'characters' (who are of course often little more than mouthpieces) in a philosophical dialogue; it is equally true that writers, such as Sterne, who play with philosophical ideas do not thereby turn themselves into philosophers. Harrison misses the *humour* in Sterne's use of Locke: Sterne's comment on the inconsequentiality of Susannah's thoughts ('Well might Locke write a chapter on the imperfection of words') is no more a serious contribution to the theory of meaning than is his roguish suggestion that the *argumentum fistulatorium* be added to the logic textbooks alongside the *argumentum ad hominem* and the *argumentum a fortiori* intended as a serious contribution to logic.

The general thrust of the supportive chapters is that fiction has a tendency to upset expectations and remodel our approach to the world, that it is inconvenient. It is time to turn to the first chapter, where the theoretical basis for the rest of the book is laid. In doing this I do not mean to diminish the significance of the supportive chapters; but their role is largely illustrative (the first chapter is prior in the order of understanding, as Aristotle would say), and since their style is to some extent that of occasional essays it would be difficult in a review to do more than (as I have) list points of agreement or disagreement.

The opening chapter is entitled 'How to reconcile Humanism and Deconstruction', and it is here that we find the book's centre of gravity. The general position Harrison seeks to defend is non-logocentric and anti-formalist. What Harrison takes logocentrism to be is not entirely clear, since he is not definitionally consistent (the theses listed on p. 123 are not, as Harrison claims, arrived at by denying logocentrism—at least not as that notion was introduced on p. 32); but the idea seems to be roughly that the logocentrist holds that meaning is not intrinsically linguistic: words derive their meanings from association with non-linguistic entities, such as occurrent phenomenological states (of course the logocentrist must claim, controversially, that such states *are* intrinsically non-linguistic). In rejecting logocentrism Harrison aligns himself with Derrida and with the twentieth-century reaction to empiricism in the analytic tradition. Harrison seeks to combine this rejection of

* *Inconvenient Fictions: Literature and the Limits of Theory*. By BERNARD HARRISON: Yale U.P., 1991. pp. 293. £25.00.

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logocentrism with a rejection of formalism, and it is here that he parts company with many exponents of deconstruction, though not, he claims, with Derrida. The formalist makes the rather crude mistake of supposing that because there is no such thing as extra-linguistic reality in the sense desired by the logocentrist, it follows that there is no such thing as extra-linguistic reality in *any* sense, that, in Derrida's famous phrase, *il n'y a pas d'hors-texte*. Harrison wishes to exonerate Derrida himself from the crude mistake which, as he rightly observes, mimics the slide from empiricism into idealism, and is the stable-mate of another equally crude and equally fashionable mistake: that of supposing that because associations between word and thing are arbitrary, meaning itself is indeterminate. From this latter rather extraordinary error Harrison seeks to exonerate Saussure. I am not in a position to judge whether the rehabilitations of Derrida and Saussure are successful: I remain suspicious, however. Harrison's account reads for me more like what should strictly speaking be called a rejection of deconstruction rather than its reconciliation with humanism. This impression is strengthened by the observation that in fleshing out his non-logocentric anti-formalism Harrison makes a number of concessions to deconstruction which he need not, and should not, make.

He agrees with the deconstructionist that much humanist criticism (New Criticism, Practical Criticism, School of Leavis) is logocentrist. I see no warrant for this at all. It is quite unclear that humanist criticism has ever committed itself to the view that the text offers a route to reality which is extra-linguistic in the philosophically loaded sense. Do we have any reason to ascribe to these critics anything other than the benign position that language and reality stand in internal relation to one another (the position which Harrison, rightly, espouses)?

Further, Harrison reasonably attacks the view that a paraphrase of a literary text might simply be *equivalent* to that text (might be another, perhaps better, way of doing the same thing). But he is wrong to take this as constituting a refutation of the claim that texts express universals. Harrison's mistake here derives, in my judgement, from a misunderstanding of Frege. As he makes clear in his final chapter, where Frege's distinction between sense and reference makes its (unfortunately first) appearance in the book, Harrison understands sense in a Dummettian way, as a method of determining reference, rather than as a way of thinking about reference or, better—since thoughts for Frege are independent of acts of thinking—as the mode of presentation of reference. Had Harrison adopted this latter (in my view preferable) construal of Fregean sense, he would have had available to him the following line of reflection: texts and their paraphrases express the same universals (they have the same *reference*); but they do so in quite different ways (they differ in *sense*). With that machinery in place, one can see what paraphrase can achieve (getting the student to understand the text by hooking on to the right reference—'what the text is saying'), and what it cannot achieve (duplicating what the text says in the way the text says it). Only with such machinery in place can one, I suggest, see the point of the humanist enterprise (which is largely one of paraphrase); without it, humanism lies exposed to the deconstructionist charge—which Harrison too readily concedes—of not taking the textuality of texts seriously.

Harrison's failure to accommodate Fregean sense properly understood is of a piece with his claim that 'the notions of reference and truth have no coherent application to literature' (p. 47). Here we arrive at an intolerable tension at the heart of this book. Harrison's whole project is to show that fiction can interact with (by disturbing) our view of the world, that, in short, there are cognitive gains to be had from literature. But there are no cognitive gains to be had from a realm of discourse to which the notions of truth and reference have no application. Only conceptual confusion can issue from denying that obvious point. So something has to give. It is clear that Harrison has much more money on the cognitive dimension of literature: that emerges especially clearly from an excellent discussion of the way in which literature achieves its meaning partly by way of connections with the world (p. 49ff). Harrison's concession to deconstruction that literary language 'as such . . . is non-referential and . . . makes no statements' (p. 51) is a false move.

If reading literature is—at least partly—a cognitive activity, its sentences must be up for assess-

ment as true or false, and its words must refer. To what? Clearly, to universals. If Harrison is right about the cognitive value of literature—and he surely is—then the Fregean model is just what is needed to stop the slide into incoherence which is unhappily at the centre of Harrison's theory. Instead of that model, Harrison offers, by way of reconciling his expulsion of truth and reference from the domain of literature with his acknowledgement that 'language is everywhere hopelessly infected by the extra-linguistic' (ibid.), the thesis that literature achieves its cognitive ambition by setting up 'seismic convulsions . . . which allow the relations between sign and sign, long confirmed by habit, to dissolve and reform in new patterns' (ibid.).

What are these convulsions? Plainly they cannot be syntactic convulsions, at least not centrally. Nor can they centrally be semantic convulsions, at least not in the sense in which Lewis Carroll defeats, or plays with, semantic expectations. Great literature no doubt works in part by disturbing the reader (although here Harrison allows too little theoretical room for literature which deals in 'what oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd'); but what surprises the reader cognitively speaking is not so much the writer's handling of language as his depiction of his fictional world. (Sometimes indeed the reader will judge in retrospect that events did not, after all, take such a surprising turn, that the beginning did contain the seeds of the end: on that Aristotle was surely right. Harrison is, consistently enough, dismissive of Aristotle.) The point is that in 'shifting and reforming the sign/sign relationships' (p. 52) the writer, centrally, engages in manipulations which are already allowed for in the language. With the Fregean model in place, we can say that the writer opens up new vistas on our familiar world, or even vistas on a new world (new universals): this way of putting it makes clear the cognitive point of engaging, as writer or reader, in literary activity. Harrison claims that reading a text 'has more in common with a relationship between persons than with the scientific scrutiny of a natural object' (p. 143). The analogy is certainly a telling one, but why suppose that the categories are mutually exclusive? Contemplation of reality is sometimes dispassionate, but it need not be, and in the case both of reading and of engaging in personal relationships, is not. Surely truth is at the very heart of relations between persons.

It is revealing that Harrison regards ordinary, non-fictional discourse as a 'neutral device for recording what is the case' (p. 52). But why should we let that through? Ordinary language has to present the facts *in some way*, just as much as fictional language. That does not debilitate its fact-stating powers: after all, the facts cannot be presented in *no* way. Harrison's excessive pessimism about the competence of fictional discourse to state facts and his misdirected optimism about the competence of non-fictional discourse to do so are two sides of the same coin. History and fiction are, as Aristotle recognized, not so very far apart after all. (On p. 249 Harrison well expresses the point I am aiming at—that the theory-ladenness of ordinary discourse does not operate to bar its access to reality—but he has unfortunately not allowed this insight to feed back into the early statement of his theory, with consequent adjustment to what is said about fictional discourse.)

I have concentrated on my disagreements with Harrison, but I should not like to leave the impression that I think this a bad book. On the contrary, what makes this book so stimulating and worth while is precisely the extent to which it invites fruitful disagreement. That in itself is a real achievement, given the task Harrison has set himself, for (in this reviewer's opinion) much writing in the deconstructionist tradition is too bland and philosophically naïve to make interesting disagreement a lively option. I have indicated that I regard the book's main fault to lie in its excessive willingness to make concessions to deconstructionism. Of course humanism was never philosophically sophisticated; how could it be, since its practitioners were not theorists? That laid it open to the distinctively theoretical (but superficial) attack mounted by the deconstructionists. I hope Harrison will take it as a compliment (it is meant as such) if I say that for me the great value of this book is that it creates a yearning for *another* book, one which would provide us with something we have too long lacked—a philosophically sophisticated defence of the humanistic tradition of literary criticism.

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ESSENTIAL AESTHETICS

Diané Collinson

THIS COLLECTION of eighteen essays* is extremely valuable, not only as an instance of excellent writing in philosophical aesthetics but also as testimony to significant developments in the subject. T. J. Diffey has been benignly formative in that development. As editor of the *British Journal of Aesthetics* and as a contributor to it over the last twenty-five years, he has advanced the Journal's international reputation as a forum for the discussion of a wide range of topics in the philosophy of the arts. In so doing, and as this book well shows, he has contributed notably to the status of aesthetics as a flourishing branch of philosophy and to the refutation of any extant accusations of the subject's dreariness.

Many of Diffey's essays have previously appeared in philosophy Journals or in books. In the present volume their coherence is made plain by an informative Introduction. From it we learn that Diffey has a deep interest in philosophical method and the logic of concepts, an interest engendered by his teacher at Bristol, Stephan Körner, and nurtured through his own close study of the work of R. G. Collingwood. His thought is further enriched by his informed love of literature, an interest in classical American philosophy and in the ethics of Stevenson, Ayer, Hare and Urmson which, he says, preceded that in aesthetics. The consequence of this philosophical disposition is that his enquiries are characterized by an analytic tenacity and a clear sense of direction, neither of which is so ruthless as ever to be insensitive to the qualifications and conjectures that attend any journey towards philosophical understanding. He is self-declared as someone more concerned with questions pertaining to the nature of definition than with 'seeking to recapture in, and for, philosophy a kind of phenomenological repetition of the first-hand experiences to be had from looking at a particular painting, reading a certain poem or, for that matter, writing one' (p. 2).

Given such predilections it is not surprising that several of Diffey's chapters treat of issues relating to the possibility—or impossibility—of providing a definition of art; that others take their impetus from the thought of Collingwood and Moore, and that scrutiny is directed to such topics as the kinds of values ascribed to art and the aesthetic, the nature of aesthetic experience, the relationship between art and morals, criticism, and natural beauty.

Can art be defined? Diffey's first five chapters constitute a wide-ranging treatment of this question. In Chapter One, 'Essentialism and the Definition of "Art"' (1973), he unfolds a view that challenges any easy allegiance to anti-essentialism, pointing out that anti-essentialists who have adopted Wittgenstein's doctrine of family resemblances as a strategy have failed to relate it to art in a convincing way. We need to know, he says, what resemblances may be said to hold between works of art; whether we are to consider resemblances between 'individual works of art, the *oeuvres* of various artists, the different media of art, or what?'. And he asks, 'how do we know the resemblances we posit are family resemblances?' (p. 20). These and other considerations do not show, and Diffey does not mean them to show, that anti-essentialism is mistaken, but 'only that it is non-proven' (p. 21). Kennick's anti-essentialist claims in 'Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?' are examined with care. Diffey points out that Kennick's title seems to assume that all traditional enquiries are of an essentialist nature, that this is not in fact the case, and so Kennick's view must be seen more as a stipulation of what is to count as 'traditional

* *The Republic of Art and Other Essays.* By T. J. DIFFEY. Peter Lang. 1991. pp. 345. $49.95.

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aesthetics' than as a historical account. The well-known 'Warehouse Test', in which Kennick seems to be claiming that the meaning of a term consists in its correct uses, fails to recognize, Diffey says, that 'On some occasions we may have to be explicit about what "art" means' (p. 29).

Diffey's own approach to essentialism is by way of the historicity of the concept of art. He invokes Locke's notions of real and nominal essences and asks: 'Does art lack real or nominal essence?'; that is, is there something a work of art must necessarily have in order for it to be art, and is there a criterion that designates the applicability of the term 'art' to a thing? (p. 35). His answer is that art lacks both real and nominal essence, though not for anti-essentialist reasons: 'Art has no nominal essence because . . . it is not a term we are called upon just to apply to something. Art has no real essence because art has a history' (ibid.). He proposes that theories of art should be regarded as enquiries after knowledge rather than meaning, and that definitions of art should be seen as characterizations of specifiable ranges of art. A difficulty for this view is one that is part of a wider issue in philosophical aesthetics, namely that of invoking, without vitiation to either, historical as well as philosophical considerations. Diffey observes that theories of art are not always presented under restrictions of time and place but 'are cast in a misleadingly universal form' (p. 37). He notes, too, that there is a need to justify any claim that a given account of art actually belongs in 'a series of transformations which are all of them transformations in, or belonging to, the same series' (ibid.). When he returns, in Chapter Three, 'On Defining Art' (1979), to the matter of historicity, he rejects Platonist, eternal-essence-seeking and Wittgensteinian use-naming accounts of art in favour of an account in which any unthinking subjection to the historical is tempered by the philosophical requirement to analyse what it is that history is accounting for. There is, he urges, scope for a critical deployment of the concept of art, and this critical activity is part of a developing historical reality rather than something external to it in the ways that Platonist and Wittgensteinian approaches are external to history.

In Chapter Five, 'The Idea of Art' (1977), Diffey resumes the task of re-aligning our approach to defining art. He suggests that to think of art as an idea may be more fruitful than thinking of it as a concept. Here he draws on Coleridge's distinction between the two, in which an idea is characterized as less susceptible to articulation or delineation than a concept; as something, Coleridge said, the knowledge of which may exist without a person's being distinctly conscious of it and certainly without his being able to express that knowledge satisfactorily; and perhaps most significantly, as something not possessed by the generality of persons, but as possessing *them*. Coleridge advanced the view that ideas in fact constitute man's humanity; 'For try' he writes, 'to conceive a *man* without the ideas of God, eternity, freedom, will, absolute truth, of the good, the true, the beautiful, the infinite' (pp. 79, 80). To this catalogue of ideas Diffey adds 'art', adducing for its inclusion reasons that are not only cogent but also generative of reflection on issues such as the kind of value that is placed on art and the importance of philosophical aesthetics in the larger structure of philosophy.

When his paper 'The Republic of Art' (Chapter Two) was first published in 1969, Diffey was unaware that he was contributing to what was to become the institutional theory of art; that is, the view that it is the conferral by some appropriate group of the status of art work that makes something a work of art. His own institutional theory grew from reflection on whether G. E. M. Anscombe's distinction between brute facts and institutional facts might be transferred from ethics to aesthetics: 'Could one say the statement "x is a work of art" is a statement not of a brute fact but of an institutional fact?' (p. 4). In Chapter Four, 'The Institutional Theory of Art' (1984), Diffey re-affirms his view that for something to be art it must be 'analyzable in terms of some sort of process of public judgement' (p. 68). Of course, if public conferral is to be taken as a necessary condition of something's being a work of art then the prima-facie implausible claim that a poem or a painting, say, is not a work of art if it has not been made publicly available has to be defended. And Diffey does defend it. Critics of his position ask us to think whether we would want to say that, for instance, Emily Dickinson's poems would not be works of art

if they were unpublished, and Diffey agrees that it would indeed 'seem scandalous' to speak of them so; but he points out that 'it must be remembered that when we think of those poems *our* knowledge of them is knowledge of *published* works' (p. 69). He continues, 'But where there is, on the contrary, only a manuscript without a publishing history, I do not find it difficult to deny that that is a work of art' (ibid.). The point is a compelling one. The unpublished or the unexhibited works are poems, novels, paintings and so on, but they are not fully fledged works of art until they have been 'treated or taken up in certain sorts of ways' by members of the Republic of Art (p. 70).

Engrossing and complex matters present themselves when we juxtapose the following objects of thought: aesthetic experience, aesthetic value, the demise of traditional metaphysics. These are themes that recur in this book but I wish to draw particular attention to Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen in which relationships between them are displayed: 'The Idea of Aesthetic Experience' (1986) and 'Schopenhauer's Account of Aesthetic Experience' (1990).

In 'The Idea of Aesthetic Experience' Diffey poses the question, 'what are we talking about when we talk about aesthetic experience?'. He bluntly replies, 'I have to confess I do not know'. What he now offers for scrutiny is a concept or idea which, like that of art, is not susceptible to containment in any single account. Diffey argues that the idea of aesthetic experience is distinguishable, even if it is not ultimately separate, from ideas of art and beauty. 'We should not assume', he remarks, 'that aesthetic experience and the experience of art are identical' (p. 228); but if we do detach aesthetic experience from its anchorage in discussions of art, then 'there seems to be no other place for it to go or context for it to occupy, so that it is left dangling in mid-air, as it were' (p. 227). It is, he observes, a perfectly familiar idea, yet we do not know what its exact relationship with art is, nor are we clear about its relationship with religious and moral experience. He suggests that 'the term "aesthetic" has taken on meanings and resonances that cannot be exhausted by identifying it with art or beauty' (p. 234) and he uses passages from Dostoevsky and John Cowper Powys to illustrate his meaning. The passages, too long to include here, are well chosen. Without harming any affiliations of 'aesthetic' with 'art' and 'beauty', they dwell on sensibilities that, in spite of being little more than intimations or impressions of a finer and more poignant way of being in the world, are nevertheless transforming and significant for the life of the soul. The term 'aesthetic', Diffey says, 'extends thought, stretches the mind and leads us into new and uncharted territory . . . to new possibilities of experience' (p. 236); and all this requires the clarifying attention of philosophy. It also invites the question *why* we value aesthetic experience so highly.

When Diffey turns to Schopenhauer the same question about value emerges from a slightly different context. He first compares Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic perception with that propounded by Stuart Hampshire in 'Logic and Appreciation'. Hampshire characterizes the work of art as 'gratuitous' and as something 'to be held still in attention', and Diffey points out the similarity of this view to Schopenhauer's characterization of aesthetic experience as contemplative and will-less. But there are differences in the two accounts that he finds more interesting. An important one is that Schopenhauer regards aesthetic contemplation as a means to attaining knowledge of eternal Ideas and a nirvana-like release from individual existence, whereas Hampshire maintains that the enjoyment, analysis, heightened perception and discussion of the variety of formal arrangements to be discovered in things constitute an activity that is engaged in for its own sake. Thus there is a Schopenhauerian answer to the question why we value such experiences: they let us see how things really are. But there is not a comparable Hampshirean answer. On Hampshire's account, as on other contemporary accounts of aesthetic perception, it becomes problematic, Diffey remarks, 'to explain how works of art, *if* they are the object of the aesthetic attitude, and if *this* is what the aesthetic attitude is, could ever have been taken with the seriousness we ordinarily give them' (p. 247). In former times, the metaphysical frameworks of philosophies such as Kant's and Schopenhauer's provided clear rationales for the importance of aesthetic perception; but now, 'Schopenhauer is too oriental, Kant is too Christian for contempor-

ary philosophical taste . . . contemporary aesthetic theories . . . are expected to operate within a totally secular view of the world' (p. 249).

Is Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory instrumentalist in quite the way Diffey suggests? He says that Schopenhauer regards peace of mind as 'intrinsically the best state of mind' and knowledge of the forms of nature (Ideas) as 'instrumental in securing this peace of mind' (p. 249). But perhaps the matter is less clear than that. In *The World as Will and Representation* Schopenhauer writes: 'But yet the source of aesthetic enjoyment will lie sometimes rather in the apprehension of the known Idea, sometimes rather in the bliss and peace of mind of pure knowledge free from all willing . . .' (Volume I, para 42). From this, it seems to me, we must take it that it is the perceived phenomenal object—the tree, the flower, the work of art—that is the *instrument* or means of access to the perception of Ideas and peace of mind, and that Schopenhauer is ascribing intrinsic value to both the perception of Ideas and to peace of mind.

The question of what can be said about why we value art, and many of Diffey's thoughts concerning it, is one that I shall take away from these two chapters to spend time on. Without the support of traditional metaphysics (and we could not want exactly that support, anyway), we are in need of words in which to speak of aesthetic experience in a way that recognizes and confirms that it is not a marginal element in human life. Diffey is surely right in making the point that in the term 'aesthetic experience' our language 'tells us more than we know by having hit upon new continents of experience when it was not necessarily engaged in such a search'. To this I would want to add the thought that if aesthetic experience is cognitive, then what it is cognitive of are not actualities but possibilities.

I have not been able to comment on all the chapters in this book. That fact is testimony to the close-packed richness of its thought, not to inadequacies in the undiscussed chapters on the relationship between morals and aesthetics, on Collingwood, literary criticism and natural beauty. I have found interest and benefit in each essay; and I have enjoyed throughout the book a written style that is always consonant with Diffey's keen-sighted and unwavering intellectual honesty.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Spirit and Beauty: An Introduction to Theological Aesthetics. By PATRICK SHERRY. Clarendon Press. 1992. pp. 192. £25.00.

IN OUR CULTURE many of the finest works of painting, architecture, literature and music are products of the Christian religion. And art continues to contribute to contemporary Christian practice in many forms, from icons to anthems. Why should there be this special relation between art and religion and what is it exactly? These are, presumably, questions for theological aesthetics, to which this book aims to be an introduction. Sherry thinks that our experience of beauty and our experience of the divine have several properties in common, notably their transcendent 'other worldly' character and their power to transform the commonplace. He is also impressed by the fact that some of the terms central to thinking about art, most obviously 'creativity' and 'inspiration', are also to be found in the traditional language of theology.

One possible explanation of the connection between art and religion is that the existence of beautiful things, especially in nature, gives us evidence for the existence of a divine creator. 'The heavens are telling the glory of God and the firmament sheweth his handiwork' says the Psalmist. But Sherry argues that such an explanation is both subject to the many familiar objections to any teleological argument and inadequate as an explanation of the immediacy of the connection between beauty and spirit. It is better to think of artistic and natural beauty as a reflection of God's own beauty and thus think of the experience of beauty as an apprehension of the work of the Holy Spirit as He brings creation to perfection. His conclusion is that if his account is correct, 'then the wonder and admiration which artistic inspiration evokes may be seen as part of our wonder at the manifoldness of creation and at the continued activity of the Holy Spirit in the world' (p. 132).

In developing and defending this thesis Sherry reviews a wide range of topics—traditional problems of aesthetics, allusions to God's beauty in the writings of the Fathers and other major figures in the history of Christian theology, and Trinitarian theology especially as it relates to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He also expends considerable effort in arguing that there is nothing fundamentally strange or puzzling in talk of God's beauty, or in the idea of comparing God's beauty with that of creation. He concludes the book by arguing that his thesis lends some support to the suggestion that 'art is the most suggestive medium for conveying eschatological ideas [and] avoiding the banality of putative descriptions of the afterlife' (p. 171).

I imagine that those who are interested in aesthetics but not in theology will find very little in this book that is informative or interesting, and may regard many of Sherry's arguments and analyses as explanations largely *obscurum per obscurius*. As one interested in both theology and aesthetics, however, my complaint is rather different, namely that there is insufficient analytical precision and argumentative rigour to make this book a wholly satisfactory contribution to a fascinating but extremely perplexing subject. For the most part Sherry's idea of 'argument' is too weak.

Consider two examples. First, he replies to the complaint that talk of God's beauty is odd by recounting a great many instances in which historically important theologians speak in this way. But of course those who think the oddness is more than unfamiliarity will find the passages he quotes no less odd than the original assertion. Second, in reply to the objection that we cannot apply the idea of 'beautiful' both to things seen and God, who is unseen, he recalls that we speak easily enough of beauty with respect to abstract entities no less than physical objects, for instance mathematical proofs and scientific theories. But this fact of common lin-

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guistic usage does not ensure consistency of meaning, any more than the fact that we can describe some colours as loud gives us reason to think that they have audible properties. Similarly, the fact that we can meaningfully speak of 'the beauty of holiness' does not imply anything about the possibility of comparing holiness with hillsides.

If by calling his book an introduction Sherry means to inform and enlighten those who previously knew nothing of the subject, he has failed. If by 'introduction' he means that he has attempted to make a start in theological aesthetics, then, despite any impression created by his very considerable erudition and fluency, this is all he has done. But perhaps he would not claim to have done more.

GORDON GRAHAM

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The Good Society and the Inner World: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Culture. By MICHAEL RUSTIN. Verso. 1991. pp. 270. £11.95; clothbound, £34.95.

SINCE THIS book is concerned, in the words of its subtitle, with psychoanalysis, politics and culture, only a segment of its rich tapestry is of direct relevance to readers of this journal: a part, that is, of the part concerned with culture. Structurally, the book is composed from nine extant essays, together with an introduction. This heritage is apparent: for example, the discussion of post-Kleinian psychoanalysis in Chapter 6 includes a long (and charming) footnote which informs the reader that the 'post' of post-Kleinian 'differs from "post-modern" or "Post-Marxist" in not intending to imply . . . that a revolutionary intellectual break has taken place' (p. 145). However, in following essays, Rustin then drops the term 'post-Kleinian', in favour of 'late Kleinian'. To have done so initially would have removed any possibility of confusion on that point.

The book as a whole has two major targets. Positively, it attempts to present a late-Kleinian account of culture. Applied to the arts, this involves a rejection of the 'Freudian Symbol' approach to the arts, which concentrated on a 'particular set of unconscious objects of symbolism' (p. 3). [An extreme example here: the Dali-driven dream sequence in Hitchcock's 'Spellbound' (1945).] Second, and negatively, the book is a polemic against kinds of Lacanianism: or, as Rustin puts it, 'routing all messages via Paris' (p. 179). Thus the emphasis is *away* from some currently widely employed and broadly *psychoanalytic* accounts of cultural phenomena.

In fact, as Rustin notes, the application of Kleinian ideas to art is familiar from the writings of Adrian Stokes and Peter Fuller, as well as Richard Wollheim. The development of *late* Kleinian ideas, largely owing to Bion and his followers (p. 206), contributes to the understanding of the arts through 'its attention to how symbolic forms contain and find order and harmony in sensations and experiences' (p. 3). For 'the essential core of aesthetic experience lies in the "containing" or "binding" of sense experiences or of mental images or desires, into some "containing" or symbolic framework' (p. 207). This idea is explored, in 'Psychoanalysis and Aesthetic Experience' (Chapter 8), through a discussion of psychoanalytic writing on *Hamlet* from Ernest Jones to Harris Williams, and through the introduction of ideas from Kant's *Critique of Judgement*: in particular, the claims of the 'subjective universality' (p. 221: quoting Kant) explained via a shared human nature.

Any evaluation of such ideas depends on the degree to which a broadly psychoanalytic conception of persons can be assumed, and to the extent to which a 'common human nature' (p. 221) is thought plausible. But such an evaluation must also judge what, if anything, is genuinely *psychoanalytic* about the art-criticism which flows from the whole approach. As Peter Lamarque noted of psychoanalytic accounts of literary criticism, any discussion must do more than simply present a theory of the creation and reception of the literary work; it must go beyond 'apparently impressive analogies' between literature and psychoanalysis based on both being interpretative; and it should involve more than just the attraction of psychoanalytic readings of the literary works. To fail to meet such constraints would be to cease discussing the *art work* at all. With its emphasis on the *genesis* of art works and cultural artefacts, it is unclear how psychoanalyt-

ically inclined theory can meet these constraints.

Here Rustin's strategy is at once helpful and mystifying. Chapter 9 is a sustained discussion of *Romeo and Juliet* (with very extensive quotation from the text). Its claim is that 'the concept of thinking, as a human capacity which depends on a certain kind of benign social environment, and on relationships of parental affection, is illuminating in understanding' (p. 252) that play. Further, this is taken to be a late Kleinian reading, since that conception of thinking is identified in the works of Klein and Bion. My difficulty lies in seeing that one needs the orientation of a *general* late-Kleinianism for this concept to be revealing. This perceptive criticism of *Romeo and Juliet* might employ one concept of psychoanalysis, but is that what inflects the whole criticism? In short, could someone ignorant of late-Kleinianism have written this piece? It seems to me clear that such a critic could have done so (once the explicit references to Klein are removed—and they might anyway originate from the dictionary of Kleinian thought mentioned by Rustin (p. 5)).

In summary, then, this text explores one kind of answer to questions about the complex relationship between art and the human mind, and does so sympathetically and in detail. It shows, for example, how a psychoanalytic approach can go beyond mere 'psychoanalysis of character' (p. 252); and also how it need not be reduced to the list of symbols or to Lacanianism. It is not, though, a book for doubters. Those unconvinced as to the *general* plausibility of psychoanalytic understanding of persons will certainly find nothing here to convince them. But broadly sympathetic critics may have their understanding deepened by a provocative and interesting book.

GRAHAM MCFEE

University of Brighton

The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses. Edited by DAVID HOWES. University of Toronto Press. 1991. pp. 336. £13.95; clothbound, £31.95.

THE PRIVILEGING of the visual sense is a feature of contemporary Western societies upon which many modern and post-modern critics have commented. Ours is a civilization of the image, with proliferating visual technologies (TV, film, video) which paradoxically both implicate us in and distance us from the world beyond the screen. Our language too is permeated with visual metaphors which equate understanding with seeing. Historians of science, philosophers, literary critics and feminists have remarked on the epistemological and political consequences of this mode of perception which separates the knower from the known, subject from object, mind from body, while anthropologists have emphasized the theoretical distortions that a methodological visualism, based on an 'impartial observer', introduces into the study of social action. But if the critique of the Western hegemony of the visual is by now well established, until recently there has been little exploration of alternative ways of sensing the world. This volume pursues the question of how other people perceive, and think they perceive, the world, and investigates the relations between sense ('reason') and the senses.

The collection opens by attempting to denaturalize the senses, starting with some early articles written in the 1960s. Walter Ong posits a historically shifting sensorium—the shift from the ancient Greeks' tactile, 'participatory' geometry to moderns' visual, spectated geometry being one example—signalling an awareness of plurality oddly abandoned in his later, better-known work on the oral/literate duality. Mallory Wober analyses cross-cultural work on both visual and proprioceptive skills which suggests that particular societies socialize their members to develop particular senses, presaging Howard Gardner's more recent theory of 'multiple intelligences'. George Devereux focuses on indigenous theories of cognition, contrasting cultures who define intelligence as ability to speak with those who define it as 'having a good ear', and tentatively hypothesizing on the opposing cultural values—self-expression versus selflessness—underlying these. More recently composed, Constance Classen's fascinating analysis of scientific accounts of three 'wild children' in Europe and India highlights just how much individuals must be 'educated' into their culture's dominant sensorium, and that even seemingly 'physiological' responses to cold or

heat are to some degree learned. Ending the first section, Anthony Synnott examines how philosophers from Plato to Marx placed the senses in a moral hierarchy, and whether they trusted them as a means to knowledge or considered them a legitimate end in themselves.

In section two, four essays by anthropologists document the rich elaboration of senses in some non-Western traditions. Steve Feld shows how the rich cosmological and social meanings carried in the sounds of night-time drumming performances in New Guinea move listeners to tears, while Joel Kuipers explores the complex cultural organization of taste in Indonesia. E. Valentine Daniel's consideration of the tactile 'reading' of the pulse as key diagnostic procedure in Siddha medicine in South India and its contrast with those used in biomedicine leads him to review the Peircean doctrine of the sign. David Howes speculates on the role of olfaction in moments of transition, such as rites of passage. Kenneth Little turns the mirror back to the West by outlining the visual politics of Kenyan safaris which present a carefully constructed romantic African wilderness to rich American and Japanese tourists.

The final section represents work-in-progress, based on both fieldwork and library research, in Nigeria's Hausaland (Ian Ritchie), Zaire (Lisa Andermann), Morocco (Kit Griffin), India (Sylvain Pinard), Mexico (Lisa Andermann) and South America (Constance Classen). This is preceded by an excellent introductory chapter by David Howes. He argues for an anthropology of the senses which approaches other cultures through their own 'sense ratios' rather than as defective versions of a Western model, and proposes methods for achieving this.

In the midst of this dizzying mass of ethnographic detail, the authors are concerned to stress that little can be taken for granted about the senses—not even that there are five. Different hierarchies of the senses emerge, privileging hearing or touch over vision, though here what is practically dominant is not always culturally dominant. Moral dimensions of certain senses become evident—indeed, sight is in many societies labelled the anti-social sense, through its association with envy and 'the evil eye' while touch may be a primary way of establishing friendly social intercourse. Moreover, senses are inter-related in surprising ways; witness the Peruvian Shipibo-Conibo Indians' geometric designs, used in healing, which float through the air and turn into a song when reaching the shaman's lips, then revert to designs when contacting the patient's body which they penetrate and heal. These design-songs also have a fragrance, wherein their power resides.

David Howes' three summarizing articles render coherent an otherwise unwieldly collection of papers, representing not only anthropological work but also investigations in cognitive psychology, ethnopsychiatry, art and religion. The wider implications, intraculturally and cross-culturally, of these exploratory and largely descriptive papers remain to be explored. Yet the revelations of alternative sensings of the world make for a heady brew, a pungent tickler of our own lazy Western noses, tongues, skin, ears and—not least—imagination, and offer a taste of the intellectual surprises awaiting should we once again return to our senses.

JANE K. COWAN

University of Sussex

The Cycladic Spirit: Masterpieces from the Nicholas P. Goulandris Collection. By COLIN RENFREW. Introduction by CHRISTOS DOUMAS. Photographs by JOHN BIGELOW TAYLOR. Thames and Hudson. 1991. pp. 207. £32.00.

THE ART of the Cycladic islands in the central Aegean began to excite curiosity around the middle of the nineteenth century, when travellers first reported the presence there of ancient figurines and vases, finely made from local marble. From the 1870s onward, archaeological exploration brought to light, mostly from burial grounds, many examples of marble, pottery and other artefacts dating, as we now know, from the Early Bronze Age or third millennium BC. This Cycladic art, once regarded by many with disdain as 'barbaric', 'crude' and 'uncouth', has come during the twentieth century to be greatly admired and sought after, as the deplorable growth of illegal excavation and even forgery testifies. One of the aims of *The Cycladic Spirit* is to consider this change in

appreciation and explain why it has come about.

An introductory chapter by Doumas outlines the stages in the rediscovery of Cycladic civilization. He observes its continuity from the Late Neolithic culture of the area—something stressed also by Renfrew in his survey of the geographical and chronological background. Both representational and abstract approaches to creative art were already evident in Neolithic times: the 'Fat Lady of Saliagos' (*c.* 5000 BC; plate 7) is a direct forerunner of the slim female figures of the Cycladic Bronze Age.

Renfrew's descriptive chapters guide the reader through the different categories of artefact, showing the typical economy and simplicity which characterize Cycladic art. He discusses the 'canonical' or folded-arm figures and their purpose, which was not primarily for funerary use, in his view. The problems of interpreting these figures are compared with those arising in connection with the Archaic *korai* set up on the Athenian Acropolis some two thousand years later; the use of paint, now almost wholly lost, for adding detail to both types of figure, is another intriguing aspect of this comparison. There is a well-balanced consideration (pp. 108–116) of the difficulties in attributing works to particular Cycladic sculptors, as has been attempted most notably by Pat Getz-Preziosi.

Did these artists follow some fixed canon of proportion? Renfrew accepts that the peculiar force of Cycladic sculpture may be explained as due to an adoption of, and variations from, such a canon, and he draws interesting parallels with the Greek standing male figures (*kouroi*) of the Archaic period, and with the conventions of Byzantine artists seen, for example, in icons of the Virgin and Child (pp. 132, 136). But he doubts whether any measured basis existed which might account for the apparent conformity of the Cycladic figures to a standard type, preferring the possibility that some kind of modular system may underlie the proportions, especially in the larger figures. There are perceptive discussions of Cycladic heads and other anatomical parts, showing the variety of types that are found, as well as the features shared in common.

Most Cycladic sculpture is small-scale, but occasional pieces, including a remarkable female figure in the Goulandris Museum (plate 103), come near to life-size. The boldness of such work is amazing, in a period when life-size sculpture existed in very few parts of the world. 'This figure is a *tour de force*, one of the great early sculptural achievements of humankind' (p. 159), and there follows an illuminating comparison with the Kore 593, of the mid sixth century BC, belonging early in the series from the Athenian Acropolis. Renfrew observes that 'the archaic Greek series is concerned with volumes, the Cycladic series also with planes'; but both these figures outstandingly exemplify the qualities of 'balance, harmony, and restraint' (pp. 160–1).

An unforgettable group of smaller sculpture represents figures in action—the drinker seated on a stool and holding out a cup, the harpist (a 'type' of which several examples survive), and the player of double pipes. These and various figures of animals and birds display the range of the Cycladic sculptors' achievement, still with the same balance and restraint, for all the vitality with which they have endowed the marble.

The last chapters deal with broader issues. With regard to the modern reversal in appreciation already mentioned, Renfrew concludes that there are no universals in aesthetics; the nineteenth-century aversion to Cycladic works stemmed from the assumption that the 'right way' of representing the human body was naturalistic, as developed, especially by sculptors, in Classical Greece, and imposed on our minds by the 'tyranny of the Renaissance'. The advent of the modern movement, breaking with these traditional conventions, and the increasing regard for African and other art produced without their influence, have changed our idea of what constitutes 'a work of art'. That term itself, Renfrew argues, is defined by the observer; it does not stem from some special quality inherent in the work. By simplifying complex forms while retaining the essence of their subject, Cycladic sculptors succeeded, if unintentionally, in achieving what many artists of the twentieth century have sought to achieve.

This is a beautiful book, carefully planned and clearly written. Renfrew has the gift of

expounding even complex and technical matters with readability, and of communicating his own enthusiasm for the subject. He is aided by excellent illustrations, admirably integrated with the text. The numerous photographs, whether views of Cycladic life and landscape or pictures of the vases, figures and other objects, have been splendidly reproduced. The whole work is a fitting tribute to the generosity of the Goulandris family and especially to Nicholas Goulandris to whose memory it is dedicated.

G. PATRICK EDWARDS
University of Aberdeen

Patterns of Thought: The Hidden Meaning of the Great Pavement of Westminster Abbey. By RICHARD FOSTER. Jonathan Cape. 1991. pp. 184. Paperbound, £12.99.

ONCE I had begun to read this book, I found it very hard to put down and I made excuses to myself to read it when I should have been doing other things! It is as readable as a novel, having an enthralling strong narrative line and a nicely easy style which informs the reader without forcing the knowledge across in an authoritarian way.

This is the story of the most enigmatic of our great mediaeval art treasures; the story of the search into the hidden meaning of the geometrical mosaic pattern of the floor laid down in 1268 in the sanctuary of Westminster Abbey. Technically speaking, this floor design is a cosmati rather than a mosaic as the pieces of coloured porphyry are cut to several shapes and sizes to fit the pattern rather than being made up of tesserae of roughly the same size square. The pavement, which has been an object of great wonder and interest since its first viewing, was laid down just before the remains of Edward the Confessor were moved with great ceremony to a new shrine provided by Henry III who had adopted Edward as his patron saint.

In the intervening seven centuries it has undergone damage, repairs, and restoration by those who thought to improve upon it, but today there still remains enough of the original material to preserve its original splendour. The state of the pavement was reported to be in fairly good condition until the nineteenth century when visitors, paying to view the choir, walked on it too often and in too great a number. Not all the restoration work undertaken in the past was well informed and so some permanent damage is visible. Normally, however, the pavement is not seen by the tourists, only described to them by the guides. It is too precious and fragile to be left uncovered and so this account of it is all the more valuable. Its value is increased by the excellent colour and black and white photographs, the diagrams, drawings and reproduced documents. The amount of evidence reproduced enhances the textual account and skilfully maintains the interest.

The enigma starts with the Latin inscription marked out in brass letters, which indicates that the geometric pattern of the pavement if understood would reveal the 'eternal pattern of the universe'. As Foster writes: 'An inscription which foretells the duration of the world and claims that the abstract geometric design of a pavement can reveal the plan of the universe? To modern eyes, these notions are extraordinary. How could this elegant, but relatively straightforward, design possibly be seen to represent the complexities of the universe?'

Geometry is not nowadays viewed as quite as important a discipline as to the mediaevally educated mind. It was a link for philosophers between the tangible world of the senses and the divine world approached *only* through man's intellect. Patterns such as these formed the focus of the literate clergy's abstract contemplation. The circle had long been seen as a symbol of the eternal God, of course, and the square was seen as the created world—a circle was eternal divinity and a square was temporal matter. Hence a pattern of squares and circles as seen in the pavement was appropriate for that boundary (called '*primum mobile*') between the created universe and the divine realm beyond it. To the thirteenth-century Christian thinker, the order of the universe was a manifestation of eternal truths, communicated to man by God through the medium of mathematics and geometry.

In addition to this, the four elements of Fire, Air, Water and Earth played an important part both in their opposing positions and in their harmonious ones. Certain numerical values

were also given to the elements and this was widely used to decorate churches from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century.

So, gradually Foster comes to the meanings behind the pavement working his way through the symbols, the elements and the numerical significances. For example, the octagonals equal Sunday seen as the first and eighth days and a symbol of regeneration and resurrection of the sun; the seven-sided polygons equal the moon because of the seven phases of the moon. The outer band around the central roundel consists of sixty-one lozenges. Sixty has since ancient times been the number of time, so by adding one more it symbolizes 'beyond time' i.e., eternity. And so on.

The details of Foster's analysis and the painstaking use of evidence, historical documentation, descriptive phrases, illustrations and technicalities combine to make this a truly fascinating read. The text is annotated; there is an extensive bibliography and index and the illustrations are numbered and referred to by number in the text. I cannot recommend this book too highly and I shall certainly reread sections of it before long. Foster's concluding paragraphs continue the analytical process in the reader's mind: 'But as our minds become progressively turned to ecological and to global concerns, so the Platonic image of the world as a living creature is re-awakened from its sleep.

The metaphor of reality in which we live is gained by dredging the chaos of perceptual input with a mental net, humanity's universal patterns of thought. Could it be that through cosmological speculation we discover neither the secrets of the universe nor the nature of some supernatural Being, but of ourselves? The further we go, the closer we come to home.'

CECILIA J. HYNES-HIGMAN

Bath High School

German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity. By JILL LLOYD. Yale U.P. 1991. pp. 267. £40.00.

AVOIDING THE lurid clichés of so much recent English writing on German art, Jill Lloyd's densely packed text suggests just how rich a vein is still waiting to be mined by the historian who casts a comparatively cold eye. Her themes range from neo-mediaevalism to early nude bathing, from colonial politics, and those tribal zoos (the exotic huts and dancing savages that were so much a feature of International Expositions at the turn of the century) to the precise contents of the ethnographic collections of Berlin and Dresden. But underpinning her whole enterprise is the paradox embodied in the title: that in Germany, precisely at the moment when industrial technology takes command, the most 'modern' painters opt to assert the primal, the infantile, the dissociated. In Lloyd's own formulation (taking on the dilemma of Emil Nolde): 'As "civilisation" advances, "culture" regresses; and where these contradictory historical movements meet, they short-circuit, creating . . . a timeless, "primitive" zone'.

Lloyd hacks new tunnels into this zone of darkness, only to bring us out each time into the heart of the modern metropolis. She uncovers marvellous new material on Kirchner's Berlin street drawings (though too few are reproduced) and she brings her theme close to the artist's physical activity when she identifies the implications of Kirchner's headlong line: the attempt, 'to override the rational structures and restrictions which are felt to have divided subjective and objective experiences in the modern world. The intense rapidity of execution might also be interpreted as a kind of fight against time, an unconscious attempt to eliminate history in their own working processes, and thus to catch modernity on the wing.'

Lloyd makes interesting connections between Kirchner and the novelist Alfred Döblin; and her account of Nolde's voyage to the south seas is similarly crammed with fascinating detail entirely new to me. When his racial philosophy is, quite rightly, inquisitioned, Nolde emerges as muddled (at one and the same time, both German Imperialist and anti-colonialist) but not unsympathetic. All the same, one ends by understanding Kirchner's typically spiteful characterization of Nolde, in a 1925 diary entry, as 'often sickly, and *too primitive*'.

Nolde and Kirchner are both artists underexplored in English, yet the south seas episode provides one of the few sustained narratives in

a book which fills many gaps, but whose sum seems less than its parts. As a picture book it is frankly disappointing; much that is described enticingly in the text goes unreproduced, while too much that *is* reproduced is overfamiliar. Yale, responsible for the most intelligent art publishing of recent years, does seem to have a problem with design—with making books visually compelling.

But more fundamentally, if 'regression' is indeed one key to modernity—could our era be tagged *the century of regression*?—then surely we need some more penetrating interpretation (psychological or otherwise) than Lloyd provides. Is the primitive genuinely a source of cultural renewal—or a dangerous chimera? Somehow, Lloyd never quite shows her hand. (And it may be significant that she makes no mention of Spengler's *Decline of the West*, and that even her treatment of Nietzsche seems to me rather sketchy.) Yet she is, more than most art historians, in touch with current developments in art, and such issues have obvious bearing on recent German painting. With more Lloyd, and less unreconstructed thesis, this important book could have reached out to much more than specialist appeal.

TIMOTHY HYMAN

Visions of Symmetry: Notebooks, Periodic Drawings and Related Work of M. C. Escher. By D. SCHATTSCHNEIDER. W. H. Freeman, New York. 1990. pp. 354. £32.95.

THIS BOOK, the product of more than fifteen years of research by its mathematician author, provides the definitive account of how Escher produced his renowned interlocking drawings, based on the regular division of the plane. According to Schattschneider, 'It is an extraordinary story of an artist who was captivated by the rhythm and interplay of repeating forms and who, frustrated with his naïve attempts to create his own interlocking designs, sought and found in mathematics the fundamental keys to unlock the secrets of such patterns'.

The book comprises five chapters and a Concordance. The opening chapter, 'The Route to Regular Division', describes Escher's early artistic development in the Netherlands and, later, in Italy. From his early life onwards, he seems to have been fascinated with the problem of covering the whole picture plane although this preoccupation did not come to dominate his art until 1937. Important contributing factors were his production of woodcuts, which could be used to form repeated patterns and his delight in the mosaics of the Alhambra and La Mezquita, coupled with his disappointment that their patterns were purely geometric and non-representational. He was also directed, by a half-brother who was a Professor of Geology, towards papers on symmetry in the *Zeitschrift für Kristallographie*. These helped launch Escher into his own part-mathematical, part-artistic investigations.

The next chapter 'The 1941–1942 Notebooks' presents, with commentary, the complete set of numbered drawings from these two notebooks which summarize Escher's theory of the regular divisions of the plane and contain the classification system he used to produce his drawings.

The third chapter 'The Regular Division Drawings' is the longest of the book. After a brief introduction, it reproduces 137 numbered drawings and 14 periodic designs from Escher's notebooks of 1938 to 1941 together with his notes on their symmetry type. Schattschneider provides further notes on these drawings in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4 'The Use of Regular Division' reports that Escher never regarded his periodic drawings as finished works of art, but rather as solutions to spatial puzzles which he had set himself. Escher's attitude to his prints had much in common with that of physicists, as is clear from his statement that 'The laws of the phenomena around us—order, regularity, cyclical repetitions, and renewal—have assumed a greater and greater importance for me. The awareness of their presence gives me tranquility and support. I try to testify in my prints that we live in a beautiful, orderly world, and not in a formless chaos, as it so often seems'. However, he goes on to say that 'My subjects are also often playful. I cannot keep from having fun with our unassailable certainties'. Such an attitude is far from that of a physicist.

After Chapter 5, mentioned previously, the book concludes with a Concordance of the types of symmetry used by Escher.

The book is clearly a definitive work. It contains more than 350 illustrations, half of which have never previously been published. It is itself an outstanding example of modern book production, being in every way a delight to look at and a credit to its publisher, known for many years for the clarity and excellence of the journal *Scientific American*.

ROGER GOODWIN

University of Sussex

The Symbolism of Style. Art as Therapy. By R. M. SIMON. Routledge. 1992. pp. 209. Paperbound, £14.99.

RITA SIMON is a fine painter and illustrator, who also writes poetry. A founder member of the art therapy profession, she has devoted the past forty years to developing her understanding of the complex interplay between content and style in her patients' work. This remarkable book is the record of her experience. She argues that while a picture can speak through both its content and its style, it is the style that reflects the patient's unconscious attitude to life. Mrs Simon has evolved a classification of four basic styles which recur in art therapy; she calls them Archaic Linear, Archaic Massive, Traditional Massive, Traditional Linear and sets them in a diagram around a clock-face which also shows the transitional areas between each style. Copiously illustrated with examples of the patients' pictures, the book discusses case histories in terms of the styles produced, their regression or progression from one to another and what this implies in each patient's struggle to integrate self and outer world. The key symbol in this struggle is the circle—the ego—in the square, and the four styles are four different ways of elaborating the symbol in terms of a dominant attitude to life. Mrs Simon acknowledges her debt to both Jung and Freud but is neither a Jungian nor a Freudian. The great attraction of this book is that it does not strive to impose a philosophy or ideology but allows its conclusions to grow from the recorded contact between art therapist and patient. Mrs Simon sees flexibility, the willingness in a patient to change styles, to venture into 'transitional' styles, as a sign of mental health. The whole book records her acceptance of life as a process of changing and adapting, and her concern that those damaged physically or psychologically shall participate in its healthfulness. Mrs Simon makes no extravagant claims for art therapy—'Creative art is not a cure-all: if it were, no artist would go mad' (p. 18). But she has confidence in her approach: 'The value of providing the simplest art materials such as paint and clay cannot be overestimated as a means of recording the need to undo, regress and destroy in safety' (p. 74). In her fascination with the creative process recorded in her book Mrs Simon expresses her belief that art is an essential activity and fulfils an essential function in living; her sympathy and imagination which are yet objective, cool and controlled are qualities of a good therapist, and also give this book its appeal. It should attract readers interested in painting, because it contains much that is applicable to art generally, as well as specifically to art therapy. The styles attained by Mrs Simon's patients struggling, in paint and clay, to achieve control of their lives can be recognized in work accepted as 'high art'. For example, 'expressionism', Mrs Simon suggests, is a version of Archaic Massive art with its dynamic use of bold planes of colour 'giving an effect of massive form pressing beyond the outlines' (p. 88); and from her experience of her patients' work, she offers a stimulating definition of 'expressionism': 'rooted in subjective experience, reaching beyond the limits of representation to the emotional reality felt by the painter for his subject' (p. 88), and makes illuminating passing reference to the version of the Archaic she detects in Rubens's work, and the Archaic values in the abstract art of Mark Rothko. Such insights do not emphasize the neuroses or psychological states of the artists, any more than her records of, and comments on, her patients linger upon their illnesses; rather the interest is in the differentiation of styles, how they are produced, what is expressed through them, and the reactions they provoke in artist and spectator. Brief references to painters such as Giovanni di Paolo (p. 114), Rembrandt (p. 128), Gainsborough (p. 131), the Cubists (p. 182) encourage the reader to return to their art with fresh perception of the way it works.

Currently it is fashionable to devalue artist

or author, so it is refreshing to read a book which explores art as the record of the struggle between the individual and experience.

As a therapist Mrs Simon values painting and modelling for their record of the individual's endeavour towards integration with the outer world without the need for the intervention of language; but as someone particularly responsive to language as communication—evident in her own style—she is interested in art in which the visual is complemented by the verbal. Much of her book is verbalization of the visual, and her discussion of art directs the reader not only to painters, but also to writers. She quotes Blake; and the last sentence of her book: 'Art as therapy is a mirror that the patient makes to find his own self reflected' could be commentary on Virginia Woolf's use of mirrors in *Between the Acts*.

'Therapy is an art, and as such transcends rational boundaries: its leaps and hesitances, perhaps most of all the quality of its silences all go to make up the facilitations that occur' (p. 82).

This is also a salutary definition of the process of education at a time when it appears threatened by categorization, schematization and bureaucracy. Mrs Bird, aged 92, suffering from senile dementia, yet summoned words about her landscape painting: 'it's . . . where we can go for our reasonable life' (p. 130)—a poem in itself. *The Symbolism of Style* celebrates this quiet, good place.

SHEILA SMITH

University of Nottingham

Aldo Rossi: The Complete Buildings and Projects 1981–1991. Edited by M. ADJMI. Thames and Hudson. 1992. pp. 300. Paperbound, £29.95.

THIS IS a splendid account of Aldo Rossi's work during the past ten years. In fact the period covered is somewhat greater than the book's title suggests. One of the most interesting of Rossi's projects is the Cemetery of San Cataldo in Modena, completed in 1971. This, along with his many other buildings and plans are lavishly illustrated. The book also includes a useful introduction by Diane Girardo, an accompanying text by Karen Stein and an essay by the architect himself.

Rossi's philosophies are not always easy to follow or to describe. Despite the valuable texts in the present book, readers really interested in Rossi's ideas would be well advised to turn to some of his earlier books, in particular his *Scientific Biography* (MIT Press, 1981) and *The Architecture of the City* (MIT Press, 1982). These, plus *The Complete Buildings*, make clear that he is engaged in what might be termed 'architectural Jungianism'. He strongly believes that one of the principal roles of built form is to act as a kind of collective unconscious, summoning up or evoking very basic, even primordial, ideas and emotions from past eras. Yet he sees the role of architecture or built form as still more proactive than this. He also believes that architecture has a positive role to play; recovering memories but also acting as a catalyst for new forms of urban development and collective social life.

This type of philosophy makes Rossi very difficult to classify. On the one hand he is very critical of modernism and its explicit attempt to link form to function. Form, Rossi believes, can be largely disconnected from content; its main significance again lying in the reproduction and rejuvenating of collective tradition. At the same time, Rossi's theory remains a long way from post-modern thinking. He has little time for pluralistic pastiche of the kind adopted by this kind of thinking. He nevertheless expresses a clear predeliction for certain kinds of form. In this book and in *The Architecture of the City* he makes it clear that the monuments best representing the kinds of 'permanences' in which he was interested are those represented by Greek art and architecture.

In *The Architecture of the City* he approvingly cites those few sections of Marx on aesthetics which puzzle over the apparently universal aesthetic attraction of classical forms. Rossi argues (following Marx) that in ancient Greek society there persisted a kind of aesthetic innocence or 'childhood' which meant that the memories established in classical Greece are those to which later forms of society have continually felt attracted. Nevertheless, as the present volume also shows, Rossi remains sensitive to the local as well as the global. While attempting to evoke collective memories with basic architectural forms, he frequently remains sensitive

to local cultures and traditions. His studio for a graphic designer in Tokyo, for example, reflects ancient Japanese traditions insisting that the placing of rooms and buildings must emphasize harmony between people, nature and the spirits. Again, the complexity of Rossi's thinking derives from the many levels at which he works; general (or apparently general) forms and recollections combining with a sensitivity to local physical and social contexts.

Other buildings and projects testify to some of these themes. Some of the work carried out in his native country of Italy seem to emphasize the general and the subconscious as distinct from the local and the specific. His cemeteries (at Rozzano as well as Modena) are particularly suggestive in this respect. Rossi, a deeply committed Catholic, believes that cemeteries are 'not necessarily sad or melancholy places' (p. 179). They are part of life, their function should not be obscured and the symbols (ossuaries, urns and so forth) which have long been associated with the celebration of the dead by the living should continue to be celebrated. The buildings themselves have an almost factory-like, matter-of-fact, quality; the intention being to provide an emotional and cathartic experience as the visitors contemplate their own mortality.

Other buildings are much more definitely associated with the living. His Centro Torri Shopping Centre in Parma, for example, deliberately evokes old civic monuments. And in the same way that ancient town halls and churches often had their names in large letters appended to their facades, this centre of late twentieth-century commercialism displays the words CENTRO TORRI on fifty-feet-high towers visible to all in the surrounding, flat, Po valley. In this instance, therefore, Rossi is again separating form from function. He is using the capitalist intentions of the agricultural producers who funded this project to create a new kind of city monument; one with, again, a social purpose and one alluding to older physical forms. A similar enterprise is Rossi's proposal for part of Canary Wharf, an office complex in part of London's docklands. Here again monumental austerity prevails, but this time with deliberate allusions to the industrial warehouses associated with the old, nineteenth-century, docks.

There can be doubt that Rossi is giving very considerable, if often provocative, thought to the role of architecture and urbanism in contemporary society. Indeed, the considered and profound nature of his thinking is frequently in advance of many others in his profession. Whether his ideas of permanences and buildings as the containers of collective memory is justified seems more questionable. Is it really possible to associate distinct built forms with particular, and enduring, forms of the human subconscious? Despite Rossi's celebration of classicism, is it really possible to talk of forms of aesthetic experience which transcend social formations and social change? Does literally everyone share the same kinds of perceptions to which Rossi is trying to allude?

These questions can be related to the particular project of Canary Wharf in London's East End. While I was reading about Rossi's plans for this area the British press was giving considerable publicity to the bankruptcy of the developers associated with this project. Canary Wharf, for some people, now symbolizes the rise and fall of Thatcherism. I am not at all sure that it will continue to represent the collective memories to which Rossi speaks and which he is trying to restore. Furthermore, it is not clear that those people (such as the working-class residents in London's East End) will necessarily share or appreciate Rossi's attempt to combine with the forces of capitalism in order to restore collective memories and the ideal of Greek classicism. But Rossi would no doubt argue against this line of attack, again appealing to the deep-lying associations and resonances which affect all people. We must be grateful to Rossi for at least forcing these issues on to the agenda even if, in the end, not all of us share the whole of his philosophy.

PETER DICKENS

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Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious: from the Magic Theatre to the Crucifixion of the Image. By GEORGE PATTISON. Macmillan. 1992. pp. 208. £35.00.

THIS BOOK, written by the Dean of Chapel at

King's, Cambridge, is an interpretation of a number of Kierkegaard's works from the standpoint of a Christian. Dr Pattison traces an important theme in Kierkegaard's thought, the nature and relation of two of the latter's three basic categories or 'stages on life's way', the aesthetic and the religious. By means of a blend of history of ideas and critical interpretation of the texts selected, Dr Pattison seeks to present his own analysis of this theme, and indicates further what he argues is its theological import. Almost all the book is taken up by close summary and exegesis of the works selected, from the best known (*Either/Or*; *Stages on Life's Way*) to what the author quite rightly calls the 'poor relations' (p. 186) in terms of critical attention, the later non-pseudonymous Christian tracts.

The first chapter sets out the much discussed background of ideas against which Kierkegaard reacted so vigorously: Hegelian idealism, the gloomier outlook of the generation after Hegel, and the high Romantic identification of aesthetic and religious experience. If imagination can penetrate to the eternal behind the temporal (so to speak), then these two classes of experience are effectively identified. The second and third sections set out Kierkegaard's reaction to this, outlining the position which emerges from the combination of his beliefs about the nature and limitations of 'the aesthetic' with his insistence on the value of authenticity in religious as in other areas of life. It is here that Dr Pattison includes his major discussion of 'indirect communication' and Kierkegaard's practice of pseudonymous authorship.

At certain points in this discussion, Dr Pattison's interpretation strikes me occasionally as rather more complex than the subject demands. He writes: 'In the pseudonymous works there is no "real" author to take responsibility for the fictional characters. Consequently the burden of responsibility is passed back to the reader' (p. 78), or, in other words, 'the communicator vanishes behind the communication and the recipient of the communication is left to judge himself as to the truth of the message' (p. 85). This is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. Firstly, Kierkegaard's authorship of the pseudonymous works was well known in Copenhagen, and so he can hardly be said to have escaped responsibility for their contents; secondly, the use of a pseudonym in no respect logically alters the responsibilities of either author or reader with regard to telling and assessing the truth; and thirdly, Kierkegaard's own explanation for the technique, quoted by Dr Pattison (p. 78), is more convincing. Kierkegaard regarded the lives of nearly all those around him as inauthentic, embodying a chronic failure to discover and develop the real self by means of authentic choice. The personae of the pseudonymous works are intended to show his contemporaries, unused to fully developed selves, what such selves might be. This does not entail that the creator of the personae can be said in any important sense to 'vanish' behind the work.

Dr Pattison continues that Kierkegaard's indirect approach 'was not simply a tactical ploy, determined by the cultural situation of the modern world or by his own combination of lay status and literary ability—it was rather an instantiation of an essential element in *all* Christian communication' (pp. 92–3; author's italics). What Dr Pattison asserts to be unique to Christian communication is this: 'it honours, affirms and in the process of communication itself assures and nurtures the freedom of the recipient of the message, or, more precisely, the mutual freedom of all the participants in the process. In this respect it is decisively Christian communication, communication in which the coincidence of ends and means is continuously sustained' (p. 93). No doubt Christian communication does presuppose the libertarian framework of belief adumbrated here, but to claim it as uniquely Christian is not acceptable. It is equally the framework of belief within which, for example, some Hindus or Buddhists or atheists conduct communication. The same is true of the assertion concerning 'coincidence of ends and means': the profound and adroit techniques of a roshi (zen master) in discussion with aspirants satisfy this description at least as well as Kierkegaard's works. Such communications also satisfy the other components of Dr Pattison's description.

In the second half of the book, the author examines three areas of Kierkegaard's work—works on the theatre, works on the novel or

cast as prose fiction, and finally the religious tracts—with his analysis of Kierkegaard's 'theory' of indirect communication in mind. There is little or nothing to quarrel with in Dr Pattison's careful and detailed exegesis, and it is a welcome change to find serious consideration given to some of the often unnoticed religious works, notably those intended for the Friday service of Communion. The views one might wish to contest are Kierkegaard's views, and his presuppositions are unquestioned by the author. For example, Dr Pattison sums up one version of Kierkegaard's views of the limitations of the aesthetic as follows: 'the "truth" which can be expressed in an image is only the kind of truth commensurable with a single moment of time. As an attempt to stabilise the voracious onrush of time, the image is thus, very precisely, the poet's tribute to the terror of time' (p. 160). If this is acceptable at all, it is so only as a summary of a certain type of Western poetics. Once again, the example of Zen is instructive. In Zen, the one is immanent equally in every instance of the many, and accordingly the most important of all truths can be embodied in the one image possible in the confines of a *haiku* poem. The skill of the Zen poet lies in somehow intimating this presence by skill in focusing the reader's attention. Since time is held not to be predicable of reality, the Zen poet has no 'terror' of it. As so often with key positions in aesthetics, they work only if the settlement of certain large issues in metaphysics is assumed.

Dr Pattison's aim in his book is to present a detailed 'reading' or interpretation of what Kierkegaard says concerning the aesthetic and the religious, and anyone who goes to it seeking such an interpretation will find little to quarrel with. The work does not, and does not set out to, evaluate Kierkegaard's assertions from a philosophical point of view.

R. WILKINSON

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Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art. By JULIAN YOUNG. Cambridge U.P. 1992. pp. 170. £27.95.

THIS IS a very welcome book. Since art, for Nietzsche, is the fundamental guide to life, and 'it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified', it is surprising that this is the first full-length English-language text to concentrate explicitly on Nietzsche's aesthetics. Young's approach is chronological, his central thesis being that, though Nietzsche's view of the relationship between art and life undergoes radical changes throughout his career, he returns at the end to the position espoused at the beginning, in *The Birth of Tragedy*; one that, despite his claims to the contrary, is deeply pessimistic.

From the outset, Young aims to demonstrate the strength of the Schopenhauerian influence on *The Birth of Tragedy*. Nietzsche, of course, is profoundly aware of the terror and horror of life, and for him the world's lack of teleology renders man's suffering absurd. He insists, however, that the nausea this realization threatens can be overcome through art. There are two ways of achieving this: an Apollonian and a Dionysian way. The Apollonian solution involves focusing upon the beauty that accompanies the terrible (the power and courage of heroes in a bloody battle, for instance), and viewing life as 'terrible but magnificent' (p. 43). To this view, characterized by 'profound superficiality' (p. 44), Nietzsche prefers a Dionysian solution. In Dionysian art (especially Greek tragedy), the hero is destroyed in an exulting way: the spectator identifies predominantly not with the hero, but the chorus, and from this perspective experiences the hero's annihilation with joy: a joy which is not *Schadenfreude*, but 'an exuberant affirmation of one's supra-individual identity' (p. 46).

Young's key claim is that Dionysianism is an essentially pessimistic view of life. Moreover, his main reason for this assertion is that *The Birth* has a 'fundamentally religious character' (p. 48), and that the later Nietzsche viewed religion as 'the product of those who, damaged and demeaned by life, are fundamentally hostile to it' (ibid.). Nietzsche, claims Young, deifies art: art is meant to fill the void left by the demise of Christianity. This process, we are told, is manifested by his account of the role the tragic theatre played in Greek life. Nietzsche claims that the theatre's function was to 'stimulate, purify, and discharge the whole life of the people' (*BT* 21). 'In so describing it', Young

remarks, 'he transforms Greek theater into, in all but name, a church, a church which possesses the centrality to social life possessed by the church of medieval Christendom, and which fulfills the same function of providing metaphysical consolation for the horrors of human life' (p. 49). Furthermore, the value of western culture can only be redeemed by the rebirth of Dionysian myth; a rebirth of tragedy and 'the recreation, too, of a religious culture' (p. 50). 'This', Young claims, 'is why art . . . is the highest task and truly metaphysical (Nietzsche could equally have said religious) activity of this life' (ibid.).

I'm not sure I buy this. We must be very careful about hanging so much on the description of *The Birth* as a 'religious' work. Young's doing so depends on an over-reliance on extended metaphors. There is no need to conclude from the fact that Nietzsche offers art as a *replacement* for religion that it thereby *becomes* a religion, any more than offering you coffee because I have run out of tea makes coffee become tea. It is merely that art is felt to satisfy some of the metaphysical needs previously satisfied by religion. Also, why does Young assume that Nietzsche's criticisms of Christianity would apply to the new 'religion'—art—which he is recommending? If art is offered as a replacement for Christianity, this is surely because Nietzsche views the former as superior to the latter.

There are, in fact, two problems here. Firstly, there is the objection that Nietzsche in fact claims that, as an 'aesthetic phenomenon', the world *is* 'eternally justified'. Young anticipates this objection, but deals inadequately with it. He describes how *The Birth* posits 'an entirely reckless and amoral artist-god' (*B*75): in Dionysian ecstasy, we identify with this god, and, finding the world, the 'artwork' 'we' have created, beautiful, we see it as 'justified'. The terror of life is merely a part of this aesthetically pleasurable whole, and is justified as part of that whole. As individuals, our highest dignity is as the artist-god's works of art. So *The Birth* is pessimistic, 'since the only being to whom the life lived by human beings is said to have any kind of value is a nonhuman, external spectator' (p. 53). 'Like Schopenhauer, therefore, Nietzsche offers flight from human individuality as his solution to its pain and absurdity. Like him, therefore, he denies (human) life' (p. 54).

But why is 'flight from human individuality' a denial of human life? For many people, life attains its meaning through viewing oneself as part of something greater than oneself: God's creation; a special relationship with one's significant other; identification with a religion, class or ideology. It is not clear that identification with the artist-god is more unreasonable than taking one of these standpoints.

Secondly, Young's general approach to Nietzsche is to recognize the existence of important and fundamental changes in his thought over time: a sensible approach, and one far preferable to the all-too-common tendency of commentators to back up their interpretation of Nietzsche with conveniently selected passages from anywhere within his *oeuvre*. But here, Young is not above conflating the 'later Nietzche' (p. 48) (who serves Young's purposes, remember, because he is so opposed to religion), with the author of *The Birth*: a Nietzsche who is not only prepared to contemplate the existence of an artist-god creator, but who also, Young himself claims, views Lutheranism 'as a rebirth of the Dionysian' (p. 49).

Young next traces the progress of Nietzsche's thoughts on art through a second and third stage. In the former, Nietzsche's new-found scientific optimism leads him to criticize art as perpetuating an undesirable, because metaphysical, interpretation of existence; though classical art later regains importance on account of its ability to help create the future by providing desirable role models. By the third stage, that of *The Gay Science*, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche has lost his faith in science. For this reason, art is now viewed once more with greater respect: his ideal stance towards the world is now to view oneself as an aesthetic phenomenon: to live one's life as a work of art. One is to create one's own, authentic self, with the coherence expected of a well-executed literary character.

But Young claims that pessimism underlies even this most ecstatic, 'yea-saying' period of Nietzsche's career. The ideal stance is available

only to the *Übermensch*, for only he has the strength to will eternal recurrence; for the rest of us, 'profound superficiality' will have to do.

Young has much of interest to say about these periods of Nietzsche's writings, but there is no space to discuss this here: what really matters, as regards Young's central thesis, is that Nietzsche moves away, in *Twilight of the Idols* and other works of 1888, from the ecstatic affirmation of *Zarathustra*, to what Young sees as the pessimism of *The Birth*. The *Übermensch* wills *his* life; Dionysian man in *Twilight* merely wills *life*. But, we are forced to repeat, need this necessarily be viewed as pessimistic? In maintaining this position, Young is resting his case on the same questionable premiss as rested his claim that *The Birth* is pessimistic: that the meaning of human life is always to be found in 'human individuality'.

Despite the reservations expressed above, I would highly recommend Young's book. It is written in a style of admirable clarity, and its careful, chronological approach offers considerable insight into how Nietzsche's thought changes through time, providing a welcome change from the 'you pays your money, you picks your quote' approach of too much Nietzsche scholarship. Moreover, Young is not afraid to *criticize* Nietzsche when he sees fit; another welcome change from the combination of mere interpretation and idolatry common amongst students of Nietzsche, and which Young mentions in his introduction. In conclusion, this is an illuminating, highly readable study which fills an important gap in the Nietzschean market, and deserves a place on the bookshelf of any serious student of the aesthetic philosopher *par excellence*.

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A Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory. By JEREMY HAWTHORN. Edward Arnold. 1992. pp. 282. £35.00.

I HAVE read this work of reference, albeit slowly, from cover to cover with both pleasure and profit. It has the two virtues necessary: thoroughness and impartiality. All the five main contemporary theoretical approaches to literature—structuralist, Marxist, psychoanalytical, feminist and deconstructionist—are dealt with fairly and adequately, and indeed from the beginning, as the introduction lists under these headings, and several others, the pertinent entries to consult in order to acquire a general picture of the approach. The individual entries are listed in alphabetical order, with a great deal of cross-referencing, so that to start at any particular point is likely to initiate a fruitful process of dissemination. For example, to start with that very Derridean word, we have further references to 'meaning', 'signifier', 'signified', 'ambiguity' and 'author'. 'Meaning' refers us in turn to 'reader', 'interpretation', 'work', 'mediation', 'aesthetic', 'code', 'metaphysics of presence', etc.

'Deconstruction', however, together, not surprisingly, with 'structuralism', are described on the whole less favourably than the other main approaches. The entry under 'deconstruction', for example, concludes: 'How can one talk about rigorously grappling with a text if there is said to be nothing fixed "in" the text?' (p. 49). And the entry for 'ludism' or 'play' notes that in deconstructionist and post-modernist uses of these words, 'the fact that games often have *rules*, and that playing among both animals and humans is often the way in which the player is prepared for life in the non-ludic world, is not generally accorded much importance' (p. 137).

The entry for 'structuralism' is finally critical of those who have sought too loosely or too ambitiously to apply the ideas of Saussure outside the field of linguistics. But the successes of structuralist narratology, in the work of Genette, for example, are acknowledged.

Although the book concentrates on the literary theory of the past thirty to forty years, earlier New Criticism is fairly and fully explained, with several accounts, under different headings, of 'The Intentional Fallacy' by Wimsatt and Beardsley.

Several entries are in effect brief essays. For example, the 'ideology' entry examines particularly the usages of Marx and Engels and of Althusser, with helpful clarifications from Terry Eagleton. There is even room for the odd, gratuitous moment of humour: when, on failing to find a publisher, *The German Ideology* 'was, as Marx put it, abandoned to "the gnaw-

ing criticism of the mice'" (p. 110). About halfway through the entry, Hawthorn asks, typically, what all this may have to do with the study of literature, and provides in this case two answers: the further question as to whether, and in what ways, literature is to be considered a part of the superstructure, and the historical agendas of literary critics, which may exclude certain questions as ideologically impossible at particular moments. He cites the interesting, albeit minor, example of Lionel Trilling, who wrote his book about E. M. Forster without knowing or suspecting that his subject was homosexual, because such a consideration was, Trilling later said, not an issue at the time.

The entry on 'montage' provides a summary of the pro- and anti-modernist debate between Brecht and Lukács, but fails to provide an explanation of what montage variously is. This raises for us, in assessing such a glossary, the important questions of level, use and audience. Can it be safely assumed that all potential readers will comfortably know the meanings of 'montage'? This is clearly a book which will be useful to students, especially those in the early stages of courses or post-graduate work on literary theory, and on the whole the entries are suitably helpful and encouraging, sometimes with a first part which provides a simple, basic, historical explanation, and a second one dealing with more difficult or marginal aspects, and including expressions of Hawthorn's own opinions. In addition, there is a lengthy bibliography and a list of other relevant works of reference.

The glossary is also available in a shorter, paperback version for students, presumably for personal ownership, but I have not consulted this. The present hardback version will be especially suitable for libraries, and I have already ordered the copy for ours.

Because of its range and erudition, and its interesting use of example and detail, the work could be usefully consulted by readers of all levels of experience. Abstruse terms of narratology are conveniently explained, although more examples would have helped: 'analepsis', 'deixis', 'paralipsis', 'syllepsis'. There are the unexpected entries of 'bodice-ripper' and 'wet-diaper' writing. Particularly interesting are the entries for words which may not be thought to need glossing: 'author', 'interpretation', 'text' and 'work'. It is thus a book which can be recommended for dipping into, idly or curiously, as well as for more specific and deliberate reference.

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Paradigms Regained: Pluralism and the Practice of Criticism. By JAMES L. BATTERSBY. University of Pennsylvania Press. 1991. pp. 306. £30.00.

IN THE preface James L. Battersby describes his book as 'a reclamation project, an effort to recover for daily use much of what has been discarded as outmoded or worthless by current critical theory . . . *and* to restore, if not to primacy at least to legitimacy, much in humanistic inquiry that has been rejected as oppressively and viciously reactionary . . . by many current theorists' (p. xi). It is good to see a critic committed to traditional values fighting back positively against current critical theory rather than merely condemning it because of its supposed nihilistic consequences.

The 'prevailing doctrine' that Battersby sets out to attack holds, he claims, 'that once meaning goes immanent, once, that is "things" and "thoughts"—and all that follows in their wake (facts, values, concepts, etc.)—go inside conceptual schemes, inside the language by which they are constituted what they are, then objectivity, determinate meaning, truth, justification, valid interpretation, and so on must be given up' (pp. xi–xii). Battersby opposes this not by rejecting its fundamental premisses—that is, by asserting that there is a 'transcendental signified' or foundation which is 'discourse-independent'—but by claiming that one can justify a form of relativism that does not lead to the kind of scepticism built into the theories associated with such critics as Derrida, Barbara Herrnstein Smith, or Stanley Fish. He calls this 'a relativism with muscles, with defeasibility criteria' (pp. xii–xiii). In the final chapter of the book he summarizes his position as follows: 'In all, then, we have abandoned foundationalism, essentialism, correspondence, naive realism, and objectivism, without slipping into eclecticism, into undiscriminating

or total relativism.' . . , into skepticism . . . or into monism . . . and we have given this up without losing facts, things, standards, justification conditions, right and wrong . . . What we are left with is a *relativism with foundations and standards* . . .' (p. 254). This is clearly an ambitious book and one that certainly deserves to be taken seriously, even if the form of relativism it supports is so restrictive that one wonders whether the term is not rendered devoid of meaning. The phrase 'relativism with foundations and standards' also uncomfortably calls to mind Ibsen's master builder's claim that he can build a 'genuine' castle in the air, 'one with a foundation under it'.

Though Battersby makes powerful use of Anglo-American analytic philosophy to support his overall position, I suspect that the book may have little influence on literary critics and theorists. The preface, the introduction, and the final chapter make exciting reading but the intervening chapters in which Battersby attempts to provide justification for his position are likely to be found heavy-going by the great majority of literature specialists as well as being beyond their competence to evaluate. The argument is unremittingly abstract and philosophical with little reference to literary examples. It is therefore much more likely to be to the taste of philosophers in the analytic tradition than to literary critics and theorists. A related problem is that Battersby is often attempting to formulate non-metaphysical arguments to support ideas and concepts that to a non-philosopher might seem obvious or mere 'common sense'. Now one can see the necessity for this given that post-structuralist literary theorists have seriously undermined 'common sense' critical ideas related to meaning, reference, intention and so on but this does not alter the fact that efforts to restore the credibility of such ideas are likely to be rather wearing, to non-philosophers at least.

Battersby could have made the book more palatable to literary critics and theorists if he had decided not only to construct a theoretical alternative to contemporary critical theory but also to go beyond that and attack directly the work of his opponents, both at the level of theory and practice. But he seldom confronts his opponents directly. The effectiveness of the latter strategy has been shown by M. H. Abrams in his attacks on post-structuralist criticism, particularly his essay 'Construing and Deconstructing', which focuses on a reading of a Wordsworth lyric by the deconstructionist J. Hillis Miller. (See Abrams's book *Doing things with Texts*.) Though Battersby's book is a much more powerful theoretical defence of traditional critical concepts and assumptions than Abrams's, I feel sure that literary critics will find Abrams much more appealing, despite Battersby's efforts to import word-play into his discourse in the manner of certain contemporary critics and his use of what he calls 'chestnut' cases to illustrate his theoretical points.

Yet despite its unappealing qualities, this is a book that literary theorists should not ignore. It is a genuine contribution to literary theoretical debate. For once a supporter of traditional critical concepts and values has been prepared to reject the defensive, anti-intellectual posture favoured by so many opponents of contemporary theory and attempted to theorize his position. For this he deserves our respect.

K. M. NEWTON

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Acts of Literature. By JACQUES DERRIDA. Edited by Derek Attridge. Routledge. 1992. pp. 456. £12.99; clothbound, £40.00.

ONE OF the major reasons why Jacques Derrida has had such a strong influence on literary criticism and theory is that he is primarily a commentator on texts rather than the kind of philosopher who discusses ideas and concepts in the abstract. Indeed much of his writing resembles literary criticism in that it involves close reading and focuses on the linguistic and rhetorical complexities of texts. He has also written on quite a number of literary texts but he has not discussed his view of literature at any length in previous books. This book attempts to remedy that omission by including a long interview with Derrida in which he discusses literature in detail and assembling virtually all of the essays he has written on literary texts, some of which appear in translation for the first time.

Of particular interest in the interview is Derrida's attitude to the concept of literature

itself. Literature as a category has been attacked by some literary theorists but Derrida views it in a much more positive light, while recognizing that it cannot be defined constitutively. Like Raymond Williams, he regards the concept of literature as a recent creation: 'The set of laws or conventions which fixed what we call literature in modernity was not indispensable for poetic works to circulate. Greek or Latin poetry, non-European discursive works, do not, it seems to me, strictly speaking belong to literature' (p. 40). But whereas Williams regards the emergence in the modern period of a narrow range of texts as 'literary' as an unfortunate development, Derrida celebrates this fact for these texts are those which he finds particularly interesting.

It becomes clear in the course of the interview that literature for Derrida is virtually identical with modernist texts by authors such as Mallarmé, Joyce, Kafka, all of whom he discusses in this volume, and though he also writes about earlier works, these are viewed from a perspective shaped by his reading of modernist writing. What literary texts as he conceives them have in common, he says, is 'that they are inscribed in a *critical* experience of literature. They bear within themselves, or we could also say in their literary act they put to work, a question, the same one, but each time singular and put to work otherwise: "What is literature?" or "Where does literature come from?" "What should we do with literature?"' (p. 41). He goes on to relate this to one of his own preoccupations: the contradictory relation in language between singularity: 'what does not return, what is not repeated' (p. 42) and iterability: the necessity for writing to be repeatable, 'to become exemplary and thus involve a certain generality' (p. 43).

A question raised by this and by Derrida's writing on literature in general is whether the interests that shape his reading of literary texts are too narrowly focused to be categorized as literary critical in any conventional sense? Does he not, for example, treat literary texts in too abstract a fashion, paying little attention to their dramatic and human aspect? This question is particularly provoked by the following remark he makes: 'I must confess that deep down I have probably never drawn great enjoyment from reading fiction, from reading novels, beyond the pleasure taken in analyzing the play of writing, or else certain naive movements of identification. I like a certain practice of fiction, the intrusion of an effective simulacrum or of disorder into philosophical writing, for example, but telling or inventing stories is something that deep down (or rather on the surface!) does not interest me particularly' (pp. 39–40). Virtually all literary texts are stories or narratives in one way or another; even *Finnegans Wake* has an underlying story. Can literature therefore be authentically discussed by someone uninterested in stories?

For readers of literary texts for whom the story aspect is of central importance the answer is likely to be no. For such readers—and they no doubt constitute the great majority of readers of literature—Derrida's criticism is likely to be of little interest. But if one accepts Derrida's concept of literature, readers who read for the story are not really concerned with literature, as he understands it. Stories can be repeated in other words without undermining their identity but literary texts cease to be such when paraphrased. What has happened in the modernist period is that certain authors have realized this and though their texts may not eradicate story completely, literary language itself assumes priority over story. It is arguable, therefore, that for such texts Derrida is an ideal critic since not only is there a radical break from story in his criticism but he has found a way of discussing texts which seem resistant to conventional forms of literary criticism.

Paradoxically there may be greater problems with Derrida's writings on philosophy than with his work on literature. It is often stated that Derrida shows that philosophy and literature cannot be rigidly separated but whereas his approach to literature, at least with regard to modernist texts, is, as I have suggested, defensible as a legitimate approach, his way of writing philosophy and interpreting philosophical texts has created greater difficulties. Perhaps the equivalent of 'story' in philosophical discourse—coherent argument, logic, clearly defined concepts—is so central to philosophy that many philosophers have difficulty in recognizing Derrida's philosophical writing as properly philosophical.

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THE LONG GOODBYE: THE IMAGINARY LANGUAGE OF FILM

Gregory Currie

WHEN FUTURE historians of ideas name our age the age of language, they will have two kinds of reasons for their choice. The reasons creditable to us have to do with the discoveries we have made concerning the structure of language, the mechanism of its acquisition, its role in thought and communication. The discreditable reasons have to do with our insistence that every humanistic discipline is founded upon some linguistic or quasi-linguistic structure.

So entrenched is this principle of the ubiquity of language that expressions such as 'the grammar of stories', 'the vocabulary of modernism' and 'the language of film' do not seem strange to us.[1] Sometimes, indeed, they are not seriously meant: talk of the vocabulary of a style often means just whatever devices are standardly employed within that style. But sometimes the usage suggests possession of a theory that can turn casual connoisseurship into a powerful technique of analysis. That suggestion is spurious. Art, architecture, film and the rest have little in common with any of the uncontroversial examples of language that have shaped linguistic theorizing. It is not likely, therefore, that language will help us explain how it is we use, interpret and appreciate any of these things. So I claim, and so I shall argue with respect to the case of film—a case with certain complexities that make it especially interesting in this regard.

This much is entirely negative. But we shall learn something important about film and the comprehension of film by comparing its communicative aspect with that of language.

I

The hypothesis that there is a language of film is not the true but uninteresting claim that the language of *Citizen Kane* is English and that of *Rashomon* is Japanese. It is the hypothesis that there is a specifically cinematic language that can and sometimes does apply when there are no accompanying words or sounds. It is the hypothesis that there is a language of cinematic images, their modifications and their juxtapositions.[2]

Enthusiasm for the hypothesis seems to be on the decline. Christian Metz, for example, has said that there is nothing in the cinema corresponding to

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'a language-system's characteristics and internal organization'.[3] But he has continued to apply the categories, or at least the terminology, of linguistic analysis; he says, for example, that photographs lack the 'syntactic components of discourse so numerous in cinema', and he describes optical effects as 'clauses of speech'.[4] And while the emphasis in film theory has moved away from the straightforwardly linguistic to the psychoanalytic, the impetus for this move seems not to have come from a rejection of the linguistic model, but from the thought that psychoanalytic models are themselves language-like. Thus one of the leading ideas of the theorist to whom so much credit in this area is given, Lacan, is that the unconscious is structured like a language. Perhaps talk of film language is the nostalgic rhetoric of a ritual that no longer commands belief. If that is so, let us acknowledge it, and say goodbye at last to an idea we should never have embraced.

There may be another hypothesis to consider: that cinema is to be analysed not as a language but as an example of the broader category of semiotic systems. It will seem natural, if the hypothesis that cinema is a language is to be rejected, that we should consider the weaker position of the semioticists (weaker, that is, because the hypothesis that cinema is a language entails but is not entailed by the hypothesis that it is a semiotic system). But I shall not confront the semiotic hypothesis in any detail. One reason is that the generality aimed for in semiotics—including, according to one author, everything from aesthetics texts to 'zoosemiotics'[5]—has resulted, rather predictably, in a great deal of taxonomizing but little that could be identified as theory. Nor has it ever been made clear what a 'code' is supposed to be, though codes are what semioticians are apparently most interested in finding.[6] But there is no need to tackle semiotics separately, for some of what I shall say in relation to the hypothesis that there is a language of cinema will count against semiotics as well. Semioticists seem to be committed to the *conventionality* of the sign systems they investigate.[7] And in the course of arguing against the idea of a language of film I shall be arguing that cinematic images are not conventional signs.

II

W. J. T. Mitchell described the idea of a language of images as 'an institutionalized violation of common sense', though he did not seem to think that this was an argument against it.[8] But there is more at stake here than common sense, which is anyway notoriously revisable in the light of successful theory. What do we hope to *gain* by supposing that there is a language of cinema? One thing the cinema-language theorists seem to have hoped for is an explanation of our comprehension of cinematic images and their combinations in terms of the capacities we exercise in interpreting language.[9] I claim that the most plausible account of our comprehension of those things uncontrover-

sially described as languages cannot help us explain our understanding of cinema, because the central concepts employed in explaining linguistic comprehension have no application to cinema. Arguing in this way, we may sidestep those potentially confusing and sterile questions of definition. If someone agrees with my conclusions and still wants to say that the cinema is a language, I shall not argue with his choice of words. All that matters will have been conceded: that there is insufficient similarity between this 'language' and any natural language for us to expect progress to be made in understanding the cinema by applying to it our hard won knowledge of how paradigmatic languages work.

III

Let us specify some salient features of natural language: salient, that is, from the point of view of explaining comprehension. Since one of the reasons the concept of cinema language has been able to thrive is that it is never discussed with any precision, I shall try to be as precise as I can be—and that may be more precise than the phenomenon before us strictly warrants—in describing what I take to be theoretically important aspects of that supposed language. This will have at least the virtue that those who want to defend the concept of cinema language will have to specify exactly where and how my description goes wrong, or where I go wrong in claiming that there is nothing in cinema that corresponds to the description. The account will be somewhat compressed, but the concepts appealed to should be familiar, and compression will facilitate an overview; it is the logical relations between these concepts that I want to emphasize.

Natural languages such as English display the features of *productivity* and *conventionality*. Productivity means that there is an unlimited number of sentences of English that can be uttered, and in fact many of the sentences we utter and comprehend have never been uttered before. It is evident, then, that whatever learning English involves, it does not involve learning meanings sentence by sentence; otherwise we would need instruction everytime we heard a new sentence.

English is conventional in that what words and sentences of English mean is determined, not by relations of naturalness or affinity between words and meanings, nor because the human mind is specially apt to associate certain words with certain meanings, but by adventitious uniformities of practice that are adhered to because they facilitate communication. The differences between the various natural languages are very largely accounted for as differences between these uniformities of practice. A convention, as David Lewis has argued, need not have its origin in agreement.[10] There is a convention to the effect that a word has a certain meaning when there is a certain regularity of use among members of the speech community; they use that word intending

thereby to mean something, and they do so because they know that others do the same, and desire to continue the regularity because by doing so they are able to achieve a co-ordination between what they mean by it and what hearers will take them to mean: a co-ordination necessary for successful communication. It does not much matter what word we use to express a given meaning; what matters is that most of us use it most of the time to express the same meaning. That way we have some idea about what meaning others use it to express, and they have some idea about our use. And that way we are able to co-ordinate our communicative activities.

Conventionality and productivity combine to set further requirements on the shape of language: conventionality requires that language has to be learned, productivity precludes it being learned sentence by sentence. If meanings in our language are to be learned, they must be specifiable *recursively*: starting with a set of conventions that assign meanings to a finite stock of words, we combine words into further meaningful units (e.g., sentences) by rules of composition, which tell us how the meaning of the whole depends on the meanings of the parts.[11] Thus our language is *molecular*: its sentences are built out of independently meaningful units—what I shall call *meaning-atoms*—by rules that assign meaning to complexes as a function of the meanings of the atomic parts, together with the rules of compositional structure. The words are our atoms; they are meaningful, and they contribute by their meaning to the meanings of larger units to which they belong, but they themselves have no meaningful parts.

Since the atoms—words in English—are assigned meanings individually,[12] and since the composition rules make the meaning of the whole a function of the meanings of the parts, we can say that meaning in our language is *acontextual*. The meaning of a given word is determined by its meaning-convention, not by the meanings of other words, and not by anything else; the meanings of sentences depend only on the meanings of the words in them.[13]

In sum, our language is productive and conventional, so its meaning-determining conventions are recursive, so it has meaning atoms, so it is molecular, so it is acontextual.[14] A great deal in the argument that follows will depend heavily on these entailments.

IV

So far we have been discussing the meanings of words and sentences in the common language: *semantic* meaning. Semantic meaning needs to be distinguished from *utterance* meaning: what it is reasonable to suppose the utterer meant by uttering that sentence in the context it was uttered in.[15] As the definition suggests, utterance meaning depends partly on context. An utterance of 'Harold is a snake', performed while witnessing some particularly discreditable action of Harold's and as part of a conversation about Harold's

character, might mean that Harold is given to scheming self-aggrandizement. But the sentence 'Harold is a snake' does not mean that.

The meaning of a particular utterance depends in part also on the meaning of the sentence uttered, which depends on convention: your utterance about Harold would probably have had a different meaning if you had said 'Harold is an aardvark'. But it is an error to think that utterance meaning is itself conventional. As our example makes plain, semantic conventions alone don't determine utterance meaning, and it cannot be supposed that the meaning of an utterance is determined by conventions of the form 'An utterance of sentence *S* in context *C* means *M*'. There is an unlimited number of values for *C*, and contexts are not constructed recursively from a finite set of context constituents. We figure out utterance meaning by applying the conventions of semantic meaning, together with *non-conventional* rules of rationality. We assume the speaker understands the language and the relevant features of the speech-context, and is able to act appropriately—to choose appropriate words—so as to get us to realize what it is he intends to get across. The best hypothesis about that intention gives us the utterance meaning. This assumption of rationality is not a convention, because it is not an assumption to which there is any alternative. We cannot choose to regard a speaker as rational and so interpret his utterance one way, or choose to regard him as irrational and interpret it another. If we do not assume him at least minimally rational we have no way of deciding between countlessly many interpretations.

It is important to recognize that utterance meaning can occur where the utterance in question does not involve a use of language; gestures, facial expressions and acts of all kinds can have an utterance meaning. I take this to be uncontroversial. It is controversial as to whether the category of utterance meaning is conceptually or historically prior to that of semantic meaning, but we do not need to make a judgement about that. We might hold that utterance meaning is not prior to semantic meaning, but that it is possible for there to be specific acts with utterance meaning that are not semantically based.

As we shall see, a failure to distinguish semantic and utterance meaning has confused both sides of the argument over cinema language.

V

Our question, then, is this: is meaning conveyed by cinematic images in anything like the way that (semantic) meaning is conveyed by words and sentences? I shall assume that we are dealing with cinematic images that are made photographically. Not all the things we call cinematic images are made that way; there are cartoons and the less familiar practice of marking directly onto the film strip. I will consider only photographic films because they present an interesting and distinctive class, and because it is photographic films

that are most often discussed in the context of film language. I shall also assume that we are dealing with cinematic images that function to present a fictional narrative, rather than, say, a documentary. In that case, we can sharpen our question a little further, for the kind of meaning we shall be concerned with here must be meaning that contributes in some way to our understanding of the fiction the film presents. It is clear, pre-theoretically, that cinematic images present meanings that do so contribute; let us call any meaning of that kind *story-meaning*. And now our question is this: Does any of the story-meaning that cinematic images convey possess the communicative features that we have attributed to the meanings of words and sentences?

One tempting but unsound strategy would be to argue that, with film, story meaning is conveyed in a way that is context sensitive, thus violating the acontextuality condition which, as we have seen, is a feature of semantic meaning. Thus George Wilson argues that the meaning we give a particular sequence of shots depends on how coherently that sequence, so interpreted, fits into the rest of the film. Whether, in *The Lady from Shanghai*, the juxtaposition of a hand pressing a button and a car crashing is to be taken as signifying a causal relation between the two depends on whether there is elsewhere in the film evidence for this peculiar causality. This suggests, says Wilson, 'the holistic character of all interpretive work'.[16]

Wilson is right to say that what the cinematic images tell us about the story depends on the surrounding context of other images. But that is true also of words and sentences in a text, where there is no dispute about the presence of a language. What kind of relation between described events is suggested by one bit of text depends upon the role that bit of text is seen to have in the context of all the other bits. If the text says 'her hand pressed the button just before the car crashed' it is then a matter of interpretation, that will have to take account of the rest of the text, as to whether it is part of the story that the pressing caused the crash. So the context-dependence of interpretation applies to literature as much as to film, and it cannot on its own be an argument against there being a language of the cinema.

Plainly, we are mixing up semantic and utterance meaning. Semantic meaning is determined by the conventions of the language, and these conventions provide, as we have seen, for the acontextuality of meaning. What those words suggest about the structure of the story told is just what that choice of words with those meanings suggests about the story the teller *intended* to tell; this kind of meaning does not depend on convention. It depends on context, together with assumptions about rationality.[17]

So perhaps the defenders of cinema language can meet Wilson's objection by drawing a parallel distinction for cinematic images. In that case the defender will say, of Wilson's example and the countless others like it: 'What we may infer about the story from these images and their juxtaposition is, of course, a contextually sensitive matter. But we should not conclude from this that

the meaning *intrinsic* to the images themselves is contextually determined—no more than we should conclude that the semantic meanings of words and sentences is contextually determined.' What we require of the defender is that he tell us what this intrinsic, acontextual meaning possessed by cinematic images is, and that he shows (i) that this meaning is story-meaning, and (ii) that this meaning has the explanatory features of semantic meaning.

I shall argue that there are two plausible candidates for such an intrinsic meaning of cinematic images, that the first one fails to satisfy condition (i), and that the second one, while it meets condition (i), fails to satisfy condition (ii).[18] So the case for a language of cinema is not made out. Of course, this argument depends for its force on my having correctly identified the plausible candidates, and my result could be overturned by the discovery of some other candidate that meets conditions (i) and (ii). But I have no idea what this other candidate would be.

VI

My first candidate is what the cinematic image records, which I shall call *photographic meaning*. What the image typically records is actors performing actions among props on a set. This sort of meaning is acontextual: it does not depend on relations between images, because it is locally determined by the conditions of the take. And by juxtaposing images one simply gets an accretion of meaning: if the meaning of image A is $M(A)$ and that of image B is $M(B)$, then image A followed by image B just means $M(A)$ & $M(B)$, where the order of juxtaposition is irrelevant to meaning; showing B after A does not mean, in the sense of meaning at issue here, that the events that A records occurred before the events that B records. The meaning, in this sense, of a complex of images is just the logical sum of the meanings of its constituent images.

But photographic meaning cannot be story-meaning. There are several reasons for this, and I shall mention just one of them.

If photographic meaning were story meaning, it would always be true that a viewer who did not grasp the photographic meaning of the image would lack knowledge relevant to understanding the story—just as one who does not know the meanings of the words and sentences on the page lacks knowledge relevant to understanding the story told in the novel. But photographic meaning is not like that. A shot may involve a trick of some kind; it may seem to show a man falling a distance that no man involved in the relevant profilmic events ever did fall. It may seem to show a fantastic creature, or a man walking on water. Or it may be a shot that seems to be a distant or blurred view of the main actor but is actually a photograph of a stand-in. In such cases the members of the audience will seldom have any idea about the photographic meaning of the shot in question. But if there is a doubt in the

minds of the audience about what is happening in the story, or a disagreement between them about what is happening, it is implausible to suppose that it will be resolved by teaching them more about the cinematographer's tricks of the trade. By learning those tricks they might learn something about cinema in general, but they would not be put in a better position to work out what is happening in the story.

While it may not be relevant to interpreting the story what events the cinematic image actually records, it is relevant what event the image *seems* to record. Because of the use of mattes and other devices, the image may not record a man falling off a building; but it may very well seem to record such an event, and anyone who viewed the image in standard conditions would be able to say that that was what it seemed to record. And its seeming to record this would be a relevant piece of evidence for someone watching the film and trying to work out what the story is—though it would be a too hasty conclusion to say, on the basis of watching the image, that it is part of the story that one of the characters really does fall off a building; it might turn out that the image presents something which, within the story, is a dream, a hallucination or a mere possibility (deciding which would require taking into account the rest of the film's images, together with sound and other features). So this kind of meaning—call it *appearance meaning*—is a kind of story-meaning. It is also acontextual, in the sense that one can generally say at least something about what an image appears to record without knowledge of the surrounding context of other images. There may be images to which this kind of meaning does not have application, and we shall say of them that any story-meaning they have is context dependent; I am thinking of examples such as the uniformly dark screen that begins and ends Ford's *The Searchers*; it is only in the context of other images that one could say that this dark image represents the dark interior of the homestead; out of context it does not seem to represent anything at all.[19] But the fact that there are exceptions to the general rule that images have appearance meanings does not show that appearance meaning is an irrelevant or unimportant feature of those images; there are occasional sequences of letters and words occurring in literature that have no (semantic) meanings, but that has no tendency to show that literal meaning is irrelevant or unimportant for literature.[20]

Appearance meaning is story meaning; but it is certainly not conventional meaning: it is not possible to identify any set of conventions that function to confer appearance meaning on cinematic images in anything like the way in which conventions confer (semantic) meaning on language. This is the fundamental disanalogy between language and all pictorial modes of representation. We saw from the case of language that where meaning is both productive and conventional it must also be recursive and so molecular. But the appearance meaning of a cinematic image is non-molecular. There are no atoms of meaning here; every temporal and spatial part of the image is mean-

ingful down to the limits of visual discriminability. To suppose otherwise would be to embrace an absurd epistemology of the image according to which we understand the meaning of a cinematic image by identifying certain elements of it from a list of meaning atoms, building up the meaning of the whole by rules of composition. The understanding of cinematic and generally pictorial images manifestly does not work like that. On the other hand, appearance meaning is productive: there is an unlimited number of situations that cinematic images can appear to record, and we generally have no trouble understanding the appearance meanings of cinematic images we have never seen before. So appearance meaning cannot be conventional.

It is conventionality that allows linguistic meaning to be productive. Where meaning is productive and non-conventional, as it is with the meaning of cinematic images, we have what Flint Schier called 'natural generativity': the characteristic of certain kinds of representations to enable us to go on from a few samples to understand and interpret novel representations of the same kind.[21] We cannot do that with the meanings of English words; we cannot explain 'red' and 'blue' to a novice and expect him then to form a reliable belief about what colour it is we call 'green' (unless he can make an informed guess on the basis of his knowledge of the conventions for some other, suitably related language). But with cinematic images, as with pictorial images of other kinds, we do catch on, once the confusions provoked by novelty have passed. Of course natural generativity is something that wants explaining; it is scarcely credible that a system of communication would be naturally generative without there being something *in virtue of which* it is naturally generative—though that something might be highly complex and disjunctive. I happen to believe that cinematic images are naturally generative in virtue of their similarity to real things. In that case it is *likeness* that plays the role for cinematic images that conventionality plays for language: both, in their different ways, make for productive systems of communication. But this is not something I am concerned to argue for here. I am arguing only for the non-conventionality of cinematic images.

VII

It is time to answer some objections.

To say, as I do, that the appearance meaning of an image is non-conventional is not to say that this kind of meaning *has nothing to do* with convention or with intention. For example, there are causal relations between intentions, conventions, and the appearance meanings of pictures. Intention plays its part in guiding the camera, and how things are placed before the camera is usually influenced by social institutions such as styles of dress, composition and decor, as well as by considerations of decorum. But this is not grounds for saying that the meaning of the image is *itself* conventional in the

sense that meaning in natural language is conventional. To be conventional in that sense there would have to be a set of conventions governing the meanings of all the image-atoms, and since there are no image-atoms there are no such conventions.

The distinction between meaning that is determined by convention (and that is therefore conventional) and meaning that is merely connected to convention is overlooked by those who appeal to a vague, impressionistic and all-purpose notion of convention to support their claims about the conventionality of images. Umberto Eco has argued for the conventionality of images generally on the grounds that our images tend to be, and perhaps inevitably are, affected by our social practices: a picture of a lion, once praised for its lifelikeness, owes much, we can now see, to the conventions of heraldic representation.[22] Again, this argument simply conflates two kinds of conventions: conventions that affect meaning and conventions that determine meaning. From the fact that the characteristics of a sign are affected by convention it does not follow that the sign is a conventional sign. A sign is conventional only if there is a convention which determines its meaning.

It can sound as if I am winning this argument by stipulation, insisting that images are not conventional in a quite idiosyncratic sense. Not so. You may give 'convention' any sense you please, but please use it only in one way, and make sure you have in your vocabulary other words, one for each distinguishable concept we need in this inquiry. One of those concepts is what I have called 'conventionality', and it is a concept that applies to words in English because their meanings are determined by a co-ordinated practice based on mutual expectation. That is the target concept, call it what you will, for anyone who wants to argue that the comprehension of cinematic images has much in common with the comprehension of language. I have been arguing that this target concept does not, and could not, apply to the relation between cinematic images and their meanings, and the whole argument could be restated without using the word 'convention' at all.

VIII

Someone might agree with all I have said so far, and claim that it is an elaborate irrelevance, that the analogy between cinema and language takes hold not at the level of individual images but at the level of their combination; that there are identifiable patterns of combination between images, and that these combinations have a meaning that is partly dependent on the manner of their combination, just as sentences are meaningful partly in virtue of their syntactic structure. But at this level the analogy between film and language is utterly superficial. First, as many theorists have noted, the representational content of an image cannot be equated with that of a name, predicate or other sub-sentential part of speech. If these images line up with anything in language

it is with sentences, since both represent states of affairs. So we cannot hope to find in the articulation of images anything like the internal syntactic structure of a sentence. The most we can hope for is to latch onto the linguistic model at the point where sentential connectives are introduced: the familiar truth functions, together with the intensional operators such as 'because', 'causes', 'in spite of', etc. Even if there were a genuine parallel discoverable at this point (I shall argue that there is not) it would hardly constitute a vindication of the idea that a theory of language comprehension will explain the comprehension of cinematic images; by the time we have introduced these operators into our account of language, we have done nearly all the hard work of explaining how language is comprehended in terms of conventions of word meaning and the recursive rules of grammar—things that we have seen have no counterpart for in film.

In fact, there is no significant parallel between the connectedness of images in film, and the sentential connectives of language. Consider a piece of standard shot-reverse-shot editing, in which the second shot is understood to represent the view as seen by the character shown in the first shot, and compare this with sentential connection displayed in the construction '*P* because *Q*'. In the latter case we can point to conventions of meaning and rules of grammar that determine for this construction a literal meaning: that *P* occurred because *Q* occurred. But with the shot-reverse-shot construction we cannot speak in the same way of conventions and literal meanings; there is no convention that says that a shot of a character face-on followed by a different shot means that the second shot is from the point of view of the character—there are too many cases where a shot of the first kind is followed by a shot that is not subjective. Rather, we infer the connection between the two shots from the context of surrounding shots, together with assumptions we have made about the course of the story so far, the likely location of the character, and the rationality of the film-maker: we assume that shots and their combinations are chosen by the maker so as to facilitate our comprehension of the story rather than that they succeed one another in an arbitrary fashion. We arrive at a judgement that this is a shot-reverse-shot combination not, as the model of our comprehension of semantic meaning would have it, by understanding a rule of cinematic grammar, but by applying the constitutive rules of rationality discussed earlier in connection with our comprehension of speaker's meaning.

Should we say, then, that there are no specifically cinematic conventions? My argument does not require that. Perhaps there are a few such conventions. Perhaps it is 'by convention', or something like it, that the slow fade out and fade in signifies a significant passage of time. Anyhow, it will do no harm to my thesis to admit that there are occasionally in cinema conventions of meaning at work. If there are, they do not amount to anything like the systematic, articulated, bottom-up set of conventions that govern a natural language. The most they manage to do is to enrich the meaning of an already non-

conventionally meaningful structure. The conventions of cinema are islands in a stream driven by the force of natural generativity; they may improve the view, but they have a marginal effect on the direction of flow.

IX

If my argument is right, the project of explaining our comprehension of cinema on the model of our comprehension of natural language cannot succeed. It does not even come close, employing as it does quite the wrong concepts. We must abandon the way of language, convention and code, and think about cinema narrative in terms of natural generativity and intentional, rationalistic explanation.[23]

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[1] On the myth of 'story grammar', see R. Wilensky 'Story Grammars Revisited', *Journal of Pragmatics*, 6 (1982), pp. 423–32.

[2] Sometimes advocates of cinema language seem to be asserting that there are many different such languages. The arguments I shall bring forward will be just as effective against that hypothesis as they are against the hypothesis that there is one such language. So I shall not bother to consider the multiple-languages hypothesis separately.

[3] 'On the Notion of Cinematographic Language', in *Movies and Methods*, ed. Bill Nichols (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976).

[4] '*Trucage* and the Film', in *The Language of Images* ed. W. J. T. Mitchell (Chicago U.P., 1980), p. 158 and p. 165. Metz's theorizing, with its movement from language proper, to *grand syntagmatique*, to a vast proliferation of codes, bears the marks of a degenerating research programme.

[5] Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1976), p. 13.

[6] Eco says that a code is 'a repertoire or system of sign-functions'—somewhat unhelpful as a definition ('On the Contribution of Film to Semiotics', in *Film Theory and Criticism* eds. M. Cohen and G. Mast, third edition, Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 196). And no characterization can be read off from the ragbag of examples on offer. Among cinematic codes there are, we are told, 'the complex system according to which the cinematic equipment (recording camera, film strip, projector) "reproduces movement"' (Christian Metz, *Language and Cinema* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974), p. 191), and 'the representational code of linear perspective' (Jean Louis Comolli, 'Machines of the Visible', in *The Cinematic Apparatus* eds. Stephen Heath and Teresa de Lauretis (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 135). There is no natural way to 'go on from there', unless it be just to say that everything is a code.

[7] 'Signs are correlated with what they stand for on the basis of a rule or convention', Umberto Eco, 'On the Contribution of Film to Semiotics', p. 196.

[8] Editorial introduction to *The Language of Images*, p. 3.

[9] 'The concepts of linguistics can be applied to the semiotics of the cinema only with the greatest caution. On the other hand, the

methods of linguistics . . . provide . . . a constant and precious aid in establishing units that, though they are still very approximate, are liable over time . . . to become progressively refined', Christian Metz, 'Some Points in the Semiotics of Cinema', in *Film Theory and Criticism*, third edition, p. 176.

[10] See David K. Lewis, *Convention* (Harvard U.P., 1968).

[11] It is not claimed that we learn our language entirely from the bottom up. No doubt we start with simple sentences, shake out the word meanings by decomposition, and zig-zag back and forth, continually expanding our competence in a way governed partly by trial and error. But if the meanings of linguistic units could not, in principle, be stated recursively, the language would not be learnable.

[12] Not every word is an atom, as when a single word has a meaning that is a function of the meanings of other words and operators, as with 'invalid'.

[13] Notice how this account of meaning in natural language contradicts the structuralist's claim that linguistic meaning is wholly a matter of a sign's relations to other signs. That is as it should be; a change in the meaning of one term does not induce a change in the meanings of all terms.

[14] This theory, sometimes called 'compositional semantics', still seems to me the only straw floating, despite the arguments of Stephen Schiffer, *Remnants of Meaning* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987). See the papers by Mark Johnston and Barbara Partee in the Symposium on Schiffer's book, *Mind and Language*, 3:1 (1988).

[15] Note that this might be a different thing from what the speaker *did* mean by uttering it, sometimes called 'speaker's meaning'.

[16] *Narration in Light* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P., 1986), p. 203.

[17] This is not Davidsonian charity, which would have us regard the speaker's utterances as (largely) true—clearly a pointless injunction in the case of a fictional utterance.

[18] The first candidate fails, incidentally, to satisfy condition (ii). But since it fails to satisfy condition (i), we need not argue for this further conclusion.

[19] This illustrates the difference between a dark and a blank screen, for in these shots the screen is not, so it turns out, blank.

[20] Appearance meaning certainly requires further analysis and explanation. Here, I will say only that the appearance meaning of an image is not to be thought of as typically giving rise to a judgement that things really are as the appearance meaning of the image suggests—a suggestion in line with the currently popular but false hypothesis that cinema is deceptive. Rather, we might say, the image gives rise to an experience with a *representational content* corresponding to that appearance meaning. See Christopher Peacocke, *Sense and Content* (Oxford U.P., 1983), Chapter 1.

[21] See his *Deeper into Pictures* (Cambridge U.P., 1986). See also Crispin Sartwell, 'Natural Generativity and Imitation', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 31 (1991), pp. 58–67, especially pp. 62–4. Schier, I think, wanted to *define* pictures (and icons generally, of which pictures are in his sense a subset) in terms of natural generativity. I have no such ambition. Richard Wollheim employs a very similar concept, which he calls 'transfer', as the basis for a telling criticism of semiotic theories of art in *Painting as an Art* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), p. 77.

[22] *A Theory of Semiotics*, p. 205. See also Ernst Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (fifth edition, Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1977), p.68.

[23] Something I attempt in *Imagination and the Image: A Philosophical Essay on Film and other Pictorial Arts*, forthcoming. An earlier version of this paper was read by Jerrold Levinson, who made important suggestions for revision. Thanks are also due to Paisley Livingston for discussion.

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AESTHETICS AND ENGAGEMENT

Allen Carlson

IN A substantial article in this journal entitled 'The Historicity of Aesthetics', Arnold Berleant launches a powerful attack on traditional aesthetics.[1] This attack is expanded and deepened in his recent book, *Art and Engagement.*[2] In this essay I address Berleant's arguments against the tradition, suggesting that each argument fails to establish its conclusion. I further argue that the fact that they fail is a good thing—good for our appreciation of art, good for aesthetics, and even good for Berleant's own position. By and large I consider the line of thought as developed in *Art and Engagement* as this is the most recent and complete presentation.

Berleant's overall position is essentially that engaged participation rather than disengaged contemplation constitutes the substance of art appreciation. However, the position has two aspects: a somewhat normative thesis concerning our appreciation of art and a more theoretical stance focusing on traditional aesthetics and alternatives to it. The normative thesis is developed primarily in *Art and Engagement*, the centre-piece of which is a series of excellent studies in which Berleant demonstrates how the appreciation of various art forms involves active participation. The thesis is convincingly applied both to arts, such as architecture and film, which more or less lend themselves to it and, more interestingly, to others, such as painting and perhaps classical music, with which it seems less at home. Moreover, it is brought to bear not simply on obvious modern cases, such as the 'happenings' of the sixties, but also on traditional works seemingly created purely for calm, serene, contemplation. For example, with landscape painting, a paradigm for the passive disengaged gaze, Berleant takes the viewer into the landscape, opening its space to constitute an environment in which the spectator is free to wander, to participate, to engage, to cease to be a *spectator* in the traditional sense. We thus appreciate a landscape such that, as Berleant puts it, 'we look not at the painting as an integral object but *into* the painting, into its space'.[3]

The more theoretical side of Berleant's position involves not simply demonstrating the role of engagement in art appreciation but attempting the ambitious task of constructing an 'aesthetics of engagement'. This part of the position which Berleant calls 'the new aesthetics' is meant not only to provide theoretical justification for the emphasis on participation, but also to replace certain traditional doctrines which, Berleant contends, have 'impeded and distorted' appreciation and 'misrepresented' aesthetic activity.[4] More pre-

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cisely, the aesthetics of engagement is meant to be 'an alternative to the Enlightenment's aesthetics of distance and disinterestedness, which is', Berleant thinks, 'a history more than a tradition in Western culture'.[5] The cornerstone of this new aesthetics of engagement is Berleant's explicit attack on traditional aesthetics in the form of what may be called the three dogmas of aesthetics.[6] The dogmas are, first, 'that art consists primarily of objects', second, 'that these objects possess a special status', and, third, 'that they must be regarded in a unique way'.[7] Berleant holds that each of these which he terms 'eighteenth-century principles' has been shown by the art of this century to be not only 'simply inadequate' but 'utterly irrelevant'.[8] He argues for the 'unsuitability' of each of the three dogmas and for its replacement by the 'new aesthetics of engagement' by reference to recent developments in the history of art.

Berleant's argument against the first dogma, that art consists primarily of objects, is essentially that 'during the past century, the art object has become less important in the aesthetic situation and at times has vanished altogether'.[9] He cites the movement in the visual arts which ends with 'conceptual art, Happenings, and performance art', saying that it 'started with the dissolution of the representational object' and 'concluded with the disappearance of the painting itself'.[10] He notes that the 'various forms of process art, like action painting, earth art, conceptual art, and performance art de-emphasize the final product and stress the activity of making and grasping art'.[11] However, such observations seemingly show only that during this century the visual arts have moved from a focus on physical objects, that is, on representing physical objects by creating other physical objects, to a focus on events, that is, on the processes, activities, and gestures that are also involved in art-making. But if this change in emphasis in the visual arts refutes the first dogma of aesthetics, then this dogma would have been refuted long ago by those art forms, such as drama, poetry, and music, in which physical objects never have been a major focus. It is clear, therefore, that a lack of objects in Berleant's sense does not refute the first dogma. Moreover, it does not, I suggest, because this dogma does not pertain to objects as such, but rather to the fact that art involves formal 'objects of appreciation', which formal objects can be processes, activities, gestures, and the like, that is, the various kinds of events which have traditionally constituted the focuses of appreciation in many art forms. Thus, Berleant's argument misses the theoretical substance of the first dogma.

Berleant's argument against the second dogma, that art objects possess a special status, fares no better. He points out that some 'artists in this century have been intrigued by the ordinariness of things, by the very features that make them undistinguished' and cites as examples, first, drama which involves the 'dull mundanities of common speech' and the 'seemingly pointless reiteration of banalities' such as *Waiting for Godot* and, second, the readymades and

found objects of Duchamp and others.[12] But what this line of argument fails to appreciate is that such works are, as it is said, the exceptions that prove the rule. It is precisely because works of art *do* in general have a special status that works such as *Waiting for Godot* and Duchamp's *Fountain* were not only initially created, but, more importantly, continue to be appreciated. Were it not for the special status of art, we would not continue to ponder Beckett's 'seemingly pointless reiteration of banalities' nor continue to be intrigued by Duchamp's irreverent gestures. If anything, what is demonstrated by these kinds of works is not that art is not special, but rather that many of the things that initially strike us as ordinary and undistinguished are, when seen anew, also special.[13] Therefore, the theoretical point of the second dogma is not undercut by the cases Berleant cites.

This reference to being 'seen anew' suggests the third and most significant of the three dogmas: the 'doctrine of disinterestedness', the claim that works of art must be regarded in a unique way or with a special attitude. The essence of Berleant's argument against this dogma is as follows: 'Much of the recent history of the arts . . . reads as an intentional denial of disinterestedness, for artists have shaped works in every medium in which the active participation of the appreciator in completing the artistic process is essential to the aesthetic effect'.[14] This line of argument is essentially *Art and Engagement* in miniature, for, as noted, its central purpose is to demonstrate that active participation is required in the appreciation of various art forms. However, although the recognition of the significant role of participation in art appreciation is both the main contribution of the volume and imperative for a proper understanding of such appreciation, it is none the less ineffective as an argument against the doctrine of disinterestedness. It is ineffective because there is no necessary conflict between appreciation involving active participation and its being disinterested. The failure to appreciate this point is the key weakness in the argument against the third dogma. Moreover, it also has significant ramifications for Berleant's attempt to construct a new aesthetics of engagement.

Consequently, this point, that there is no necessary conflict between appreciation involving active participation and its being disinterested, requires defence. First, it may be noted that the literature does not support such a conflict. For example, Jerome Stolnitz is one of the main architects of what might be called the modern synthesis in aesthetics and even though disinterestedness is the core of his aesthetic attitude theory, he finds no tension between it and participation. Indeed, he, as Berleant, dwells on the fact that appreciation must be active and involved. He describes it as 'alert and vigorous' and characterizes it with the following alliterative slogan: 'Appreciation . . . is awareness, alertness, animation'.[15] Moreover, Stolnitz is not an exceptional case; it is difficult to find a modern exponent of disinterestedness who does not also claim active involvement as a feature of aesthetic appreciation. Second, analogous cases also suggest that special attitudes of the disinterestedness sort

and active participation need not be in conflict. For example, intense religious experience is said to involve a special attitude or state of mind not unlike that of the aesthetic attitude. However, in the religious case the relevant attitude is not only not in conflict with but indeed supports and in some cases initiates and perhaps even requires active participation in a range of rituals, ceremonies, and celebrations. There is no tension between what is essentially a disengaged religious state of mind and involved participation in, for example, either an intense Catholic communion or a rousing Baptist prayer meeting. In fact, in such cases the presence of a special attitude is seemingly required to make any sense whatsoever of the nature and the level of the participation. Moreover, I think the same is true of art: without a special attitude, or without at least some of what is enshrined in the three dogmas, much of our participation, our active engagement with art would be unintelligible.

Thus, I conclude that Berleant's arguments against the three dogmas of modern aesthetics fail. And, as noted, I think that this is a good thing. Consider what would have followed had Berleant's arguments been successful: we would have no special objects, no special status, and, most important, no special attitude. Indeed, we would have nothing special at all and therefore nothing especially aesthetic. The point is that without at least one or the other of the three dogmas and especially without the third, we are seemingly without any means for distinguishing the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic or even for identifying and demarcating the realm of the aesthetic. Such a lack of what might be called theoretical aesthetic resources seems potentially problematic. Indeed, it would be very problematic for, first, our appreciation of art, second, Berleant's new aesthetics of engagement, and, third, aesthetics in general. Concerning our appreciation of art, without a means to demarcate the aesthetic, much of our involvement with art, and especially both our active engaged participation and our appreciation of works such as *Godot*, seemingly becomes quite unintelligible and perhaps even senseless—as unintelligible and senseless as engaging in baptism, communion, and worship without the resources for demarcating a religious experience, a religious state of mind, or some such thing. Second, concerning Berleant's aesthetics of engagement, without the resources traditionally provided by the three dogmas, Berleant seemingly has no grounds for holding that his new aesthetics has anything to do with anything being in any sense aesthetic. His position may be new and it may properly emphasize participation, but it is open to the charge that it has nothing to do with *aesthetic* appreciation. Third, concerning aesthetics in general, without the three dogmas of traditional aesthetics, we are seemingly without any analysis of the essential concept of the discipline we call aesthetics. In short, it is at least possible that without the three dogmas, we face the end of aesthetics.

Berleant, of course, is not unaware of the relationship between the three dogmas, especially the third, and the demarcation of the aesthetic. He begins

his discussion by noting that disinterestedness emerged 'as the mark of a new and distinctive mode of experience called "aesthetic", a kind of awareness distinct from more commonly recognized alternative modes, such as instrumental, cognitive, moral, and religious'.[16] Moreover, after mounting his 'argument from participation' against the third dogma, he concludes: 'Disinterestedness no longer identifies what is distinctive in the aesthetic situation'.[17] However, it is at precisely this point that Berleant does not seem to discern the seriousness of his situation, that is, he does not seem to fully realize what follows from abandoning the traditional means by which to demarcate the aesthetic. What follows can be brought out by recalling some other recent cases of qualms concerning certain aspects of the three dogmas, for example: Paul Ziff's dissatisfaction with the conventional account of the aesthetic in *Antiaesthetics*, Timothy Binkley's claim that art need not be aesthetic in 'Piece: Contra Aesthetics', and, of course, George Dickie's discovery of the 'vacuousness' of the aesthetic in 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude'.[18] In these cases it is clear that, given an attack on the 'mark' of the aesthetic or on the aesthetic itself, there are only two alternatives: either provide a new theoretical account of the nature of the aesthetic, as Ziff seemingly attempts to do, or simply abandon the aesthetic, as seemingly suggested by Dickie and, in a more limited way, by Binkley.[19] In short, without the dogmas which define the aesthetic, we must either supply new dogmas or else give up the aesthetic.

These allusions to some of the recent history of the discipline bring out more clearly the precarious position of Berleant's overall account. The trouble is that although Berleant abandons the traditional resources for demarcating the aesthetic, he does not clearly and straightforwardly embrace either of the two possible alternatives. He does not go either the way of Ziff or the way of Dickie. Rather he only gestures towards each of the two alternatives, while at the same time helping himself to the concept of the aesthetic as frequently and as liberally as he pleases. Thus, for example, in the Epilogue of *Art and Engagement*, interestingly entitled 'Art and the End of Aesthetics', Berleant gestures towards the first alternative by saying that we 'need a new guiding theory' and a 'rewriting of aesthetic theory' and towards the second by claiming that we have come 'to the end of aesthetics as we have learned it'.[20] Yet throughout the volume he continues to employ the concept of the aesthetic and to employ it in what is essentially the traditional manner. For example, early in the discussion there is a short paragraph in which he speaks, without blinking as it were, of 'aesthetic perception', 'aesthetic experience', 'an aesthetic context', and 'the aesthetic situation'.[21] This is a lot of aesthetic stuff to sustain given that we are both at the end of aesthetics and as of yet without a new theory.

However, it is seemingly the first alternative, that of providing a new theoretical account of the nature of the aesthetic, that Berleant wishes to pursue. But the problem is that there is not, at least in either 'The Historicity of

Aesthetics' or *Art and Engagement*, much progress in this direction. This is because the suggestions Berleant makes, which are meant to move in this direction, do not in fact provide a theoretical account of the aesthetic. The obvious candidate for the job is, of course, Berleant's new aesthetics of engagement itself. And indeed, in summarizing his own contribution to the task of providing what he calls the 'new guiding theory', Berleant says that 'the underlying principle is that aesthetic activity is a unified process that conjoins the distinguishable aspects of art and aesthetic appreciation into an inseparable experiential whole' and that concerning such 'aesthetic experience', it is 'aesthetic engagement' that is to be identified 'as both the common feature' and 'the factor whose theoretical significance is most fundamental'.[22] Thus, Berleant takes 'aesthetic engagement' to be the fundamental theoretical notion of his overall account. However, even this short summary of the aesthetics of engagement, despite what Berleant claims, reveals that the notion of 'aesthetic engagement' cannot play the fundamental theoretical role which is at issue. What the summary demonstrates is that the aesthetics of engagement, rather than contributing to an account of the nature of the aesthetic, only assumes such an account. Each of the substantive components mentioned in the summary, that is, 'activity', 'appreciation', 'experience', and even 'engagement' itself, is modified by the adjective 'aesthetic' and thus is assumed to already be aesthetic prior to serving as a component in the theory. In short, Berleant's new aesthetics of engagement presupposes rather than provides a theoretical account of the nature of the aesthetic.[23]

In conclusion, I suggest that the problems in Berleant's position may stem from the fact that in attempting to, as Berleant puts it, free aesthetic inquiry 'from the restrictive ideas of the recent past', he overlooks another recent idea.[24] This is the somewhat out-of-fashion idea that there is an important distinction between meta-theory and applied theory. The distinction is that which in its classic employment was used in ethics to separate meta-ethical inquiry from normative ethics and to bequeath to the former the analysis of ethical concepts and to relegate to the latter the more messy and mundane matters of morality. Of course, in such classic positivist applications the distinction was drawn too sharply and applied too harshly. None the less, the distinction marks two separate theoretical tasks and, although these two tasks are in fact more closely related than the distinction's initial applications imply, they are yet distinct in important respects. For example, neither kind of theoretical task can be accomplished *simply* by means of carrying out the other. Overlooking this point can result in confusion about what has and what has not been accomplished. The immediate relevance of this distinction is that, on the one hand, in their traditional theoretical role the three dogmas of aesthetics are primarily meta-theoretical dogmas with relatively weak normative ramifications, while, on the other hand, Berleant's substantive position is primarily a normative position with relatively little meta-theoretical power.

This fact helps to explain a number of things: first, why Berleant's arguments against the three dogmas are not successful; second, why there is no necessary conflict between the three dogmas and engaged appreciation of the arts; third, why, if Berleant abandons the three dogmas, he must either abandon the aesthetic or else more explicitly address the issue of its nature; and, finally and most important, why Berleant's aesthetics of engagement does not, in the final analysis, engage the central question of aesthetics.

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[1] Arnold Berleant, 'The Historicity of Aesthetics—I and II', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 26 (1986), pp. 101–11 and 195–203.

[2] Arnold Berleant, *Art and Engagement* (Philadelphia: Temple U.P., 1991). The original occasion for this essay was a session on *Art and Engagement* held at the annual meeting of the American Society for Aesthetics in October, 1991. I am grateful to Berleant and to members of the audience for helpful comments. I have also benefited from discussions on this topic with Joachim Ludwig.

[3] Ibid., p. 69. Although Berleant's attempt to indicate the importance of participation in the appreciation of a variety of art forms is impressive, it is not without problems. The most obvious is that it appears to involve equivocation on the notions of participation and engagement. Thus, in so far as this is a problem, Berleant's 'aesthetics of engagement' has an additional difficulty: were it to constitute an account of the nature of the aesthetic, that account would involve ambiguity.

[4] Ibid., p. 18.

[5] Ibid., p. 44.

[6] The three dogmas and Berleant's attack are concisely presented in 'The Historicity of Aesthetics', op. cit., which could have been entitled 'Three Dogmas of Aesthetics'. The allusion to Quine might have suggested a fruitful comparison with Richard Rorty's attack on modern epistemology in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton U.P., 1980). Berleant's line of thought contains the seeds of a Rorty-type 'deconstruction' of aesthetics, which, however, Berleant does not fully develop. In fact, one way of putting part of my point is that were Berleant's arguments sound, they would provide grounds for such a 'deconstruction' of his own position—what might be called 'self-deconstructing'.

[7] Berleant, *Engagement*, op. cit., p. 11.

[8] Ibid., p. 20.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., pp. 23–4.

[12] Ibid., p. 24.

[13] Were it to be suggested that this point overlooks the intentions of the artists, for they intended to demonstrate that art has no special status, then it must be responded that if their intentions were such, then they failed to fulfil them and, as it were, the tail has, in the final analysis, wagged the dog. Of course, determining the exact nature of each of an artist's original intentions, what he actually did, and what he thereby accomplished, let alone distinguishing among the three, is no easy matter. For a discussion concerning in particular Duchamp's intentions and accomplishments, see Timothy Binkley, 'Piece: Contra Aesthetics', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 35 (1977), pp. 265–77.

[14] Berleant, *Engagement*, op. cit., pp. 25–6.

[15] Jerome Stolnitz, *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism: A Critical Introduction* (Boston:

Houghton Mifflin, 1960), p. 37. Stolnitz takes the slogan from Kate Hevner, 'The Aesthetic Experience: A Psychological Description', *Psychological Review*, 44 (1937), p. 249. Elsewhere I discuss the active nature of appreciation in Stolnitz's account; see Allen Carlson, 'Appreciating Art and Appreciating Nature', in *Landscape, Natural Beauty, and the Arts*, eds. Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge U.P., 1993), pp. 199–227.

[16] Berleant, *Engagement*, op. cit., p. 16.

[17] Ibid., p. 26.

[18] See Paul Ziff, *Antiaesthetics: An Appreciation of the Cow with the Subtile Nose* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984), Binkley, op. cit., and George Dickie, 'The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude', *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1 (1964), pp. 56–65.

[19] For a discussion of Ziff's attempt to provide a new analysis of the aesthetic, see Allen Carlson, 'Critical Notice of Paul Ziff, *Antiaesthetics: An Appreciation of the Cow with the Subtile Nose*', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 17 (1987), pp. 919–33. Concerning Binkley's limited abandonment, see section V. 'Art Outside Aesthetics' of his article, Binkley, op. cit., pp. 272–3. Dickie puts his claim in different ways. In 'Myth' he says that 'an underlying aim of this essay is to suggest the vacuousness of the term "aesthetic"'. See Dickie, op. cit., p. 64. Elsewhere he claims that 'there is no reason to think that there is a special kind of aesthetic consciousness, attention, or perception. Similarly, I do not think there is any reason to think that there is a special kind of aesthetic appreciation.' See George Dickie, *Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis* (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1974), p. 40.

[20] Berleant, *Engagement*, op. cit., p. 211.

[21] Ibid., p. 46.

[22] Ibid., p. 212.

[23] This same point, that is, that the notion of the aesthetic is assumed rather than analysed, also applies to some other proposals in *Art and Engagement* concerning the nature of the aesthetic: for example, Berleant's suggestion of 'direct' 'perceptual awareness of the environment' as a model for the aesthetic and his appeal to the concept of the 'aesthetic situation or field'. He develops this latter notion in an earlier volume; see Arnold Berleant, *The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* (Springfield: Charles Thomas, 1970). I intend my remarks concerning the failure of this concept to provide an account of the aesthetic to apply only to Berleant's recent work, not to its original presentation. Concerning the aesthetic appreciation of environments, I elsewhere argue, like Berleant, for the active, involved nature of such appreciation. See, for example, Allen Carlson, 'Appreciation and the Natural Environment', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 37 (1979), pp. 267–75, and 'Environmental Aesthetics' in *A Companion to Aesthetics*, ed. David E. Cooper (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), pp. 142–4.

[24] Berleant, *Engagement*, op. cit., p. 212.

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TWO WOMEN BY GIOVANNI BELLINI

Mary Bittner Wiseman

ONE INTENTION of this essay is to lay bare the logic of Julia Kristeva's interpretations of the Madonna paintings of Giovanni Bellini.[1] Another is to pave the way for a rewriting of Freud's family romance from the point of view of the Madonna rather than of Oedipus. Freud's conceptions of the feminine are called into question by this different point of view, based as these conceptions are on his admitted ignorance about what goes on in the earliest years of a girl's life and the virtual absence in his writings of any discussion of motherhood or of the mothers of his patients. The task of the essay, however, is not to put the family history of Mary, Jesus, and his two fathers into play with that of Jocasta, Oedipus, and his two familial roles. Nor is it to challenge the laws by which Freud constitutes the feminine, to wit, that everything is always already gendered, that the mother is feminine and every infant masculine, and that one cannot love the same.[2] The task instead is to sketch a theory of interpretation suggested by Kristeva's interpretations of Bellini and consistent with a conception of the relation between past and present adumbrated in the late work of Roland Barthes.[3]

In 'Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini' Kristeva distinguishes between the mother as an *object* (of inchoate desire) and as what fulfils the maternal *function*, a function she identifies in terms of the rhythm, music, vitality of the instincts before they are tamed by being brought under the sway of language and culture. The rhythms of the untamed instincts are treated as homologous to the fragmentation of light and space out of which Bellini constructs his forms, and he is described as coming to perform in his paintings a function similar to the maternal. The manner of the paintings, then, exemplifies the story that Kristeva reads in their (subject) matter. Mystery surrounds the question of who Bellini's mother was, and Kristeva sees his *œuvre* as marking successive stages in the drama of his reconciliation to the absence of a mother, a reconciliation that finally everyone is called upon to make. The drama begins with his early Madonna paintings.

What follows conjoins two Bellini paintings that span forty years of his long painting life, all spent in Venice where he was born some time after 1433 and died in 1516, and reads them as figures for the unconscious of classical psychoanalysis as revealed by Kristeva. The paintings are the *Lochis Madonna* in Bergamo and the *Woman with a Mirror* in Vienna.[4]

The Madonna and child is the sacred subject most frequently painted by

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IOANNES·BELLINVS
Alinari P.F. 2° N.° 16902. BERGAMO - Galleria Carrara. Collezione Lochis. La Madonna col Bambino. (Giovanni Bellini)

LOCHIS MADONNA (1475)
(Alinari/Art Resource, New York)

Bellini and the *Lochis Madonna* one of dozens of images made by him for private devotion. Until about the late 1480s mother and child appear alone as they do in this painting, whose two figures exhaust its surface. Mary is in the centre, her head near the top of the picture plane, as near the top as the front of the parapet on which the child rests is near the bottom. Her right sleeve and his left arm touch the painting's sides. No room for a witness to the

drama enacted in the shallow space between the flat background panel of dark squares and the ledge on which the child kneels and from which he almost tumbles out of the painting. He does not, however, because the Madonna holds him as firm as ever maternal body did hold its parasite, its guest. But she is not there. Abstracted, inward looking, beautiful fragile face beneath the Byzantine wimple, a woman as absent as her maternal hands are present. Face and hands move along different axes. The axis of her body runs from his left knee to the top of her head, the axis of his moves from his right foot to the top of his head. Her hands are positioned along the axis of his body which is twisting away from her, whose own body is cut off by the parapet, making of it the partial figure of the icons beloved in Byzantium, icons in which the holy person pictured is supposed actually to be present. No person is present in the *Lochis Madonna*, however. The mother is not there for her son within the painting, but the traditional art historian Rona Goffen will articulate a sense in which they are both there for the Renaissance viewer and Kristeva will assign a sense to an unrepresentable past's being latent in the texture as well as in the content of Bellini's art.[5]

It can be illuminating to play off against psychoanalytic accounts of the works of religious art the theological accounts that figure in standard art historical treatments of them. The two kinds of accounts of the Madonna and child's presence to the viewer, for example, are different in content but similar in structure. Goffen's explanation is couched in terms of Renaissance pictorial conventions. In all of the Madonnas painted by Bellini before 1500 Mary is shown half length and the child is positioned on a ledge or parapet that has the shape of the altar on which the son's sacrifice is repeatedly offered up to his father. The child is always shown on the ledge, thrust towards the viewer, almost out of the picture space, and the Madonna is always immediately behind it (G28). The half figure refers to the Byzantine tradition and the legend that Mary appeared before Luke as he was making a drawing of her, and he was therefore able to produce a portrait (G59). Because painted in the presence of the model, the portrait was thought to have greater claim to truth or greater authority than does a picture made from memory or imagination. The half-length figure and the parapet were 'a means of asserting the visionary presence of the sacred beings before us' and are gone from the Madonna paintings after 1500 (G65). 'These implications of presence are [then] replaced by a Western conception of the sacred image as a representation—a painting, not an apparition' (G66).

The sense in which the sacred beings were thought to be there in the image in the paintings before 1500 is not so different from the sense in which an object may be said to be present in its photograph and the spirit of the ancestor is believed by tribal members to be there in the carving. The photograph is a light-written trace of rays reflected onto the camera's lens from the object that stood before it, and had there been no object, there would have been no

photograph. Were the ancestor's spirit not to have been captured by the carving (within a different causal order from the photograph's), the carving would have no power. Bellini's early Madonna paintings were made for private devotion, and their effectiveness came in part from the viewer's beliefs that God exists, that the child of Mary is God incarnate, and that mother and child are present in their image. This last belief was constructed not only from beliefs about the existence of God and his son to which Bellini refers, however, but also from his singular contribution to the Venetian Renaissance, namely, the luminous density of colour in his paintings. The paintings themselves become fields of colour, light, and space on which everything solid melts into air, as does the difference between image and real thing. Although the Madonna is absent from the child within the painting, she and the child are thought to be present to the viewer as the image itself comes to betoken presence. The effect of this realism of the image is to make the painted figures part of the viewer's world, thereby facilitating the viewer's transference onto them of desires aroused and made conscious by the encounter with the painting.[6]

Next to this realism of the image may be put a realism of the becoming-bound-of-instinctual-energy. Rather as Kant's imagination schematizes the manifold of perception, readying percepts for the imposition of concepts, the categories of understanding, so, on Kristeva's view, art schematizes the instincts' energy, readying unbound energy for the imposition of symbolic forms, the categories of language. What goes on in the womb and at the breast before the not-yet-subject has the categories of language through which to express or to represent its experience binds the subject-to-be to its mother, and separation from the mother requires and begins with the schematization of the newly free energy. On Freud's account, the male child's bond turns into a desire for intimacy with its mother that succumbs to the threat of castration. This is not the case with the girl child, however, and Freud confesses to finding the stage in the girl's life before the bond is loosed a dark continent within which there are no signposts. None the less, he theorizes the matter in such a way that the girl wants to have a child by her father and not to have to contend with her mother as rival. The Madonna satisfies these conditions and is the girl's ideal of what to be, just as she is the ideal object of the boy's desire before the threat of castration followed and smashed to pieces this desire. Since the fact of castration precedes and causes the girl's desire for her father, really desire for a child by him, nothing occurs in the girl's life to destroy her Oedipal dream. Indeed, because the Madonna is the sublime fulfilment of the girl's Oedipal desire, it acts *against* the destruction of the desire. For the Madonna has a child by God, the archetypal father from whom all goods flow, and the child she has by him is what enables all of God's children to regain paradise. There could be no more powerful nor desirable father or child. Since there is no heavenly mother of whom Mary

need be jealous, she is the archetypal mother. So seductive is the figure of the Madonna that she is what the girl must want to be if she is to cease to be a little man and become a woman.

Kristeva begins her story before the subject-to-be has become subject to desire for the object mother and tells it through art, in which is repeated the schematization of the instincts. Suffering separation from the mother is the beginning of the construction of the subject, the building of the ego, the binding of the energy of the drives. John Lechte has persuasively argued that for Kristeva 'art is the means of *identifying* with suffering', or of 'putting suffering into the symbolic', and this may be generalized to whatever, like suffering, can be undergone but not spoken.[7] If the real is supposed to be instinctual energy unbound, directed to no object, then this real is the materiality of language, its rhythm, 'the vital, erotic aspect of language, . . . the difference between art as drive affect taken in charge, and art denuded of all affect, the art of a pure symbolic form'.[8] Bellini's early Madonna paintings take charge of the bond between mother and child by putting it into signs, the bond that is necessary *in utero*, gradually to become impossible after birth as the infant gradually becomes a subject. He painted its strength and its fragility: for the bond with the mother, like the thread of the spider, is at the same time most strong and most fine. Once the psychic umbilicus is put into signs it becomes part of what Roland Barthes has called the *studium*, what is conventionally coded in an image, what belongs to culture. The *studium* can be transversed or transgressed by the *punctum*, what leaps up out of the image to pierce, to prick, to touch, to wound its viewer.[9] Kristeva's notion of the instinctual real taken charge of by the symbolic renders Barthes' notion of the intractable real tamed by culture.[10] Tamed but not broken, for the power of images lies precisely in their being responsive to what can leap up from their undersides to touch the viewer. For Kristeva as for Barthes, the real reasserts itself within the world of signs as energy ever threatening the stability of form, of the coded, the signed. A moment engendered by this threat, a moment of the greatest risk for the infant-becoming-a-subject, is captured in the *Lochis Madonna*. It is when the mother is not there and the forms of the world are not yet, when the instincts are deprived of their natural ends and are not yet redirected to others.

If art is 'the intersection of sign and rhythm, of representation and light, of the symbolic and the semiotic' (K242), if it takes the instincts in charge by putting them into signs, if it is a construction out of the instinctual energies latent in the manifest 'meaning and content of what it represents', then art can break through the myth of the maternal figure that was given its current form by Freud. Part of the myth is that the story of Oedipus tells the truth about the original causes and objects of desire and that all later desires are mere reprints or revised editions of the original. If the story is true, then the Madonna is the Oedipal ideal and is what girls want to be and what boys

want to have as their own. Kristeva suggests that painting plumbs the depths hidden by this myth in breaking through the screen, the foreground, the obstruction to which she claims the myth reduces (K260). Her view is that the myth is a screen behind which work the primary processes and within which lie what has been forgotten or repressed. This is the raw and the unsigned that art takes in charge. This is where motherhood happens. This is where masculine and feminine are not yet.

The *Lochis Madonna* refers to the Byzantine world in which the image signified the presence to the viewer of the person imaged. The *Woman with a Mirror*, on the other hand, belongs to the Renaissance world rediscovering the primary of sight that had yielded to Judeo-Christendom's hidden God who communicated through signs, not least among them Judaism's written law and Christianity's spoken message. The later painting is about looking, not about being in the presence of and suffering separation from what one would keep present to oneself, would keep as one's own. One can be in the presence of something at which one does not look, sensing it through other modalities, but one cannot be a spectator and look at nothing. *Woman with a Mirror* can be said to be about being a spectator, a spectator of images impossible to separate from the things imaged. There is in everyday thought a distinction between appearances that, like mirror images, cannot be detached from what appears in them, on the one hand, and images, photographed, painted, or



WOMAN WITH A MIRROR (1515)
(Nimatallah/Art Resource, New York)

drawn, that can be detached from what they represent, on the other. *Woman with a Mirror* can be read as assimilating the relation between the painting and its spectator to the relation between the image in the hand mirror and the eyes of the woman holding the mirror. For what the mirror shows finally is a function of the object it reflects, and what the painting shows its spectator is full as much a function of the unconscious of the culture in which it was painted diffracted through the unconscious of the culture of the spectator.

The composition is familiar. There is a parapet-like table or bench at the bottom of the picture and a dark featureless wall dividing background from foreground. The woman is not behind the parapet as the Madonnas are but is sitting on it, her legs cropped at the thighs by the bottom of the canvas. They are in front of the parapet that had kept the Madonnas securely within the picture, and the woman seems to hover between our world and the picture plane. Unlike them she is alone, nude, except for a blue and dark green brocade hair covering edged with pearls and a red scarf encircling her, over her right upper arm, around her back, and over her left thigh and pudenda. Along the black, light-absent wall are a window and a round mirror, its top cropped by the painting and its bottom just above her left shoulder. The window occupies three-fourths of the left third of the canvas; on its sill rests a transparent glass vase holding flowers from the world outside the window and showing light passing through water. Mirrors, window, and water-filled glass comprise a catalogue of media that play light, Venice's genius, by reflecting, transmitting, or refracting it. The left side of the woman's head and her left forearm obscure more than half of the surface of the mirror that reflects the back of head and arm. Finally, in her right hand is a mirror whose glass, unseen to us, reflects the image in the mirror on the wall.

Windows are looked through, mirrors into. The most distant view in the painting is the one seen through the window that reveals a flat plain, the buildings of a town behind which rise low hills that give way to higher hills of the same blue as the sky. The horizon vanishes into a horizontal band of brightest yellow white light above the mountains. Landscape moves the eye into the picture plane back beyond the human figures. Whereas in some earlier paintings, e.g., the *Madonna with Two Trees* in Venice (1487), the shadows cast by the figures' heads posit a source of light *in front of* the picture plane, opening it up into the space where the spectator stands, here Bellini opens up spaces *within* the picture plane, 'enough to make every cubist dream' (K263). The space between the mirror on the wall and the back of the woman's head is one onto which there are two perspectives: the spectator sees in the mirror on the wall the back of the woman's head and the forearm that touches the hair covering, the woman sees them in the mirror in her hand. The spectator sees an image in the wall mirror but not in the held one. The woman sees what the spectator does not: the image in the hand mirror of the image in the mirror on the wall.

The viewer's line of sight to the window goes straight through it to the distant horizon, while the line of sight to the mirror ricochets back towards the viewer through the space between mirror and what it reflects, the woman's arm and head, 'producing a bend in representation and engendering a third space. Neither background nor foreground, it is the opening of one vista of the painting towards the viewer. . . . It is a reflexive glance, a circular look, careful to fragment space as much as possible by following the refraction of light rays' (K265). Again, within the painting there is the same circular look: the woman looks into the hand mirror to see the image in the wall mirror of her head and arm. The space in the *Lochis Madonna* was shallow and the painting did not point outside to the spectator who, in the early Renaissance, was apt to believe the Madonna to be present in her image and therefore to share the spectator's world. In the *Woman with a Mirror*, however, mirror image takes the place of sacred presence, and the painted message is that the spectator sees in the world the same kind of thing that the woman with the mirror sees within the painting, namely, mere reflections. The painting like a mirror shows the spectator to himself, shows him to be a viewer of images of images and lures him into the space between image and thing, a space impossible to traverse because the imaged thing itself can never be reached. This space opens up in front of so unmitigated an absence of light in the rear wall as to render almost irresistible the place where light ricochets between the perpendicular mirrors.

The image, the outside, the surface, the skin triumph. The original present thing, its inwardness, its inside, its depth, its womb are forgotten. The separation from the body of the mother, from inside the mother, from the memory of the inside is complete. The body of the mother has become the body of a woman and nothing is hidden, as Mary is from her son in the early Madonna paintings. Kristeva interprets the early Madonna's absence as her dreaming memory of maternal joy and energy intransitive, tied to no object. However this elsewhere is to be read, the Madonna's absorption in it, her being taken up in it, has the effect that her attention has no object. The attention of some later Madonnas, on the other hand, has the child as its object and that of the woman painted in his old age has herself, now not as something in which to be absorbed, but as something to be looked at, to be seen. No part of the outside of the woman's body is in principle concealed, for the mirrors can do their work and show her all. Her hair and her sex are partially covered but with such a tease of rich brocade and silk as to call attention to them and to prove that it is after all what is masked that tempts and has power. So, too, what is unconscious, especially where there is no language to represent it, no forms to direct it, or where it has been repressed. Kristeva's thesis, as Lechte elaborates it, is that art gives language and form to what is either disturbing or unrepresentable, inexpressible, unsigned. Once the repressed is re-formed, once the instincts are given form and taken up by systems of signs, of repres-

entations, it is the form (the sign, the representation) that is the object of wishes, drives, desires, beliefs, intentions, emotions, energies, tendencies, fantasies.

Nothing seen in the work is *original* because its origin is 'a whirl of words, a complete absence of meaning and seeing; it is feeling, displacement, rhythm, sounds, flashes', 'Heraclitus' flux, Epicurus' atoms, the whirling dust of cabalic, Arab, and Indian mystics' (K239–40). What is seen is not a copy but a representation of what in its innocence of meaning cannot be presented. Not an object that can be presented to a subject, the innocent flux or dust can only immerse, surround, subsume, consume the not-yet-subject. Kristevan interpretation is recognition of the transference onto the painting of the primary wishes and impulses, drives and desires, awakened by the painting's giving them form. Transference occurs when instinctual energies become objects of attention for what-is-becoming-a-subject as its energies are distanced by being represented and assigned to it. Freud says of transference that it is 'the one thing the presence of which has to be detected almost without assistance and with only the slightest clues to go upon, while at the same time the risk of making arbitrary inferences has to be avoided'. Yet it cannot be avoided since 'use is made of it in setting up all the obstacles that make the material inaccessible' to analysis, where resolution of the transference allows the patient to see the validity of the connections constructed during the analysis.[11] The censored or unrepresentable material in question is inaccessible except through interpretation of the transferences, dreams, jokes, symptoms, and body language through which it counterfeits itself, with interpretation of the transferences being the hardest. Rather as the patient in analysis must *resolve* the transferences she has made in order fully to appreciate the connections constructed in the course of the analysis, so the spectator must *recognize* the transferences of primary processes and primal repressions that the painting has made onto its surface and in recognizing repeat the painting's work, acknowledging even as she transfers what would be otherwise inexpressible, unconscious, inaccessible.

Of the *Woman with a Mirror*, dated and signed the year before his death in 1516, Goffen says that it 'represents the master's final statement on what had been a leitmotif of his œuvre, the professional self-awareness of the painter and the significance of his art' (G252). She says further that his 'concern with the sense of sight was conscious, perhaps self-conscious, in the way of early sixteenth century Italian artists preoccupied with the *paragone*, the competitive comparison of the representational arts, painting and sculpture', where the debate was about which of the two could better imitate nature (G252). Painting claimed the palm on the ground that it could present different points of view at the same time. Finally, Goffen ends her study by claiming that with the *Woman with a Mirror* Bellini 'reminds us that the purpose of the Renaissance artist is to reflect nature, to mirror and to recreate reality' (G257). Icon yields

to paragon, Byzantium to Greece, the hidden to the visible, the dark continent to light. Light is not only the necessary condition for the visual perception of form, however, but is also what reduces form, shatters figuration, dazzles, and blinds. This is why paintings can stun, can turn lives around by their thunder.

The psychoanalyst is like the Renaissance artist in so far as he presumes to recreate the reality of the patient, reflecting in his interpretations the unconscious threads that weave themselves through the patient's life, the interpretations mirroring the life. The mirrors show the woman in the painting what she could not otherwise have seen, as analysis shows the patient what would otherwise remain hidden. For this reason *Woman with a Mirror* may be read as a statement about the self-awareness and significance of the art of psychoanalysis as well as of painting, about insight as well as sight, and about blindness.

The unconscious works upon the person to whose system it belongs and so far forth is there in his life as the Madonna is there is her icon. But it can be recognized and acknowledged only through its distorting representations, just as the sight of an object is achieved only through some medium that perforce distorts, more or less. Vision can be shown to be coded, where codes are arbitrary albeit subject to the constraint of coherence, as is the analyst's interpretations of disguising dreams, transferences, and other constructions of the unconscious. His interpretations diffract these constructions as they themselves diffract the unconscious material of which they are constructions, namely, the unrepresentable energy of drives as well as what has been repressed. Without the interpretations insight into the system unconscious is impossible. The analyst, like the spectator of the *Woman with a Mirror,* can see what the patient and the woman cannot, the transference or any counterfeiting construction and the wall mirror. The spectator or analyst *cannot* see what the woman or the patient is seeing, however, and if there is enough of a difference between their points of view, then what analyst and patient (or spectator and woman) see will not be the same. If the place from which the one looks is a place that the other *cannot* occupy, if the story constructed by one has a line that the other cannot or will not follow, then the sights seen or the stories told will never converge.

What the painting shows is a woman looking at a series of images of herself that it is principle unending, where the object of the images is in principle unobservable. There is no exit from the loop, as there is no exit for Freud from the story that begins with Oedipus. Kristeva's singular contribution to psychoanalysis is to have refused to enter the loop by beginning the story not from the place of the son in whose story the daughter has no place, but from the place of the infant, and to have told the story through paintings, whose ground performs a role not unlike that performed by the body of the mother. For precisely as a painting is *both* brushstrokes or patches of paint and what

the strokes represent or do, so is the maternal body under the sway of *both* the instinctual, psychotic maternal aspect of motherhood identified by Kristeva and the symbolizing, speaking paternal aspect, where instincts are blind and symbols empty without each other.[12] Moreover, the place of the infant is the body of the mother whose womb, material, hidden, is the dark other side of what light reveals and mirror gives back: image, outside, surface, skin.

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REFERENCES

[1] Julia Kristeva, 'Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini', *Desire in Language*, ed. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia U.P., 1980). All references to this essay will appear in the text as (K00).

[2] Some of these issues are treated in 'Three Renaissance Madonnas: Freud and the Feminine' forthcoming in *Transformations: Arts, Politics, Sciences*, eds. Christie McDonald and Gary Wihl (Pennsylvania State U.P.).

[3] This is discussed at length in my *Ecstasies of Roland Barthes* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 152–98. Barthes is talking about literature but it seems to me that what he says applies to art in any genre: 'literature is desacralized, institutions are impotent to defend and impose it as the implicit model of the human. It is not, if you like, that literature is destroyed; rather it is no longer protected, so that this is the moment to deal with it. . . . Our gaze can fall, not without perversity, upon certain old and lovely things, whose signified is abstract, out of date. It is a moment at once decadent and prophetic, a moment of gentle apocalypse, a historical moment of the greatest possible pleasure.' 'In Inauguration of the Chair of Literary Semiology, College de France, January 7, 1977', *October*, 8 (Spring 1980), p. 14.

[4] These paintings are reproduced in Rona Goffen, *Giovanni Bellini* (New Haven and London: Yale U.P., 1989), *Woman with a Mirror* on page 253 and *Lochis Madonna* on page 47.

[5] Rona Goffen, *Giovanni Bellini*, p. 53. All further references to this book will appear in the text as (G00).

[6] The mechanism of transference as it works in the spectator of works of visual art is discussed in 'Renaissance Paintings and Psychoanalysis: Julia Kristeva and the Function of the Mother', a longer version of the present paper forthcoming in *Ethics, Politics, and Difference in Julia Kristeva's Writing: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Kelly Oliver (Routledge).

[7] John Lechte, 'Kristeva and Holbein, Artist of Melancholy', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1990), p. 346.

[8] Lechte, p. 347.

[9] Roland Barthes, *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), pp. 49–59.

[10] *Camera Lucida*, p. 119.

[11] Sigmund Freud, *Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria*, ed. Philip Rieff (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1963), p. 138.

[12] Any painting that is a work of art may be so described on the basis of what Richard Wollheim has identified as this 'special kind of experience, which I call *seeing-in*, marked by this strange duality—of seeing the marked surface, and of seeing something in the surface—which I call *twofoldness*'. Richard Wollheim, *Painting as an Art* (Princeton U.P., 1987), p. 21.

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ESCHER AND PARMIGIANINO: A STUDY IN PARADOX

Jane Duran

PHILOSOPHERS ARE familiar with the self-referential statement and the conundrums that spring from it; it is a staple of the literature. More intriguing, however, and less frequently examined is the visual paradox.

In a piece in the *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Kornel Solt argues that visual works can and do make statements.[1] This thesis alone might be thought to be somewhat controversial, but what Solt goes on to suggest is even more startling: some visual works make 'true' statements, some 'false', and some make non-valued statements, neither true nor false.[2]

The immediate suggestion is that the work of M. C. Escher falls along these lines, and this is no doubt a preliminary accurate assessment, but it leads to another question: can we think of any other artist—an artist from perhaps another period—who falls into this category? And is it possible that pictures and visual reproductions may make statements which are actually contradictory, or paradoxical? (Solt denies this.)[3] Before attempting a reply to the second question I will expand upon the work of at least one painter called to mind by the first.

I

Richard Gregory, writing in a work devoted to a special interdisciplinary conference on Escher, notes:

> All representational pictures are paradoxical, as they are two dimensional surfaces (and may be clearly seen as such) and yet they are also seen as the three dimensional world of objects they represent. . . . [I]t is clear that Escher was by no means the first artist to exploit illusion. . . . The most striking examples, presumably because they are within one simple object, are the 'Impossible Triangle' and the 'Continuous Staircase'. . ..[4]

Here Gregory makes explicit some of the most overt examples of what might be called the paradoxical in Escher's art. But Gregory also asserts that Escher was not the first to exploit this theme, and I wish here to examine the work of the Italian Mannerist, Parmigianino.

Celebrated for his use of line, Parmigianino's work is noted, according to

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Rossi, for 'the refined beauty of its formal elements'.[5] Yet what makes his use of formal elements quite striking is a certain tension in backgrounding that seems to highlight the exquisite elegance of his human figures.

The Madonna with the Long Neck, now in the Uffizi, is perhaps Parmigianino's best-known work. Here we have what is only superficially a Nativity scene: the conventional elements are almost completely usurped by the unconventional play of figure. A Madonna with an elongated neck, hands, face and figure holds an infant Christ the size of a three- or four-year-old child (particularly in length of limb), but still with a babe's face. She and the child are surrounded by what appear to be cherubim, yet these figures have the same extended length of limb and exaggerated visual manner. All of the foregoing is contrasted, visually, with an unusual background that, at first glance, appears to be a row of truncated classical columns.

It is these columns that provide the elements in the painting which put one in mind of Escher. Although the Doric columns by no means dominate the painting, they are abruptly imposed immediately behind the figure of the Madonna and her billowing silken cape so that the contrast of line (the harshness of the columns and the flowing elements of the drapery) is immediately apparent. What astounds the careful viewer, however, is that the row of columns appears to be fashioned—for whatever reasons—in a way that puts one in mind of a Mobius strip or an Escher staircase. The foregrounded portion of the Madonna's blue silk cape cuts across the row, and immediately below the cape one can count—Parmigianino has been visually explicit, as it were—approximately eight to ten columns. However, if one looks up above Mary's cape, one notices something jarringly odd: the row of columns has disappeared, and only one column is left. The column in the foreground is the only column, and the columns shown behind it (which, towards the bottom of the painting, had appeared in careful perspective) are now gone. Freedberg asserts that the effect is simply the result of incompletion of the painting: the work is unfinished.[6] What tantalizes the viewer, however—and may not be the result of accidental incompletion—is the careful shading of the columns up to the cape, which suggests that they are in the process of disappearing. In any case, the effect is pronounced.

One might fruitlessly wonder what the artist had intended by this (especially if one were inclined towards committing the intentional fallacy), but the effect is one of surrealistic juxtaposition. A somewhat fantastical rendering of the Madonna is made still more dreamlike by the appearance of a plainly impossible row of Doric columms which comes and goes, so to speak.

Still another painting of Parmigianino's contains a similar *trompe-l'œil*. Although his work is thought of as representing a period of decadence at the end of the High Renaissance, commentators have focused largely on the porcelain smoothness of his exaggerated figures, beings who seem to be simultaneously less- and more-than-human. Only a small portion of the critical

writing has noted the extent to which Parmigianino plays with an almost surrealistic background. *Madonna with St Zachary* shows a similar Madonna figure with the Saint in the foreground, the infant and two angels to the left side. Rossi, in noting how Parmigianino is a typical Mannerist, comments that 'there is already an elegance of line, as we may see in the shapes and the nervous drawing of the figure and the landscape'. But again in the landscape we see an odd juxtaposition: a classically fronted structure—a temple or mausoleum, perhaps—rises immediately behind the Saint. As in the previous painting, a foregrounding of rocks and brush cuts across it, truncating the line so abruptly that the structure appears to have risen from nothing. Still more jarring is another Doric column to its immediate left; the column supports nothing, is free-standing, and has no apparent relationship to the structure or anything else in the picture. It looms alarmingly from a base of foliage, points heavenwards and then stops. F. David Martin, writing over thirty years ago in a journal article, entitled 'On Enjoying Decadence', noted that what we get from the Mannerists is 'the "existential self" . . . as in so many of the portraits of . . . Parmigianino'.[7] It does not seem to be an exaggeration to state that part of this 'existential self' comes from the inexplicably organized backgrounds appearing in many of his works.

Now one interpretation of the Mannerists asks us to think of them solely or largely in terms of their self-conscious response to the high classical style which preceded them. Martin also claims that

> Fertile styles, such as that of Italian Renaissance art, have a wide but finite range of possibilities that require many artists to realize. The earlier artists can realize only so much; the imaginations of those who follow are fired by the contrast between the realized possibilities or accomplishments of the preceding tradition and the unrealized possibilities they suggest. . . . [Pontormo's work] is nervous and unreal, colors are off-key, space is crowded and irrational . . . but to be fully aware of these peculiarities necessitates contrasting them imaginatively, to a large extent automatically in the trained observer, with the classic forms, for otherwise they would not be felt as either peculiar or meaningful.[8]

Juxtaposing some of Solt's assertions on statement-making with Martin's commentary on the Mannerists, one is led to the conclusion that Parmigianino indeed makes statements (as Escher no doubt does)—it's merely that they are difficult to classify according to type. But if a Mannerist such as Parmigianino and a twentieth-century artist such as M. C. Escher have something in common, it might prove helpful to try to be more precise about what that something is. Solt wants to claim that there is no such thing as the genuinely paradoxical statement in the visual arts because the genuinely paradoxical relies on self-reference, and paintings cannot be self-referential. The latter assertion might be thought to be problematic; whether or not there is a visual equivalent of 'This sentence is false' strikes one, initially, as up for grabs. In the next

section I will attempt to investigate the status of work such as Parmigianino's and Escher's in terms of its statement-making capacities.

II

Solt originally asserted that some of the statements made in paintings were neither true nor false to account for the sorts of subjects that are generally referred to as 'mythological' (or even less than mythological—Solt mentions Mickey Mouse). Now the difficulty here would seem to be that the visual richness of the media to which Solt refers is much greater than the typology he employs (drawn from language) allows. If, to utilize Solt's third category, there are visual statements which are neither true nor false, there must be several sorts of sub-categories of these statements. The classical-allusion paintings of eighteenth-century France, with Pomona and Vertumnus as subjects, have little to do with Donald Duck and it somehow seems to be an error to place them in the same category.

The same sort of claim might be made—indeed, has been made—about Escher's work. Several commentators have subdivided his work into six, eight or more categories.[9] Some of his work (particularly the earlier cuts) is straightforwardly conventional (*Castrovalva, S. Peter, Rome*); some is merely figurative or geometrically abstract (*Concentric Rings*). But neither of these categories—Bonaiuto has nine such rubrics[10]—contains work that is at the level we would ordinarily call 'paradoxical'. As Bonaiuto himself notes, that work is more properly represented by *Ascending and Descending*.

Now the problem that immediately presents itself here is that of labelling. In the truth-table decision method for the sentential calculus, SL sentences which receive truth-values of F in all columns are deemed contradictions. It is not, of course, the case that all contradictions are paradoxes. Rather, a paradox seems to be best subsumed under the SL biconditional, and is the sort of SL sentence which would receive the assignment 'T iff F'.

My claim, which I take it is relatively non-controversial, is that some of Escher's work—and indeed even elements of Parmigianino's—is paradoxical when seen in this light. Of course, the work is not self-referential in the sense that the Barber Paradox is. The visual instead signals its paradoxicality by asking us to accept the truth of a situation which can occur only if some other element in the situation does not occur (in other words, it is the visual equivalent of 'T iff F'). In this sense, then, I believe that at least Escher's work is paradoxical, and Solt's definition of such work is too narrow to do the situation justice. If renderings of Goofy and other creatures are neither true nor false, then it seems fair to assign the label 'paradoxical' to the Escher work, while still retaining Solt's insight that the work is not paradoxical in the sense that sentences are.

III

More intriguing, perhaps, is a still-less-stringently formulated definition of 'paradoxical', employed by Bonaiuto, that helps explain features of the work of some other artists whose names might be thought not to be relevant to this context. In research undertaken at the University of Rome, Bonaiuto notes that subjects generally find works such as *Ascending and Descending* by Escher to be 'perturbing', 'incongruous', 'strange' and 'absurd'.[11] Although it may be readily conceded that this has little to do with the formal definition of paradox, it may help explain our reaction to elements of Parmigianino's *The Madonna with the Long Neck*, or even, more surprisingly, to elements of some work by Giotto.[12] In commentary on *Madonna*, Freedberg notes that 'In the *Collo Lungo* and in antecedent works Parmigianino had employed linear rhythms in a swift, ascending pattern which deprived the drapery of weight'.[13] While focusing on these somewhat unusual aspects of Mannerism, many art historians have failed, I believe, to give adequate coverage to the juxtaposition of odd elements in the backgrounds of these works which prevents our making sense, so to speak, of the rest of the work. But both the work by Escher and the work by the Mannerists (including, as Martin has it, several artists other than Parmigianino) certainly falls under the rubric 'perturbing'.

We are also struck, at least in Escher's work, by elements that might best be described as 'incompatible'. Escher's *Drawing Hands*,[14] for example, leaves us puzzled by the obvious question: which hand began to draw? The formulation of these sorts of questions would seem to take place in a space, as it were, somewhere between the overtly paradoxical and the merely perturbing. A circularity is certainly not the same thing as a paradox: if I define 'epicene' as 'androgynous' and 'androgynous' as 'epicene', I am aware that more work will allow me to break out of the circle and come to primitive terms. But the circular or incompatible elements in Escher's work are—as his 'paradoxes' are, if we follow the line *contra* Solt—non-verbal. Hence one is again faced with the difficulty that there are a number of elements that are not direct matches for the correlative linguistic phenomena, but which are sufficiently close to such phenomena that one might want to place them in the same or closely similar category.

Finally, to reiterate, it seems to be an odd consequence of some of the work on both Escher and the Italian Mannerists that the commentary has an intersection in concern for philosophical or world-view themes manifest in the artist's work. I have already cited Martin in this regard; although the commentary on Escher focuses much more extensively on his use of mathematical properties and so forth, there is a rather extensive body of literature that tries to describe the *weltanschauung* behind Escher's perturbing constructions. The noteworthy point here is the similarity in the comments: Martin's

remarks on the Mannerists are no more 'existential' than this comment by Maltese on Escher:

> [W]e may now better define Escher's message. It is a bitter and despairing one; Mankind, just like every being, seems to be prisoner of a giant labyrinth, lacking in exit and entrance. Just like the prisoners who are walking around in the courtyard in the famous painting by Van Gogh, Mankind is sentenced to turn around forever.[15]

The resemblance between these comments and Martin's point that the Mannerists give us the 'existential self' is remarkable.[16]

IV

A number of lines of argument in this paper have supported the conclusion that, although the work of artists such as Escher, Parmigianino and others is not self-referentially paradoxical in the sense that language can be, it is paradoxical in important ways, none the less. Beginning with Solt's analysis, I noted that Solt allows the visual arts to have statement-making capacities, while still restricting their statement-making range, so to speak, only to three categories: 'true', 'false' and without truth value. Before attempting to respond to Solt's assertions, however, I noted that, while Escher might be the artist whose name crops up the most frequently in conversations about the allegedly visually paradoxical, several commentators have mentioned other artists as well. I noted that Gregory had also asserted that Escher was not the first to employ such features, and I then undertook an analysis of some of the work of the Italian Mannerist, Parmigianino.

My analysis of both *The Madonna with the Long Neck* and *Madonna with St Zachary* indicated that, for whatever reasons, these paintings contain elements which might be described as visually troublesome or paradoxical. Although the commentators tend to focus on other aspects of Parmigianino's work, his use of truncated columns alone (in both paintings) is intriguing and supports the analysis.

I then analysed our notion of 'paradoxical' both from the standpoint of Solt's reading and from the standpoint of readings somewhat less literal, and concluded that, if Solt allows rendered Disney characters to comprise a category dubbed 'neither true nor false', work such as Escher's (or Parmigianino's) may accurately be labelled 'paradoxical'. Finally, I noted that whatever the relevance of Solt's categorizing, the commentators seem to agree, at least in the case of Escher, that his work is 'perturbing', and that both artists have 'existential' elements in their work—notes of bitterness and despair.

Taking Solt's work as a point of departure, then, I have attempted an analysis of that which is bothersome in the work of two well-known artists

of their respective periods. I have suggested that, whatever formal labels are involved, Escher and Parmigianino have in common a desire to express a certain unease. That unease—so typical, according to many, of our twentieth-century cultural life—would not be misdescribed as an awareness of paradox.

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[9] See articles in Coxeter *et al.*, op. cit.

[10] Paolo Bonaiuto, 'The Usual, the Ambiguous and Two Types of Visual Incongruity in the work of Maurits Cornelis Escher', in Coxeter, op. cit., pp. 359–68.

[11] Ibid., p. 364.

[12] In the Coxeter volume, the plate on p. 399 reproduces a portion of a Giotto fresco wherein angels lamenting the death of Christ appear to have been drawn along the lines of some of Escher's symmetrical patterns.

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[15] Corrado Maltese, 'Univocals, Ambiguity, Nonsense in Escher's Art', in Coxeter, op. cit., p. 327.

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THE APPRECIATION AND PERCEPTION OF EASEL PAINTINGS

S. J. Wilsmore

IN APPRECIATING easel paintings as works of art we perceive them. I did not say: 'it is a condition for appreciating paintings *that* we perceive them'. This would make it sound as if there were two things going on, say, first perceiving paintings—seeing their line and colour—and *then*, differently, appreciating their aesthetic qualities.

If I had said the latter this would have meant that their aesthetic qualities could not *really* be seen. Instead it might be thought that these would have to be inferred—some symbolic theories of art suppose this.[1] Alternatively, those aesthetic qualities might be thought our own imaginative projection onto those geometrical forms *really* seen: theories of art which talk about art as imagination build on this thought.[2]

Our language reflects our belief that we *perceive* paintings: 'If you look at it from this angle you will *see* . . .'. We are as at home in our cultural world of perceiving paintings as we are of seeing houses and cars, people laughing, and yes, despite Descartes,[3] men walking down the street. Our use of language reflects the many different ways in which we sometimes justify our beliefs about what we see when we perceive a painting. We should accept our language for it reveals our concepts of 'perception', 'truth' and 'justification', etc., as employed in this area of our lives. Those who deny here their application in aesthetic contexts, who recommend a change, have gone astray. Sometimes they have reasoned that if we use words 'perceive' and 'properly perceive' differently in their application to paintings to that of objects such as canvases, then different concepts of perception are being employed. But there was no ambiguity present in our use of the words 'perception' and 'seeing' in application to paintings.

I would rather say that the concept of perception applies to paintings as to other objects in the world. Our concept of perception is complex in application, and perhaps it would sometimes help to say that the word 'see' has different senses. In the bare geometrical sense we might use the word 'perceive' to mean that what is perceived is what is registered by sight. In this sense a mouse that runs up a chair sees as I do 'a chair' because he registers something there which he runs up. But we would be reluctant to say that the mouse sees what I do in seeing 'a chair'. For the mouse has no concept of 'a

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chair' as something made for sitting in. We hesitate about a dog. Does the dog see what I do when I see the chair? To a greater extent than the mouse, perhaps so. He sees it as something to sit in; but as something made to sit in? No. He sits in the chair if he has a chance to do so, but nothing in his behaviour, his way of life shared with us or without us, gives justification to apply to him the full concept of a chair, as something made for the purpose of sitting in.

Normally we perceive physical objects under concepts. Language organizes perception in the sense that objects are seen as of the same kind under those concepts which identify them. Once we realize how far our perception of objects under such concepts is from the bare registering of something as a physical object then we are already on the road to understanding how we perceive paintings which are seen under those concepts already mastered in our many different forms of life.

We must distinguish between seeing pictures and seeing paintings properly when the paintings are easel paintings, i.e., works of art. It is as natural to us to perceive pictures as to perceive people. The child's natural ability to learn language accompanies his natural ability to organize the world in its terms; so he sees faces and animals in the clouds. This natural ability is also reflected in his ability to perceive directly representations. Representations are necessarily intended under the concept of 'representation of . . .'. When a picture can be seen as depicting how it was intended we can say it represents what it depicts. This is at least sufficient for the application of 'representing X' even if it is not intended that what is represented denotes X, where X is something which exists.[4] A child recognizes Superman in the comic 'flying through the air' as easily as he recognizes you are 'walking' across the room and not merely moving like a robot. He does not ask in a clear case whether Superman in the picture is suspended in the air. Nor does it worry him that Superman does not exist. Problem cases take all our attention. They arise when our normal criteria for recognition break down. We mistakenly take them for central cases.

Perceiving easel paintings as works of art requires more from us than simple recognition of what objects are depicted within them. The former requires a vocabulary not fully learnt by the child: one of appreciating what is seen, by perceiving properly the painting as the painting it is; i.e., as this particular work of art. But that does not mean that the concept of perception must now give way to that of imagination. Denying that the *aesthetic* qualities of a painting are capable of being seen, such as those expressed in the phrases 'the *sense* of exact measurement', 'its broken outlines and fractured forms [which] let you in on the provisional nature of his enterprise', etc., would rule out giving *reasons* for paintings being seen in any ordinary sense of the word 'reasons', where these are internally related to the *ordinary* beliefs that we hold about their formal as well as representational features. This is unacceptable. The

perception of such works of art *is* an active *perceptual* engagement. As such we learn *from* art, we make discoveries there and bring back from them perceptual lessons which change our understanding of both art, life and ourselves. Were it true that art were merely a matter of our own imaginative projections this would be inconceivable. Then we could learn nothing new from art. Its significance would be limited to what we could bring to it, not what we could take away with us.

Even so, perceiving easel paintings is an *undertaking* and, in this way, this concept of perception sometimes comes close to that of imagination. It is certainly unlike our perception of physical objects either as mere bodies in space or merely under the concepts which identify those objects within them which are depicted there.

First, it requires effort on our part. We must exercise certain skills in perception so as to become *perceptive*. In these cases perception is internally related to 'being perceptive' in an evaluative sense, of having the ability to see what is worth seeing because it counts as what is to be seen.

Second, in the case of a particular painting, through our perceptive abilities we come to understand which contexts are relevant to its perception, historically, stylistically, of time or artist. We must attend to it within its appropriate context in that way which best reveals it through making those comparisons which place it. That requires good judgement. Our responses to it, verbally and how we treat it, our attitude towards it are then at one and the same time expressions of our *experience* of the painting *and* of its understanding. In these circumstances our responses which show *sensibility* in the comparisons made, etc., are what we *call* 'justifying our responses by our *appreciation* of it'.

Third, we must explore the picture and how to see it properly. With the matters just discussed firmly in mind we must now ask ourselves if this or that way of seeing it is how it ought to be seen. Now we might look at it under various aspects. Now one, now another aspect might dawn upon us. Now judgement must be exercised as to which way of seeing the work does it justice.

To make these points clear let me take an example to be found in the kind of art review which appears daily on the art pages of our better newspapers. The critics who write here have a task to carry out which is not to give us theories about the arts but to guide readers, viewers and listeners as to what to read, see and hear. Their activity is of the same logical form as our own informal discussions of art among ourselves after visiting a gallery, hearing a concert or reading a book, etc.

Thus the art critic William Packer wrote about an exhibition at the Edinburgh Festival held at the National Gallery of Scotland in the summer of 1990 called *Cézanne & Poussin—The Classical Vision of Landscape*:

> What was this Classical Vision of Landscape, that unites the two masters? Leaving aside the classical reference of iconography and subject matter, that to Poussin

> was the natural and indeed conventional imaginative refinement upon his formal base, it amounts to the close ordering of form and pictorial space upon given principles of proportion and composition. Here in this exhibition are brought together, in direct counterpoint of imagery and chronology, the various ways in which these two so very different artists resolved, *mutatis mutandis*, these so very similar pictorial problems.
>
> Indeed it is uncanny to see how closely yet unconsciously they come together, the one with the other, in their pictorial and compositional devices—foliage on either side to achieve an harmonious equilibrium; the central recessive space, plane upon plane; the active, dividing tree; the distant curve of the bay or lake; the architecture, whether of city or cottage, four-square to the painting plane to anchor the whole.

Packer then argues that by seeing the paintings by Cézanne and Poussin side by side our perception of the Poussin actually changes: 'The great discovery this exhibition allows is of Poussin—not Poussin the intellectual, the great organiser and pictorial machine-maker of conventional art history, but Poussin the painter, direct, fresh and alive. The supreme irony which this show demonstrates and celebrates is that Poussin too was a painter after nature, to an extent Cézanne must hardly have expected.'

He next describes two of Poussin's paintings of the death and burial of the Athenian hero, Phocian, *Landscape with the Body of Phocian carried out of Athens*: 'Made up or not, the trees are real trees, the distant houses real houses. We move discreetly in our imagination past the figure of the mourning widow, gathering the ashes of her husband, through the trees and out into the space beyond by the city walls, bathed in the evening sunshine.'[5]

GEOMETRICAL AND ASPECT PERCEPTION

Indeed, it is Parker's view that we will see differently the work of both Poussin and Cézanne by comparing the two artists. The similarities between them, like those between two faces, are there for us to see if we look; of course, only *some* people will be able to see these similarities for they are not of its colour or size, they are not of them *geometrically*.[6] Only those will be able to see the ordering of space and the harmony of each of the artists and how they differ who are at home in a particular culture where talking of 'space' and 'harmony' comes naturally in the context of a discussion of paintings. What is meant by 'representational paintings' is spelt out in terms of such natural reactions to them as Packer's: 'the distant houses are real houses. . .'. Such reports show his way of taking these to be *paintings*, of them coming alive for him—immediate presences—in some respects as if the houses there were real houses as is shown in his attitude towards them—'Look at this house there in the shadows', etc.—in his feeling at home with how he has individualized them thus-and-so in his visual experience, their aspects dawning upon him in the light of comparisons made between the two works.

Do *not* say: 'in the geometrical sense of the word "see" we all see the two

paintings—their colour and shape—but in another sense only those see them who see what is *in* them'. If we only see the colour and shape of the paintings, then this is not to see the paintings at all. It is to see of what they are *composed.* Already, in creating his work each artist used some rules for their perception which he inherited in learning how to use for aesthetic purposes such concepts as 'proportionate', 'moving', 'linear', etc., and provided others which he bequeathed, such as a Rembrandt style, a Corot landscape, etc. It is under such concepts that we perceive his work and experience it aesthetically. Sharing a culture we share abilities with him to perceive his painting.

And do not say, 'only the geometrical sense of "see" is one of perception because only in this sense is it true that a change in the painting justifies us saying of it that it is not the same painting because something has *actually* altered'. Because in any sense of seeing *the painting*, of course, what altered could not have been simply what physically altered; i.e., the paint or canvas. For paint and canvas do not refer to the content of the painting seen. A change in how the painting is 'organized', in the sense that we *see* it differently now it is compared with another, *is* the appropriate way in which we employ the concept of perception when applied to such objects as easel paintings. So an actual change in the paintwork, in the case of damage, say, is estimated *aesthetically* in how it alters perception of the aesthetic content of the easel painting. It is this which individuates it to be this very painting and achieving a proper perception of it means to have revealed what does individuate it in this sense.

The viewer responds perceptually *in* his appreciating the work, that is, in his perceiving the painting he understands or misconceives of it. There is not: (a) first its perception and then thought about its content. Nor is there: (b) first perception of it geometrically and then the projection of imagination accounting for its content. Nor is there: (c) first an essentially private experience and then a problem of how to interpret this, how to convey it in language so that language will be adequate to the task of describing my experience of the painting and adequate to convey it to others.

I have said something about (a) and (c); (c) is implied from some ways of taking (a) and (b). So with (a) if we think of perception as some essentially private experience, as sense-data perhaps, then we think of perceiving in general as a private experience. Then perceiving easel paintings in this way is just another case of it. If we think of perception as necessarily constrained by the notion of 'what registers visually', in some sense of 'the given' and make this dubious notion of 'the given' spelt out as what is 'given' to perception as 'a physical object' then imagination is thought required for our perception of the easel painting. But what is imagined here? If we turn for help to the notion of 'imagination' being like what 'is imaged', then we could again be back to the view that what we mean by 'perceiving the painting' can only be explained by 'a private experience'.

But there are other ways of coming to believe that our experience of easel

paintings is of an essentially private experience. So if we ask *what* changes when I describe the painting differently, respond to it differently, now I have compared it to this, rather than that, style of painting I might be tempted to say that in one sense nothing has changed *outside*, nothing physically has changed, but something has changed *inside*, in how I privately experience the painting. The change is in my experience of an essentially inner object which I *perceive* only in the sense that I imagine it. All kinds of fascinating conceptual muddles are now on offer, but we have no time to investigate them all.

As showing fully the incoherence of an essentially private language would require a rather lengthy detour,[7] for the purposes of this paper let me say why there is not first a private experience and then a problem of interpreting it, that is, of making our language adequate to that experience.

If, for the sake of argument, there were such an experience then necessarily no public language *could* be adequate to describe it. Our feeling of frustration *could* (logically) never be appeased. Indeed, this is just the fear experienced by the philosopher who worries about the question of the adequacy of language to the experience of perceiving a painting. 'I stand before the painting of the *Montagne Sainte-Victoire* in awe. How could I ever describe the awe that I feel.' Well, the person who describes his problem thus has already described his feeling as one of 'awe'. *That* is an ordinary word in our language.

His feeling of inadequacy faces at least two directions. On the one hand, he might misdescribe his problem as one of expressing in language some already existing experience which is language-independent. He models this on sensation-language, and he misconceives of sensation-language as *descriptive* language, describing an independent-of-language private inner object. But to describe *such an object*, were it possible, could not be *to describe an experience of the painting*. For the latter experience is of *something* which is individuated by others and *can* be described by them while my experience of an inner private object is, *ex hypothesi*, not available to them. There is much more to be said about this feeling of inadequacy as it overcomes the philosopher. But we leave it now for the feeling of inadequacy many of us feel about *responding* adequately to a painting which is a work of art. Now it is not a question of being at a loss to know how to *describe* our experience of an inner object. The question rather is, how to respond adequately to the painting which we confront 'with awe'. It is not enough to say that it is a feeling of 'awe'. So far we have not done justice to the particularity of our experience of this very painting, say, Cézanne's *Montagne Sainte-Victoire*. It will take some effort to elaborate this experience through time in language sufficiently to manifest an understanding of the *Montagne Sainte-Victoire*; that is, before this verbal expression of our experience might be judged adequate to the painting and to any experience of it which could be called a proper perception of it. How we describe it is a criterion for others of how it is experienced. Now evaluation is in place. There is not an experience which is contingent to and externally

related to language, but rather an experience which is elaborated and identified through language. Now the criteria for others of our experience of the painting is what we say and do. But we too have no other identification of our experience of this painting other than what we do and say. We are not the privileged spectators of an experience which we must *try* to express in language. We are rather fallible people within a culture reflected in a language we use to express our responses to such things as paintings. The question arises whether our use of language and our behaviour generally will reflect sensibility, the ability in our responses to works of art to do justice to them? A negative answer to this question might be owing to our lack of understanding, say, to this particular painting. Alternatively, it sometimes results from our lack of creative ability to extend the rules for the use of our language so as to make comprehensible to others, and to ourselves, our response to the painting. The second of these is most likely to tempt us back into thinking the experience is distinct from our response. Not at all. The feeling of inadequacy comes out in behaviour, such as our continuing to search for the right expression, a figure of speech or a comparison which will express what we want to express. This is what we mean by saying, 'He has not expressed his experience in words'.

These three above ways of approaching the problem of our appreciating paintings led us astray. Instead, I am saying that the concepts under which the work was created, both those inherited and those developed there for the first time, organize our ways of experiencing it and this is what we *mean* by perceiving it as shown in our manifest response to it, verbal and otherwise which identify for others and even for ourselves how we have experienced the work.

Comparing paintings with other paintings or other things is part of our placing them, coming to see similarities and differences between them which help individuate them by fitting them into a context in which multiple concepts come together exerting their force made manifest in their meaning. Comparing them to one rather than another work exerts a different field of conceptual force and differently 'organizes' someone's way of seeing them and so of responding to them. The geometrical organization of the works—their colour and shape as measured—does not change. But the concepts of which the viewer is master inform his experience of the works so that he perceives them as the paintings they are when they play a justified part within a gestalt. Organized by different infiltrations of meaningful perceptual experience from the surrounding areas of that form of life the aspects which he sees in the work of art are sometimes those statically in the painting. *Last Writings* 602: 'The aspects in a change of aspects are those ones which the figure might sometimes have *statically* in a painting'.[8]

And in such cases, what is seen *is* the work in question. Then it *is* seen immediately like the expression of grief on a face. Even in the case of a *difficult*

painting, such as a Cubist one might be, our aim is eventually to perceive it thus. Even in such a case it would be *hard* to see it in terms of just colour and shape; that would not be to see *this* painting at all. That would not be a *direct* expression of our visual perception. We could not describe the painting in such terms if we were treating it *as a painting*. For such would not be what we mean by *a description of a painting*.

THE PERCEPTION OF ART IS NOT INFERENTIAL

Should the reader of the review agree with Packer? Packer has provided a photograph of two of the paintings to help the reader decide. However, he will need to go to the Festival to see them; and that is what the reviewer hopes to encourage. Let us suppose that the reader goes there. Now he can compare the two paintings himself. Looking closely at Poussin's drawings may help him see them as more like Cézanne's work than he would have expected, given Cézanne's close study of nature: 'The drawings alone give that game away, in ravishing detail'.

When he compares the paintings, his seeing them differently *now* is immediate and requires no inference.[9] Differently to inference he *sees* differently the paintings as he interprets them differently. He sees them *according* to how he interprets them. There is no inference from the colour and form of the paintings—what is *really* seen—to what he sees *in* the paintings. Nor is there any inference from how a painting looks to how another *must* look in looking the same as the other as one premiss must follow another in having a logical relationship to it.

The sameness between these two paintings is seen *in* the paintings as comes out in someone saying of them, 'look, they are *both* nature paintings because . . .'. And here follows descriptions of the way in which they are the same, perhaps eliciting from someone else an agreement to use the same form of words which is our criterion for their experiencing the works to be similar in this respect. This person is at home with paintings to the extent that it went unremarked—that it would have been *unjustified* to have remarked—that what he was looking at was 'a painting'. Were he himself to have to remark on it, saying 'that is a painting', *that* would have shown us that he was quite outside our culture as manifested in such forms of behaviour as their *appreciation*. Such a person would be aspect blind[10] to the possible ways of experiencing the painting which otherwise would have shown his capacity to embody, as we do, pictorial concepts within perceptual experiences. And then he too would have been able to perceive paintings as we do, appreciate them as we do.

To be within this world of appreciation someone must react to them in similar ways, if perhaps with less expertise, to Packer's responses to the paintings. He will describe what he sees—'the distant curve of the bay or lake, the architecture . . .'—using the same form of words as if he were in front of lakes and bays; *that* is how we react to *a painting*. This gives Packer's experience of

the work. It does not describe it. It *is* its expression which is at one and the same time criteria for us of how he appreciates it, i.e., understands it. Here the concepts of perceptual experience and understanding come together. That required a mastery of many concepts, including those required for straightforward perceptual claims, and a judgement for their application to paintings which is referred to in our use of the concept of 'sensibility'.

This is our form of life of perceiving paintings. Appreciation begins with perceiving paintings by so reacting to them; saying, for instance, of the representation of a yacht: 'see, it turns around', etc. In reading a novel we talk about the characters as persons we know: 'Anna Karenin's depression before her suicide changed the way she saw people'. These forms of words *are* a *direct* expression of our visual and reading experience. In a sense, it is our *primitive*, even if cultured, reaction to paintings.

In this form of life we not only treat paintings in some ways as if the figures in them were there before us, we often go further. We *imagine* what else is the content of the painting: 'We move discreetly in our imagination past the figure of the mourning widow . . . out into the space beyond by the city walls, bathed in the evening sunshine'. Surrounding the painting with such possibilities makes a difference to the way we *perceive* the painting. And such possibilities can be justified or not depending on what else is to be seen there, even by what else the artist painted in his other works.

AESTHETIC DISCOURSE AND WORKS OF ART

Let us look at this kind of cultural life at close quarters. The person looking at the painting is exploring it with his sensibility and examining there for himself the 'argument' presented by the reviewer. This is first to examine how the reviewer sees it in the context of those families of concepts which *he* brings to bear on the work for its illumination and which create there this chosen field of force to bear on the reader's perceptual ability to perceive the work as he, Packer, believes it *ought* to be seen. If this proves difficult then the perceiver must ask why and attempt to organize the work differently under other concepts which he believes better account for the work's meaning.

The logic of his examination will be the same as the reviewer's own. Let us look then at what Packer is doing and see the kind of inter-relations possible between the reviewer and his reader. He refers back to the 'classical vision of landscape' and asks what unites the two painters? The pertinent comparisons brought to bear, making us familiar with the criss-cross connections between concepts, reflect the expressive nature of the artistic terrain that manifests the painting. If the viewer cannot see the work as suggested then he cannot come to the reviewer's conclusion. The changed perception asked for is all that is meant by a conclusion desired. But if he cannot do so he might yet try to see what Packer sees by returning again to that field of force of inter-related works of art supplying the many different rules for the use of the many

different concepts, aesthetic and otherwise, relevant to this work's perception. Perhaps another such an examination might make it possible for him to see as similar what Packer sees as being so; perhaps not.

If not the reasons may lie in other connections which he himself has been able to make owing to his own mastery of techniques which finalizes in *discernment* and good judgement; that is, in his own ability to follow rules for the application of aesthetic expressions in these contexts—perhaps in ways in which Packer is still unfamiliar. If he could converse with Packer it could perhaps be his turn to bring to Packer's attention aspects of the painting neglected by him owing perhaps to some insensibility. It would not be easy for him to persuade Packer unless he is as conversant as is Packer with paintings and the ways in which they may be illuminated, brought forth. The more conversant the perceiver with the whole realm in which the painting lives the more he is enabled to see within it; the more aspects of it dawn upon him, revealing what the painting is of.[11]

HOW THE WORK OF ART IS MEANT

Normally, then, the painting is seen immediately, it holds forth. That is, normally involved is aspectual perception which once achieved results in the continuous seeing of the work as it ought to be seen: as what it is of. It is still seeing under an aspect because others could say, 'he sees it as'. Though he reports his perception of the painting and sees no alternative to that way of describing it, others see his way of seeing it as one among other alternatives. But once viewed within the content of the painting we might still not have grasped all its nuances, all its perceptual significance. The critic takes it as his task to help us do so. What Packer is trying to obtain for the viewer is an exploration of the work, so that this and that aspect of the work will dawn upon him as he gives it his attention and draws from him the same kind of responses as he himself experiences when comparing the Cézanne and the Poussin as shown in his descriptions of them. He wishes to change the aspect under which it is seen already to one he believes better reveals the painting as it ought to be seen. For then the viewer too will attend to the painting, as it was *meant*: *Last Writings* 627: 'Now I always see it as . . . "Before I erroneously saw this as . . . but now no longer. Now I always see it the way it was meant—how does this get expressed" '.[12]

A reason for looking at Cézanne's paintings could be to see Cézanne involved in his study of nature; his desire to make his paintings reveal nature as Poussin's had done. As with all works of art, we look at paintings as *human* products which explains our intense interest in what could motivate its authors. This way of looking at them informs our way of describing them, showing our attitude, our way of regarding them as such. In thinking of them as works of art we must think of them as meaningful, as having significance. Only human products could have the kind of meaning that works of art have.

Thus our vital interest in Cézanne's project which Packer expressed as his 'ambition to do Poussin over again, but from nature' shows now in our perceiving Cézanne's work as doing 'Poussin over again'. In being made aware that it was part of Cézanne's artistic project to relate his work to Poussin's we have a new context from which to surround the painting and new comparisons with which to use in our visual exploration of the work. Such knowledge guides our perception of the work.

Perceptual abilities come from a sensibility trained in the art of looking and issue both in our verbal *and* non-verbal responses to the work and the ways in which our verbal responses formatively enter our responses to paintings. They are shown in our mastery of whole areas of pertinent responses to the painting that are accessible to others for their assessment as to whether or not we show an understanding of the work which could be said to be their perception.

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REFERENCES

[1] It is unfair to Nelson Goodman to say that this is entirely his view in his book *Languages of Art* (Oxford U.P., 1969). But there are elements of his theory which have led some readers to believe that if art is symbolic in Goodman's sense then art is a matter of interpretation, of inference.

[2] Roger Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (Methuen, 1974), p. 116.

[3] René Descartes, 'Second Meditation' from *The Meditations* to be found in *Discourse on Method and The Meditations* (Penguin Classics), p. 110.

[4] I am not interested here in those cases where the necessary condition for representation is satisfied, so that it need not be *seen* that X is depicted.

[5] William Packer, 'New Light on Cézanne and Poussin', *Financial Times* (Tuesday, 14 August 1990), p. 13.

[6] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Vol. 1 (Blackwell, Vol. 1, 1982), p. 146.

[7] See Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 244–317, trans. E. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1988), p. 193.

[8] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Last Writings . . .*, op. cit., p. 77.

[9] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, llxi, trans. E. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1988), p. 193.

[10] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Last Writings*, 782–5.

[11] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, llxi, trans. E. Anscombe (1988), p. 201. 'How would the following account do: "What I can see something as, is what it can be a picture of?" What this means is: the aspects in a change of aspects are those ones which the figure might sometimes have permanently in the picture.'

[12] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Last Writings*, p. 80.

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FRANCIS JEFFREY'S ASSOCIATIONIST AESTHETICS

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WORDSWORTH'S DECLARED objective in the Preface to the *Lyrical Ballads* of 1802—to effect a revolution in the language that poets use—was never exclusively 'formalist'. As soon as he took up the subject of poetry 'upon general grounds', in order to defend his choice of poetic language, he felt constrained to ask, and to answer, larger questions: 'What is meant by the word Poet? What is a Poet? To whom does he address himself?'[1] Wordsworth's contemporary critics were obliged, therefore, to address the same issues when rejecting his practical and theoretical choice of poetic language. Of these contemporary critics, Francis Jeffrey was the most typical, because he was the most influential; with a few, remarkable exceptions, the lesser magazines and reviews echoed Jeffrey's critical opinions—as, indeed, did Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*. It is the nature of the answers that Jeffrey gave to these questions, and the associationist aesthetic that informs them, that is the subject of this paper.

Francis Jeffrey was both the editor of and, along with his friend Henry Brougham, the most prolific contributor to the *Edinburgh Review*, the first substantial periodical in English which began, fortuitously, in the same year that Wordsworth interpolated the 'Veralumian' passage 'on the Dignity & nature . . . of a Poet' into the Preface: viz., 1802.[2] Best known for his peremptory dismissal of Wordsworth's *The Excursion* when reviewing it in 1814,[3] Jeffrey led a twenty-year campaign against Wordsworth that began in the first, October 1802, issue of the *Edinburgh*, and betrayed what even Jeffrey's friend Sydney Smith recognized as 'the shape of persecution'.[4]

What, then, *did* Jeffrey and Wordsworth, respectively, mean by the word 'Poet'? 'What *is* a Poet'? 'To whom *does* he address himself'? Already we have a problem. Jeffrey's answers to these questions differed at different times and in different contexts, as did Wordsworth's own. Indeed, there was an ironic shift in their respective attitudes over the early years of the nineteenth century. When Wordsworth began with a 'democratic' theory of poetry, Jeffrey countered that 'the arts do not take their models from what is ordinary, but from what is excellent'.[5] Jeffrey, in other words, began by criticizing Wordsworth for being too 'common' in the pejorative, class sense; too radical in his appeal to, and in his choice of characters from, the 'middle and lower classes of

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society' and 'low and rustic life'.[6] Six years later, however, Jeffrey was to accuse Wordsworth of being too mystical and recondite for 'the ordinary run of sensible, kind people who fill the world';[7] of addressing himself to an even more restricted audience than that to which, *according to Wordsworth*, the Augustans had addressed themselves.

This apparent inconsistency can be attributed to a number of causes, not the least significant being the variety of Wordsworth's own poetry; 'Goody Blake and Harry Gill' demanded a critical response that differed radically from one to 'Ode. Intimations of Immortality'. Equally significant was the fact that Wordsworth's *own* attitude to the 'ordinary' reader hardened into contempt as the years of critical and popular neglect went by; Jeffrey's criticism was as much a response to the arrogance and acrimoniousness of Wordsworth—an arrogance and acrimoniousness that his own reviews had, at least in part, instigated and exacerbated—as it was a response to the poetry. And while Wordsworth's attitude was hardening, Jeffrey was himself developing and encouraging a faith in the 'ordinary' or middle-class reader as a critical criterion, just as he was developing a faith in the middle-class citizen as a political criterion. Nor should one rule out a certain perversity or malice on Jeffrey's part; it certainly does seem that, when he came to discuss Wordsworth, 'any stick [would] do to beat a dog' as one twentieth-century commentator put it.[8]

Ignoring political and economic prejudices, as well as compromises made for the sake of circulation, there are a number of related, critical considerations that lie behind Jeffrey's remorseless campaign against Wordsworth. From these critical considerations I have chosen to isolate Jeffrey's associationist aesthetic, in which we discover, not so much the cause of his inconsistency, as its concomitant and its sanction. Or, to approach the problem from the other direction, the inconsistency of Jeffrey's reviews reveals crucial ambiguities and obliquities in associationist aesthetics.

I

Jeffrey derived his theory of association from his friend Archibald Alison's *Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste.* His interest in aesthetics ultimately led to his contributing an expanded version of his review of the second, 1810, edition of Alison's *Essays* as the entry on 'Beauty' to the 1824 Supplement to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica.*[9] While at Oxford for nine months in 1791–2, Jeffrey wrote, for his own use, a long paper on the subject of beauty in the form of a dialogue. The one passage that survives in an extended quotation in Cockburn's *Life of Lord Jeffrey* confirms his indebtedness to Alison's *Essays* (the first edition of which had appeared in 1790), and anticipates the definitive statement of his aesthetic in his 1811 review of Alison's *Essays* (pp. 13–14).[10]

The thesis is straightforward enough. No object, it argues, either in nature

or art, is inherently or objectively beautiful. Aesthetic theories that attempt to ground themselves on such a hypothesis—those that insist that people respond directly to the inherent beauty of certain forms or lines or colours, for example, or of the relationship between these—such traditional theories are 'radically erroneous' (p. 6). For objects are beautiful only in so far as they evoke, through association, an aesthetic response which is in fact no more than a complex of elementary emotions common to all mankind:

> [T]he emotions we experience from the contemplation of sublimity or beauty, are not produced by any physical or intrinsic quality in the objects which we contemplate; but by the recollection or conception of other objects which are associated in our imaginations with those before us, and consequently suggested by their appearance, and which are interesting or affecting, on the common and familiar principle of being the natural objects of love, or of pity, or of fear or veneration, or some other common and lively sensation of the mind (p. 3).

To say something is beautiful is a shorthand way of saying that it indirectly excites an emotion, or a combination of distinct emotions. These simple emotions, or sensations, or affections, or sentiments—Jeffrey, confusingly, uses the terms interchangeably—'form the foundation of the emotions of sublimity or beauty' (p. 7).

The theory relies upon what Coleridge stigmatized as 'the needlepoint pins-head system of the Atomists',[11] and, because any aesthetic response may be broken down into these discrete, simple emotions, it regards all aesthetic response as radically the same. In Jeffrey's words: the theory 'establishes the substantial identity of the Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Picturesque' (p. 40). Because any act of perceiving or recognizing beauty is as individual and isolated as the mind acting, an individual may legitimately, if meaninglessly, apprehend in an object a beauty that is not apparent to—or, more accurately, that is not experienced by—any other individual. This Jeffrey allocates to 'the *second* class' of objects that are called beautiful: 'those in which the external object is not the natural and necessary, but only the occasional or accidental concomitant of the emotion which it recals' (p. 17).

These objects are the province of tastes confined to nations and other more limited groups, as well as to individuals, and are to be distinguished from those of '*universal* beauty'. Jeffrey claims that an object of this latter, universal class 'is *necessarily* and *universally* connected with the feeling' which constitutes the aesthetic response; connected or associated, that is, '*by the law of nature*' (pp. 10, 11).[12] Such an object, he insists, inevitably produces the sensation of beauty, because it inevitably invokes another object or event with which such an emotion is inevitably associated.

In 'the great shifting of values from uniformity and generality towards individuality and diversity' in the eighteenth century,[13] this theory, like the many others that anticipate it, represents an attempt to reconcile diversitarian

and uniformitarian values. While Jeffrey held that 'all tastes' are not only unique, but 'equally just and correct' (p. 43)—moulded as they are by the infinite variety of personal experiences—he also believed that certain objects or material attributes *necessarily* invoke an identical response in all individuals, because of the uniform constitution of the human mind.

It is hardly surprising that a theory which identifies beauty as an apperceptive phenomenon, reducible to atoms of emotion, should also be strictly anthropocentric. Jeffrey's final example of universal beauty, the beauty of landscape, accentuates this fact. Objects in a landscape are beautiful only in so far as they relate to human action or life, whether the objects are themselves man-made or whether they are natural formations. Wherever we look

> it is human feeling that excites our sympathy, and forms the object of our emotions. It is man, and man alone, that we see in the beauties of the earth which he inhabits; . . . it is . . . the idea of enjoyment—of feelings that animate the existence of sentient beings—that calls forth all our emotions, and is the parent of all the beauty with which we proceed to invest the inanimate creation around us (p. 14).

Being a man, nothing human is alien to Jeffrey, as the then popular aphorism from Terence expresses it. Indeed—to extend the quotation—nothing is either alien to, or exclusive of, the human. Jeffrey's theory is, as I said, anthropocentric, even to the fashionable extent of attempting to reconcile the Classical opposition between man and nature, an opposition assumed by Plato in *Phaedrus*, for example: 'I'm a lover of learning', says Socrates, 'and trees and open country won't teach me anything, whereas men in the town do'.[14]

But here, Jeffrey's aesthetic aspires to more than a simple reconciliation. If, in the mind of the individual, beauty combines atoms of emotion, then in the world of society, beauty helps to combine atoms of individuals—into a community of shared sensations, sentiments, and emotions. The aesthetic apprehension of nature turns out to be substantially identical with universal benevolence: a love of 'sentient beings'. The difference between the direct love of mankind on the one hand, and the simple emotion of love experienced in regarding the landscape on the other, is that the love occasioned by the landscape is mediated (Jeffrey's word is '*reflected*') through nature (p. 26).

A *third* class of associations, beyond the 'universal' and the 'accidental', comprises associations which subsist between objects related to each other rather by 'analogy', than by any implicit connection or contiguity (p. 23). Of the three main forms of associationism in Hume—Contiguity, Causality, and Resemblance—Jeffrey simply subsumes Causality under Contiguity (as Hume was ultimately to do), and divides Contiguity into the 'natural' and the 'accidental'. While this decision so to split only Contiguity makes little sense, it does allow the strength or validity of analogous associations to hover, unspecified, between the arbitrary and the necessary.

Objects associated by analogy are experienced as beautiful or sublime, like

those objects with an original connection in time and place, through a double process of association: first, there is the movement in the mind from image to analogy and, second, there is the movement from the analogy to sensation or emotion. The types of beauty are best differentiated by taking the example of an old tree observed in an open field. Contiguous association would relate the phenomenon to 'sentient beings' and suggest, say, protection from the elements, in turn associated with or eliciting the simple emotion of comfort. We call it beautiful, according to Jeffrey, because it makes us feel comfortable, although we need not be aware of the specific, simple emotion. Analogy, on the other hand, might invoke the dignity or wisdom of age in man, in turn associated with a correspondent simple emotion such as admiration. One is anthropocentric, the other anthropomorphic.

Jeffrey then proceeds to raise one of the perennial problems of aesthetics: 'If beauty be nothing more than a reflection of love, pity or veneration, how comes it, it may be asked, to be distinguished from these sentiments?' (p. 25). For Alison, the sensation of beauty must be fed by emotions associated, not just with a simple object or event recalled automatically, but also with a series of images or thoughts evoked by the object, images or thoughts over which the individual appears to have a measure of control: 'the effect is produced by means of a certain poetical creation, or a train of images and conceptions that are conjured up in the mind' (p. 27).[15]

Jeffrey, however, explicitly dissociated himself from this part of Alison's theory,[16] convinced rather that in most cases the perception of beauty or sublimity was 'quite instantaneous, and altogether as immediate as the perception of the external qualities of the object to which it is ascribed'. Thus he moves closer to the 'Inner Sense' moralists and aestheticians, whom he and Alison actually criticize; aestheticians such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson who assumed the existence of '"a natural sentiment", and instantaneously working "instinct"'.[17]

This is nowhere more obvious than when Jeffrey confronts the valid objection that his theory blurred—even eradicated—the distinction between beauty, on the one hand, and the sentiments of 'love, pity, or veneration' on the other. 'In very many cases', he argued, they are *not* to be distinguished; what we feel when apprehending an object to which we would apply the epithet 'beautiful' is in no way different from our experience of the direct sensation or emotion (p. 25).

In more cases, admittedly, a distinction between the aesthetic response and normal emotions does obtain, as a result of the mediation of the aesthetic response by a sensually perceptible object. But the distinction is one of degree, not of kind. Being less direct, the aesthetic emotion is less intense and less distressful: 'disencumbered of all those accompaniments which frequently give it a peculiar and less satisfactory character' (p. 26).

If Jeffrey appears occasionally to regret the intervention of association at all,

it is because it sacrifices the a priori certainty of Neo-Platonic intuitionalism (however unverifiable) to the contingencies of personal experience. It is true that the assumption of a class of 'universal' associations would appear to rescue this certainty, and with it both critical standards and a concomitant critical authority, but the potential for relativity and even anarchy in the phenomenological basis of associationism required eternal vigilance. Certainly no room could be allowed such irresponsible speculation as Alison's on voluntary fantasizing—however coloured or controlled the fantasy or reverie by an original perception. Were Jeffrey to follow Alison in this, and to permit too much free play to the mind in the process of association, it would undermine his major critical demand of the poet, as it appears formally at the close of his review of Alison's *Essays*:

> if he conceive the ambition of creating beauties for the admiration of others, he must be cautious to employ only such objects as are the *natural* signs and *inseparable* concomitants of emotions, of which the greater part of mankind are susceptible; and his taste will *then* deserve to be called bad and false, if he obtrude upon the public, as beautiful, objects that are not likely to be associated in common minds with any interesting impressions (pp. 44–5).

This demand for conformity, invoking the 'public' as the poet's measure and his judge, is the key to Jeffrey's social, political, and critical thinking. It is therefore entirely appropriate that the review which constitutes Jeffrey's most systematic account, at once of his aesthetic and of his critical theory, should work up to this caution. It is also significant that the closing summary should include an allusion to Wordsworth in its admonition of that '*proselytism*, and arrogance in those who mistake their own casual associations for natural or universal relations' (pp. 45–6).

II

Before looking at the critical and historical ramifications of all this, I want briefly to make three points about Jeffrey's adaptation of associationist aesthetics, and thus three points about associationist aesthetics generally. The first concerns the idea of universality. Invariable associations that are either effected by, or based upon, laws of nature are easier to adumbrate in theory than to observe in practice, and Jeffrey's own analyses betray a revealing equivocation. For example, he discusses female beauty under the headings of both universal and accidental associations, arguing on one occasion that the response to certain aspects of female beauty—to youth, to health, to sexuality—is universal and inevitable, and on another that a response to the same aspects as 'beautiful' is only to be expected of those 'who have been accustomed to recognise them as the signs' (pp. 10–13; 18). What is revealing is the subtle attenuation of the laws that govern association; the casual transition, in other words, from laws of nature to laws of custom.

Even in his analysis of the most 'universal' of all acknowledged forms of beauty, the natural landscape, the sense of inevitability that attaches to his original definition soon evaporates. 'There is *scarcely any one*' argues Jeffrey, 'who does not feel and understand the beauty of smiling fields and comfortable cottages' (p. 15).[18] All associations with nature are universal, but some are more universal than others.

To reconcile his associationist aesthetic with a uniformitarian psychology, Jeffrey assumes that between certain specific phenomena association operates as inevitably and universally as, say, gravitation or electromagnetism between bodies in the natural world. Hume had used precisely this physical analogy when he called association 'a kind of ATTRACTION, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural'.[19] Indeed, a distinction analogous to the one that Alison and Jeffrey make between the 'accidental' and 'Universal' is as common in eighteenth-century aesthetics as it is illogical.

For to assume that specific associations observe laws of nature *is* a logical confusion. No matter how natural or necessary the relationship between two external objects, their association is a psychological phenomenon; it remains the product and within the province of subjective experience only. There is nothing *in* the physical nature of an object A that *causes* the mind to connect its 'kindred impression', or its idea, with those of another object B—even if it could be established that A were itself the cause of B. Laws of association may indeed be 'natural'; this is to say, they may operate invariably in all minds. Neurophysiological research into the operative modes of the cerebral cortex confirms such 'neural connectivity', even suggesting that the empirical model of experience as the metamorphosis of impressions into ideas—or assimilation of inputs into higher order associative neuronal groups—is not as naïve as some post-Kantian sophistications have assumed.[20]

But still the question remains: on *what* is the mind to operate? Between *which* sense impressions or ideas are associations to be made? If we have no experience of A causing B, for example, then we cannot, according to an associationist theory, connect the phenomena of the two objects. When, for a different purpose, Hume defined causality as an illusion resulting from the experience of contiguity in time and space, he revealed the limits of associationism. In this sense, all associations are 'accidental' or adventitious, as they were for Locke. For Jeffrey to claim a Kantian 'universal validity' for his aesthetic response is to expose a critical ambiguity in associationist aesthetics, again invoking Orwell: all associations are accidents, but some are inevitable accidents. Bad drivers may get away with inevitable 'accidents', but it is unlikely that aestheticians can.

When Jeffrey demands the conformity of the poet he turns this ambiguity of associationist aesthetics to excellent, critical effect, but his counsel 'to use only such objects as are the *natural* signs . . . of emotions' flatly contradicts

his identification of beauty with sentiment. 'All sentiment is right', as Hume observed, 'because sentiment has reference to nothing beyond itself, and is always real, whenever a man is conscious of it'.[21]

Indeed, how could the *accidentality* of associationism, and the *subjectivity* of taste, be otherwise? If it were proved that something inherent in an object or material quality produced the emotion of beauty inevitably and universally, would this not be tantamount to proving the existence of objective beauty—which, with Alison, he sets out to refute? Nor is it adequate to retreat into the argument that 'material Qualities' do not physically *cause* the sensation of beauty—as sharp instruments, say, cause pain—but express instead some other non-material quality with which this sensation is inevitably associated. Dugald Stewart was to warn associationist aestheticians against 'that species of paralogism, to which logicians give the name of *reasoning in a circle*'.[22]

The truth is that the 'law' that Jeffrey invokes to avoid arbitrariness in aesthetic judgement is not an a priori, natural law at all, but a law he derives, a posteriori, from the *consensus gentium*. The confusion of a belief 'universally' held, on the one hand, with a law of nature on the other—what amounts to creative or legislative unanimity—is an ancient one: 'in every inquiry', declared Cicero, 'the unanimity of the races of the world must be regarded as a law of nature'.[23] Of course, even if there were unanimity it could not be regarded, *ipso facto*, as a law of nature. Besides, Jeffrey concedes the impossibility of unanimity; his reliance upon the *consensus gentium* here is rhetorical and political, rather than logical, and his position should then be compared with Vicesimus Knox, or with a less philosophical pragmatist such as Dr Johnson.

That an object only becomes beautiful by general consent, establishes Jeffrey's critical standards as quantitative, not qualitative. Because custom, as we saw, forms the basis of aesthetic response, so consensus becomes for Jeffrey the basis of aesthetic judgement. Any 'law' that he invokes is like the law of precedence that, as an advocate, he daily professed; which is to say, no *law* at all. Rather it is a compromise with the particularity of history and of human individuality, from which Jeffrey arrogates a power and a prerogative in criticism comparable with those of the judge in common law; 'a judge to whom the laws of poetry are paralleled with the laws of the land—crystallisations of the common sense and congealed experience of the ages', to quote Thomas Crawford.[24]

This brings me to my second point, which is simply that a subjective theory of aesthetic apprehension such as Jeffrey's translates into a primary critical concern with the audience. The reader's mind, his associations and expectations, becomes the object of critical interest and the measure of a work of art. The foundations here for a conspiracy of the reader and critic against the writer are obvious enough.

Critical theories concentrating on the reader were well established by the end of the eighteenth century, thanks both to associationist psychologists and

to Longinian critics. The great critical champion of 'the common voice of the multitude', however, neither followed 'Longinus' nor subscribed to a rigorous associationism; Dr Johnson invested the reader with an importance based on a uniformitarianism older than associationist psychology. As W. R. Keast has said, nature is defined for Johnson, 'not in terms of properties independent of the mind, but in terms of its capacity to produce certain responses in men'.[25] The same is true for Jeffrey.

The third and final point to be made about Jeffrey's article on Alison concerns his assumption that, as an aesthetic phenomenon, the object in nature is identical with the representation of the same object in a work of art. This is because Nature has, in one sense at least, assumed the role of art in his aesthetic. Beautiful or sublime natural objects have become representative or symbolic of something other than themselves: 'we feel indignation, or pity, or admiration, in consequence of seeing some piece of inanimate matter that merely suggests or recalls to us the ordinary causes or proper objects of these emotions' (p. 27). 'Reality', in other words—'the ordinary causes' of these emotions—is 'reflected' by the intervenient imagery of the natural world, which evokes attenuated versions of familiar emotions. To mediate between reality and the individual in this way has traditionally been considered the role of art.

The truth is, however, that Jeffrey fails theoretically to differentiate nature and art because in practice, more often than not, he fails to register any aesthetic difference between objects in a natural landscape and the same objects in a poem. The following passage from the review of James Grahame is typical:

> There is something irresistibly pleasing in the faithful representation of external nature, even in her simplest and most ordinary aspects. All men have interesting associations with dawnings and sunsets:—and the returns of summer and winter, as they indicate themselves upon the woods and waters, the mountains and fields of our home scenery, recal to every bosom a thousand impressions, more deep and touching than can usually be excited by objects far more new and extraordinary.[26]

Equally typical is the subtle *caveat* against innovation and eccentricity in the choice of poetic material. Some things are inherently poetical, others are not.

Finally and most importantly, therefore, he is reluctant to differentiate nature and art because he wants to use the identification, along with the compact between nature and the common reader, to discipline the artist.

III

As it turns out, it was Wordsworth himself who anticipated Jeffrey's conservative attacks on the 'fantastical sensibilities' of the Romantics,[27] inasmuch as it was Wordsworth who supplied Jeffrey with his central argument and

invoked all that Jeffrey had learned from Alison. In the Preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*, Wordsworth wrote:

> I am sensible that my associations must have sometimes been particular instead of general, and that, consequently, giving to things a false importance, sometimes from diseased impulses I may have written upon unworthy subjects.[28]

Taking his cue from this, Jeffrey began hounding Wordsworth through the early years of the nineteenth century. The following passage from Jeffrey's reviews of Wordsworth's *Poems in Two Volumes* makes explicit the prejudices and the associationist principles of his literary criticism:

> [T]he author before us really seems anxious to court . . . literary martyrdom by a device still more infallible,—we mean, that of connecting his most lofty, tender, or impassioned conceptions, with objects and incidents, which the greater part of his readers will probably persist in thinking low, silly, or uninteresting. . . . but it is certain, that, to most minds, such associations will always appear forced, strained, and unnatural; and that the composition in which it is attempted to exhibit them, will always have the air of parody, or ludicrous and affected singularity.[29]

IV

We are now in a position to return to the influence of Jeffrey's campaign against Wordsworth on the subsequent history of literature. Dissatisfied with Augustan élitism—with the exclusive social and educational refinements that were unapologetically demanded and endorsed by Augustan theories and Augustan literature—Wordsworth had begun by attempting to broaden the base of the poet republic and to make poetry more widely and abidingly relevant. The poet was a man speaking to men. Wordsworth's ideal of the poet was an articulate peasant, the Pedlar. Poetry *as an art* was adventitious.

The passage which Wordsworth interpolated into the Preface in 1802, however, betrays an ambivalence towards the poet's vocation: on the one hand, just as the poet's language had been humbled before the language of 'low and rustic life', so the poem is humbled before 'emanations of reality and truth'; on the other hand, the poet is exalted as a man 'endowed with a more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind'.[30] Even while Wordsworth struggled to identify himself as a poet of the people, in other words, he betrayed a consciousness—sometimes reluctant, sometimes priggish—of his own superiority. Eventually, when the Pedlar's history is largely subsumed by *The Prelude* and the idealized autobiographical element becomes explicit, the Poet supersedes the Peasant.

Later, from about 1807 onwards, the Miltonic prayer of 'fit audience find, though few' operates as a refrain in Wordsworth's discussions of the responsibilities of the poet, and the people whom the poet can expect to understand him become more and more exclusively those of a distant and more enlightened future.

It was to this exclusiveness—as I suggested above—and to its concomitant arrogance and isolationism, that Francis Jeffrey took such exception. Self-consciously representative of the contemporary reading public, Jeffrey affected no patience with a poetic that regarded popular disapproval only as evidence of the degraded taste of the populace. Nor was he prepared to tolerate what he saw as poetry that so flagrantly disregarded public expectation: 'Every feature which belongs to the situation, or marks the character in common apprehension, is scornfully discarded by Mr Wordsworth'.[31]

'Common apprehension'? With the evolution out of philosophy of the new 'science' of psychology (and psychopathology), came the eighteenth-century idea of the 'original genius': really a kind of different being from the rest of his species'.[32] The tautological term, or title, of 'original genius' was conferred upon those 'singular' individuals, of 'extraordinary sensibility' and with 'a more comprehensive soul', who were to legislate for the common man, either from the top of a new and quasi-spiritual hierarchy, or from the wilderness.

While associationist theories anatomized and encouraged the phenomenon, few, if any, convincingly distinguished the 'original sense' of genius on the one hand, from 'original nonsense' on the other (as did Kant);[33] fewer still approached Wordsworth's dream of creative originality empowering receptive originality, and thus creating the taste by which its products were to be enjoyed. One associationist's 'genial' sensibility was another's—was Jeffrey's, for example—bad or vicious taste: 'no taste is bad for any other reason than because it is peculiar' (p. 45). Jeffrey affirmed only those common, 'kindred impressions' to which 'the heart and the affections naturally vibrate in unison';[34] his aesthetics tended always towards what Santayana called 'the Idealization of the familiar',[35] just as associations themselves tended to generate and strengthen custom or habit.

So that even if Jeffrey had had the patience to explore the new idealist psychologies of creativity, he would still, surely, have felt as he did when writing to Carlyle in 1831: 'the more I see of philosophers and men of genius the more I am inclined to hold that the ordinary run of sensible, kind people, who fill the world, are after all the best specimens of humanity, and that the others are, like our cultivated flowers, but splendid monsters, and cases of showy disease'.[36] Jeffrey's attitude to the vaunted idiosyncrasy of genius betrays, besides an obvious conservatism, genuine anxieties.

The associations made by an individual are, by definition, accidental and singular—such unconstrained particularity is a condition of associationist mental activity. However, for Jeffrey, as we saw, the associations of 'the ordinary run of sensible, kind people' will coincide to form that semi-legalistic

con-sensus gentium upon which he relied for his critical standards. In this way is the particular identified with the general, which is nothing other than the mass coincidence of unconstrained particularities. This paradox of a consensuality of unique responses—that reconciliation of uniformitarianism with diversitarianism to which I alluded above—is at the centre of eighteenth-century aesthetics itself. 'Genius', on the other hand, with its 'affectation of singularity', threatened this ideological unanimity.

What Jeffrey's critical position represents is the coincidence of two, related movements in eighteenth-century thought. The first is, obviously, associationism—that peculiar hybrid of empirical philosophy and behavioural psychology. The second was the 'philosophy' of sensibility—if philosophy we can call it, given both the subjectivity of sentiment and the frequent modulation of sensibility into a cult of sentimentality. To the survival of this cult, Jeffrey's own criticism bears frequent witness; the tendency towards sentimentality is surely characteristic of an aesthetic that identifies beauty, *substantially*, with emotion. In so far as aesthetic apprehension originates in the sense impression, then the pursuit or cultivation of 'sensibility' was nothing other than a form of aestheticism; not art for its own and for life's sake, but sensation and emotion for their own and for life's sake.

Though no aesthete, Jeffrey was certainly a sentimentalist; more accurately, a sentimental authoritarian with no time for genius that operated 'too deep for tears'. To counteract a tendency which he interpreted as exclusive and socially divisive, Jeffrey adopted a position often extreme in its affected confusion and it its lack of sympathy. The conflict between Wordsworth and Jeffrey—between the avant-garde poet and the prevailing taste; between private vision and public demand—was perhaps archetypal. But it was certainly prophetic. Jeffrey apprehended a future in which the poet would be increasingly at odds with society, until finally alienated from it; in which the poet, despairing both of traditional values and of contemporary philistinism, would retreat into a bohemian coterie or an entirely private language and mythology. As early as 1886, Algernon Moncrieff believed that history had confirmed Jeffrey's apprehensions; that the ultimate result of the Romantic revolution was 'that poetry . . . has to a large extent ceased to be read'.[37] Jeffrey, it should also be said, helped to confirm that history.

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PHYSIOLOGY AS ART: NIETZSCHE ON FORM

Matthew Rampley

IN THIS paper[1] I shall be examining Nietzsche's critical reception of Kantian and post-Kantian aesthetics. I shall focus in particular on that element within Kant's writing which concerns itself with the problem of form, as it was taken up by subsequent thinkers and developed into what we recognize as formalist aesthetics in the work of Herbart, Hanslick, Fiedler, Hildebrand and so forth. As such I shall be arguing that Nietzsche makes his well-known, but seldom analysed claim that 'all art is applied physiology' in order to counter the constellation of formalist ideas which can be traced back to Kant's meditations on the relation of form to aesthetic experience.

I

Much of Nietzsche's mature writing on art, artists and aesthetics gains its identity from the tradition of thought it sets out to oppose, and this affects his critical aesthetics in particular. Amongst practising artists he singles out Wagner and Victor Hugo as targets, while the one philosopher who, for Nietzsche, embodies all the worst aspects in the history of philosophical aesthetics, is seen to be Kant. While in many other respects Nietzsche preserves a certain ambivalence towards Kant's Critical project, in the sphere of aesthetics his position is clear and unambiguous. In the third essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, for example, he accuses Kant of possessing the 'naïveté of a country parson' when dealing with precisely the question of art.[2] In *The Antichrist* §11 Nietzsche observes that 'Kant became an idiot' adding that Kant represents a 'mistaken instinct in everything and anything, the counter-natural as instinct, German décadence as philosophy.[3] In his private notes he is no less uncharitable to the great 'Chinaman of Königsberg' accusing him of 'clumsy pedantry and petty bourgeois manners',[4] concluding that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is 'already the embryonic form of cretinism'.[5]

Kant has not been without his defenders against the polemic of Nietzsche. Most notably, of course, Heidegger anxiously defends Kant against Nietzsche's criticisms, claiming instead that Nietzsche is reading Kant through his reception by Schopenhauer, itself a highly partial interpretation of the latter's aesthetics. More recently, other scholars such as Mihailo Djuric and

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Urs Heftrich have taken a similar line, defending Kant then arguing that in any case Nietzsche's criticisms are more relevant to the aesthetics of Schopenhauer than to those of Kant himself.[6]

On the whole these objections cannot be faulted, for as Heftrich demonstrates, many of Nietzsche's criticisms of notions such as disinterestedness and subjective universality are based on, at best, a careless reading of Kant, and almost certainly one that is shaped by the mediating figure of Schopenhauer. Indeed, while one might not wish to subscribe to Vaihinger's view that Nietzsche had no first-hand acquaintance with Kant at all, it is evident that he is guilty of a certain degree of 'poor philology' in his own reading of the earlier thinker.

I do not intend to discuss those precise areas where Nietzsche misreads Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, for this would be to duplicate the studies of Heftrich and Djuric. Moreover, such a detailed and in-depth analysis is, I would claim, missing the mark. If we ask ourselves why, in his criticism of aesthetics, Nietzsche latches on so fixedly to the work of Kant, we might find an answer in the fact that the name Kant in many ways stands as a sign, as a metonymic indicator of what Nietzsche perceives to be the tradition of aesthetics from Kant onwards. Hardly an unusual figure to choose, since Kant is significant as the founder of modern Aesthetics. Overturning the work of Wolff and Baumgarten, where aesthetics forms a subordinate discipline to the masculine rigour of logic, Kant relocates the discipline at the heart of philosophical thinking, and in many respects shapes the course of all subsequently enquiry into the subject.

Thus by reading Kant through the mediation of others, Nietzsche need not be seen as simply misreading him. Rather he can be seen as focusing on precisely those aspects of Kant which were important to Schopenhauer, to the Romantics, to Wagner, and, more importantly for the present paper, to the aesthetic of Formalism. As in his genealogical writings, Nietzsche is not so much concerned with the past *per se* as with the manner in which it has shaped the present. Turning to the specifics of Nietzsche's criticism of the aesthetic 'tradition', I shall focus on one key area of disagreement, namely Kant's much maligned and misunderstood notion of disinterestedness.

II

If we turn to disinterestedness, we have to distinguish between its initial formulation in Kant and its subsequent reception by the Romantics, Schopenhauer and so forth. When Kant says that 'Taste is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode of representation by means of a delight or aversion apart from any interest'[7] he is asserting that our concern with the aesthetic object is not one based on an interest in whether or not it actually exists. Hence he

is not claiming that we express no interest *per se* in the beautiful object, for in a later section (§42) of the Third Critique, he indicates the presence of a kind of interest in the object which he terms 'intellectual interest'. This interest, however, does not focus on the *existence* of the object, which would be the province of desire, but rather on its purely formal properties. This aspect of aesthetic judgement is central to Kant's project, since it is linked to his contention both that the beauty of an object is not related to an end and that the beautiful object pleases apart from any concept of what it is or should be. Both these latter claims, together with the notion of disinterestedness, thus dissociate the aesthetic object from considerations of means and ends, hence distinguishing the aesthetic experience of the object from the experience of it as something to be utilized. As a symbol of morality, the beautiful does engage our interest on one level, yet this 'intellectual' interest is to be distinguished from the interest in the object as a means to self-preservation or advancement. It is a distinction which allows us to understand why we can allow fictional events or objects to affect us while we know they do not actually exist, without having to resort to contemporary theories of art as a form of make-believe.[8]

However, by drawing a distinction between the aesthetic object (and this is increasingly equated with the work of art in writers after Kant) on the one hand, and the realm of the practical (i.e., of desire) on the other, Kant is laying himself open to the kind of appropriation which Schopenhauer makes of his work, once he has tranformed desire, or the Will, into a metaphysical principle. The subtle distinction between intellectual interest and desire is ignored in favour of a more simple opposition in Schopenhauer between willing and non-willing. The aesthetic experience is one devoid of all volition or interest in Schopenhauer, and hence an experience given a metaphysical significance it does not possess in Kant. Likewise, the beautiful object, in belonging to a sphere independent of the realm of utility, appeals to the Romantics as a site of resistance to the encroachment of the (conceptually bound) kingdom of means and ends.[9]

Following this development further we find the idea of the autonomy of art pursued to its most extreme conclusion in the musicology of Eduard Hanslick, and more prominently, the poets of *l'art pour l'art* such as Gautier and symbolists such as Mallarmé, who empty art of the moral content which even the Romantics had accorded it, transforming it into an enclosed sphere of self-reference. Attempting to free art from morality, such writers have, for Nietzsche, trivialized art, and it is Kant he criticizes for first proposing the idea of disinterested aesthetic experience. In *On the Genealogy of Morals* he mocks the contemporary belief in disinterestedness asserting that 'If our aestheticians never tire of claiming in Kant's favour, that spellbound by beauty one can even view undraped female statues "without interest", then one can laugh a little at their expense . . . in any case Pygmalion was not an "unaes-

thetic human".'[10] Further in the same section he notes Schopenhauer's indebtedness to this same idea, challenging the notion of will-less aesthetic experience with the observation that far from displaying no interest in the aesthetic experience, Schopenhauer was greatly interested in it, indeed positively craved it as a release from the blind mechanism of the Will. Hence in Nietzsche's eyes Schopenhauer's subscription to the idea of a will-less aesthetic experience is self-defeating, since the aesthetic is invested with a particular function or use value which enmeshes it within the system of means and ends, in short, the economy of desire, thus bringing it close to Stendhal's idea of an art that contains 'une promesse de bonheur'. It is this weakness in the entire notion of will-less aesthetic experience in Schopenhauer's philosophy which leads Nietzsche to demand that 'the aesthetics of "contemplation devoid of all interest" which is used today as a seductive guise for the emasculation of art', an aesthetics he equates with the Christian ethic of self-sacrifice, 'be questioned mercilessly and put on trial'.[11]

In *Twilight of the Idols* he devotes a substantial passage to a critique of the Modernism of *l'art pour l'art*, countering the desire of those artists who strive to free art from morality and hence render it 'purposeless, goal-less, senseless' with the following series of rhetorical questions: 'what does all art do? does it not praise? does it not glorify? does it not select? does it not bring to prominence? With all this it strengthens or weakens certain judgements of value . . . is this incidental? a coincidence?'[12]

Far from occupying a completely autonomous sphere of self-reference, art, in Nietzsche's thought, refers beyond itself to the world, inasmuch as it constitutes the material expression of a certain relation towards the world. As Nietzsche says, 'Art is the great stimulant to life: how could one conceive of it as without purpose, as goal-less, as l'art pour l'art?'[13] Yet although the specific opposition to *l'art pour l'art* is a product of Nietzsche's mature thought, brought about by his linking of art and will to power, its roots in his earlier writings can be traced without difficulty. In the first volume of *Human, All Too Human* art is already being seen as a process of world affirmation. In the section entitled 'From the Soul of the Artists and Writers' he writes that art has 'taught us for thousands of years to look upon life in every shape with interest and desire and to bring our feelings to the point where we finally shout: "however it is, life is good" '.[14] In the second book of *The Gay Science* Nietzsche offers a lengthy discussion of the origin of poetic metre and rhythm, which stands in clear opposition to the view of, say, Mallarmé, who proclaims that 'language speaks itself' (*la langue se parle*). Nietzsche claims that the use of rhythm in poetry originates in the ancient conviction that its use could enable humans to exercise some power over the gods. For it had long been recognized that music has 'the power to unload the affects, to purify the soul, to mollify the ferocia animi—and especially through the rhythmical in music'[15] and it was assumed that it would affect the gods in the same fashion. Hence

poetry finds its origin in invocations to the gods, attempting 'to compel them through rhythm and exercise a power over them'.[16]

The significance of this passage is not its observation that rhythm exercises power over human affectivity, for Nietzsche freely admits that Pythagoras had already understood this, and he would not be saying anything very interesting. Rather it is his claim, no matter how incorrect anthropologically and historically, that early humans used this awareness to try to control the gods. In other words, rhythm was utilized as a means of controlling the world, getting a purchase on it, and hence was intimately bound up with questions of means and ends, utility and desire. Thus although will to power has not yet been articulated in Nietzsche's work at this stage, art in the form of poetic rhythm is clearly motivated by will to power. It is a claim supported in the aphorism following the discussion of poetry, which discusses the beautiful. In this aphorism he asserts that 'Artists are always elevating—they do not do anything else—and moreover all those situations and things which are reputed to make a person feel good or great or drunk or merry or well and wise. These *select* things . . . are the objects of the artist.'[17] The states of being which the artist promotes are precisely those states engendered by will to power, and Nietzsche's emphasis on the selectivity of the artist will have important consequences for articulating the relation between will to power and his later aesthetic norm of Dionysian Classicism.

The notion of *l'art pour l'art*, stemming in Nietzsche's view from the Kantian idea of disinterestedness, functions as the corollary to 'that dangerous old conceptual fable, which has posited a "pure will-less, painless, atemporal subject of cognition"'.[18] Given Nietzsche's understanding of knowledge as interpretative will to power, with the pivotal role which the physiological plays in his account of interpretation, it is clear that he will find any notion of aesthetic experience based on such a conception of subjecthood quite unacceptable. Indeed, to further dissociate his own conception of aesthetic experience from the 'tradition', and hence to discredit the tradition, he applies his physiological language to the sphere of aesthetics too.

III

The physiology of art therefore plays a crucial function in this regard. It binds the notion of art, artistic creativity and aesthetic experience firmly to desire and willing. In other words, the relation between art and will to power, which in the middle works is left for the reader to construct, is made explicit in his mature thinking through their common grounding in the physiological.

The notebooks of 1887 and 1888, together with late works such as *Twilight of the Idols* and the essays on Wagner are abundant with references to the beautiful as a purely physiological phenomenon: pleasure in beautiful objects is a sexual pleasure, artistic creativity is a process of procreation, such that 'all

art . . . inflames desire',[19] and art 'reminds us of states of animal vigour; on the one hand it is an excess and outflow of blooming corporeality into the world of pictures and desires; on the other a stimulation of animal functions through pictures of and desire for heightened life'.[20] However, the link with will to power only becomes transparent if we recall that the notion of interpretative will to power is not limited in Nietzsche to the activity of just human subjects attempting to construct a meaningful environment within which to live, indeed within which living is rendered possible.

It is well known how Nietzsche seeks to outline the extent to which 'knowing' (i.e., interpreting) is shaped by the organic processes of the body. As Nietzsche says, 'It seems to me that what is generally attributed to the mind characterises the being of the organic: and in the highest functions of the mind I find merely a sublime type of organic function.'[21] Additionally, however, interpretative will to power can be seen, for Nietzsche, to be functioning at even the lowest level of organic life. As early as the first volume of *Human, All Too Human* (§18) Nietzsche discusses the manner in which the plant interprets its environment in order to enhance its own life. Against this background he views conscious interpretation as merely a sophisticated variety of this basic organic interpretative will to power. Organisms, no matter how primitive, further their life processes with intentional activity, such that Nietzsche can claim that 'propagation amongst amoebae seems to be throwing off ballast, a pure advantage. The excretion of useless material.'[22]

On the basis of such an understanding of the organic it is clear that art, as a physiological activity, must also be motivated not just by desire, but by interpretative desire for power. Beauty is, quite simply, that which enhances the feeling of power, that which best interprets and organizes the world. In a note from early 1887, Nietzsche writes '"Beauty" is for the artist something outside all orders of rank, because in beauty opposites are tamed; the highest sign of power, namely power over opposites; moreover, without tension—that violence is no longer needed; that everything follows, obeys, so easily and so pleasantly—that is what delights the artist's will to power'. Here we find cashed out in concrete terms *how* the beautiful promotes or delights will to power. It is because beauty represents a supreme act of organization and control over its elements, an act of mastery driven by will to mastery. Hence the meaning of Nietzsche's remarks on 'The artwork, where it appears without artist, e.g. as body, as organisation (Prussian officer corps, Jesuit order)'[24] becomes much clearer. The organizational perfection of both of these bodies inspires the goal of the interpretative process to gain ever increasing control over and organization of its environment.

Yet at this point one might object that Nietzsche's critique of the tradition of disinterestedness, which lays so much importance on the internal formal qualities of the aesthetic object, has in fact merely reaffirmed this understanding of the beautiful through its insistence on will to power as organization,

as purposive perfection. Indeed, Kant's claim that the beautiful displays a certain purposiveness without purpose, i.e., that the subject can project an internal finality onto the object, which then serves as the criterion of the object's beauty *qua* attainment of that end, is merely affirmed and reiterated by Nietzsche's own position.

Well, this objection, persuasive though it is, would be valid were it not for the fact that Nietzsche diverges quite markedly from Kant, Schopenhauer, Hanslick and so forth as regards what constitutes an aesthetic object or work of art. Nietzsche makes frequent appeals for a reorientation of aesthetics to take in the standpoint of the creator, a reorientation which involves, as a consequence, the transformation of the notion of 'how' or 'what' art actually *is*. This change in emphasis from examining the spectator's experience of the already present and static art work to analysing the creative activity of the artist is paralleled by a turn away from the notion of art as a collection of objects, ready-made and completed, and towards a conception of art as an event or an 'occurrence' (though not in the Heideggerian sense of 'Ereignis').

In making such a claim I am not pretending that Nietzsche ceases to refer to works of art, or asserting that he denies their existence as objects. Such a claim would be absurd since he discusses individual works throughout his career, from Boccaccio's *Decameron*[25] to Wagner's *Parsifal*[26] and Cervantes' *Don Quixote*.[27] What I am arguing, however, is that the significance of works of art lies less in the effect they have on the spectator, reader or listener *qua* static, finished totalities, than in their shaping of human affectivity as dynamic creations or achievements of the artist. In other words they count less as self-contained totalities (and here we see another manner in which Nietzsche departs from Kant and from Formalist aesthetics) than as the products of a particular impulse, in short, as the achievements of interpretative will to power, sublimated into the aesthetic drive. As Nietzsche argues in *Human, All Too Human*, 'so-called art proper, that of artworks, is just an appendage'.[28]

In dealing with the definition of the term 'Kunst' in Nietzsche an added confusion occurs in Nietzsche's willingness to use the word to describe not only products of the aesthetic drive but also those objects which are institutionally defined as art, yet which Nietzsche regards as fundamentally non-aesthetic. The most obvious example is opera, which he considers to be an essentially inartistic phenomenon (see *The Birth of Tragedy* §19ff.). So too in *Human, All Too Human* I§220 there is a curious discussion of 'The Beyond in Art' which notes the existence of art forms which promote a sense of the transcendent, then concludes, 'A stirring saga will emerge from this, that there once existed such an art, such an artistic belief'.[29] Nietzsche's conclusion thus suggests that he terms these works of art out of deference to common consent rather than any personal approval of their content.

Despite this difficulty one can nevertheless argue that for Nietzsche art and the power of formal organization which characterizes the beautiful work of

art count less for themselves than for their significance as exemplifications of the will to power which pervades all life processes. Hence he is trying to bridge the gap which he sees as having sprung up, separating art from life, the beautiful from the interests it serves. A gap which originates in a sundering of the interest in artistic form from the more general interest in furthering the process of life.

If we take into account Nietzsche's understanding of the beautiful as an exemplification of interpretative will to power it requires no great leap of intuition to grasp his preference for classical taste, which we see in his so-called 'Dionysian Classicism', and furthermore to understand his antipathy towards Romanticism. Romanticism is characterized in Nietzsche's eyes by a lack of organization and discipline; like Wagner's 'unendliche Melodie' it is a product of the feeble spirit unable to exercise control over either itself or its material, whereas the Classical (and by this Nietzsche frequently means the neo-Classicism of Poussin or of the eighteenth century rather than just Classical Antiquity) is the product of a strong organizational drive.[30]

In the second volume of *Human, All Too Human*, for example, Nietzsche makes a distinction between Classicism and Romanticism with strength as the distinguishing criterion, writing that 'Both classically and romantically minded spirits . . . contemplate a vision of the future: but the former do it on the basis of the strengths of their time, and the latter on the basis of its weakness'.[31]

In *The Gay Science* (§370) Nietzsche offers a fuller distinction between an active and a reactive creative principle, once again on the basis of whether an enfeebled reactive desire for absolution motivates the artistic drive, or whether it is instead animated by an active superabundant power, in short, *amor fati*. Nietzsche claims, 'Every art, every philosophy can be seen as a means to healing and help in the service of growing, struggling life: they always presuppose suffering and sufferers. Yet there are two kinds of sufferers, on the one hand those who suffer from superabundance of life . . . and on the other those who suffer from an impoverishment of life . . . who seek peace, calm . . . redemption from themselves through art.'[32] Art can serve as a means to revenge against life, and hence the mimesis of suffering only goes towards strengthening Romantic pessimism, but it can also represent suffering in order to overcome it, subsequently to affirm suffering and the world in general, as is the case with Greek tragedy. The artistic representation of suffering is an ambivalent praxis, which, like Nihilism, can be employed in both an active and reactive sense.[33] As active it can be the work of 'the forward striving spirit',[34] where will to power interprets and gathers up ever more, where 'opposites are tamed', and yet where the contingent nature of that interpretation is recognized and in addition celebrated. As reactive it can be the product of the 'disinherited' spirit, whose faith in the 'tree of knowledge'[35] has been shattered, yet refuses to face up to the task of accepting responsibility for the

creation of new values, either clinging to a residual faith in the notion of an autonomous, objective truth to the world, or seeking to annihilate all values. In these responses art is used either to confirm the belief in an objective 'order of things' (in this regard one might think of nineteenth-century Realism, where the artist putatively erases his own subjectivity by 'giving himself over' to the real) or as a means to transcend, and ultimately escape from, the terrifying abyss of nothingness (here one might interpret the work of Newman or Rothko as constituting an enactment of this kind of response).

In his later notes from 1887, Nietzsche explicitly equates the difference between active and reactive with that between the Classical and Romantic styles, with, once again, the function of will to power as organization acting as the criterion for distinguishing the two. In a note from Autumn 1887 he asks whether 'the opposition between active and reactive does not lie hidden behind the opposition of Classical and Romantic',[36] and in a later note entitled 'Aesthetica' from the same notebook Nietzsche writes 'In order to be Classical one must possess *all* the strong, apparently contradictory gifts and desires: but such that they go together beneath the one yoke'.[37] In contrast, one of Nietzsche's main criticisms of Romanticism in his symptomatological analysis of Modernity, is its lack of organizing power. In Romanticism he observes 'the will to unity . . . but the inability to let it exercise tyranny in the most important thing, namely with regard to the work itself',[38] and it is a criticism Nietzsche repeats in his attacks on Wagner.[39] In other words, Romanticism is a sign of enfeebled will to power.

Nietzsche's physiological critique of Kantian disinterestedness may be flawed inasmuch as it addresses issues which are not to be found in the text of Kant himself, but its significance lies in laying the groundwork for his own attempt to locate art firmly within the network of interests which go to characterize organic life's engagement with the world. As Nietzsche says, 'At bottom, Man reflects himself in things, he considers everything to be beautiful that throws back his own image.'[40]

IV

In this paper I have thus outlined Nietzsche's critique of one element in Kant's aesthetics, on the basis of which a more general criticism can be made of Formalism. Nietzsche focuses on the issue of disinterestedness, its subsequent history and all the consequent assumptions which depend on the idea in order to put forward a conception of art fundamentally opposed to everything the 'tradition' has taken art to be. Admittedly, Nietzsche does appear to share with Kant the conviction that the formal aspect of the beautiful, and with this word Nietzsche invariably implies beautiful art, is the most significant. Beauty is the power to organize, to arrange, to exert control, and hence his appropriation of the classical as an aesthetic norm. However, he goes further by

attempting to understand *why* a certain formal configuration should be perceived as beautiful. Far from accepting Kant's separation of intellectual interest (i.e., that interest in the object of aesthetic judgement which is disinterested) from the more general interest in the realm of the practical, Nietzsche instead sees aesthetic interest as an analogue of desire, and artistic beauty as an analogue of will to power. As an analogue of will to power, art represents a mode of seeing-as, of seeing the world *as* perfect, *as* simplified *as* organized in a certain way. It is driven by a compulsion-to-*transform* ['Verwandelnmüssen'] the world.

The more general application of Nietzsche's criticism of Kant can be seen when we set it against a similar criticism of Formalist aesthetics by the tradition of Marxist aesthetics and the sociology of art. Such analysis shares with Nietzsche the conviction that questions of beauty and taste, indeed the very notion of art itself, are shaped by a certain set of interests. A recent work in this tradition, namely Bourdieu's *Distinction*[41] claims that the very space of the aesthetic is constructed to serve the specific interests of the bourgeoisie, by whom all discourse concerning the aesthetic is governed. Here too we see criticized the notion that beauty and judgements concerning beauty are formed on the basis of a disinterested perception of the formal elements of the objective configuration or manifold. To this extent Nietzsche would be in agreement with Bourdieu, i.e., that a certain function can, indeed must, be ascribed to art within the social sphere, though without reducing this functionality to a matter of mere utilitarianism. However, beyond this point Nietzsche's thinking diverges considerably from that of Bourdieu or any other strictly Marxist analysis. For implicit in Bourdieu's thinking is the idea that once the ideology of the aesthetic has been defrocked, once the contemporary norm of beauty has been revealed as 'that which is beautiful for the bourgeoisie', the question of art will then be open to an authentic understanding. It will then be possible to release art from its subservience to a particular political goal, whereby the idea of art will also be extended to encompass not the high art of bourgeois taste but also popular culture.

On this very point Nietzsche's thinking refuses such utopianism. First, his more general project demands a thinking of social relations on lines other than those of class and property; the social analysis that runs throughout his writings employs terms such as reactive and active, weak and strong, slave and free spirit. Second, Nietzsche would claim that releasing art and the aesthetic from their appropriation by the bourgeoisie does not constitute their liberation from all interest *per se*. Rather it is an act itself performed to further some end, i.e., to serve some interests which are merely other than those prevailing at the present time. The reason for this is quite simply that the question of art and the aesthetic forms an integral part of the wider process of symbolic activity, of world-making and interpretative world-constitution, processes which occur at a level more fundamental than that determined by class. For

Nietzsche, aesthetic judgement functions as the criterion according to which will to power interprets the world in one way and not in another, hence any goal of a systematic, scientific world understanding will always already be pre-empted by the demands of aesthetic sensibility.

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[3] KSA 6, pp. 177–8.

[4] KSA 11: 26[96], p. 175.

[5] KSA 13: 16[55], p. 504.

[6] See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, trans. David Krell (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991), Vol. I, 'The Will to power as Art', §15, 'Kant's Doctrine of the Beautiful. Its Misinterpretation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche'; Mihailo Djuric, *Nietzsche und die Metaphysik* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), pp. 209–22, and Urs Heftrich, 'Nietzsches Auseinandersetzung mit der "Kritik der Ästhetischen Urteilskraft"' in *Nietzsche Studien*, Vol. 20 (1991).

[7] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. G. Meredith (Oxford U.P., 1952), §5.

[8] See Kendall Walton's book *Mimesis as Make-believe* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1990), which proposes the curious notion that fiction is a game of make-believe into which the spectator knowingly enters, and that emotional responses to what are known to be fictional events are in fact 'pretend' responses. Note the assumption in his account that we are always in control, always somehow able to manipulate the situation as we wish.

[9] For a good general account of the Romantics' reception of Kant's aesthetics, and in particular of his exposition of the four modalities of aesthetic experience, see Manfred Frank, *Einführung in die frühromantische Ästhetik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), especially lectures 4–9.

[10] KSA 5, p. 347. In linking aesthetic experience to sexuality this passage, and other similar ones cited below, also open up the question of the gender of the aesthetic subject. Amongst recent commentators Jacques Derrida is the only one to have paid much attention to Nietzsche's concern with the relation of gender, more specifically woman, to representation and production. See Derrida, *Spurs. Nietzsche's Styles*, trans. B. Harlow (University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 75ff. Derrida's foregrounding of Nietzsche's concern with the relation of woman, truth and castration recalls Nietzsche's claim that Kantian aesthetics, through neglecting the constitutive function of desire and will to power in the matter of taste, represents an 'emasculation' [Entmännlichung] of art.

[11] KSA 5, p. 52.

[12] KSA 6, p. 127.

[13] KSA 6, p. 127.

[14] KSA 2, p. 185.

[15] KSA 3, pp. 440–1.

[16] Ibid.

[17] KSA 3, pp. 442–3.

[18] KSA 5, p. 365.

[19] KSA 13: 14[119], p. 296.

[20] KSA 12: 9[102], p. 394.

[21] KSA 11: 25[356], p. 106.

[22] KSA 12: 10[13], p. 461.

[23] KSA 12: 7[3], p. 258.

[24] KSA 12: 2[114], p. 118.

[25] KSA 7: 7[9], p. 138.

[26] E.g. KSA 5, pp. 242ff.

[27] '"Don Quixote" is one of the most harmful of books' (KSA 8: 8[7], p. 130).

[28] KSA 2, p. 454.

[29] KSA 2, p. 180.

[30] It is important to take note of Ernst Behler's observations in his 'Nietzsche und die Frühromantische Schule', *Nietzsche Studien*, Vol. 7 (1978), that Nietzsche's concept of Romanticism is on the whole limited to the 'late' Romanticism of mid-nineteenth-century France, the primary figure being Victor Hugo, rather than the work of the early Romantics in Germany. On Nietzsche's turn to Classicism, see Adrian del Caro, 'Dionysian Classicism, or Nietzsche's Appropriation of an Aesthetic Norm' in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 50 (1989).

[31] KSA 2, p. 652.

[32] KSA 3, p. 621.

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[34] KSA 12: 9[166], p. 434.

[35] KSA 5, p. 99.

[36] KSA 12: 9[112], p. 400.

[37] KSA 12: 9[166], p. 433.

[38] KSA 13: 11[312], p. 132.

[39] See, for example, *The Case of Wagner*, §7 (KSA 6, p. 27), and 2nd Postscript (ibid., p. 47).

[40] KSA 6, p. 123.

[41] Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction*, trans. R. Nice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1984).

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THE CONTINGENCY OF CUTENESS: A REPLY TO SANDERS

John Morreall

IN HIS critique of my article 'Cuteness', John Sanders argues that my treatment of the distinctively babyish features which get infants noticed and cared for by adults 'is, if not an altogether fallacious way of explaining the matter, at least an extremely misleading one'.[1] The guiding hypothesis in my article, as Sanders noted, was that 'in the evolution of our mammalian ancestors, the recognition and appreciation of the specialness of the young had survival value for the species. And so certain features evolved in the young which got them noticed and appreciated; these features constitute cuteness'.[2] The babyish features I discussed were drawn from the research of ethologist Konrad Lorenz: overall smallness; large head, forehead and eyes; round protruding cheeks; rounded body shape; short thick extremities; soft body surfaces; and behaviour indicating weakness and clumsiness.

From my explanation of cuteness, Sanders concluded that I held four theses: that cuteness is (1) a characteristic set of features now common among human infants; (2) a set of features which the infant offspring of our mammalian ancestors once lacked; (3) a set of features which was attractive to adult members of our ancestor species independently of the fact that infants had them; and (4) a set of features which was selected specifically because of this attractiveness (p. 162). Sanders objects to all four theses.

I did not, however, claim or imply (3) or (4). I agree with Sanders that it is highly unlikely that early mammals found large heads, clumsy behaviour, etc., attractive *before* these became typical features of the young. The view that Sanders attributes to me, that 'infants *acquired* a certain look because of its independent ability to attract and please adults of the species' (p. 163) is not mine. What I said was that at a certain stage in evolution, young mammals developed distinctively babyish features which served as 'releasing stimuli' for affectionate behaviour from adults. These features had survival value and were passed on to succeeding generations. Earlier animals such as insects and reptiles, whose young needed no parental care, did not develop such features.

Sanders's objections to (1) and (2) require more comment. I do hold (1), that cuteness today is a particular set of visual features. But I do not hold this to be a necessary truth as Sanders implies; I hold it to be a contingent truth.

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He writes, 'While it is no doubt true that cuteness in humans may now be identified with some such set as the one mentioned in (1), there is nothing essential about the link between any particular set of features and "cuteness"; no set of features is intrinsically "cute"' (p. 163). I agree: mammals might have evolved differently, so that some other features in infants were the distinctively babyish ones. On another planet right now, indeed, cuteness for some species may consist of having a bright green exoskeleton or flattened gelatinous tentacles. I was not trying to give cuteness *ontic* status, as Sanders implies (p. 164); clearly it has only *functional* status. Cuteness is visual features which get some biological job done—the nurturing of the young.

This explanation also helps clear up my position on (2). Sanders rightly points out that earlier in evolution, other features than those we today call cute may have made infant animals attractive to their parents. From that fact he wants to call into question (2), that cuteness is a particular set of features which the infant offspring of our mammalian ancestors once lacked. What I was claiming in the passages from which Sanders derived (2) was simply that at some stage in evolution, when parental care of the young became important, visual features made infants attractive to adults, and before that time there were no cute features. Our invertebrate ancestors, for example, had no need of cuteness. Throughout my article I focused on the features which constitute cuteness in human babies today, but I did not deny that other features may have constituted cuteness at earlier stages of evolution.

The gist of Sanders's objections to theses (1) and (2), then, is that the identity between cuteness and the particular set of features that are cute in contemporary human babies is only a contingent relation. Since I agree, his objections are misplaced.

Leaving aside our points of agreement, let me now consider a necessity claim which Sanders makes and I reject: that infants *had* to be cute. He complains that 'it is too easy to infer from Morreall's line of reasoning . . . that infants *in general* might conceivably never have developed cuteness' (p. 162). That in fact *is* my view; against it he argues that children are cute by necessity. Sometimes he makes the necessity sound logical, sometimes biological. In the logical argument he makes babies cute by definition. 'For children, as a *general* rule, to be unusual, would be a logical impossibility. But for the same reason it would be impossible, as a general rule, for children to be uncute. Cuteness *is* just the attribute of looking like an infant (whatever it is that infants look like)' (pp. 162–3). At the end of his article, Sanders says that 'Anything that *is* typical of infants, within any species that requires extensive nurture of parents for young, is definitive of cuteness for that species' (p. 164). But this simple identification of cuteness with all the features babies generally have is incorrect. Babies' bilateral symmetry and their opposable thumbs, for instance, are not cute. Not even all of their distinctively babyish features are cute—consider their tendency to vomit without warning. Cuteness *is not*

'anything that is typical of infants'. Cute features, rather, are the distinctively babyish features which elicit nurturing behaviour in adults.

Sanders also offers a biological argument that babies are cute by necessity, according to which animals that need a great deal of care in infancy 'must always be disposed favourably to babyish looking creatures'. If they had not been so disposed, Sanders asks, 'How could the raising of such infants ever have got going?' (p. 164). But this claim of biological necessity for cuteness overlooks the other ways in which parents are or might have been motivated to nurture their offspring, aside from visual attraction. The releasing stimuli for nurturing behaviour might have been solely auditory or olfactory, for example. In many species today the young elicit nurturing from parents primarily by special calls or odours; in species such as moles visual stimuli play virtually no role in nurturing. And nurturing can be motivated independently of how the young look, sound, or smell. A human mother now is motivated to cuddle and nurse her infant by the hormone oxytocin secreted by her pituitary gland. In a world where young humans lacked babyish features to attract adults, they might still have been nurtured by parents with the appropriate hormones in their bloodstreams.

Cuteness is a powerful mechanism, to conclude, but it is neither a logical nor a biological necessity that babies are cute.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Definitions of Art. By STEPHEN DAVIES. Cornell U.P. 1991. pp. 243. $12.95; clothbound, $31.50.

MARCELL DUCHAMP'S outrageous *Fountain*—an upended urinal with the attribution 'R. Mutt 1917' scrawled graffiti-like on its side—has long been the centrepiece for philosophers' discussions of the definition of art. In aesthetics circles, it can sometimes seem that what you say about *Fountain* becomes criterial for what you think about art in general. Art historians, in my experience, find this emphasis puzzling; for although they acknowledge the importance of Duchamp in the development of twentieth-century art they tend not to credit *Fountain*, or the other 'readymades', with such universal significance. Part of the reason is that art historians spend little time discussing the *definition* of art, which perforce they must accept as given. Another more interesting reason, though, is that Duchamp's readymades acquire their significance in the history of modern art *independently of the question whether they merit the label 'works of art' themselves.* The iconoclastic *act* of exhibiting *Fountain*, along with Duchamp's intellectual rationalization of that act, made possible certain kinds of works which undoubtedly do merit the label 'art'—but it doesn't follow that what Duchamp did was thereby create a work of art in that act. The legendary figure who picked up the football and ran with it no doubt features in every history of rugby but in that act he was not playing rugby himself.

Stephen Davies's acute and comprehensive analysis of modern attempts to define art keeps returning to *Fountain* as an 'intuition-pump' to test different theories. And, sure enough, all the main positions do seem forced to take a stand on Duchamp. Even those—like Morris Weitz—who try to warn us off any attempt to define art can find support in *Fountain* for the view that there is no settled *conception* of art to define. Suppose, though, in forsaking intrinsic features as constitutive of art, you think instead that art is to be defined in terms of its *function* in human lives, in particular the function of producing a certain kind of pleasure (or pleasurable experience). Then you confront *Fountain*. How can a plain, and unsightly, urinal possibly fulfil any of the functions associated with art? Davies quotes an impassioned rejection of *Fountain* as art by Monroe Beardsley, the principal proponent of the 'functionalist' approach, who defines art in terms of a capacity to afford aesthetic experience. But must the functionalist automatically exclude *Fountain*? Who's to say that this 'work' cannot afford such an experience? Perhaps by being exhibited in a gallery (upended, with a signature) the urinal acquires aesthetic properties, invoked by being looked at from an aesthetic perspective, which it would not have in its more mundane setting. Already we are forced to reconsider the notion of an 'aesthetic experience'. But can *Fountain* be a *work* of art when it seems to involve no 'creation' or making (at least by Duchamp)? Davies offers subtle arguments to show that works of art don't strictly need to be *artefacts* as such; after all, pieces of driftwood, suitably displayed, can be art works without any alteration of their physical form.

While functionalists tend to reject *Fountain* as art, other theorists—such as Danto and Dickie—who emphasize the conferring of art status on objects through institutional procedures will be better disposed to accepting it as a work of art. After all, it was exhibited by an established artist, photographs of it appear in standard histories of art, its influence on subsequent works is undisputed, and it is endlessly discussed by . . . well, aestheticians. This is a strong prima-facie argument for accepting it as a work of art with a place in an artistic tradition. But even these 'proceduralists', as Davies calls them, have to admit that *Fountain* is a hard

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case because it fails on so many other paradigmatic features: it has little aesthetic merit, it is not the product of skill or creativity, it doesn't afford much aesthetic satisfaction, and it is not initiated by an appropriate artistic intention.

Davies's book is a careful and judicious weighing of the issues between the functionalist and the proceduralist camps. He himself comes down in the end on the proceduralist side but is even-handed, by and large, in assessing the arguments. His principal criticism of functionalism is that (many of) the aesthetic properties that the functionalist might draw attention to as indicative of art status in fact *presuppose* the prior acceptance of the work as art. In other words, only when art status has been institutionally conferred on an object will certain kinds of aesthetic properties emerge. 'As a urinal Duchamp's *Fountain* shares its properties . . . with other porcelainery; as an artwork it shares its properties with marble statues' (p. 67). This idea of 'emergent' properties is absolutely crucial to an understanding of art (including literature).

But the idea of art cannot be divorced from *value* and that at best complicates proceduralist accounts. Having emergent aesthetic properties is necessary but not yet sufficient for art; those properties must yield an interest, or reward a certain kind of attention, if their presence is to signal an art work. An object must merit the institutional conferring of art status on it or it simply fails as a work of art. Part of the reason why *Fountain* is so dubiously classified as art is that—even granted its institutional credentials—it doesn't earn the right to have the appropriate aesthetic attention bestowed on it. What this suggests is that functionalist considerations are perhaps more inextricably linked to institutional procedures—involving the *successful* conferring of art status—than Davies's otherwise attractive dichotomy might imply. And what about *Fountain*'s institutional credentials? There are different ways in which the institution of the Artworld can confer significance on an object, without thereby making the object a work of art. This points to at least two different kinds of value recognized by the Artworld: the value of an object or event in the history of art, as a contributor to its development, and the value of an object or event as a work of art. Normally these are co-extensive: but the interest of *Fountain*, I believe, is that it shows they need not be.

All in all, Davies has done an exemplary job sifting and adjudicating the huge volume of material on this perplexing topic. It is hard to imagine a better introduction to the problems. But more than that, his careful delineation of his own position has surely earned canonical status in the ongoing debate.

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Philosophical Aesthetics: An Introduction. Edited by OSWALD HANFLING. Blackwell in association with the Open University. 1992. pp. 483. £10.95; clothbound, £35.00.

THIS VOLUME is part of the Open University's course on 'Philosophy of the Arts', which also includes two Readers published internally by the Open University: *Theories of Art and Beauty*, ed. Robert Wilkinson, and *Art: Context and Value*, ed. Stuart Sim. It has been widely publicized, even to the point of sending copies to academics in the field, and is clearly regarded by the publishers as a textbook of some importance.

Aesthetics is a difficult area of philosophy or, at any rate, one which is unsuitable for beginners, and this reviewer cannot be the only teacher who attempts to discourage undergraduates from doing it, with regrettably little effect. Fortunately, a number of good introductory textbooks have appeared from time to time, with M. C. Beardsley's *Aesthetics* (1958) being, even yet, something of a heavyweight champion, in more than one sense of the metaphor. This new introduction, however, deserves to be a winner. If it does not exactly supersede all previous introductions, it can reasonably be regarded, for the present at any rate, as some kind of *primus inter pares*.

The book contains eleven essays, subdivided under four headings: (i) what is art? (ii) art and feeling; (iii) art, world and society; (iv) art and value. The three essays in the first category, all by Oswald Hanfling, are entitled 'The Problem of Definition', 'Aesthetic Qualities', and 'The Ontology of Art'. Together, they constitute a short introduction to current English-language

aesthetics almost by themselves. He comprehensively surveys all of the relevant debates without excessive simplification, and writes at just the right level for beginners working under supervision. There is appended to each of the essays, as there is to all of the essays in the book, a bibliography of works referred to, which serves also as a guide to further reading.

In the second section, Diané Collinson surveys a number of descriptions and theories of aesthetic experience. This is a tricky area, which many teachers shy away from. Some might even feel that philosophy has little to say on the matter. The Collinson essay, however, shows convincingly that aesthetic experience has been a topic in philosophical aesthetics since its beginnings, and that, from Kant onwards, it has moved closer to the centre. Robert Wilkinson focuses on the notion of expression as an aesthetic concept. Expression is an idea which we seem unable to do without, but which never seems to sustain a satisfactory definition or explanation. Wilkinson pursues some of its manifestations, most impressively in his account of Hanslick on music, and shows, again, that it is a concept with philosophical character and weight.

The third section contains an essay by Rosalind Hursthouse on truth and representation, and one by Tom Sorrell on art, society, and morality. Hursthouse's is a model of its kind. She establishes the framework of debate in a discussion of Plato and Aristotle, and then concentrates on recent discussions of pictorial representation and truth in literature. Sorrell demonstrates the same kind of breadth in an essay which faces the difficulty of having to avoid Marxism, since this is written about in a later essay. Instead, he ranges across Plato, Shaftesbury, Tolstoy, Wilde, and Flannery O'Connor, and concludes with an interesting discussion of whether the concept and experience of the aesthetic are socially determined.

The final section includes two essays by Colin Lyas on the nature of art criticism. One concentrates on the problem of aesthetic value judgements, in particular their relation to non-aesthetic descriptions of works of art and the question of whether they are objective or subjective. Lyas's other essay deals primarily with the kind of evidence that can be marshalled in support of critical and interpretative judgements of art, in particular evidence related to the artist and his intentions.

The final two essays in the section, and in the book, are written by Stuart Sim. One is a survey of structuralist, post-structuralist, and post-modernist theories of art and the aesthetic. The other is a survey of Marxist aesthetics. It is only with these two contributions that the reader is moved away, in any serious degree, from philosophical aesthetics in an Anglo-American mode. This may possibly seem a limitation on the book's cultural outreach. Limitation or not, however, it implies a recognition of a problem that painfully confronts students and teachers in most British Universities, namely, the availability of books.

No book, even if it is as worthy as this one, can expect to emerge from a review unscathed, nor to be presented to students without warnings attached. Oswald Hanfling, for instance, is excessively Wittgensteinian in his discussion of the definition of art. His paradigm case conception of such definition (first expounded by Paul Ziff in his 'Art and the "Object of Art"') seems to me to misconceive both the nature of definition and, more importantly, the role of definitions in human discourse. Stuart Sim's account of structuralist thought and structuralist aesthetics tries to cram far too much into the available space, and far more than is reasonable in an elementary introduction. No doubt other teachers will have their own quibbles, and guide their students accordingly. There is physical evidence, also, to suggest that the essays by Hursthouse and Sorrell were inserted late in the book production process, and the second of Lyas's essays is marred by typesetting errors.

Quibbles aside, however, it is an excellent book of its kind, and one which I intend to adopt as a set textbook. Not the least of its merits is that, despite its length, and even though it incorporates several plates, four of them in colour, it is within the price range that students (and, nowadays, academics) can afford.

HUGH BREDIN

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Understanding the Arts: Contemporary Scandinavian Aesthetics. Edited by JEANETTE EMT and GÖRAN HERMERÉN. Lund U.P.; Chartwell-Bratt, Bromley, Kent. 1992. pp. 288. Paperbound, no price given.

THERE IS always a case against publishing collections of this sort. It is that the contributions do not usually undergo the kind of scrutiny which is a precondition of publication in the more highly rated philosophical journals. In fact this collection, which concentrates on literary aesthetics, generally reaches a high standard and if I concentrate my attention on one or two papers it is not because I think the others unworthy. In cases I found them extremely persuasive.

One paper in particular argues a position which most readers of this journal will find disconcerting. Hans Mathlein and Torbjörn Tännsjö advocate what they call 'aesthetic nihilism'. The argument, clear and uncomplicated, is that since there are no reasons to believe in such things as intrinsic aesthetic values, by which they mean aesthetic values *in re*, it is not true that any one work of art is better than another nor are any two of equal value. All aesthetic judgements are false. (This is a little hasty; the authors seem to think that all aesthetic judgements are judgements of value.) The only way in which they might be true is if we take the 'plausible' option that a difference of opinion is an empirical issue in that the best works of art are those which have the capacity to generate pleasurable experiences. To illustrate this they take a Leonardo and a sentimental picture by Brogelin currently popular in Sweden. (It is oddly comforting to find that poor taste is endemic in other nations as well as the British.) I will not elaborate the argument; any reader can fill it in; it is that criteria of value in the arts are unclear and conflict.

Readers might find this a useful paper to put into the hands of beginning students. It is oddly unsophisticated; there is no mention of assent or consensus theories which, after all, have been around for centuries. But it testifies to the fact that the most useful papers are often those which state preposterous theories with clarity and brevity. This succeeds on all counts.

The other papers are, by contrast, models of sobriety and decorum though Stein Haugom Olsen, in the course of an interesting if polemical piece on atheoretical criticism and theoretical criticism, is justifiably waspish about some literary theorists. There are several useful papers on literary interpretation and intention, a valuable account of recent work on metaphor, and a careful and acute piece by Simo Säätelä on the misuse of Kuhnian ideas in the arts. Jeanette Emt defends an abstract-entity account of fictional characters against allies and critics alike.

All in all the collection illustrates the healthy state of Nordic aesthetics. I will end by remarking, not for the first time, the sobering fact that Scandinavians, for whom English is not a first language, often write clearer and more elegant English than many native speakers.

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Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XVI: Philosophy and the Arts. Edited by PETER A. FRENCH, THEODORE E. UEHLING, JR, and HOWARD H. WETTSTEIN. University of Notre Dame Press. 1991. pp. 450. $21.95; clothbound $49.95.

COLLECTIONS OF essays on aesthetics are needed if the subject is to consolidate its position as an intellectually exciting branch of philosophy. They help provide a background of work from which new work can grow and to which new work can be compared. This collection, one of a respected and well-established series, is, therefore, welcome. What of the essays themselves? Do they convey a sense of a subject on the march, at the forefront of philosophical enquiry?

Whilst acknowledging that the collection is entitled 'Philosophy and the Arts' not 'Philosophical Aesthetics', my tentative judgement is that they do not. With various exceptions and qualifications, I received the impression that aesthetics still, as it were, rises between two stools: loose philosophizing is excused because the writer is writing about art and the lack of substantial thought about art is excused because the writer is writing philosophy. The philosophy fell short in some of the essays in

three ways. First, in the use of insufficiently detailed arguments from literary theory to make points in the philosophy of mind or language. Second, in a tendency to make a wild metaphysical point in an urbane manner without providing the substantial philosophical back-up that is needed to make mentioning it worth while. Finally, the common avowal that aesthetics must both take from the best of other branches of philosophy and keep up with the most recent is not always borne out in practice.

The variations in quality and subject-matter of the essays make it probable both that the collection as a whole will seem slightly unsatisfactory, and that it will have something of interest for every reader. The first of the twenty-nine essays is by Davidson, on Joyce and language; Josef Stern, in turn, contributes a thorough and interesting essay on Davidson on metaphor. There follows an essay on Aristotle; several of 'substantive aesthetics', including some ruminations on ethics; a number on topics in 'analytic aesthetics' including beauty, representation, interpretation, originality, jokes and art; and then, following a plea for proportion in architecture, a section on music, and finally a study of the temporal in art.

Two essays I have selected for closer scrutiny are by Nicholas Wolterstorff and Colin Radford. Wolterstorff's essay is a reaction to Kendall Walton's claim that something is a representation if it plays a certain role in appreciator's activities; that is, its function is to provide props in games of 'make-believe'. This contrasts with Wolterstorff's own view that performing the illocutionary action of inviting to imagine is composing a fiction, and that when one performs this by composing or presenting an object, one represents. Wolterstorff's skilful dismantling of Walton's arguments against theories of representation based on intention does not lead him to dismiss Walton's own account, however. Rather, he claims that a full account of representation will draw on both accounts: with some texts what we imagine is linked to the text via authorial intention, with others via the rules of the appropriate game of make-believe. There is, in addition, Wolterstorff suggests, another way: often certain purposes determine the link between the text and our imaginings. For example, it is often the purposes of the community which select the states of affairs to be associated with scriptural texts as what they are saying.

I am unhappy with Wolterstorff's liberal approach here. The role of social purposes in representation seems to me analogous to that of public opinion in the courts of law. Public opinion might make it the case that a conviction *is* secured by due process of law, but it is not itself such a process. Similarly, social purposes might make it the case that a text is associated with one state of affairs and not another, but it is not itself a contribution to representation. Furthermore, the argument for linking representation to intention is surely strong enough to warrant seeing cases of representation without intention as parasitic—'as if' they were produced with intention.

There is also a suspicion, here in a thumbnail sketch, that Walton's account itself is parasitic on accounts which involve intention. Although Walton's suggestion that interacting with art is playing a game of make-believe is beguiling in the case of the visual arts—especially his famous case of the horror movie—it is less convincing in the case of the written word. How is a sentence a prop? What fictional truths does it generate? Not the proposition it expresses; that is a matter of semantics, not make-believe. Walton rescues his account by claiming that we play a game in which the story is being narrated to us by someone (who may or may not appear in it). We make sense of novels by imagining they are an *intentional* act of communication.

I will finish with a comment on one of the two essays by British philosophers in the collection: namely, Colin Radford's attempt to answer the question 'How can Music be Moral?'. Tracing the thread of this essay is a difficult and ultimately frustrating experience, as there are long and unnecessary digressions and little sustained argument. One of the questions considered is the seemingly intractable connection between music and the emotions. Radford does not seem to distinguish between some sort of crude arousal theory (music makes us want to dance) and a correspondence theory (there is a '*match, mapping, consonance* between tempi and rhythms and human movement' (p. 427)). Both contain widely advertised and

apparently fatal flaws. The loose nature of the argument means that when the conclusion does come—that music is moral if it displays dignity and restraint—the reader is left at a loss as to what to make of it.

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Understanding Dance. By GRAHAM MCFEE. Routledge. 1992. pp. 344. £12.99; clothbound, £35.00.

AN INSTITUTIONAL theory of art is here given in a substantial and clear presentation. As the author affirms, the book 'will not tell us how to understand dance. Rather, on the basis that dance is understood, it will try to articulate that understanding' (p. 11): nor, it may be added, will it much help to understand dance criticism or creativity. McFee's sources are close to home in terms of acquaintance and outlook—Wollheim, Best and Diffey in particular—so this is not a wide-ranging aesthetics text. It offers one account of art, distinguished from aesthetic interest generally, emphasizing works as interpreted objects.

The tone is of dialogue and argument so that student readers would gain an impression of how issues may be systematically confronted in establishing a philosophical position. Chapters are helpfully bracketed by preamble and conclusion and, at a cost of repetition for the continuous reader, each is relatively self-sufficient. Dance itself appears only modestly, though works are mentioned—often contemporary American-idiom—and there are brief extracts from critical commentary, mostly Siegel. But these are mostly unexamined and in McFee's 'second order' exposition serve chiefly to remind that there is something to which the institutional account refers.

Best (*Expression in Movement and the Arts*) offered an arguably muddled Wittgensteinian approach to the problem of connecting expression and criteria. Perhaps for an intermediary 'falling under a description', McFee offers what is said in 'the Republic of Dance'. The present book owes much to Diffey's succinct 1969 paper (*B. J. Aesth.* 9.2) on The Republic of Art, including art as 'institutional fact' (following Anscombe's distinction from 'brute fact') and the elements of submission to a public and corporate judgement. Among problems for this account are the identity and acceptability of the defining Republic and how it comes into being without prior concept and practice and may benignly accommodate innovation.

Oddly for one concerned with social and public context, McFee shows no interest in the actual institutions of dance—companies as run by royal courts or choreographers, the roles of academies and impresarios. Even where the identity of works is concerned he prefers, to history of production, say, a rather unspelt-out test of satisfying a notation 'agreed by the knowledgeable' (p. 97) to be adequate. He adopts Wollheim's type/token account in relation to the performances of works.

Taking experience as concept-mediated and acknowledging that art is, at least weakly, some part of life, McFee proposes its point to be 'offering conceptual change around life issues' (p. 193), specifically the education of the emotions. In an account so avoidant of subjectivism, the emotions, unless carefully elucidated, seem a dubious last resort for concepts. (McFee's position may usefully be compared with those of Reid and Goodman.)

The focus on dance makes a refreshing change if somewhat brave/foolhardy here. Given its wordlessness and notorious instability, the strong temptation lurks to substitute for the art the documentary impedimenta of the language-using Republic. Comparison with, for example, landscape painting or literary satire might have helped to place the problems for dance studies in context. Here most dance, including that which is performed as magical, social or pleasurable, has to be defined out as beyond the pale.

As experience kinaesthesis (concept mediation ungranted) is trivial, with no sensible place. It thus exits along with greater aesthetic brethren: the subjective (from which an allowable 'personal' is assimilated into the objective), the imagination (at best marginal to the perception of art) and artistic intention (save in so far as comment on the public work may start from knowledge of the choreographer and in turn supposes intention as evidenced by the work).

For the price we are left at the end of McFee's

account with 'something is art if the right people say it is art' (p. 71). Irrefutable rightness all around?

Readers whose interest is dance itself or a general artistic sensibility may feel that the title misleads. But as addressed primarily to students of dance aesthetics (and those with other art concerns should not be put off), this book should serve well to expose them to the demands of a philosophical approach.

ALAN SALTER

The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music. By LYDIA GOEHR. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1992. pp. 314. £35.00.

THIS ORIGINAL and important book will, I hope, be read by philosophers whose interest in aesthetics is not restricted to the aesthetics of music. If Goehr's general position is right then we have a deal of rethinking to do about conceptual analysis in the arts. When in the course of this review I suggest that she does not establish her claim that the concept of a work of music, as she defines it, came into being about 1800, it does not mean that I dissent from the general principles which led her to propose this view.

One important such principle is that our concepts have histories. Goehr goes further. Concepts are subject to human control. They serve interests, something which philosophers in the analytic tradition have not properly understood. We have 'decisionary power' over them (p. 91). On the whole, this claim of 'decisionary power' is too extreme a version of the thesis she needs. Concepts change through fairly large-scale changes within a language or a community of speakers. It would be hard, even for a conceptual dictator, to control such changes. More often such changes are the inadvertent consequences of other things we do. A series of discrete changes, or a particularly powerful teacher might mould language but it would be hard to ensure such changes.

Part One of this book is a survey of recent work on the analysis of the concept of music. She contrasts Platonist theories such as those of Wolterstorff with nominalist theories such as those of Goodman. It is a very competent and thorough survey and the bibliography is, in itself, a reason for a recommendation of this book. On the one hand, we have those thinkers for whom the work of music exists independently of the performance and the notation; indeed Wolterstorff is enough of a Platonist to think that all possible works of music pre-exist their notation. For him all that a composer does is to recognize a work; he does not create it (p. 52). This is distinctly at odds with commonly made distinctions and would, of course, apply quite generally. Nobody ever creates anything. The gifted poet, scientist or philosopher is merely good at recognizing possible propositions whose existence is prior and independent.

A frequently aired criticism of such Platonism in music is that it denies creativity. If a work of music is an abstract entity, a sound pattern that exists independently of the composer then, instead of creating it, he merely selects it. The customary reply is that there are two sorts of selectivity and that one of these is creative. On the face of it this is an evasion unless the Platonist has a theory about what it is to recognize a pattern *ab initio* and, moreover, an account of how the abstract entity enters into a causal relationship with the composing mind. Levinson, whose Platonism is discussed fully by Goehr, distinguishes implicit types and initiated types; however, it is hard to see how the distinction helps. It is as much of a problem for the ontologist of music as it is for the Platonist philosopher of mathematics who has to show how mathematical discoveries are made. We need an epistemology. It seems likely that any theory which is offered will be *ad hoc* to the extent that it is unconstrained by the Platonism.

I think the problems are twofold. First of all it is a fact that music is composed in a certain historical setting. Beethoven's music is, *inter alia*, an expression of romanticism and no abstract type pre-dating the foundation of the world can have that expressive character. There are, then, features of the work of music which cannot be found in the abstract sound pattern. Indeed, if, *mirabile dictu*, that exact sound pattern were repeated at another time it would not have the same properties.

Secondly, what makes Mozart use the Alberti bass in his K.545 piano sonata? We will

not explain this in terms of his apprehension of a Platonic sound pattern. It is rather that it was part of the lingua franca of music at that time. Brahms uses the St Anthony Chorale in his variations not because he apprehended an abstract sound pattern in a Platonic vision but because he came across a tune written down by somebody else. The way composers write depends upon the models which are extant. The very vocabulary of music is like this, the figurations, ornaments, turns, trills, the *in nomine* and the chordal progressions which are gradually modified and added to. A composer cannot write just anything. Gombrich raised the question why Leonardo could not paint a French Impressionist picture. The answer is that the phenomenon of style is a human historical product. The significant point is, of course, that within a selection constrained by historical forces, we can still make a distinction between those composers who are creative, such as Mozart, and those who are less so, such as Dittersdorf.

Goodman's doctrine that the work is a class of performances constrained by a notation represents the opposite pole. The notorious doctrine that tempo is not notational whereas the notes are has, as has been so often remarked, the consequence that a performance of Beethoven which took an hour over each quaver but where each note was accurate would be a performance whereas one with a single wrong note would be wrong. One devastating question puts this into place. Goehr asks what it is supposed to be a theory of (p. 36). If the divergence between theory and practice means so little to Goodman what interest does his theory have? A purely formal arrangement of definitions and arguments has no independent interest at all.

But we have not dismissed the nominalist–Platonist contrast from further consideration. In Part Two Goehr considers how the idea of a work of music developed and she proposes that the concept of a work is a regulative concept. It may incorporate an ideal which requires that the performance of a notated score should be as accurate as possible (though it will be highly unlikely that any performance will be free from major or minor errors) (p. 101). Platonism and Nominalism, it seems, share at least this in common; they propose to articulate the prevailing conception of the 'work'.

Now as far as I can see, nothing prevents such a concept from being incoherent: after all, to paraphrase Goehr, such concepts are the *locus* of ideological pressures; just as a member of the Conservative party may believe various inconsistent doctrines about freedom, opportunity and equality and a Christian various incoherent things about God, evil and human freedom, so a musician may believe incoherent things about the sanctity of the composer's intentions and about the freedom of the interpreting performer. Indeed, Goehr (p. 242) views the concept of the work as generating oppositional forces which challenge it.

I conclude that there are various ways in which the concept of music might be related to practice. It might be consonant with it or dissonant with it. In the latter case it might incorporate ideals which either are not put into practice or could not be put into practice. If Goodman accurately captures the concept in his nominalism then what he captures is a conception which stands very obliquely to musical practice. For we do not count a performance with a single mistake not to be a performance of the work. To say that he represents a musical ideal in this vision of accuracy holds before us, by implication, an ideal of performance to which a performer should aspire. So it is not ultimately irrelevant to musical practice as Goodman seems to conceive it that he should present the thesis in this way. It depends what we require from analysis; do we want an analysis which connects with performing practice or an analysis of regulative ideals? Our question must then be 'what work does the concept do?'; 'what interests is it serving?'. Although it is fair to castigate analytic philosophy for a failure to understand the historical dimensions of the concept, for we need to ask the function of the concept, it does not preclude getting a correct synchronic account of the concept.

Having said this, however, the nub of objections to Goodman is the sheer unmusicality of his concerns. How often is it said that whereas one pianist plays all the notes, another like, say, Schnabel, makes mistakes aplenty but catches the spirit of the music. What matters is interpretative depth. I have to say that this does

not seem to interest Goehr enough. In fact she believes, mistakenly, that fidelity and interpretative scope are opposed one to the other (p. 273). For musicians, the differences between a great recreative interpreter such as Furtwangler or Beecham, or Solomon or Curzon, and others is a matter of central concern. These are the recreative forces which create interpretative traditions.

The concept of the work of music, Goehr suggests, derives naturally from a number of factors, the beliefs that fine art is self-sufficient and autonomous and that its contemplation is an end in itself (pp. 171, 177). The ideal of an imaginary museum enshrines these ideas. Prior to 1800 she argues, the idea that a work of music was composed and then performed in various places and at different times and that it was the child of its creator barely existed (pp. 118, 179). Unfortunately, the evidence she adduces (p. 180), Haydn's contract at Esterhazy forbidding his communicating and copying his compositions, for example, suggest the exact opposite. What it does suggest is that his works were owned by his employer but clearly the thought of their being published and played elsewhere was sufficiently a possibility for the contract to expressly forbid it. Her stress on the acceptance of what we now consider plagiarism hardly shows that the concept of work we now have did not exist, though it does show, and this fits in very well with her main contentions, that concepts have changed sometimes radically and sometimes a bit at a time. Certainly there were changes in the concept of music at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Meyer remarks on the repudiation of convention, the cult of genius, formalism and organicism and the marginalizing of context. These ideas, elements in the Romantic movement, played a part in changing the way people thought about music. Evidently this is a matter of degree not kind. But it does not seem that the change introduced a concept of a work of music as performable at different places and different times. That was there before.

Tallis's great 40-part motet was possibly a response to a challenge laid down by Striggio's precedent, which by all accounts it eclipses, but, suggests Paul Doe, it also surely embodies a desire for personal fulfilment, the desire of so many composers to create a representative sample of the best of their art in their old age. Remember, too, that Byrd and Tallis held a licence to publish music, unlikely given Goehr's general position. Let's go back even further. After his death in 1521 the music of Josquin circulated 'throughout Europe in both manuscript and print, more than any other music of his generation'. Of course, only the music of the great masters survived their death in this way but that is neither surprising nor new. The fact is, and, of course, the existence of the music demonstrates it, music did survive after the composer's death; it was published, circulated and performed at different places and times. We know that 'Spem in Alium' was performed a few decades after Tallis's death with English words; it is improbable indeed that these composers did not care about the fate of their work. Even if they were themselves regarded as craftsmen the tales of their 'temperament' suggests that they did not wholly accept the valuation society placed upon them.

I suggest, then, that in many ways musicians prior to 1800 behaved much as they do now with respect to their creations. They behaved as if they had the concept of a work and it regulated their practice though they did not refer to the 'work' as we do. In other ways, of course, their attitudes were different. Goehr will agree with me that these differences are matters of degree not kind; but we do disagree on just how considerable the difference of degree is.

Before ending, I want to return to the question of ideology, about which Goehr says too little. We need to know what difference it makes that a concept is, as I would put it, ideologically charged. To some extent, Goehr has looked in the wrong place. The *locus* of ideology in music is mainly in its written history. There is no doubt that we still have a history of music based on a canon dominated by German composers, the last relic of that German cultural and intellectual domination which marked the last century. It is highly relevant that the sort of history of music which has come to express such an ideology is one in which the central characters belong to the canon. It does not merely record the real causal influences on a creative mind; rather it

expresses a relationship which is constructed to relate the music which is in the repertoire. Of course, such a history is a way of making the development of musical language intelligible to us. The way is open for the history to become an expression of an ideology.

Why do I call this an ideology? Clearly the ideology implicit in the musical canon is not an ideology in the fully fledged political sense, even though there is a strong case for saying that, like standard ideologies, it possesses means by which potentially disruptive facts are not allowed to falsify it.

But what might be overlooked is that it is also an ideology in the sense that it may distort our experiences of music. In that it shares one feature with paradigmatic ideologies; it is both inevitable and damaging. It is inevitable in that we cannot do without a history and history in this ideal sense embodies a canon. It is necessary to make possible our experience of art. It is necessary because without a history we cannot make sense of the originality of a great figure. But, by the same token the ideology distorts because it devalues the experience we have of figures outside the canon and inflates the experience we have of music from inside the canon. It is my thesis that the presence of the canon acts like an ideology in privileging certain responses to certain figures while marginalizing others. Figures of genuine value may be relegated and minor figures overpraised. Compare the Berwald symphonies with those of Schumann or consider whether Mendelsohn's piano concertos should be played instead of those of Hummel! It is not my case that there are a great number of such misjudgements, if misjudgements they are (for we must remember the indispensability of the canon and the inevitability of the filtering it implies).

Finally, to return to Goehr in the light of all this, what do we gain from having a concept of 'work of music'? Goehr seems distinctly suspicious of the concept (pp. 271ff.). The obvious gain must be that it gives us a way of marking out and thus preserving the best. If our diet, like that of eighteenth-century listeners, consisted mainly of contemporary music, think what we would lose! Most of the music composed at any time is mediocre and ephemeral. To such music the work concept is not specially relevant. For listeners whose lives are short and whose attention is the object of clamorous rivals, it matters that we listen to the best. The best, and this comes close to being as plain a matter of fact as we can have, will include Beethoven's sonatas and not a 'Beethoven' sonata where the performer improvises on a theme from the first movement. For these reasons value is central to the whole issue.

Professor Goehr does not entirely persuade me. But I must finish by saying that this is a splendid book, lucid, well informed and consistently thought-provoking.

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Music and the Mind. By ANTHONY STORR. Harper Collins. 1992. pp. 212. £16.99.

THIS IS a most interesting, thought-provoking book. From the start we are aware of Storr's deep love of music; the book is a pleasure to read and because of its wide-ranging interdisciplinary content there is much new material in his approach to perennial problems in the Aesthetics of Music.

Storr states his position clearly: 'Music has incomparably enriched my life. It is an irreplaceable, undeserved, transcendental blessing.' He adds, however, that what music brings to our lives is hard to define. The book is an exploratory search of what it is about music that so profoundly affects us and why it is such an important part of our culture (or any culture, for that matter).

He ranges over many topics: the origins and functions of music, the importance of bodily movements which music provokes, its effect on brain and body, the form and content of music, its significance, its therapeutic qualities, etc. There is an excellent critical chapter on the psychological view that music provides an escape from reality and also a wealth of discussion of diverse views of representatives from various disciplines. Two chapters, one on Schopenhauer and Freud, the other on Jung and Nietzsche, are particularly stimulating. There are also numerous quotations, some of which are pure gems.

Storr's aim is to reconcile the two opposing camps of the formalists, who see music exclusively in terms of its form and structure, and of the emotivists, who concern themselves mainly with the powerful, emotional content of music. He has no doubts about the importance of both these aspects and stresses their significance in his view of music as being a way of ordering human experience. Music makes sense of our inner experience by giving both structure and coherence to our feelings and emotions. The elucidation of this quality which music so powerfully possesses is the main theme of *Music and the Mind.*

Storr states: 'The individual listener's response to music is a principal theme of this book' (p. 23). This 'promise', tantalizingly, is only partly fulfilled. He gives us much about how human beings respond to music in a rich variety of ways. He draws our attention to the fact that, in our culture, we are increasingly under pressure in our daily working lives to separate rational thought from feeling. This pressure is significantly relieved by music which has the power to reunite mind and body, to restore our sense of personal wholeness. The formalists wish to prevent such unity by trying to make the appreciation of music purely cerebral, whereas, as Storr argues, music is rooted in bodily rhythms and movement which are inextricably bound up with our feelings and emotions. He writes: 'People make sense of experience in a variety of ways and, . . . those who are particularly attracted towards the abstract are often people whose early personal relationships have been deficient' (p. 177). Here, then, we come to the crux of the matter—personal relationships or the lack of them in our lives decide our response to music. If this is right, and I strongly suspect that it is, then *an individual listener's* response to music has to be explored in terms of the kind of relationship that he/she is capable of establishing with the music.

Storr offers a very good discussion of the contrast between getting to know the music and getting to know the composer. He writes: 'Some aspects of a composer's personality inevitably manifest themselves in his music; but the object of listening is to get to know the music not to get to know the composer' (p. 121). Having said this, he argues that music, nevertheless, derives from a deep emotional need to communicate with other human beings which is prior to the need of conveying objective information or exchanging ideas. He supports this by pointing out that we all have strong preferences for various composers because these are partly related to the way in which the personal characteristics of different composers are embedded in their music and that this irreducible minimum of a composer's personality, which comes through, makes his works identifiably his. This element determines whether or not we can 'get on with' a particular composer. This, surely, provides an important link with Storr's main view that music helps to order our experiences. It is here that the importance of the individual listener's response to music comes in.

What responses the music evokes is to a large extent dependent on the particular past experiences of the listener; these impose personal limits on what is possible for him/her. The communication, so central for Storr, concerns the discovery of a shared experience which is a profoundly important part of the value of music; the listener does not clearly distinguish the work from the composer in so far as he is present as its creator, as another human being. This may have little or nothing to do with the historical person of the composer. The individual listener finds illumination, clarification and reassurance about his/her own experiences and this enables him/her to order and/or accept his own feelings and emotions in a much more coherent, confident way. Storr, so eminently qualified for this, stops short of exploring the intimacy of this relationship; that is our loss.

Having said this, *Music and the Mind* is a book I, for one, shall be returning to constantly in the course of my own work. It is a short book but it contains a wealth of ideas for anyone for whom music is of importance.

FRANCES BERENSON

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Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. By MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM. Oxford U.P. 1991. pp. 403. £40.00; paperbound, £13.95.

THIS LONG and imposing book continues the line of thought that Martha Nussbaum pursued, with fascinating results, in *The Fragility of Goodness*. It consists of a series of related essays, revised to give some continuity, and often with an 'Endnote', which are largely devoted to exploring the relationship between literature, specifically the novel, and moral philosophy. Despite the fact that she considers that 'This is a rich and wonderful time in moral philosophy' (p. 169), Nussbaum thinks that it would be still better if philosophers would pay close attention to the complexities of the moral life as only novels, she feels, can convey them. She begins by arguing this in general terms, employing Aristotle's conception of the search for the good life as her major support. She argues for the primacy of moral perceptions, and thus of the particular case, over principles; and for the centrality of feeling as well as of intellection for achieving a satisfactorily rich conception of the moral life. This extended general section strikes me as more of a low-keyed harangue than an argument, and though I find much of her position sympathetic to the point of triteness, nothing that she says in general terms would persuade me if I didn't already share much of her outlook.

When she arrives at her favoured novelists, they turn out to be Henry James, especially the late novels, Dickens in *David Copperfield*, Proust and Beckett, with James well to the fore. That is no surprise, given that her view of morality is such that if 'taken seriously and if we wish to have texts that represent it at its best (in order to anticipate or supplement experience or to assess this norm against others), it seems difficult not to conclude that we will need to turn to texts no less elaborate, no less linguistically fine-tuned, concrete, and intensely focused, no less metaphorically resourceful, than this novel' (p. 157). 'This novel' is *The Golden Bowl*, which means that one wonders how many texts one will have at one's disposal. For even among James's late works, it is distinguished by its extraordinary complexity and convolutedness of style, which many people consider, as Leavis does, to indicate a 'hypertrophy of sensibility', a disproportion between what James is doing and how he is doing it. It is a question, too, whether this novel can be correctly characterized as 'concrete and intensely focused'. There is a strong case for saying that it is diffuse, abstract, and morally incoherent. It is not a case that Nussbaum considers, and indeed throughout her consideration of her chosen novels she is not at any point inclined to suggest that they are in any respect flawed. I don't see how one can take literature as seriously as she does without considering the possible limitations and defects of one's chosen examples of it, especially since they clearly have the closest bearing on its value for the moral philosopher. The questions that one can't help asking about the Ververs—how did Adam become so rich without being a ruthless businessman, isn't Maggie brilliantly adept at manipulating people, however much she is suffering?—are somehow suppressed by Nussbaum. She is so *begeistert* by talk of love that instead of exerting her critical intelligence, she lapses into a breathless exposition of *The Golden Bowl* which had the effect on me of making it seem less impressive than I had previously found it, in fact positively irritating. That is a risk that commentators on James, in particular, run and often succumb to.

But even if one doesn't press this issue, there remains the significant fact that the novels that Nussbaum selects to show that a moral philosopher can learn from them are a specialized bunch: they tend to deal with characters who are obsessed with the minutiae of personal relationships, who see 'people, and nothing but people', as Lawrence wrote of E. M. Forster. Lawrence occupies no place in this book, nor does Mann or Conrad. I take those novelists not quite at random, because they all are extremely concerned with the question of how we should live, but all deal with the matter in terms, not only or primarily of relationships, but of their characters' callings, their finding the meaning of their lives in pursuit of an impersonal ideal. Concentrating as she does on 'fine consciousnesses', whose leading preoccupation is to establish exactly how they feel about other people, and how other people feel

about them and one another, Nussbaum is led to a conception of the moral life which induces claustrophobia in me. Of course, in close, especially erotic relationships, it is essential to grasp the peculiar and particular nature of the otherness of individuals. But that can only, for several reasons, be a part of anyone's moral existence, unless they are the privileged inhabitants of a world like that conjured up in late James. And how many people could be, or would want to be?

Nussbaum is rightly keen on the closeness, or indissolubility, of form and content in the novel and in the lives with which it deals. But it applies also to her book. One gets from reading it a very strong sense of the person who wrote it: someone who can't rest until she has convinced us of the way in which morality is either transcended by, or incorporated in, a loving view of the circle in which one dwells. Wisely mistrustful of her peers' inclination to be persuaded by some of what she writes, she makes her points so insistently that they become increasingly unclear. I felt, often, that I had got the message, but finding that there were still twenty pages to go on the same topic, I started wondering whether I was at fault, or whether Nussbaum underestimates the value of concision. There should be a tact in criticism which leaves the reader feeling that there is still work to be done, that he has a contribution to make to the understanding of the text; Nussbaum wants to say everything for us. And my unease was abetted by the ease with which Nussbaum, over and over again, finds that novels are telling us what, it is perfectly clear, she wants to hear. Although she is ardent about the lessons we all need to learn, the texts she deals with, in superficially painstaking detail, but often without noting the elements in them that make them more worryingly complex, all conveniently offer themselves to her as supporting and sustaining her quest for ever more refined sensitivity. She is, one might say, the Leonard Bernstein of moral philosophy, not content until everyone realizes the import of what she is writing about, but also sees how much it means to her. Her presence is the most abiding and emphatic element in the book, and that surely indicates that she has made a grave miscalculation about her style—and thus, of course, about her content.

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Countercurrents: On the Primacy of Texts in Literary Criticism. Edited by RAYMOND ADOLPH PRIER. State University of New York Press. 1992. pp. 302. Paperbound, $17.95.

THIS COLLECTION of fifteen essays appears in SUNY's 'Margins of Literature' series. In his introduction the editor suggests that, for this collection of essays, to be 'on the margin' means that the contributors are marginalized with regard to the current assumptions of literary criticism. As early as in the acknowledgements the editor tries to provide a rationale for the publication of this volume as marginal by referring to 'the inhuman and antihumanistic state of textual exegesis presently in the west', and his relief on finding that there is 'at least one academic press in North America [which] still possesses the powers of a broad and discerning humanism'.

The essays are announced as addressing the 'now decidedly unpopular assumption: the primacy of texts in literary criticism'. The answer to the currents of post-modernism, which the contributors to this volume presumably wish to counter, is given as a retrieval of 'what eternally lies beneath the surface of the text' against the alleged post-modernist rhetorical compulsion to 'exteriorize its text on the surface'. Prier defines the 'primacy' of the title as a 'deeper' shared participation in language. This is hardly sufficient to convince anyone. Does this mean that the text is more important than the author or critic, or that the text is prior in the sense that the selves of either author, reader or critic are textually constituted?

It is possible that the primacy of texts in literary criticism is to be shown, rather than discussed, for the majority of the essays are literary criticism, with varying degrees of theoretical embellishment, dealing with texts originating on the European continent. I will, however, limit myself in the following to three of the minority theoretical essays.

E. F. Kaelin's essay on the structuralist–post-structuralist controversy attempts, having out-

lined the French history of the debate, to Americanize it by the introduction of the Peircean categories of 'firstness', 'secondness' and 'thirdness'. The conclusion of the resulting discussion is that a critic should concern him or herself with the work as a system of signs which refers only to its potentiality to 'become, in interpretation, the icon of a definite feeling'. This conclusion leaves one with the suspicion that Peircean semiotics could be applied to this debate with rather more fruitful results.

The discussion in William Kennedy's essay 'Address as Focus' is more fruitful. He starts with Habermas's assertion that with Nietzsche's entry into the discourse of modernity, the argumentation was fundamentally changed, and he concludes by saying that while this is true, 'this has occurred only through Nietzsche's engagement with the rhetorical practices of ancient Greece'. Kennedy shows how Nietzsche's reading of the classical masters, in particular the Plato of the *Phaedrus*, influenced his own views away from the taxonomic conception of rhetoric prevalent in his day towards the importance of rhetorical address and its effect upon discursive practices. The essay demonstrates how De Man and others have failed to grasp the subtleties of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* by failing to bring Nietzsche's conceptions of double address to bear on his treatment of the Apollonian and the Dionysian perspectives.

Brenda Deen Schildgen's 'Endurance of Value' is a fairly conservative defence of 'the canon' as defined by six criteria, with *Don Quixote* as her chosen example. Her first criterion, that canons are created by authors rather than critics, may be well served by her example, but perhaps less so by other works one would still want to call canonical. Authors do this, she argues with reference to *Don Quixote*, by retrieving texts and genres as models to be examined, imitated, parodied or subverted in their own text, thus creating a canon of works in order 'to direct readers to their own place in a continuous dialogue of literary exchange'. One may argue that Shakespeare, for instance, does rather less well against this criterion than Cervantes.

The critical essays all belong to the still, despite some headline-grabbing excesses of certain American 'schools' of literary criticism, prevalent mode of literary criticism. They are learned and show enviable perceptiveness. What the critical essays share with the more purely theoretical ones, however, is that they do not address the question of the primacy of texts in literary criticism in any adequate way. The essays of this volume have little in common, and they are not even unified in the systems of reference they operate. The overall impression is of various essays collected just for the sake of publication, and while there are good, interesting and thought-provoking essays in this volume, the most disappointing thing about it, given the title, is that we are given very little indeed 'on the primacy of texts in literary criticism'.

OLE MARTIN SKILLEÅS
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The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno. By J. M. BERNSTEIN. Polity Press. 1992. pp. 292. £35.00.

THIS EXTRAORDINARILY ambitious philosophical work begins with 'the discordance of art and truth' and ends with 'political love'. In the intervening pages, Bernstein attempts to show how Modern Art and Modern Philosophy are intimately if, in his view, painfully, linked. There is very little in the project which does not address issues of the greatest importance for both disciplines, and for our 'Fate' in modern societies as a whole. The argument surveys the historical positioning of art, aesthetics, ethics, history, philosophy and politics in such societies. In this review I will give an account of the general argument, at the inevitable expense of detailed critical discussion which the technical passages deserve and require.

The book consists of five chapters and an introduction. The latter establishes the problem of 'aesthetic alienation' which underwrites the work of Bernstein's interlocutors: Heidegger, Derrida and Adorno. Yet is is almost immediately apparent that Bernstein has invited his three guests in order to remember and interrogate a fourth: Immanuel Kant. This is not a flippant way of describing what goes on in the text: for it is Kant who sets in motion

the problematic of the argument; and whose Third Critique provides for each position and failure of thinking about art in its alienation which Bernstein will explore.

So, what is 'aesthetic alienation'? For Bernstein, art's emergence out of the shadows of religion and into the light of the Critical Philosophy is also the *alienation* of art from 'truth' and 'morality'. At the very outset it is stressed that truth, morality and art do not remain the same through this process of separation. This point is easily and often casually accepted in the case of art: we are generally used to the idea that art progresses, and that one landmark in that progress is its becoming properly aesthetic, properly concerned with its own 'form of life'. But Bernstein rightly keeps in view the historical absurdity of the claim that in some way truth and morality could be the same after separation from art as they had been before, and thereby points to the simplicity of an internal progress-based model of art's development towards the aesthetic. Bernstein objects —on ethical grounds, as we shall see—to the modern definition of the three central forms of life, of cognition, in 'exclusive ways'. He further sees each sphere as marked—or even wounded—by the process of separation, but in particular regards art as carrying the historical burden of whatever more whole, humane truth and morality may have been lost as a result: 'The experience of art *as aesthetical* is the experience of art as having lost or been deprived of its power to speak the truth—whatever truth will mean when no longer defined in exclusive ways' (p. 4).

Careful readers will note the slippage here between past and future, which is not accidental. An ideal past and its remembrance occupy a dominant role in the work of Bernstein's chosen thinkers, and indeed in his own ethico-political subtext. The project of his thinkers is 'to interrogate . . . what [art] has been and become. To understand art, to answer the question of the meaning and being of art, is to understand, grasp a certain history' (p. 4). For Heidegger, Derrida and Adorno—'post-aesthetic' philosophers—the question in dispute is 'which history?' (The ethical turn takes place over the course of the book, the question becomes '*whose* history?'.) For all three thinkers on Bernstein's reading, art is conceived of 'as having suffered a loss, the past is projected from the state of alienation as a time when art and truth were not in discordance, when they were united or in harmony. *Thus every conception of the alienation of art from truth is simultaneously a work of remembrance, a work of mourning and grief, even for those philosophers who doubt that such an "original" state of union ever existed*' (p. 4, emphasis added). But it is important to note that despite this morbid sense of loss, Bernstein does not see art's aesthetic life during the historical period of modernity as its complete end. This is because he regards a certain type of art—what he calls Modernist art—as having a messianic destiny or 'Fate' in relation to the alienated condition of the three branches of human cognition. Modernist art in this account is 'the critical self-reflection of truth-only cognition and its conscience' (p. 5). Here, then, is the future element of Bernstein's location of art at its moment of becoming aesthetic: art takes on, is given, a critical function in relation to the whole.

Kant's Third Critique plays a central role, then, because it both establishes the autonomous domain of the aesthetic, places the final barrier so to speak; and at the same time is an attempt to bring about the unity of the faculties, of the forms of cognition, through art. 'The Kantian analysis is true, but not as a metaphysics of the experience of art, but rather as a social inscription of the historical fate of modernity' (p. 192). Bernstein insists that Kant's attempt at categorial re-unification, and its widely recognized failure and critique amongst Kant's German Idealist successors, provide the resources for a full understanding of Aesthetic or Modernist or Automonous art, and thereby of the predicaments of Modernity itself.

What, then, are these predicaments? It is in answering this question that Bernstein is likely to meet opposition. The disaster of progressive modern (read 'capitalist') societies is, in his view, following Adorno, the untrammelled rule of the profit motive, 'the universal domination of use-value by exchange-value' (p. 208). Universal exchange is possible only where it is possible to view all things as subsumed under the concept of exchange: only where 'sensuous particularity' can be sup-

pressed. For Adorno and Bernstein, this possibility is modern truth-only cognition, *rationalization*. This modern disaster, its disastrous consequences in terms of human suffering, is linked to another: the suppression of ethico-political life. Fundamental here is the role of philosophy itself. Bernstein points out that the separation of political life from the life of contemplation is inaugurated by Plato in the same moment as the abolition of the poets from the *polis*. Thus philosophy begins with an expulsion of two forms of practical engagement: with the community and with sensuous particularity. The book's whole argument is directed towards the speculative claim that, after the long haul to modernity: 'the modern work of art itself in its unity without a principle or concept determining that unity, and the community gathered around particular works with their shared *sensus communis*, became images or after-images of the (idealized) polis. The discordance between art and truth is the after-image, the memory, of the discordance between politics and philosophy, politics and truth-only cognition. Art now, or just before now, is (or was) the cipher for an absent politics. . .' (p. 13).

In this type of speculative argument (and he explicitly [p. 257; p. 273] regards his ethico-political propositions as speculative in the technical Hegelian sense), Bernstein wishes to implicate philosophical work itself in the disaster. In his view the only possible philosophy seems to be one that acknowledges guilt for Plato's original sin.

Apart from difficulty in following some of Bernstein's arguments for the implication of one thing in another, I was uneasy with the transition from an Adornian aesthetic theory and negative dialectics into the final speculative and especially ethical argument for the migration of Judgement into political and theoretical feminism. The latter migration is offered as the way to re-think who 'we' are, to re-ground the absent politics (to which the book is directed) together with love. Bernstein's identification of feminism as the inheritor of the critical force of the 'Modernist sublime' is certainly provocative and promising. But the injection of the rhetoric of love, care and friendship into the problem seemed hasty, rang lyrically hollow. It is to be hoped that Bernstein can in the future develop this thread with the same degree of skill as he has situated Kant's success and failure.

The other criticism which could be made of the text is in a way a minor one, and from another point of view seems significant. For an argument dedicated to drawing attention to the bulldozing of 'sensuous particularity' by the exclusive Truth of Modernity, there is a paradoxical lack of respect shown to the fact that 'Works claim us beyond our capacity to redeem them discursively' (p. 252). Such an acknowledgement must surely include the fact that very specific uses of works—as if their claiming had already been mastered or 'subsumed'—to support points of philosophical argument *must* be carefully handled. This sense of care, despite the extended discussion around a painting by Van Gogh of peasant shoes—symptomatically the particular one is only specified as that discussed by Heidegger—is often missing. Thus an aparticular, amorphous 'Late Beethoven' becomes (merely?) *an example* at the end of a long philosophical discussion (p. 234).

In many ways one would need more space to address the difficult questions such a book poses. This is in turn a mark of the attention it deserves. Bernstein has made a much-needed attempt to place art and its relationship to aesthetics back in the foreground of philosophical, historical and political debate. The encounters with particular 'post-aesthetic' philosophical works are conducted with great vigour and considerable attention to detail, but the author rarely loses sight of the urgency of re-addressing, re-inventing the controversial history of modernity.

It remains to be said that the publishers have produced a sturdy and appropriately austere volume, although the typesetting has gone awry in one or two places, and the Index is far from complete.

NEIL COX

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Grounds of Dispute: Art History, Cultural Politics and the Discursive Field. By JOHN TAGG. Macmillan. 1992. pp. 219. £10.99; clothbound, £35.00.

THIS BOOK is a collection of essays written by Tagg between 1985 and 1990. The title of the collection is descriptive, summarizing the book's broad areas of concern while also indicating both the constituency from which the author himself emerges and that which it primarily addresses. John Tagg was among the first in this country to make the move in Art History against connoisseurship, iconography, artistic biography, and the study of periods and movements, and towards a Social History of Art. Up for scrutiny and criticism in these essays, therefore, are the traditionally unquestioned assumptions of the discipline of Art History: the function of museums, the Art Historical canon, and the work of art as the object of Art History. All these are familiar themes to those conversant with the concerns and practices of the 'New Art History'.

Most of the essays here have been published separately before, so perhaps the most interesting thing the collection may offer is a potential revealing of Tagg's recurrent preoccupations. The first essay 'Art History and Difference' (1985) sets the tone for the whole collection which, in stark contrast to earlier pronouncements of 'The New Art History', is markedly introspective and self-questioning. This is partly due to the benefit of hindsight; Tagg's discussion often takes the form of retrospective analysis of the optimism of the emergent leftist History of Art in the late seventies. Particularly poignant is Tagg's quotation of T. J. Clark from 1974: 'I'm not interested in the social history of art as part of a cheerful diversification of the subject, taking its place alongside the other varieties—formalist, 'modernist', sub-Freudian, filmic, feminist, radical, all of them hot-foot in pursuit of the New. For diversification, read disintegration' (p. 41).

Clark's radical early expectations and hopes for a completely redirected Art History have not yet been fulfilled, and despite his protestations, the 'social history of art' seems to have taken its place alongside the other varieties of Art History. While undoubtedly there have been changes in the practice of Art History since the late seventies due to the critique of the discipline by the likes of Clark and Tagg, the impact of such changes on the institutions they criticize has been through their absorption and containment by the opposition rather than by the opposition's capitulation. Paradoxically, the crisis precipitated by the 'New Art History' has been diffused by the atmosphere of post-modern pluralist tolerance which Clark was so anxious to counter. Conversely, it has also been offset by the old and new Right with their reflexive tendency to clothe the real inconsistencies and failings of their positions in the armour of 'value' and 'the art object', a defence that is presented as the necessary alternative to the abyss of post-modernism. All this leaves the 'New Historians' in an all too familiar dilemma: obliged to come to terms with their own institutional status and concurrent loss of radicalism and novelty, while at the same time having manifestly failed to fulfil their early revolutionary expectations. Mapping a path through the ensuing crisis of confidence is the theme of the essays collected here, and paradoxically gives them much of their strength.

The least satisfying are 'Art History and Difference' and 'Should Art Historians Know Their Place?'; both these papers tend to apply their self-critical tendencies towards comparatively abstract problems. 'Art History and Difference' suggests that while the initial programme of the early Social Historians of Art had been to attack the methodological norms of the discipline of Art History, it had neglected to question the function Art History plays within society. This new line of confrontation with the institutional structure of Art History might potentially have a revivifying effect on the tired radicalism of the early days. One feels that while there is still considerable mileage in Tagg's assertion, it avoids the issue of how the practice of a radical Art History should continue beyond finding more and more tangential figures of authority to undermine. The last few sentences of the paper seem to acknowledge as much: 'Art History must know how it is touched by and touches, in turn, this dispersed structure of governance. But there is no neutral ground on which the attempt may be made. The problem of *where* to practice is as pressing as *how*' (p. 46).

The problem which 'Art History and Difference' acknowledges, if only obliquely, is that most of the early phase of the 'New Art History' is very good at undermining the methods and assumptions of traditional Art History but not at replacing them with alternatives. What is striking about the later essays, which might now constitute a more considered 'New Art History', is their renewed vigour signalled by an engagement with the more positive but ultimately far more challenging problem of practising radical Art History in the absence of the possibility of a coherent strategy. In a variety of different and constructive ways, the essays collected here address this problem.

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Against Art and Artists. By JEAN GIMPEL. Polygon, Edinburgh. Revised British ed. 1991. (First published in French, 1968.) pp. 172. Paperbound, £8.95.

WHEN YOU pick up a book provocatively entitled *Against Art and Artists* and see that it is only 172 pages long, you know the arguments it contains are going to be somewhat reductionist. Nevertheless, it is hard not to feel sympathy with Jean Gimpel's loss of faith—and regret that little has changed since first he expressed it. The views he set down in this book when published in France in the sixties are no less iconoclastic and relevant now that it is being republished in a revised English edition for the nineties.

From the Renaissance onwards, both church and state have used art as propaganda. Artists, Gimpel argues, must therefore be immoral. What is worse, some of them even create art for the cynical reason of making money. And what is worse still, some artists, such as Picasso, have been deified for so doing. While I suspect Gimpel is labouring the point when he calls this 'a disgrace to our civilisation and a proof of its spiritual decline', that is not to say he does not have a point, *per se*. After all, it is pretty sickening that artists such as Picasso or Van Gogh have become more famous than statesmen and scientists such as General Marshall or Sir Alexander Fleming who have played a far more significant and worthy role in shaping the modern world.

Although Gimpel has little sympathy with western intellectuals, he does not go far enough when criticizing them. After all, it is the intellectuals, not the artists themselves, who are responsible for the sycophantic Cult Of The Artist. For although artists tend, on the whole, to be self-indulgent, pretentious, petty, decadent, vain, lazy charlatans who do not befriend soap and water as often as they ought, they cannot be accused of being their own best publicists—as anyone who has heard an artist attempt to explain his work will testify. It is the western intelligentsia who permit the bombing of Guernica to be considered without horror because it gave Picasso the opportunity to paint an immortal masterpiece.

The western intelligentsia have been the tailors who made the emperor's new clothes. They have proceeded on the assumptions that, first, if you can't justify it, call it art, and second, that art is anything created by an artist and an artist is anyone who claims to have created art. Fortunately, Gimpel has taken it upon himself to play the part of the boy who sings out that the emperor is in the all together.

But this is not to say his book is faultless. Because it was written so long ago, it is difficult to appreciate how fresh and original some of the views it contains really were. His observation that modern artists regress 'farther along the road away from civilisation towards childhood and primitivism. Their achievement should not go unrecognised. They have succeeded so well that it is often difficult to tell their work from that of children, and mentally ill', for instance, now seems clichéd and in bad taste. And his argument that art has attained the status of a quasi-religion, with the artist as a high priest with special understanding and perception, has since been popularized so effectively by John Berger in *Ways of Seeing* that it is difficult to get too excited about it now.

Also, the book tends to wander from the point, with rambling, disparate, *non sequiturs*, art-historical anecdotes, or theories about the influence of photography which contribute little to the argument. Some of these parenthetical observations make entertaining reading, though. Did you know, for instance, that the

London branches of Bardi and the Peruzzi, Giotto's patrons, went bankrupt in 1339, when the King of England repudiated his substantial debts. And that the memories of this remained so vivid in Italy that during the Second World War Mussolini demanded that England repay the debt, with interest.

But my favourite divertimento is his hatchet job on Gauguin. He sees Gauguin as the prototype of the artist we know and have to endure today. Gimpel writes: 'Not unlike the hagiographers of the high Middle Ages, who stylized their lives of saints into uncritical panegyrics, the art historians have told and sung the life of Gauguin as that of a genius of art'. Much evidence is offered in support of this.

Gauguin, it seems, did not see himself as the calculating, cowardly, lecherous, boastful man that Gimpel suggests he was. Rather, in two paintings at least, he identified himself with Christ. He and Christ, it seems, were both martyrs. When advised to leave Tahiti because of his numerous ailments, for instance, he declared 'every revolution generally needs martyrs'. The catalogue of his other character flaws is long. He was grossly irresponsible with regard to his wife and family. He cynically exaggerated his sufferings in order to win the sympathy, and the financial support, of his correspondents. He did not live in destitution, as he claimed, and he did not champion the cause of the Tahitian native against an oppressive colonial administration. In point of fact, Gimpel claims, Gauguin defended the interests of the colonialists with zeal. And as for his reasons for going to the Pacific islands in the first place? According to Gauguin: 'The stupid buying public needs something new by way of subject matter'. On this quotation alone Gimpel could justifiably rest his case.

NIGEL FARNDALE

The End of Expressionism: Art and the November Revolution in Germany, 1918–19. By JOAN WEINSTEIN. University of Chicago Press. 1990. pp. 332+72 illustrations. £31.95.

THIS BOOK is a welcome contribution to our knowledge of a brief period which is usually passed over quickly as authors seem to race to discuss the wider developments which took place in art in Weimar Germany. Traditionally art historians have concentrated their discussion of the immediate post-war and Weimar periods in Germany on the (considerable) artistic and aesthetic developments which emanated at that time, mentioning only briefly the contemporary socio-political upheavals. But by making the latter central to her discussion, Weinstein's book both complements the standard works and places Expressionism more securely in the context of the times. The political background to Expressionism is made clear from the outset, for with military defeat, economic collapse, and revolution all occurring within the space of a few months artists in Germany sought to organize themselves into groups, usually with revolutionary aspirations: the November Group, the Working Council for Art, the Action Committee of Revolutionary Artists, to name but a few. They imagined a revolution in which the arts would play a key role, where the affairs of art would be as vital to the well-being of the community as politics themselves. Perhaps in this lay their naïvety for, as Weinstein tells us, eventually the Expressionists, one after another, were confronted with the 'reality' of having to choose between intellectual aspirations and the more basic matters of life. Most of them reached an accommodation with the establishment and many in time found themselves in positions of power and influence—professors in the academies, for example—although others moved towards the communist party and ultra left-wing politics.

Structurally the book is divided into five chapters, namely the introduction, a chapter on the development of Expressionism in each of three venues, Berlin, Dresden and Munich, and a concluding chapter. This structure makes for clarity of presentation of the contents, but the separate discussion of the movement in each venue blurs slightly the chronology of the narrative, although this is not a serious problem for the reader.

The book, which borders on the esoteric, examines minutely a period of only eighteen months or so and unfortunately the amount of detail—not to mention the number of acronyms—with which one has to cope at times

clouds the main thrust of the discussion, which centres on the struggles of the various groups of Expressionist artists to establish a hegemony, hitherto denied them, in art circles in post-war Germany. The art world in Germany at that time was much more closely aligned to the affairs of state than was the case, for example, in Britain. Thus, with the political and social turmoil brought about by the end of the war, artists naturally assumed that their role would change too and that a socialist utopian society would emerge. The revolution of November 1918 brought much optimism but this was not sustained as, first, the revolution itself collapsed, and, second, the underlying bureaucratic social structure changed less than had at first been imagined. Thus, in many centres the various art institutions were by 1920 still administered by largely the same personnel as previously and the commercial gallery and dealer system still endured.

While historians usually discuss the strictly aesthetic issues and innovations of the time, Weinstein gives us a useful insight into the political manœuvring of the central figures, many of whom subsequently became enormously influential. We see, for example, Walter Gropius shaping the ideas which he later implemented at the Bauhaus; painters such as Erich Heckel, Max Pechstein, Karl Schmidt-Rottluff; the architects Bruno and Max Taut and even museum curators coming together to determine future strategy. But, alas, as Weinstein demonstrates, they and others consistently failed to arrive at a consensus and rarely got beyond the formulation of vague ideals devoid of practical consequences. In Berlin, Dresden and Munich the dilemma facing artists was the same, that of claiming revolutionary status for their art while increasingly enjoying the benefits of an anti-revolutionary government and economy. In Weinstein's words: 'while almost everyone at least implicitly opposed the capitalist art market, they were all still counting on it' (p. 102). The would-be revolutionary aspirations of many artists were further undermined when, by late 1919, they had been hopelessly—even callously—out-manœuvred by the political left whom, in its various guises, they had taken to be their natural allies.

Weinstein's book has all the hallmarks of a doctoral dissertation although nowhere in it is there mention of such a beginning. Her literary style is dry, her argument is not always easy to follow, and at times the narrative reads like a catalogue of events rather than an unfolding story. Yet overall these are minor quibbles with an excellent book and one which is much needed. The main text is complemented by copious footnotes and the bibliography is extensive and well ordered. The illustrations, which are all in black and white, are well chosen to exemplify the text but in a book at this price, one would reasonably expect a few colour plates.

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The Portrait in Photography. Edited by GRAHAM CLARKE. Reaktion Books. 1992. pp. 228. £23.00; paperbound, £9.95.

THIS NEW book edited by Graham Clarke extends some of the recent work on portraiture (by Marcia Pointon and others) within the history of art to the specific practice of photography. He argues that the medium adds an additional dimension to those questions of the nature of mimetic representation, the social and political relations which have been encoded in portraiture and the nature of identity which has informed much of the general debate around portraiture. He points out that photographic portraiture uses similar iconography and tropes as portrait painting but in addition it functions as the index of the actual physical presence of the portrayed implying a discussion beyond that of the issues around painting. Clarke's collection is not chronological or comprehensive but aims to investigate what makes a portrait and, by collecting a number of different essays from a range of writers, maps out a possible terrain within which lies the specific practice of photography. In his introduction, Clarke sets out the issues with a closely analysed account of a fascinating photograph by Southworth and Hawes—*Unidentified Girl with Gilbert Stuart's Portrait of George Washington*—from the 1850s. The work allows him to introduce the medium, style, function, status, intention, site of viewing and the play of the gaze which to the writer are crucial issues.

For Alan Trachtenberg it is the daguerrotype which epitomizes the uniqueness of the photographic image. He reminds us that the daguerrotype has no negative to be transformed into a positive photographic image (which is therefore capable of being—and has been—manipulated). Daguerrotypes are literally the authentic trace of the individual whose physical existence is embedded within the metallic image. Asking 'What do we mean by calling the daguerrotype image a "portrait"?', he considers what makes a likeness a portrait and what is the relationship between cultural history and technical development?

Trachtenberg puts the reception of the daguerrotype into a contemporary 'mixed discourse of science, technique, art and magic' of 'images as magical replicas, as fetishes and effigies'. In his essay on Nadar, Roger Cardinal places that photographer's work within a range of contemporary cultural representation, not only that of painted portraits but also of descriptive writing from French Romantic writings to the realist novel. He brings together the discourses of realism, portraiture and photography and addresses portraiture as a cultural practice specific to certain groups at a specific historical moment.

David Ellis approaches the issue from another viewpoint. In selecting images of D. H. Lawrence (for a book that he was researching), Ellis speculates on the construction of an individual identity through photography (as does Cardinal on Baudelaire), and, in his own contribution to the book, Clarke looks at the relationship between identity and social order in August Sander's typological photographic programme. Mike Gidley takes these questions further in his essay on Hoppe's 'types' by employing the notion of difference in his 'cultural archaeology' of Hoppe's early images, considering them within a body of work which included social (named) portraits and social types. His provides the most comprehensive account of the wider issues around photography and also considers the racial, class and gender differences between a portrait and a typology, demonstrating that 'Hoppe . . . produced not a simple transcription of what he saw, but images inscribed with contemporary ideas of difference' (p. 152).

The essays that stand out in this collection are those by Mike Gidley and Dawn Ades. Ades's work is informed by her extensive work on Surrealism and Dada; it demonstrates knowledge of and draws on a wide range of visual sources, including photography. She argues that Duchamp is not just working within, but is actually interrogating, current discourses of sexuality, representation and identity. The starting point for her essay here is the acceptance of the evidence of the photographic trace as the sign of authenticity and the way in which Marcel Duchamp recognizes and abuses this sign in the creation of his own *alter ego*, Rose Selavy, by drawing on the existing photographic codes. Through his play of irony, Ades argues, Duchamp shows the issue of 'likeness . . . to be no longer relevant—or perhaps, more correctly to be expoitable in ways that shift the centre of intent away from the subject/sitter and towards the mode of representation' (p. 97). This essay will be a useful addition to the Duchamp literature.

These essays are informed by a range of cultural theories, the majority (and most successful) of the essays have as their starting points insights associated with Susan Sontag and Roland Barthes; they also draw on the more recent work by John Tagg. The notion of the photograph as fetish with a theoretical underpinning from cultural anthropology demonstrates that photography did not just pose a threat to painting *per se* but in very specific ways to portraiture in particular.

Although covering a range of texts, this is, after all, a book about photography; this being so the poor quality of its reproduction is regrettable. In some cases the detail is impossible to decipher. Further, the apparent randomness of some of the images finally becomes inescapable in an essay such as Philip Stokes's speculative and untheorized thoughts on the nature of the family photograph. (He seems to be unaware of feminist work on the subject.) His account is descriptive rather than analytic so it seems very odd that the photograph, *Boarding House. Portrait*, which is reproduced on page 196, is not the image which Stokes has been describing in great detail on the same page. Other photographs seem to be included rather by chance than intention. At £23.00 for a collection of

essays about visual culture, the reader would at least expect adequate reproductions of at least some of the images.

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Freedom, Truth and History: An Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy. By STEPHEN HOULGATE. Routledge. 1991. pp. 263. £10.99; cloth-bound, £35.00.

AFTER HIS articulate comparative study *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics* (Cambridge, 1987), Houlgate has written a comprehensive exegesis of Hegel's 'heaven storming' system offering the novitiate entry into the complex forecourts of that unique philosophical sanctum in which art, history, religion, logic and metaphysics achieve a dialectical fusion. The chapter which readers of this journal will be most concerned with—'Art, Beauty and Human Wholeness'—puts the case (which Houlgate seems sympathetic to) that art should deal with the fullness of human experience as opposed to its fragmentation and collapse as portrayed within the works of Kleist, Joyce and Beckett. The claim is a brave one since the events of this century test any Hegelian faith in the holistic coherence of the human predicament. The works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche attest to how Hegel's most consequential philosophical bequest is in fact his acceptance of opposition and contradiction as the engine of socio-political as well as spiritual life rather than his optimistic belief that the agony of such tensions could be overcome by an all-resolving historical teleology. That such a claim might engender puzzlement within philosophical circles cannot be an objection to it since philosophical–historical claims should spur further thought. Houlgate's claim about Hegel's aesthetic at least has the virtue of forcing its readers to clarify their own view of the matter—a Hegelian compliment if there ever was one.

If as Houlgate intimates in the chapter 'History and Truth', 'history is . . . self-conscious . . . self-narrating activity' (p. 31) culminating in 'a full consciousness of what we are' (p. 34), it is curious that any introduction to Hegel's aesthetics in terms of both what shaped it and what it has shaped is eschewed. Instead, Houlgate focuses on and defends Hegel's doctrine of beauty, embodying the latter's hermeneutic of trying 'to employ the actual words of the people we are considering' (p. 35). This proves unfortunate for reasons which Houlgate cannot be held fully responsible. A defence of aesthetic beauty in terms of it sustaining 'the wholeness and richness of human life' will seem to the philosophical ear of the Anglo-Saxon community preposterously pompous if not empty while to those sensitive to contemporary aesthetics debates in France centring around Lyotard's analysis of the beautiful and the sublime, it will seem a totalitarian imposition. The unfortunate aspect is that Hegel's significance in the unfolding of contemporary European aesthetics is massively significant but an analysis of something other than his doctrine of beauty is required to reveal this. Had either the aesthetics of Heidegger or the more approachable arguments of Gadamer been used as a means to engage the student well versed in the contemporary horizon, the full power of Hegel's innovation could be brought out. Houlgate only begins to hint at such a tactic. He notes Hegel's abhorrence of romantic subjectivism (p. 35) and of how in artistic criticism one should let 'what is substantial emerge from chance and mere whims' (p. 174). It requires a master to seize and develop the philosophical and critical potential of such dispositions. Accordingly, in *Truth and Method* Gadamer states that 'what we call with Hegel "substance" . . . is the basis of all subjective meaning' and that the aim of understanding is to 'discover in all that is subjective the substantiality that determines it' (Sheed and Ward, 1979, p. 269). Thus '*patere legem, quam ipse tulisti*' is a maxim that must be applied to Hegel's aesthetic for, given that neither history nor art has ended, the substantive nature of his position can only be grasped as both historically determinate and determinant.

Houlgate's references to Hegel's remarks about art as 'the sensuous appearance of the Idea' or the 'appearance of truth' cry out for exploration. They are the very signature of Hegel's aesthetic. If Gadamer is right about how in the apprehension of a word, 'every word causes the whole of the language to

which it belongs to resonate', Hegel's remarks continue to cause the whole history of aesthetics to resonate. As historically determinate, they are his consequential response to Plato's fateful divorce of the sensuously apparent from the intellectual realm of pure Ideas. Plato's relegation of the artist to the status of untouchable was never taken seriously. Aristotle, Plotinus and Ficino quickly perceived that if art was merely the *semblance* of and not *the* beautiful itself, rather than distracting us from it, art encouraged us to set out on the road towards grappling with the intelligible truth of the beautiful. It is extraordinary how many artists and philosophers of art accepted Plato's privileging of logico-mathematical knowledge over the 'merely' historical and artistic. In accordance with the neo-Platonic dimensions of Cartesian aesthetics even Joshua Reynolds was to argue that 'the beauty of which we are in quest is general and intellectual: it is an idea that subsists only in the mind: the sight never beheld it nor has the hand expressed it'. This Moses-like view of art as that which by means of appearance draws us to the realm of intuitable universals but which for fear of denying itself as the medium of appearance, can never itself pass into it, was weakened by Leibniz. Instead of grasping art as the sensuous intimation of truth, he presented sensuous appearance as an imperfect or confused mode of knowing the intelligible but not ontologically distinct from it. This line of argumentation was continued by Baumgarten for whom natural and artistic symmetry were both reflections of and analogies for logical and ultimately divine order. He insisted, furthermore, upon the irreducible autonomy of sensuous appearance, arguing that any passage from contemplating the dawn, replete with its associations of renewal and bringing into light, to reflecting upon the idea of dawn as a conceptualization of earth's movement in relation to the sun, could not occur without loss. The transition might achieve a more distinct or general idea of dawn but only by destroying the immediacy of the particular experience. In Baumgarten's thought, appearance acquires its own truth. Kant disliked this as it located the truth of the beautiful appearance in the empirical realm allegedly rendering it subjective. He accordingly suggested that an appearance is truly judged beautiful because it potentially evokes within a community shared inter-subjective aesthetical responses. Schiller and Gadamer complained that the consequence of Kant's concerns with the truth of appearance rather than the appearance of truth, his confining of truth to the reservations of conceptual knowledge and the removal of art from the realm of knowledge, emptied all content from art. Hegel's dialectical monism simultaneously restored art's content and recognized the special status of appearance. Hegel not only conceived of Ideas as having both an intellectual and sensual mode but understood the contradictions and historical tensions between, for example, the theory and practice of democracy as driving the idea towards an ever fuller realization of itself. The coming into appearance of truth has an epiphanic value. It is the sensuous incarnation of an idea. Thus Plato's doctrine of Ideas is brought down to earth in Hegel's philosophy of art. Yet not even this is the end of the story.

Though his aesthetics imbued art with the dignity of sensuously embodying the history of human ideas, Hegel's rationalist tendencies convinced him that only philosophy attained a complete comprehension of Ideas. In philosophy, art met both its self-negating realization and historical end. Though Hegel's belief in the historical unfolding of a fixed system of ideas was soon discredited, variants of his notion of 'the coming into appearance of truth' found their way even into his opponents' thinking. Nietzsche, the arch-denier of metaphysical truths, celebrated the fleeting world of appearances as *the* truth. The world does not emerge or fall into appearance from another state but is the totality of such appearings. Thus, there is no difference of kind between the world and art, for the truth of art as beguiling appearance is also a mode of the world's truth as an appearing. Heidegger sees in that self-same process the essence of actual Being as the simultaneity of disclosure and closure but he sees in art not the revelation of Plato's ideas but the epiphanic objectifications of the contingent but historically binding forms of our cultural existence (*Dasein*). Gadamer brings the argument full circle. The subject-matters of art are the defining themes (*die Sachen*) of a culture, be

they thematically specific or existential in their reach. These 'ideas' have no metaphysical origin and yet they are historically transcendent in that they are not reducible to any one epoch. Such 'truths' do not exist apart from their historical manifestations and yet always remain more than their appearings. Neither are such truths complete nor do they exhibit a teleological structure but remain open and capable of expansion. Most important of all, the realm of art as the theatre of coming into appearance is the domain in which these ideas are revealed, sustained and transformed. Plato is turned on his head and art, rather than logico-mathematical reasoning, becomes the guardian of the 'ideas'. This contemporary elevation of art would not have been possible without the catalyst of Hegel's conception of art as the sensuous appearing of the Idea. The greatest philosophical celebrant of history requires history to reveal the magnitude of his contribution to the history of aesthetics.

Houlgate's discussion of Hegel's philosophy of art is concise and free of Hegel's rhetoric. Though the portentous nature of Hegel's aesthetics does not become apparent unless considered historically, Houlgate's straightforward exegesis offers a clear introduction. His treatment of Hegel's philosophy of art gives rise to the thought that a rigorous defence of Hegel's aesthetic is worth while since its central conception of art as the coming into appearance of truth offers a phenomenological basis for a critique of the rampant subjectivism in the deconstructive approach to aesthetics. Such a defence would have to articulate itself without recourse to any appeal to historical necessity. As the dilemmas of Gadamer's hermeneutical aesthetics indicate, we are still in need of an aesthetic theory which can centre upon Hegel's conception of the sensuous epiphany of truth without succumbing to the vagueness of particular experience or to the unbending generalities of the rational dimension of 'ideas'. Perhaps the merit of Houlgate's account is that it reveals the need for a yet more innovative mode of Hegelian mediation.

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A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR DEFINING A WORK OF ART

Richard Kamber

I THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF THIS PROPOSAL

THE DEFINITION I propose is intended to capture the classificatory use of 'art' and 'work of art'. What makes my proposal modest is that it does not attempt to reform the way that people talk about art. It accepts the inevitability of debate and uncertainty over whether some objects, events and designs are works of art at all. It also accepts the fact of overlap between classificatory and honorific or prescriptive uses. It recognizes that it is sometimes difficult to tell which of these uses a speaker intends and that speakers themselves may not be clear about their own intentions. Above all, it acknowledges that the classificatory use is often—though not always—tied to value judgements. This is why I do not follow Morris Weitz, George Dickie and others in referring to the honorific or prescriptive use as 'evaluative'.[1]

The modesty of my proposal notwithstanding, I believe it is worth making. Besides providing a useful model against which to measure more restrictive definitions of art, a definition of this kind can shed light on related aesthetic issues. Though it makes no effort to force agreement in our uses of 'art' and 'work of art', it helps to illuminate the grounds for our disagreements. In addition, it explicitly distinguishes: (1) *paradigm cases* (works about which all or nearly all knowledgeable and reasonable people would agree); (2) *unexceptional cases* (works about which most knowledgeable and reasonable people would agree); (3) *plausible candidates* (works which some knowledgeable and reasonable people might claim to be art and whose reasons for doing so would be intelligible though not necessarily persuasive to other knowledgeable and reasonable people).

II TESTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL DEFINITION OF ART

To be successful, any definition that claims to capture the full range of the classificatory use for 'art' and 'work of art' must satisfy the following tests.

First, it must be consistent with the common practice of identifying certain objects, events and designs as works of art because they resemble other objects, events and designs that are generally agreed to be works of art. Most of us will not hesitate to call a fugue, a sonnet or an oil painting a work of art, even if we know nothing about its origins.

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Recent efforts to define 'art' in terms of historical linkages are right to emphasize the importance of what has already been accepted as art in determining what new works will be accepted as art.[2] But the past that counts most in this regard is the past that has been incorporated into our cultural heritage through the accumulation of genres, forms and subclasses of art. Our willingness to accept a new or newly discovered work as art may depend in part on whether there is a recognized category into which we can confidently place that work—a category, perhaps, such as 'mobile', 'concrete poem' or 'pop art'.

Second, it must be able to include experimental cases that stretch art to its limits. Works such as Marcel Duchamp's *Fountain*, Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali's *Un chien andalou*, Samuel Beckett's *Breath* and John Cage's *4′ 3″* may mark the fringes of what art can be, but few critics, curators or historians of art today would deny that these deliberately provocative works are at least borderline instances of art.

Third, it must deal adequately with another range of cases about which people who take an interest in and talk about art are likely to differ. What cases in this range most often have in common is that they were made by individuals who in the process of making them did not or may not have thought of themselves as practising a fine or performing art. Such cases include the following: (1) Works of craftsmen and craftswomen, such as jewellery, rugs, tapestries, ceramics, metalwork, furniture and glassware; (2) Works of engineers and landscape architects, such as bridges, parks and plazas; (3) Works of graphic, industrial, interior and urban designers, such as posters, automobiles and city plans; (4) Works of writers who are not writing fiction or poetry, such as articles, speeches and essays; (5) Performances by athletes whose sports place a high premium on grace and form, such as bull fighting, acrobatics and competitive ice skating.

For a classificatory definition to deal adequately with this wide array of cases, it must, I believe, provide a plausible account of why people differ or waver about cases of this kind and explain under what conditions a given case is likely to be called a work of art.

III THE DEFINITION

A Necessary Conditions for Being a Work of Art

What distinguishes art from nature is intentional making, design or presentation. What helps distinguish the fine or performing arts from other arts is aesthetic intent. Individual practitioners of other arts (medical, manual, etc.) may care about aesthetic interest, but it is not necessary to the arts they practice—except in special cases such as plastic surgery. In contrast, aesthetic intent is necessary to the fine and performing arts to this extent: an object, event and design cannot be a work of art unless we know or have reason to

believe that it is intended to be an object of more than incidental aesthetic interest. The reason this condition must allow for surmise as well as knowledge is that we often don't know the intent of artists. The grandeur of the *Iliad* or the striking design of a Bambara mask by an unknown carver may give us reason to believe that the individuals who made them intended them to be objects of fairly intense aesthetic interest, but we have no direct way of verifying those beliefs.

Thus, what all works of art have in common is that they have been composed, crafted, designed or presented by one or more individuals whose intent was (or appears to have been) to cause that work to be used, at least in part, as an object of aesthetic interest of some intensity. These are necessary but not sufficient conditions for being a work of art.

It may be worth noting this formulation leaves open the possibility that the individual(s) responsible for making or presenting a work of art could be a computer or an animal. To qualify, the individual in question would have to be capable of intending that the work be used as an object of aesthetic interest. Whether any computer or animal could meet this qualification seems doubtful. Yet happily for them (if they care), fame and fortune have triumphed over uncertain qualifications for AARON, the computer, whose drawings have been exhibited in art museums and Ruby, the painting elephant, whose work has earned over $250,000 for the Phoenix Zoo.[3]

B Alternative Supplementary Conditions for Being a Work of Art

In order to be a work of art, an object, event or design must also satisfy one or more of the following conditions. To put the matter more precisely, an object, event or design that satisfies the above conditions will qualify as, at least, a plausible candidate as a work of art, if it clearly satisfies one of the conditions listed below. An object, event or design that satisfies the above conditions will qualify as a work of art, if it clearly satisfies two of the conditions listed below. An object, event or design that satisfies the above conditions will qualify as a paradigm case of art (in the classificatory sense), if it clearly satisfies three of the conditions listed below.

1. It has physical and/or formal properties that make it easily recognizable as belonging to a class of objects, events or designs whose members are generally agreed to be works of art. For example, it is a fugue, a sonnet or an oil painting on canvas.

2. It is presented as a candidate for aesthetic appreciation by some person or persons acting on behalf of the artworld. For example, it is exhibited in an art museum as a candidate for aesthetic appreciation.

3. It has the capacity to arouse and sustain aesthetic interest of some intensity. For example, it is experienced by most people who read or re-read it as beautiful.

C Applications

Under this definition, a handsome piece of driftwood seen but left undisturbed on the beach would not be a work of art because it is the product of natural forces. An oversized, hand-wrought link of chain from a nineteenth-century factory would not qualify as art, although it may arouse and sustain our aesthetic interest, because we have no reason to assume that it was intended to be aesthetically interesting.

Duchamp's Readymades, a very bad oil painting and a beautiful glass lamp shade would all be at least plausible candidates as works of art. A fugue performed by a chamber orchestra, an unpublished sonnet of notable merit, an oil painting on canvas exhibited by an art museum and an ancient gold bracelet presented as art in an art history book would clearly be works of art. Michelangelo's *David*, Joyce's *Ulysses* and Leonard Bernstein's score for *West Side Story* would all be paradigm cases of art (in the classificatory sense).

IV CLARIFICATIONS

There are several terms in the above definition that require clarification. I have organized my comments about them under three separate headings in the paragraphs below.

A 'Aesthetic'

The key word 'aesthetic' appears in my formulation of the necessary condition for art as well as in two of the three supplementary conditions. If this word were synonymous with 'artistic' (and it has sometimes been used that way), my definition would be nearly circular. But I am not using 'aesthetic' to mean 'artistic'. In fact, my use of 'aesthetic' does not in any way require that there be such a thing as a work of art.

In the above definition, 'aesthetic' occurs in the expressions 'aesthetic interest' and 'aesthetic appreciation'. Aesthetic interest and aesthetic appreciation are species of aesthetic responses. J. O. Urmson has pointed out that a response can be both aesthetic and something other than aesthetic (e.g., personal or economic).[4] For my purposes, it only matters that a response (say of interest or appreciation) be at least partially aesthetic.

With these points in mind, I define 'aesthetic' as follows. One's response to an object, event or design is aesthetic if and only if one is responding at least in part to the way it looks, sounds, feels, smells or 'reads', and not just to some other thing, purpose, or some part of one's own body to which that object, event or design calls attention.[5]

Taste as a distinct form of sensation has been omitted from this list because its range (sweet, sour, bitter, and salty) is too limited to permit aesthetic experiences except when supplemented by other more complex sensations. However, I have added to this list the word 'reads' to deal with the special

mix of sensory and imaginative experience that is essential to literature and sometimes associated with other arts as well. Reading a written text may involve attention to each of the following: (1) how it looks on the page; (2) how it sounds as we read it to ourselves; (3) what sights, sounds, smells, etc. the words on the page direct us to imagine.

B 'Artworld'

The second key word is 'artworld'. Here too it may seem reasonable to suspect circularity. I have used this term because it says in two syllables what might otherwise require several lines and because I wanted to make clear my debt to Arthur Danto and George Dickie, whose institutional theories of art undergird this part of my definition.[6] The artworld, in its broadest sense, consists of institutions, organizations, professions and professionals whose principal work is to produce, present, study or critique any of the fine or performing arts. For my purposes, it is best understood rather conservatively to include only those institutions, organizations, professions and professionals who command some influence and respect in their chosen art forms. Even this restriction leaves open questions about whether Country and Western radio stations or the directors of teenage horror films are representatives of the artworld, but it keeps at bay the trivializing of the artworld by such casual acts as briefly renting an art gallery, a theatre or a printing press.

The question of circularity is best answered by noting that the above definition does not require that the artworld be defined in terms of art or that art be defined in terms of the artworld. Most members of the artworld describe themselves rarely, if at all, in terms of a generic concept of art. Their stock and trade are the artefacts, practices and histories specific to music, painting, sculpture, poetry, etc. As for art, the above definition does not necessitate association with the artworld as a condition for being art. What my definition does propose is that presentation by the artworld is one of three ways that an object, event or design can become at least a plausible candidate as a work of art.

Another way of understanding this issue is by asking whether there could be works of art if there were no artworld? My answer is yes, and this answer underscores the divergence between my definition and strictly institutional theories. To accept the implication of strictly institutional theories that the cave painting at Lascaux, the sculptures at Chichen Itza or the epics of Homer were not art until an artworld arose to dub them art is to confuse the event of labelling with the product being labelled. Art was being made and used before there was an artworld just as mathematics was being discovered, developed and used before there was a 'world' of institutions, organizations, professions and professionals whose principal work was the advancement of mathematics.

Nevertheless, the powers of the artworld are formidable. As the history of

the arts in the twentieth century has made quite clear, the artworld has the power to get people to consider as plausible cases of art objects, events and designs which they otherwise would have dismissed as unworthy of serious consideration as artworks. The artworld does this by presenting such objects, events and designs as candidates for aesthetic appreciation, an action that people outside the artworld can also perform. But this action has greater force and a different kind of credibility when performed by people acting on behalf of the artworld. A homemade wooden chair displayed in a major museum is likely to be seen quite differently from the same chair displayed in the stall of a flea market.

A subtler power is the capacity of the artworld to reassure us about what we may comfortably regard as works of art. The fact that George Orwell's essay 'Shooting an Elephant' is usually called a literary essay by literary critics and often anthologized in collections of literature by publishers of literary works reassures us that it is indeed a literary work of art, whereas we may be quite unsure about whether nicely written articles and essays that we come across in newspapers or (non-literary) journals are entitled to the same status. Similarly, the frequent display of ancient Greek vases in art museums and art history books helps to explain why most people are more confident about regarding these artefacts as art than other decorated utensils.

C 'Clearly' and 'Of Some Intensity'

The word 'clearly' is used three times in my introduction of alternative supplementary conditions for being a work of art. The expression 'of some intensity' is used both in my formulation of the second necessary condition and the third alternative supplementary condition. The effect of both terms is to increase the extent to which the application of these conditions will vary with individual judgements and standards.

To one observer, it may seem clear that a crude, framed painting of Elvis Presley on black velvet lacks even the physical and formal properties that would entitle it to be called a work of art. To another observer, it may seem equally clear that this creation, however execrable, is none the less a work of art. These observers differ about what physical and/or formal properties an object must have to be a work of visual art. They may also differ about whether there is a minimum level of value an object must attain to advance from mere candidacy as art to art.

The expression 'of some intensity' is borrowed from Monroe Beardsley's account of aesthetic experience.[7] Beardsley uses this expression rather loosely, and my use is loose as well. By speaking of 'aesthetic interest of some intensity' I mean to exclude interest in the way things look, sound, feel, smell or 'read' that is negligible, incidental or half-conscious. But what remains is subject to the assessments of individual experience and judgement. For one observer a pair of contemporary Navajo ear-rings, or the performance of a

skilled matador or a design for the body of an automobile may seem objects of fairly intense interest—and therefore works of art. For another observer, the aesthetic interest of all of the above may seem insufficiently intense. These observers may differ not only about how aesthetically interesting they themselves find the ear-rings, bullfight and design in question, but also about how intense 'intense' has to be to justify the appellation of art. They may differ, furthermore, about how intensive and extensive the aesthetic interest of others must be before one sets aside one's own lack of intense aesthetic interest as determinative.

Since the terms 'clearly' and 'of some intensity' make my definition less precise than it might be, it is natural (though perhaps a bit naïve at this point) to ask why I have used them. As I explained in Section I, my purpose is to capture the way people talk about art and works of art, not to reform their usage. I have introduced these terms deliberately to preserve the openness, individuality and value-dependent features of the classificatory use of 'art' and 'work of art'. The intent of my modest proposal is not to shrink the grey areas that are scattered across the surface of our common discourse about art but to command a better overview of where those areas are.

V THE ESSENCE OF ART

What bearing, if any, does my modest proposal have on the debate between essentialists and anti-essentialists? Is my proposed definition merely a nominal definition (a set of rules for using the words 'art' and 'work of art') or does it purport to explain what art really is? Does art have an essence, and, if it does, can that essence be described?

What I take to be the essence of art has already been described by the necessary conditions of my proposed definition of art. As those conditions imply, art is a species of *techné*. The common essence of artworks is that they have been composed, crafted, designed or presented by one or more individuals whose intent was (or appears to have been) to cause that work to be used, at least in part, as an object of aesthetic interest of some intensity. This is the essence of art because these are the characteristics that are essential (i.e., necessary) to being a work of art. Furthermore, this essence helps explain why artists and audiences care about art: we care about the making and experience of aesthetically interesting objects, events and designs.

The shortcoming of this essence is that it is not sufficient to identify works of art unless we add the alternative supplementary conditions spelled out in my modest proposal. But if we add those conditions, the resulting essence is no more than nominal (Locke would say 'less') since it doesn't capture what is externally common to all works of art much less their ultimate nature.

T. J. Diffey provided a key to this issue when he said 'Art has no real essence because art has a history'.[8] From its various beginnings, art has served a multiplicity of purposes: to honour or entreat the gods, to promote fertility,

to provide shelter (architecture), to imitate nature, to inspire reverence, to inculcate virtue, to immortalize patrons, to entertain, to enlighten, to express or elicit emotions, to create beauty, to celebrate class values, to challenge the boundaries of art, etc. Hence, we should not be surprised to find that art defies reduction to the sort of essence or definition we expect of natural kinds, such as gold, or single-purpose artefacts, such as doorstops.

Art has been shaped by its rich and energetic history, but the history of art has not been shapeless. Among the most powerful features that have emerged from its history are: (1) the primacy of aesthetic interest both as an end in its own right and as an important means of helping art works achieve other ends; (2) the accumulation of recognized genres, forms and subclasses of art; and (3) the gradual convergence of institutions, organizations, professions and professionals that make, present, study and critique art to form what is now called the artworld. It is this trio of aesthetic interest, recognized genres and artworld that today guides decisions about what counts as art and provides the basis for a sound definition of the classificatory use of 'art' and 'work of art'.

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[1] M. W. Rowe in 'Why "Art" Doesn't Have Two Senses', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 31 (1991), pp. 214–221, argues that the distinction between classificatory and evaluative senses of 'art' is ill-founded and that the classificatory sense could not exist. But Rowe's arguments are not convincing. For a detailed refutation of Rowe's position, see Graham Oppy, 'On Functional Definitions of Art: A Response to Rowe', *British Journal of Aesthetics* 33 (1993), pp. 67–70.

[2] For example, See Noël Carroll, 'Art, Practice, and Narrative', *Monist* 71 (1988), pp. 140–156.

[3] For AARON, see Grace Glueck, 'Portrait of the Artist as a Young Computer', *New York Times*, 20 Feb. 1983, sec. 2: 31–32. For Ruby, see Rhonda Rundle 'Ruby Sees Red, Or So They Say, And Sells Paintings', *Wall Street Journal*, 4 Dec. 1991: sec. A: 1 & 10.

[4] J. O. Urmson, 'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?', in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 31 (1957), pp. 75–92.

[5] My mention of body parts in this definition of aesthetic responses is based on a similar point developed by George Santayana. As Santayana argues, although both aesthetic and physical pleasures are physiologically based the latter unlike the former 'make no object so conspicuous to us as the organ in which they arise'. George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896; New York: Dover Publications, 1955), pp. 23–24.

[6] The seminal work was Arthur Danto's 'The Artworld', which first appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1964), pp. 571–584. George Dickie presented the first version of his institutional theory in *Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell U.P., 1974).

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BEAUTY IN NATURE, BEAUTY IN ART

Christopher Janaway

IN THIS paper I want to examine a claim which has received some attention recently, namely the claim that the term 'beauty' stands for a single, generic concept of aesthetic value, which has application both to natural objects and to art. While the aspiration behind this view has its attractions, I shall seek to cast doubt on whether it can be fulfilled, at least in the manner of recent proposals.

The first such proposal is that of Mary Mothersill. Mothersill sets out to show the following: 'first . . . that there *is* a generic, standing concept—which is to say that Alcibiades, a good *haiku*, a successful poem, and so forth, have an interesting common feature—and second . . . that the term "beauty", as it is commonly understood, picks out that concept'.[1] Later Mothersill makes clear that it would not matter if the *term* 'beauty' disappeared, since we could refer to the same thing as 'aesthetic value', for example. Her point is, however, that we need such a generic *concept*. It is a standing concept, by which she means one which we could not get along without. There are two of Mothersill's claims that I want to highlight. One is that beauty knows no ontological limitations: items of any sort may be beautiful, and *a fortiori* both works of art and natural objects may be instances of this same concept.[2] The other is that whenever an object's aesthetic merit is discussed, it is its beauty that we are ultimately interested in. Whereas Wittgenstein observed, 'It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgements are made, aesthetic adjectives such as "beautiful", "fine", etc., play hardly any role at all',[3] Mothersill counters—rightly—that 'Where a concept governs a context, it doesn't need to be mentioned', adding that 'when a point about a poem or musical performance is made, the concept of beauty is in the background'.[4] Putting together these two claims, we arrive at the position that whenever an aesthetic judgement is made about either a work of art or a natural object, there is a single concept, beauty, which governs the context of the judgement.

The second example is provided by Anthony Savile's paper, 'Beauty: A Neo-Kantian Account'.[5] Savile's aim is to begin with the case of beauty in art, then to progress to a single account which encompasses natural as well as artistic beauty.[6] In the case of art, he says, 'the term "beauty" is the most general term of aesthetic praise, one that can always be applied or withheld from any work of art with propriety and relevance'.[7] When Savile comments on the fact (a 'quirk of aesthetic history') that the term 'beautiful' is not used

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in all cases of aesthetic success, his line parallels Mothersill's: 'One of the defects of taking the historical accident seriously is that it would deprive us of a concept which in aesthetics we urgently need and for which I have claimed the concept of the beautiful is well suited'. This is another way of saying that beauty is a standing concept. Also similar is Savile's view that beauty governs the context of aesthetic judgement: 'the critic . . . will concentrate on other features that [a work] possesses. But this concentration is in the tacit service of the question why the work he studies is as beautiful (or as little beautiful) as it is.'[8]

I want to put forward some observations which suggest that beauty cannot be, in the way that these writers propose, *both* the general concept governing all contexts of aesthetic praise *and* a concept applying univocally to cases of art and nature alike.

An approach to the issue of beauty in art and nature can be made from the perspective of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*. Kant's account is complicated by his notion of the sublime, which allows for a form of aesthetic judgement not concerned expressly with beauty. Nevertheless, I shall take it that for Kant 'beauty' is a generic term of aesthetic praise with something like the role envisaged by Mothersill and Savile. The question I wish to start from is whether Kant thinks that we apply the same concept univocally to nature and to art. Consider the following:

> it is imperative . . . to determine the difference between beauty of nature, which it only requires taste to estimate, and beauty of art, which requires genius for its possibility (a possibility to which regard must also be paid in estimating such an object).[9]

> in a would-be work of fine art [*schöne Kunst*] we may frequently recognize genius without taste, and in another taste without genius.[10]

This makes it sound as if an art work's being beautiful is something different from a natural object's being beautiful. Beauty in a tree or flower depends solely on its estimation by taste—whether it presents itself to the beholder as having a formal purposiveness, whether it gives rise to a disinterested pleasure in the free play of the cognitive faculties. On the other hand, a poem or painting may please in just this way, yet lack the qualities that genius can instil into things. Since for Kant genius 'displays itself . . . in the portrayal, or expression of *aesthetic ideas*',[11] we may think that if a work fails to express aesthetic ideas, then it fails to be a beautiful work.

If Kant is saying this, he is taking '. . .is beautiful' to enunciate an *overall aesthetic judgement* in a way which is perfectly intelligible. We may judge of a work that its form, colour, or sound is (as Kant would say) pleasing to taste, but nevertheless consider it not to be an aesthetic success, all things considered. Some works are decorative, even exquisitely so, but do not (as Kant would say) express an aesthetic idea, or do so very well. The thought is that we

expect a successful work of art to 'body forth to sense' aspects of life or reality, in such a way as to stimulate a wealth of conceptual thought in the observer, without restricting her to any one definite set of concepts.[12] To achieve this is, in Kant's terms, the work of genius, and it is only if we are thus stimulated to thought and apprehend the work *as* having been made possible by genius that we can truly judge it an aesthetic success.

Now if 'beauty' is to be a predicate of overall aesthetic praise for art works, an art work's beauty will have two essential components: that it be pleasing to taste, and that it express aesthetic ideas. On the other hand, the beauty of a tree or flower has only one component—it 'only requires taste to estimate'. If we have one-component beauty on the one hand, and two-component beauty on the other, it follows that beauty in art and beauty in nature are not the same. 'Beauty' becomes an ambiguous term.

Later, admittedly, Kant tries to reassert the unity of beauty, saying that 'beauty (whether it be of nature or of art) may in general be termed the *expression* of aesthetic ideas'.[13] But I argue that this does not alter the points made so far. The sense in which a naturally occurring tree may 'express an aesthetic idea' is different from that in which a work of art may do so, as Kant recognizes in his immediate 'proviso': 'with beauty of nature the bare reflection upon a given intuition, apart from any concept of what the object is intended to be, is sufficient for awakening and communicating the idea of which that Object is regarded as the *expression*'.[14] It is not easy to explain how a natural object is supposed to express an aesthetic idea for Kant.[15] But we know that in the Analytic of the Beautiful he makes crucial use of the notion of an object's being apprehended as purposive for our cognition, and it seems fairly clear that it is with this purposiveness that the aesthetic idea of nature is concerned: '*Natural beauty* may . . . be looked on as the *presentation* of the concept of formal, i.e. merely subjective, finality'.[16] Natural beauty expresses the single idea of its designedness for contemplation by us. But the difference between beauty in nature and beauty in art remains what Kant says it is in §48 and §51: in the case of nature, judging something beautiful does not require us to pay attention to anything other than the pleasure we gain in experience of the object. Its being pleasing to taste and its expressing an aesthetic idea are not two separable components of its aesthetic value. 'Bare reflection upon a given intuition' occasions pleasure in the object's formal purposiveness, and the same 'bare reflection' is sufficient to awaken and communicate the idea which the thing expresses. In the case of art, on the other hand, we have to attend to the manner of production of the work, understanding that it is intentionally produced under some concept, and asking what ideas the artist has successfully embodied in its perceptual form. Thus, even if natural beauty can also be said to express aesthetic ideas in its own peculiar way, beauty in nature remains a one-component affair, while beauty in art has two components.

But is this not puzzling? Another statement Kant makes is this: 'whether we are dealing with beauty of nature or beauty of art, we may make the universal statement: *that is beautiful which pleases in the mere estimate of it*'.[17] And for independent reasons, we may wish to preserve an intuition that a tree and a painting can both be judged beautiful in the very same way. If so, we may think it desirable if Kant can be read accordingly. Such a reading is achieved with admirable clarity by Mary McCloskey in her book, *Kant's Aesthetic*.[18] She writes that for Kant, 'whereas the aesthetic worth of natural objects is simply a matter of their being beautiful, the aesthetic worth of works of fine art turns upon their being beautiful and on their expressing aesthetic ideas'.[19] McCloskey makes use of the distinction between 'vehicle' and 'tenor': it is the virtue of the artistic vehicle to be beautiful, while the tenor—what the beautiful vehicle carries—consists of aesthetic ideas. On this account, the aesthetic value of art works still has two components. The difference is that beauty is now only *one* of the components. In holding out for the intuition that beauty really ought to be the same in natural and artistic cases, we now have to sacrifice the notion that '. . . is beautiful' expresses a judgement of *overall* aesthetic value in the case of art works. We have to admit that a work of art can be beautiful, in just the way that a flower or tree might be, and still not be fully an aesthetic success. So far, then, in looking at Kant, we face a choice: *either* beauty is always the ultimate aesthetic value of any thing, in which case there is no single account of beauty to be had that covers both art and nature, *or* being beautiful is the same for both art and nature, but must constitute only part of the aesthetic value in the case of art.

Here is another approach to the same dilemma. First, remember Wittgenstein's thought: 'Suppose someone were to say: "Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is, but ugly instead of beautiful"?!'[20] Now we can agree, I think, that any part of nature that differed in respect of *none* of its properties from something beautiful, must be beautiful. In this sense, there could not be a butterfly 'exactly as this one is' which failed to be beautiful, if this one was beautiful. But it is more interesting to consider whether some relatively restricted sub-set of the butterfly's properties can be put forward as the 'supervenience base'[21] of its beauty: those properties which nothing could share with it without sharing its beauty. And an initially plausible candidate for such a sub-set can be reached by rephrasing Wittgenstein's example thus: 'Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is *in appearance*, but ugly instead of beautiful'. The most likely first intuition is that if the thing is beautiful, nothing exactly like it in appearance can fail to be beautiful.

Mothersill's account of beauty reflects this intuition. As she says: 'I may prefer my rose to yours, but if, in the event, I cannot tell them apart, then . . . whatever I may *say*, it is not solely for its beauty that I prize my rose.'[22] With roses or butterflies, it seems that if A and B are perceptually indistin-

guishable to me (in appropriate circumstances, and so on), then it is actually wrong of me to claim that one is beautiful and the other not.

Now, if we wish to make this a claim of full generality, we will be bound to say that it would not matter *vis-à-vis* their beauty if we imagine our two indistinguishable objects continuing to look exactly the same, but now have one of them be a work of art, or indeed have both of them be works of art. And this can seem right: if it looked just exactly like this, and this is beautiful, how could it matter that somebody made it? There would be a mental adjustment for the observer to make on realizing this additional fact—she might now find herself preoccupied with admiring the skill of making such a beautiful thing, or instead, like the person tricked by the sound of Kant's bogus nightingale,[23] cease to find the same kind of interest in it once the trick came to light. (These are different reactions most of us have had to artificial flowers.) But for all that, we may think, the *beauty* of the object must remain the same, provided that it still looked the same to the observer in every way.

However, can we rest with this? How do works of art fare on Mothersill's test? It is by now a familiar, and—I would argue[24]—correct claim, that two perceptually indistinguishable objects can differ in their aesthetic properties. There are two relevant kinds of case. One is where two distinct art works are perceptually indistinguishable, but one is, say, trite, while the other is profound—which, I take it, would mean that their aesthetic value was not the same. (The most persuasive imaginary example of this general kind is that of the two *Don Quixotes* written by Cervantes and Menard in Borges' short story.[25]) The other case would be where just one of the objects was an art work, the other a non-art work that was perceptually indistinguishable from it. (Danto's imagined case of Rembrandt's *Polish Rider* having an exact double produced by the action of a centrifuge may serve as an example here.[26])

Let us put together an example of the second kind, building on the previous discussion. Suppose we have Wittgenstein's butterfly, and a work of art perceptually indistinguishable from it. Suppose that of the latter we can say that it is witty, profound, or banal, or whatever you like, subject only to the restriction that no such predicate can be applied to the butterfly. There is a respect, then, in which the butterfly and the work of art differ as to aesthetic value. Where does this leave their beauty, or lack of it? According to Mothersill, an assessment of a work's aesthetic merit *is* ultimately an assessment of its beauty, and this is true regardless of whether the object is a work of art or a natural object. Thus judging an art work's beauty ought to have the same structure as judging a rose's beauty. If I cannot legitimately judge two perceptually indistinguishable roses differently as regards beauty, I should not be able to do this where one or both of the perceptually indistinguishable objects is an art work. But since two perceptually indistinguishable objects can differ in their aesthetic value in the kinds of case we have mentioned, we

are left with the same dilemma as before: *either* beauty is a different, more complex affair in the case of art works than it is in the case of nature, involving as 'supervenience base' more than an object's perceptible properties, *or* an art work's beauty is not the total of its aesthetic value.

Thus, if the test of indistinguishability is a perceptual one,[27] then Mothersill's conception of beauty does not seem capable of extension from the case of roses to the case of works of art. I have spoken in particular of aesthetic properties which art works may have, such as being trite or profound, the point being that whether an art work has such properties as these depends not solely on its perceptible features, but on the time, place, and culture of its production, the artist's conception of it, the styles or conventions into which it may fit, and so on.

Turning now to Savile's analysis of beauty, we find that it is able to subsume just such properties under the head of the work's beauty, because it begins with the beauty of works of art specifically. My contention about this account, however, will be that it does not convincingly extend to cases of natural beauty.

Savile builds into his analysis of the beauty of a work of art the notions of problem, style, and understanding:[28]

(1) Problem: 'The artist's work answers, successfully or not as the case may be, to a determinate problem of design that he poses himself or entertains.'
(2) Style: 'the problem to which the artist addresses himself must be resolved within a set of aesthetic constraints, which I shall here call a style. Only by reference to a set of stylistic constraints can we sensibly judge that the answer the artist proposes to his overall intention is successful or not.'
(3) Understanding: 'only those responses to works of art that derive from a proper understanding of them are fit to enter into the characterization of their beauty. Unless I see the work as answering to the problem and style to which it really does answer, I shall misunderstand it, and my response, however intense or rewarding for me, will not bear on the truth of the claim that the work is beautiful.'

With these ideas in place, Savile is able to offer the view that 'a work of art is beautiful if and only if when seen as answering to its problem in its style it evokes the appropriate response'.[29] This response is 'that which we experience when we recognize that the solution a work of art proposes to its problem in its aesthetic constraints is just right, that, as Wittgenstein put it, it "clicks". We see the work as satisfying its overall intention.'[30] The notion of a problem, for Savile, is in fact a modest one: 'not more than a description to which something is made to fit'. Similarly, a style is to be understood as 'no more than a set of aesthetic constraints that determine correctness or incorrectness'.[31]

With such an account as this, we may extend Mothersill's test to cover art works in particular: if I prefer A to B, but cannot distinguish them perceptually, *and* do not understand them to differ as to which problem they address in which style, then I cannot coherently judge one beautiful and the other not. Strange cases where an art work differs in its aesthetic value from something perceptually indistinguishable from it will now be explicable in terms of a difference at the level of problem or style. For example, the two *Don Quixotes* satisfy different descriptions and answer to different aesthetic constraints.

I am content, for the sake of argument, to accept this way of accounting for the beauty of works of art, meaning by that their overall aesthetic merit. But now it seems to be natural beauty that will not fit the analysis, as Savile himself recognizes: 'Unless the analysis I have offered can be extended to cover natural cases of beauty as well, and extended in such a way as not to import ambiguity into the concept, my proposal will have to be judged a failure. Yet, since the notions of style and problem have no place in nature, it may seem inevitable that this judgement should be returned.'[32] Once again, natural beauty appears to have only the one component, namely the right kind of response—whatever exactly that turns out to be—on experiencing the object. In contrast, beauty in art has the additional component of being answerable to the conditions of problem and style. So we must now examine Savile's attempt to overcome this apparent disparity between nature and art.

Put informally, Savile's claim is that something is a beautiful work of art 'if and only if when seen as answering to its problem in its style it evokes the appropriate response'.[33] Remember that this response, for Savile, is what we experience when we recognize that the solution proposed to a problem within certain aesthetic constraints is 'just right'.[34] Do we have *this* response to flowers, trees or birds? There is more than a suspicion that we do not, but this is clearly a symptom of an underlying difficulty Savile encounters in seeking an account of unrestricted generality by stretching his analysis of 'is a beautiful work of art' into an analysis of 'is a beautiful *F*'. The underlying difficulty is that such things as flowers, birds, and trees seem to contravene the analysis, in that they do not propose solutions to problems, and are untrammelled by any aesthetic constraints.

Savile addresses this worry head-on. His first point is that it is 'perfectly possible' to view natural objects in the light of notions such as those of a style (or similar aesthetic constraint) and a problem (or description) to which they answer. He cites some examples from Gombrich: 'Would not a Chinese call that orchid "perfect" which corresponds most clearly to the rules he had absorbed? Do we not tend to judge human bodies by their resemblance to those Greek statues that have become traditionally identified with the canon of beauty?'[35] Savile is encouraged by this possibility to build the notions of problem and style into his totally general analysis of assertions of the form 'is a beautiful *F*'. Accordingly, *any object* will be beautiful if and only if we would

respond in the specified way to it *when it is viewed as answering to some particular problem and as in some particular style.*

One objection to this is a very simple one: that it is 'perfectly possible' to view things encountered in nature as answering to some problem and as in some style is not sufficient to show that an object is beautiful *only if* our response to it is conditioned by our viewing it in such ways. This will not be established even by the fact that sometimes we actually do view natural objects in such ways. So building problem and style into the very analysis of beauty in general remains an unmotivated step.

Savile, however, discerns another problem with his analysis so far. It is that almost anything will be able to qualify as beautiful provided that we impose a style and problem on it carefully enough. As he says: 'Take for instance a poplar tree. It does not take much imagination to see that tree in a style that emphasized the vertical as fitting the description "tree". Then [the analysis given] would encourage us to say that a poplar was a beautiful tree. And this is too cheap a victory.'[36] The implication is that '. . .is a beautiful tree' is not a predicate we would want all trees to satisfy indiscriminately. Savile's solution is to replace the single predicate '. . .is a beautiful tree' with a host of more specific predicate phrases. Instead of analysing judgements of the form '*x* is a beautiful *F*', we should, Savile suggests, be analysing judgements of the form '*x* is a beautiful *F* as fitting description *D* within aesthetic constraints *C*'.[37]

It is not clear how this will help. The problem at hand is that the unamended analysis would enable any assertion of beauty about any tree to count as true. By making a description and set of aesthetic constraints an explicit part of the assertion of a thing's beauty, we are able to put the more specific assertion 'That is a beautiful tree as fitting the description "tree" in a style that emphasizes the vertical' alongside (e.g.) 'That is a beautiful tree as fitting the description "willow" within constraints borrowed from Chinese painting'. We may have thereby prevented *all* trees from satisfying the *same* predicate '. . .is beautiful', but, since both the more specific assertions are capable of being true, we have not prevented there being *some* way in which *each* tree is beautiful.

A more serious doubt is whether judgements of this extended form ever occur, particularly in the case of natural beauty. Savile offers the doubter two thoughts. One is that in the case of natural beauty, 'it is the beholder who selects the parameters of judgement. It is he who decides what the relevant *D* and *C* are to be.'[38] The fact that there is no *fixed* description or set of quasi-stylistic constraints for trees, sea shells, or deserts, might suffice to create the false impression that *no* description or constraints are ever built into the judgement of such things as beautiful. That is one point. The other is that 'we may . . . take it to be a matter of conversational implicature that where no specification is given the most natural choice for *D* and *C* is to be understood'. Savile elaborates: 'In the case of *D* we shall generally understand to

be implied the predicate *F* under which the object is given to us, and for *C* it will be most reasonable to select those constraints that are assumed by speaker and hearer to be of common interest.'[39] Once again, this goes towards explaining cases in which such descriptions and constraints are implicit. Sometimes, subject to the will of the judger, a judgement of the beauty of a willow tree may be derivative from practices of judging according to identifiable, though not explicitly stated, aesthetic constraints—this we may concede. When considering a natural object's beauty we are at liberty, as it were, to pretend we are considering a work of art of a certain kind, or to behave in some respects as if we are. But what about the many cases where—seemingly—we do no such thing? Savile has said nothing to convince us that such descriptions and constraints are always in play when we judge a natural object beautiful.

However, there is a more fundamental question which I should like to raise about Savile's approach. Savile claims near the start of his analysis of beauty that what we have to analyse is not the straightforward predicate 'is beautiful' but 'is a beautiful *F*'. (This is before the complicating factors of description and constraint are added to the analysandum.) The point he is making is expressed by saying that 'beautiful' is not a predicative adjective, as most people have thought, but an attributive one.[40] There is room for doubt about this general claim. Consider the following scene, in which a purely predicative judgement seems the likely outcome: a person with no knowledge of botany or zoology is exploring a tropical rainforest, and comes upon a small, intricate, brightly coloured object attached to a tree. For all she knows it might be an insect, a fungus, a reptile, a part of the tree, even a human carving with some function. We may suppose that such thoughts and others pass quickly and tentatively through the person's mind, without settling anywhere definite. But, as she thus attends to this mysterious object for some time, she has a response of a particular kind to its appearance. Let us stipulate that this response is such as to legitimate the judgement: 'That is beautiful', or, to bring out the point at issue, 'That is beautiful—whatever it is'.

The question is whether we are entitled to make this last stipulation. Savile will say No—the person's response to the object cannot have been such as to legitimate a judgement of beauty, because *ex hypothesi* there was no recognition of the object's 'rightness' in answering to some description in some style. According to his view that there are no predicative judgements of beauty, we may rule that no genuine judgement concerning the thing's beauty can have been made in the case described. But this ruling sounds unduly dismissive: for do we not seem, taking the example on its own, to have a judgement of beauty in which the object judged is picked out purely demonstratively, and the subject is, at the moment of judging, unable to offer any secure classification of it? (At most it is judged as a beautiful *thing*. But for something to be beautiful *as a thing* is for it to be beautiful *tout court*.) An alternative to Savile

would have to be built around a convincing account of the kind of response that makes a judgement of beauty legitimate in such a case, but I suppose there is little harm in referring to this response provisionally as 'consciousness of mere formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive faculties'.[41] If such a response may occur, in the absence of the subject's imposing any description on the object, then, while it is important to note the mistake which Savile criticizes—that of thinking that *all* judgements of beauty are of the purely predicative form 'is beautiful'—it would also be wrong to suggest that all judgements of beauty can be covered by an analysis of 'is a beautiful *F*'. *Some* judgements of beauty are not of that form. And these, *a fortiori*, are not of the more sophisticated form Savile offers later: '*x* is a beautiful *F* as fitting description *D* within aesthetic constraints *C*'.

Here again, I suggest, we are likely to discover a disparity between art and nature: while all judgements of artistic beauty require some description *F* under which the object to be judged is placed, judgements of natural beauty can be of the purely demonstrative kind, exemplified by the rainforest encounter above. The claim here, in Kantian terms, is that there are 'free beauties of nature',[42] but that the beauty of art is always a dependent beauty. Art must always be recognized to be art before we can judge it beautiful,[43] and it must be judged in the light of the intention under which it was produced—'a concept of what the thing is intended to be' must be at the basis of the judgement.[44] On the other hand, 'To enable me to estimate a beauty of nature, as such, I do not need to be previously possessed of a concept of what sort of a thing the object is intended to be, . . . rather, in forming an estimate of it apart from any knowledge of the end, the mere form pleases on its own account.'[45] The claim is not that all and only natural beauty is free beauty. Some naturally occurring objects may have only dependent beauty (and—though this is not material to my argument—some artefacts may be freely beautiful, of which Kant's wallpaper and decorated frames may be examples).[46] The point is that judging an object in nature beautiful does not require that it be subsumed under any conceptual classification. An object in nature does not have to be judged a beautiful *F*, in order to be judged beautiful.

The thought that there are 'free beauties of nature', which I have argued is a truth, amounts to a denial of Savile's claim that something's being beautiful is always expressible in the form '. . . is a beautiful *F*'.[47] If it is possible to judge an individual beautiful *tout court*, this has a fatal effect on Savile's attempt to show that a single account of beauty can be arrived at by generalizing from the definition he gives of 'is a beautiful work of art'. If we retain his analysis of '*x* is a beautiful work of art', then 'beautiful' has to be understood as ambiguous: to judge 'x is a beautiful work of art' is one thing, to judge 'x is beautiful—whatever it is' another. Nature reveals that a judgement of the latter form *can* be a judgement embracing a thing's overall aesthetic value. Art shows that, on the other hand, a judgement of a thing's overall aesthetic

value *can* necessitate subsuming it under some specific description and viewing it in the light of a problem and a style.

If we continue to believe that any thing's beauty must coincide with its overall aesthetic value, then we have to accept that there are different kinds of overall aesthetic value, and, along with that, that 'beauty' is ambiguous. If, on the other hand, we continue to be impressed by the intuition that a rose and its replica, of whatever provenance, must not differ in their beauty, then we may be prone to oppose Savile right from the start, and insist that any classification of an object under a description, or thought of it as meeting stylistic constraints, must be irrelevant to its beauty as such. To take such a line would enable us to hold out for an unambiguous predicate 'beautiful', by deciding, in effect, that all beauty is free beauty. But the price is then that a work of art's beauty will certainly not exhaust its aesthetic value. It is preferable, I think, not to be too absolutist on either count: it is likely that not all beauty is free beauty *and* that not all aesthetic value is beauty. What we have learned—if I am right—is that there cannot be a single generic concept which is the highest term of aesthetic praise and which is applied univocally throughout all judgements of art and nature.[48]

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[48] I am grateful to John Armstrong, Sebastian Gardner and Paul Taylor for reading an earlier version and offering me comments.

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THE PARADOX OF HORROR

Berys Gaut

'IT SEEMS an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy.'[1] Thus did Hume open his classic discussion of the paradox of tragedy, and it can as properly serve as a statement of the kernel of the puzzle found in the closely related paradox of horror. We can approach this paradox by reflecting on the following statements, all of which seem to be true. (1) Some of us enjoy horror fictions. (2) Horror fictions characteristically produce fear and disgust in their audience. (3) Fear and disgust are intrinsically unpleasant emotions. The most straightforward explanation of these facts seems to be that we enjoy the fear and disgust the fictions produce in us. But to assert this yields the apparently paradoxical view that we enjoy intrinsically unpleasant emotions. So the paradox of horror rests on what might be termed the paradox of the enjoyment of negative emotions. However, there is another explanation of the phenomena available: we are enjoying not negative emotions, but rather some other feature of the situation, such as the curiosity we feel about what is going to happen. This is, roughly, the solution to the paradox that Noël Carroll defends in a recent book.[2] I will criticize this solution, as well as an expressivist solution. I then examine several recent claims that there is nothing paradoxical about our enjoyment of negative emotions, and will show that a variation of this view can be defended against apparently decisive objections. Thus it transpires that we *can* enjoy fear and disgust, so there is nothing paradoxical about our enjoyment of negative emotions, nor about our enjoyment of horror fictions.

I

Carroll provides a cognitivist solution to the paradox of horror. Drawing on the work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas, he argues that monsters, such as werewolves or a man with a fly's head, are violations of our categorial schemes. Douglas argues that such violations are seen as threatening and impure, and this is Carroll's explanation of why works of horror generate fear and disgust. But because monsters are categorial violations, being physically impossible according to our conceptual scheme, we are also curious about them, and find them fascinating. This curiosity is heightened in the case of

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novels and films by the processes of narration, which entice us to wonder whether the monster exists and what it looks like, involve us in the question of whether the characters in the fiction will come to believe in its existence and can destroy it, and so on. Hence our enjoyment of horror arises from its exploitation and satisfaction of our curiosity about monsters and the narrational processes of their discovery, monsters being peculiarly suited to elicit our interest because of their status as categorial violations. But this status also explains why monsters produce fear and disgust in us. So we cannot have the enjoyment without the negative emotions: 'the disgust that such beings [monsters] evince might be seen as part of the price to be paid for the pleasure of their disclosure' (p. 184). Moreover, because we know that the monsters are only fictional, the fear and disgust they arouse in us are muted in comparison with what they would be if we were to meet such monsters in real life, which allows the pleasures of curiosity more easily to outweigh the displeasures of fear and disgust.

Though Carroll demonstrates considerable skill in defending his solution, it is, I believe, unsatisfactory. His view depends crucially on claims about monsters, defined as beings not believed to exist now according to contemporary science (p. 27). Yet not all horror fictions involve monsters: an important and popular sub-genre of the modern horror film is the 'slasher' movie, which deals with psychopathic serial killers.[3] Psychopaths are not monsters, they are instances of an all-too-real phenomenon. Carroll's response to this sort of objection is that some of these psychopaths are presented as having supernatural powers, and so are really monsters (p. 37); if the characters are human, but are akin to monsters, then fictions involving them are borderline cases of horror (p. 39); and otherwise we should regard the fictions as tales of terror (p. 15). But to take the latter course is simply to transform the paradox of horror into a paradox of tales of terror, where the solution involving appeal to monsters cannot work. On the other hand, to treat certain clearly human psychopaths as akin to monsters depends on a metaphorical extension of the term 'monster', and to talk of psychopaths as categorial violations extends the notion of a categorial violation to the point where beings simply with unexpected or unusual traits will be counted as categorial violations: yet we clearly need not feel disgust at the unusual. Moreover, to hold a position from which it follows that films such as Demme's *The Silence of the Lambs* are borderline cases of horror marginalizes what look like paradigm examples of the modern horror film. Carroll's appeal to monsters disguises the simple point that we can be disgusted by and afraid of human beings because they do evil and awful things, and no mention of monsters or of categorial violations is needed to explain our reactions.

It might be thought that Carroll should drop his talk of monsters and his definition of horror in terms of them, and simply appeal to our curiosity about the extraordinary characters in horror fictions as overcoming the fear

and disgust they produce in us. He is doubtless correct in holding that such fear and disgust are less intense than they would be if we thought these beings were real, but, even so, as his many examples and common observation show, we can feel great fear and disgust during horror films. The problem with Carroll's solution is that most horror films are so formulaic in their plots, and their monsters and killers so stereotypical, that it is difficult to believe that our curiosity could very often be sufficiently stimulated to overcome the purported disadvantages such works incur in producing disagreeable emotional states in us. The conventions of genre weigh too heavily on most horror fictions for Carroll's solution to be a plausible one.

Finally, and most simply, consider Norman, a disappointed spectator who comes out of a horror film and complains that it wasn't scary enough. He wanted to be *really* frightened, but the film hardly raised a mild tremor of apprehension in him. On Carroll's view Norman must really be complaining that his curiosity wasn't heightened enough. But that is not what he says, and indeed, he might say that the film was quite interesting. The problem was, he avers, that it wasn't *frightening*. We are back to the core of the paradox of horror again: people seem to enjoy experiencing negative emotions.

II

It is worth briefly exploring an expressivist solution to the paradox. This holds that we do not enjoy the negative emotions that horror engenders, but, rather, we enjoy the expression of these emotions, by which we relieve ourselves of them, or lighten the grip they have on us.[4] Collingwood usefully distinguishes two versions of expressivism: the simpler holds that the process is akin to unburdening oneself of emotions by engaging in acts of make-believe (for instance, getting rid of one's anger by imagining kicking someone), the more sophisticated overlaps with the cognitivist view, holding that one lightens one's emotion by coming to understand what was before an unknown perturbation.[5]

Carroll rejects expressivist solutions for horror, claiming that we cannot gain satisfaction from the expression of our fear of monsters, for there are none, so we have no antecedently felt fear of them (p. 246). However, this objection is too swift, for it fails to recognize that monsters can serve as metaphors for our fears. Interpretations of horror fictions as expressing covert sexual fears, or fear of death and the physicality of the body, or of loss of sexual identity, are legion, and are, in many cases, quite plausible. Carroll does acknowledge that the horror film cycle correlates quite well with periods of social tension (e.g., the 1930s cycle with the Great Depression), but he objects that horror had its *aficionados* even at times when there were no social anxieties, and that mere expression of social anxieties is not appealing, for otherwise public lectures on these topics would have mass appeal. Hence

expressivism cannot provide a general solution to the problem of horror (pp. 206–14, 248). But this reply, too, succumbs to the objection that horror can express perennial personal anxieties, as well as social ones, and can do so in a powerfully metaphorical form.

However, I believe that Carroll is correct in rejecting the expressivist position, for, even as adumbrated above, it suffers from severe shortcomings. If we are attracted to horror for its cathartic effect, so that watching a horror film is the equivalent of 'talking out' one's fears, it is odd that these films are least attractive if one is in an uneasy or fearful mood. One doesn't say 'I'm scared, so I think I'll go to see a horror film'. Rather, one needs to be in a fairly robust psychological state in order to enjoy these fictions at all. Further, these films not infrequently leave (and are designed to leave) a lingering sense of fearfulness in their audience: one may feel scared as one walks home, and uneasy going to sleep. This is precisely the opposite effect one would expect if one's fear had been 'lightened'. Instead, these fears have been induced and exacerbated, and then one is frequently left in a state of disquiet. Even if one has been given metaphors for the objects of one's fears, this has not resulted in a lightening of one's emotions, but rather provides new materials with which to produce these emotions at will. Finally, if the expressivist doctrine were correct, we should expect to dislike the arousal of our emotion of fear when watching a film, and then only start to enjoy ourselves when the emotion was dissipated at the end of the film, assuming that it has an end that did not further enhance our fear. But horror audiences can enjoy themselves throughout the film, and hence they cannot enjoy merely the 'lightening' of the emotion.

III

It would be a Herculean task to examine the many possible variations of cognitivist and expressivist accounts of the paradox of horror. But I have shown that some simple versions of both are incorrect. However, the motivation to think that *some* version of these theories must be correct is presumably that otherwise we are left with the apparent paradox that audiences are enjoying the negative emotions of fear and disgust. If we can show that this is not paradoxical, then cognitivist and expressivist theories will be less compelling. Instead, we can endorse the enjoyment theory: horror attracts because people can enjoy being scared and disgusted. This thesis has the merit of simplicity, and it accounts for the intelligibility of Norman's complaint. It can also explain a salient fact about horror, of which it is easy to lose sight. The genre has as its self-conscious aim the production of fear and disgust in its audience, and it has become increasingly sophisticated and successful in achieving this effect. Moreover, the majority of horror works lack any serious artistic worth. They are pure entertainment: they aim simply at providing

their audience with enjoyable experiences. Taking these points together, the simplest, most straightforward explanation of the phenomenon of horror is that sometimes people *enjoy* being scared.

Consider Suzy, a mountaineering enthusiast. She enjoys putting herself into dangerous situations, feeling the thrill of fear as she dangles over the edge, knowing that it is only her skill and equipment that save her from certain death. She finds life simpler, more elemental in such situations, her fear gives an acuteness and 'edge' to her experience that is lacking in everyday life. She appreciates many aspects of the experience, and her fear is an inextricable part of the composite whole which she enjoys. Her motivations are not the stuff of psychopathology, still less are they unintelligible: the existence of many activities from sky-diving to motor racing testifies to the enduring attractions of danger. On a humbler level, even the pleasures of riding roller-coasters depend partly on the fear one feels as the car careers around the bend, and one is not entirely convinced that it will stay on the tracks.

Nor are such phenomena confined to fear alone. One can also enjoy other 'negative' emotions. One can enjoy disgusting stories, and there is a minor genre, popular on college campuses, of 'disgust' movies, pre-eminent amongst which is John Waters' *Pink Flamingos*. The negative emotion of anger can also be enjoyed: irascible individuals sometimes seek out situations in which they will have an opportunity to get angry. Likewise, it is possible to relish a feeling of quiet melancholy, dwelling on the sorrows and disappointments of life, and weeping for the sadness of the world.

Phenomena of this sort have been noted by several philosophers in the last decade, and have been seen as key ingredients in the solution of the paradoxes.[6] It would be tempting simply to cite such cases without explanation of how they are possible, and think that this would decisively show that one can enjoy negative emotions, and so dissolve the paradox of horror. But to do so merely opens one to the objection that they are not really possible at all, for they would involve the enjoyment of intrinsically unpleasant emotions. Hence, the objection continues, such cases are misdescribed, and what is enjoyed in them is something other than the presence of a negative emotion. For instance, Susan Feagin in her critique of Carroll's solution to the paradox discusses several examples, including the roller-coaster case, of the enjoyment of negative emotions and their associated sensations.[7] Carroll's response is that she simply ignores the paradoxicality of negative emotions, and what *he* enjoys about roller-coasting is not the queasiness, but the 'novel way of moving through space' and the 'overall thrill' of the ride.[8] This redescription strategy will be attractive only as long as we are unable to explain away the apparent paradoxicality of the enjoyment of these emotions.

Two kinds of theories have been advanced to explain how the enjoyment of negative emotions is possible, but neither is entirely satisfactory as it stands. The first is the 'control thesis', developed by Marcia Eaton, and refined by

John Morreall, on whose version I shall focus.[9] Morreall holds that one can enjoy negative emotions when one is 'in control' of the situation which produces the emotions, where control is understood in terms of an ability to direct one's thoughts and actions. So Suzy can enjoy her mountaineering escapades because she knows that she is skilful enough to avoid coming to harm. It is peculiarly easy to enjoy negative emotions in the case of fiction, since the fiction has no practical consequences for its audience. In this case it is sufficient in order to be in control that one be able to direct one's attention and thoughts. However, if one loses this control, perhaps because the fiction depicts violence and suffering so graphically that one's negative emotions become too strong, then one will not enjoy the emotions.[10] Thus there is a ready explanation for how one can enjoy negative emotions, both in fiction and in real life.

This solution is ingenious, but inadequate. The paradox of negative emotions arises because, apparently, we are able to enjoy intrinsically unpleasant emotions. But the control thesis leaves it utterly mysterious how the mere fact that I can choose to attend or not to an otherwise unpleasant emotion, such as fear, could render that emotion pleasant. Further, the believer in the intrinsicality claim will hold that it is a necessary, conceptual condition on an emotion being fear that it is experienced as unpleasant, so that the psychic mechanism of hedonic transformation, to which the control theorist gestures, is a conceptual impossibility. There is thus a lacuna in the control theory, which owes us an account of how the apparent conceptual connection between fear and displeasure can be explained away, or how the connection can be construed so that it does not undermine the theory. But, in any case, the theory's linkage of the enjoyment of such emotions with the control of them seems straightforwardly false. People vary greatly and unpredictably as to whether or not they enjoy horror films. If Morag does not enjoy them, that need not be because she cannot adequately control her attention with respect to them. Rather, her reason for not enjoying the film is that when she *does* direct her attention to the bloody corpse, she does not like what she experiences. Conversely, Norman may believe that the very height of enjoyable fear is when his gaze is riveted to the gruesome spectacle, when he 'cannot take his eyes off' the unfolding carnage. For, after all, if one is enjoying something, then one's attention tends to be drawn irresistibly to it.

IV

The second, more promising view of how it is possible to enjoy negative emotions has been developed by both Kendall Walton and Alex Neill. They deny that these emotional responses are intrinsically unpleasant. They both speak as if it is a purely contingent matter whether or not people enjoy the emotions themselves. It is not the emotions themselves that are intrinsically

unpleasant, they hold, but, rather, it is the *objects* of the emotions which are unpleasant or disvaluable. Walton argues that Hume was wrong to think that sorrow is in itself disagreeable. Rather, 'What is clearly disagreeable, what we regret, are the things we are sorrowful *about*—the loss of an opportunity, the death of a friend—not the feeling or experience of sorrow itself'.[11] Neill, in a critique of Carroll's theory, similarly points out that the emotions of pity or fear aren't painful in the way that stepping on a thumb-tack is. Instead, he says, 'In describing an emotion as "painful" or "negative" or "unpleasant", I suggest, we are in fact saying something about the situations in response to which we typically experience those emotions. That is, it's the situations rather than the emotions which are distasteful or undesirable, which we (metaphorically?) describe as painful or unpleasant.'[12]

However, this view encounters two serious objections as thus formulated. Firstly, the defender of the claim that negative emotions are intrinsically unpleasant will properly protest that it can't be a purely contingent matter that these emotions are felt as unpleasant. For imagine we came across a tribe who said that they felt a certain emotion at the death of their loved ones, and that this emotion was the most enjoyable one to be had. We would, I take it, be justifiably reluctant to translate the word they used to name this emotion as 'grief'. This suggests that there is a conceptual constraint on negative emotions being felt as unpleasant. Secondly, both Walton and Neill have a problem in so far as they appeal to a contrast between the unpleasantness of the emotion and the unpleasantness of the object of the emotion. For to say that something is unpleasant is to attribute to that thing a dispositional property: namely, the property of producing unpleasant experiences in people, and the salient experiences in the cases under discussion are those of sorrow and fear. Neill tries to counter his objection in a footnote by claiming that the unpleasantness may be in the situation itself rather than in the feelings I have towards the object. He gives the example of pity, which is an emotion directed towards others' suffering. So the painfulness figures here as something which the people whom I pity suffer, rather than as something which I experience.[13] As he admits, the suggestion needs further work, but it does not seem promising. For it is not sufficient for me to pity others that I think they are suffering: the sadist may believe the latter, without feeling any pity at all for them. If we have to appeal to unpleasantness here, it must be an unpleasantness which I also feel.

There is a more promising way to meet this second objection. Neill explicitly disavows a hedonistic theory of value,[14] and in the passage, which I quoted, he says that the situations towards which negative emotions are directed are distasteful *or undesirable*. Walton would doubtless take this position as well, and both he and Neill endorse versions of the evaluative theory of the emotions to be discussed in the next section. I suggest, then, that we drop talk of the pleasant and unpleasant here, and speak purely in general evaluative

terms. This move would allow us to counter the objection I raised about the dispositionality of the unpleasant. Hence we could allow that when people are enjoying negative emotions it is not because they regard the objects of the emotions as unpleasant, even though they enjoy the emotions, but because they regard the objects of the emotions as undesirable, and to believe that something is undesirable, is not *ipso facto* to find it unpleasant. However, it will be replied, to drop the reference to pleasure, and merely to speak of the objects of the emotions as disvaluable, seems to make the first objection I considered even more devastating, for now the contingency of the link between the negativity of emotions and their unpleasantness is even more salient. But I will argue that one can meet this objection in a way that neither Walton nor Neill considers, by showing that there are conceptual connections between evaluation, desire and pleasure, but that these non-contingent links are of a sort which do not threaten the solution to the paradoxes defended here.

V

Hume was puzzled by how it is that the spectators of a tragedy can enjoy sorrow, terror and anxiety, since he held that such emotions essentially involve feelings of pain.[15] As Walton notes, we can dissolve the paradox by disputing Hume's analysis of the emotions. In fact, as I will now argue, the correct view of the emotions *entails* that negative emotions are such, not in respect of unpleasant feelings, nor even in respect of the unpleasantness of their objects, but, rather, in respect of the negative evaluative thoughts they incorporate.

Hume's theory is an instance of the 'traditional' view of the emotions as phenomenologically characterized feelings. The dominant modern theory of the emotions, however, holds that emotions are cognitive, essentially incorporating evaluations.[16] Thus to fear something involves evaluating it as threatening, to be angry with someone involves evaluating her actions as wrong, to be sorrowful involves thinking that a loss has been suffered, and so on. What other factors must be present for an emotion to exist is a matter of dispute, but plausibly they include the requirement that the subject be in an abnormal physiological state caused by the evaluation. However, one emotion is to be individuated from another in terms of the evaluations involved, rather than by the particular features of the physiological state or of the associated bodily sensations, for there is no pattern of physiological changes or set of sensations peculiar to each emotion, and an emotion may be associated with different sensations in different people.[17] Now, if the emotions are to be individuated by the evaluations, then the difference between 'positive' and 'negative' emotions must consist in the difference between the evaluative thoughts. But there is no phenomenal character to a thought *per se*. So the

difference between positive and negative emotions can only consist in the fact that the *evaluations* incorporated into the former are positive and those in the latter are negative. That is, what makes negative emotions negative is not the painfulness of either the emotional response or of the object. Rather, it consists in the fact that objects to which these emotions are directed are brought under negative evaluative concepts: the dangerous, the wrongful, the shameful, etc. Since we can disvalue something without finding it unpleasant, it follows that it is possible to find both negative emotional responses *and* their objects pleasant. Hence, by appeal to an evaluative theory of the emotions, we can show that there is nothing paradoxical about the enjoyment of negative emotions, for it is only required that one *disvalue* the *objects* of these emotions. Hence one can dissolve the paradoxes of horror and tragedy.

There is a certain irony in this solution, since Carroll is fully aware of the evaluative theory of the emotions. Indeed, his account of the emotions is based on the version of the evaluative theory due to William Lyons, which I have drawn upon in the preceding paragraph, and he elaborates his definition of the emotion of art-horror so as to conform to an evaluative analysis of the emotions (pp. 24–7). But he does not see in his book that the 'abnormal, physically felt agitation' (p. 27), which he requires for fear to be present, need not be an intrinsically unpleasant state, for the negativity of the emotion can be explained in terms of the object of the emotion being negatively evaluated, rather than the emotion itself being unpleasant. Indeed, Carroll himself argues that what the agitation feels like can vary massively from person to person and from time to time in one person, so it is doubly puzzling why he assumes that the agitation must be experienced as unpleasant.

We now have to answer the objection that this solution allows it to be a contingent matter that we generally experience negative emotions as unpleasant. I am going to argue that the view of the emotions as evaluative does allow for the existence of a conceptual connection, but a conceptual connection of a sort that still allows us to dissolve the paradoxes. I will consider the connection in two stages: firstly, the conceptual link between evaluations and desire, and secondly, that between desire and pleasure.

Internalists about evaluation hold that there is a necessary connection between judging a situation to be good and having a motivating reason to bring it about (the reason need be only prima facie, and so may be overriden by other, conflicting reasons). This is so, because evaluations give us reasons for action: for someone to hold that an action is good, but that he has no reason to bring it about, shows that he has not grasped the meaning of the word 'good'. Further, people can be deceived about the contents of their beliefs, and if someone claims to believe that something is good, but it is apparent that he has no motivating reason to bring it about, that is defeasible evidence that he is mistaken about the content of his belief. Now internalism of this sort is too strong, for it is possible to be in a state of *anomie* or despair

in which one can recognize that a course of action is a good one, yet not be motivated to pursue it. Further, it is at least conceivable that a moral pervert should be motivated by a course of action just because it is evil. But both sorts of cases are motivational deviations, which are specifiable as such only against a background of motivational normality. Hence a more modest internalism will claim that necessarily *typically*, if someone believes that something is good, then he will have a motivating reason to promote it.[18]

Secondly, there is a conceptual connection between having a motivating reason (a desire, in the broad sense in which philosophers use that term) and finding something pleasant. Hedonists try to capture this connection by claiming that the only thing desired for its own sake is pleasure. As many philosophers have argued, this is false, since I can, for instance, rationally choose to forego a life of pleasure if it is based on systematic deception.[19] But a more promising conceptual connection is captured by Mill's dictum that 'to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility'.[20] This is compatible with holding that we desire for their own sakes things other than pleasure, for instance, knowledge. For even if I desire knowledge for its own sake, I will find the idea of acquiring it pleasant. As J. C. Gosling has argued, Mill's dictum captures the characteristically human way of desiring things, one might say, passionately: if we *really* want something, we will be joyful at the prospect of achieving it, and downcast if we cannot obtain it.[21] This is supported by the fact that if one thinks that one desires something, yet feels no pleasure at the prospect of getting it, then that is strong, though defeasible, evidence that one does not desire it after all. So there is a conceptual connection between desire and pleasure. However, Mill, in holding that we always find the idea of the desired thing pleasant, makes the connection too strong, for one may, for instance, do one's duty without enjoyment. So we should adopt the same strategy as we used above and hold that necessarily *typically*, if someone desires something, then the idea of achieving it gives her pleasure.

Putting together these two conceptual connections, we have the conclusion that there is a conceptual connection between evaluation and pleasure: necessarily, typically if someone positively evaluates a state of affairs, then she will feel pleasure at the idea of achieving it. Now, if the individual has the relevant knowledge about the state of affairs concerned—if the state of affairs is as her idea represents it to be—then the state of affairs will be pleasant. Conversely, necessarily typically, if someone negatively evaluates a state of affairs and she is relevantly informed about it, she will find that state of affairs unpleasant. So it follows that, given that the agent is adequately informed, the view of the emotions as evaluative does place conceptual constraints on whether it is typically possible to enjoy being in the situations which are the objects of the emotions. Further, since the pleasant is a dispositional property, if the object is unpleasant, the experience of it (including one's affective experience of it)

is unpleasant. Hence, in the case of negative emotions, the view of the emotions as evaluative entails that informed agents will typically experience the objects of their emotions and the emotions themselves as unpleasant.

So the evaluative theory of the emotions is not susceptible to the counter-example based on the unintelligibility of the tribal people who feel sorrow, yet find the emotion pleasant. For, we can note that the emotion concerned is not typically unpleasant for them, and therefore is not sorrow. But have we not now reproduced the paradox of horror, by showing that one cannot feel fear, and hence evaluate something as threatening, without experiencing the emotion as unpleasant? However, this is not so, for it was crucial to the conceptual connections discussed above that they were of the form 'necessarily *typically*'. This being so, there is plenty of scope for the enjoyment of these emotions in atypical situations or by atypical people. This allows Suzy to enjoy her fear, and it allows the *aficionados* of horror to enjoy their fear and disgust. The latter are helped by the fact that they know the film is fictional and that neither they nor the actors depicted are in real danger. But these atypical cases are only possible against a background in which people do not enjoy these negative emotions. The background of typical unpleasant responses is necessary for these emotions to be negative.

This itself might seem a paradoxical result, but it is not. It is, in fact, a perfectly familiar result of holistic theories about the mental. The position I defend here does not assume, or entail, the truth of functionalism. But like functionalism it is a holistic view, and functionalists similarly define mental states by means of a 'typically' operator, in order to respect the holism of the mental. Functionalists seek to define mental concepts in terms of their functional role, and so hold, for instance, that pain is (roughly) that state which typically results from bodily damage, typically produces the desire to escape the source of the damage, and typically produces avoidance-behaviour. As David Lewis has pointed out, this allows for cases where atypical people may not be motivated to avoid pain (or, we can add, may even enjoy it): but it is only *pain* that they can enjoy because of the background of normal aversive reactions to that state in the (human) community of which they are members.[22] So the full solution to the paradoxes depends both on a view of the emotions as evaluative, and on the recognition of how mental holism presents itself in respect of emotions, desires and enjoyment.

Hence we can dissolve the paradox of horror. That paradox rests on the claim that the enjoyment of negative emotions, understood as intrinsically unpleasant emotions, is impossible. The paradox seems to arise only because we construe the negativity in terms of these emotions being intrinsically unpleasant, whereas we should really construe their negativity in terms of the fact that the emotions essentially incorporate negative evaluations. But this entails that typically people will find the objects of these emotions unpleasant *and* the emotions themselves are typically unpleasant. Thus it is wrong to

hold that whether people enjoy these emotions or not is a merely contingent, non-conceptual matter. But because there is only a conceptual requirement that people *typically* don't enjoy them, that allows room for some individuals on some occasions to enjoy them. Moreover, this solution explains why it can seem so plausible to hold that these emotions are intrinsically unpleasant. For, while it is false that necessarily, if someone feels fear, she does not enjoy the experience, it *is* true that necessarily she or others of her community *typically* feel fear. It should be clear that this solution, being entirely general, also solves the paradox of tragedy.

Of course, why any particular individual enjoys feeling fear, and another doesn't, or why some horror films are enjoyable and others not, is an interesting and no doubt complex matter. But it is the proper subject of empirical, psychological investigation and it would be unproductive to engage in armchair speculation about why this is so. What I have shown here is that this empirical investigation is possible. For I have argued that there is no a priori, conceptual problem about the enjoyment of negative emotions in real life, or in fiction. There is no paradox of horror.[23]

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[2] Noël Carroll, *The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Heart* (New York: Routledge, 1990), especially pp. 178–95. Page references in the text are to this work. In chapter 1 he defends the view, recorded in (2) above, that the horror genre produces not just fear, but also disgust in its audience.

[3] See Carol J. Clover, 'Her Body, Himself: Gender in the Slasher Film' in James Donald (ed.), *Fantasy and the Cinema* (London: B.F.I., 1989), for some evidence of how widespread such films are.

[4] This is, of course, a common, though perhaps incorrect, way of interpreting Aristotle's doctrine of *katharsis*. For a welcome scepticism about the possibility of establishing precisely what Aristotle meant by this term, see K. Bennett, 'The Purging of Catharsis', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 21 (1981), pp. 204–13.

[5] R. G. Collingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford U.P., 1938), pp. 109–11.

[6] See the references below to Feagin, Eaton, Morreall, Walton and Neill.

[7] Susan L. Feagin, 'Monsters, Disgust and Fascination', *Philosophical Studies*, 65 (1992), pp. 75–84, at p. 81.

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[10] Morreall, op. cit., pp. 99, 101.

[11] Kendall Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts* (Cambridge: Harvard U.P., 1990), p. 257.

[12] Alex Neill, 'On a Paradox of the Heart', *Philosophical Studies*, 65 (1992), pp. 53–65, at p. 62.

[13] Ibid., p. 65, fn. 15.

[14] Ibid., p. 61.

[15] See Hume's discussion of the passions in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, especially pp. 438–48, eds. L. A. Selby-Bigge and P. H. Nidditch (Oxford U.P., 1978).

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[17] See William Lyons, *Emotion* (Cambridge U.P., 1980), especially chapters 3, 7 and 8. Lyons also thinks that the concepts of some, though not all, emotions involve reference to desires. But the internalism I argue for below will show that the concepts of all emotions implicitly incorporate reference to desires which are typically possessed by those experiencing the emotion.

[18] The argument of this paragraph is that of James Dreier, 'Internalism and Speaker Relativism', *Ethics*, 101 (1991), pp. 6–26, at pp. 9–14, though I have substituted 'typically' for his 'normally'.

[19] Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), pp. 42–5.

[20] J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, ed. Mary Warnock (London: Fontana, 1962), p. 293. Mill, of course, endorses the dictum in the context of his defence of hedonism, but the dictum itself does not entail hedonism as formulated above.

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[23] I am grateful to John Haldane for his comments on this paper.

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AQUINAS ON THE AESTHETIC RELEVANCE OF TASTES AND SMELLS

Donald McQueen

INTRODUCTION

THIS PAPER falls into four main parts. First, there is a brief account of Saint Thomas Aquinas's views about the nature of beauty. Secondly, I consider an argument of his to the conclusion that the tastes and smells of things are not relevant to the aesthetic appraisal of those things. Aquinas's views are then related to those of the contemporary philosopher Roger Scruton, who endorses Aquinas's conclusion on the matter. Fourthly, criticisms of both Aquinas and Scruton are offered and some suggestions are made as to how the question might be adjudicated.

Some preliminary points need to be made. The first is that, in what follows, the word 'object' is used in a very wide sense. Thus, a vase is an object, so is a symphony, so is the performance of a symphony and so is a *son et lumière* display. Secondly, although Aquinas's thoughts which I shall be considering concern the nature and scope of beauty and the beautiful, I shall regard them as being in fact directed at aesthetic concepts in general. His aesthetic vocabulary is somewhat restricted, but I think that the points he raises can be applied in a more general way than the way in which he applies them. Finally, all references, unless otherwise stated, are to the *Summa Theologiae (ST)*. The *Summa Contra Gentiles* will be abbreviated as *ScG* and Aquinas's *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* as *In Metaph.*[1]

I AQUINAS ON THE NATURE OF BEAUTY

Beauty, says Aquinas (1.39.8), requires three characteristics in the beautiful thing (*ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur*), namely, integrity (*integritas*) or completeness (*perfectio*)—'since things that lack something are thereby ugly (*hoc ipso turpia sunt*)'; secondly, right proportion or harmony (*debita proportio sive consonantia*) and, thirdly, brightness or brilliance (*claritas*)—'whence things are called beautiful which have a bright colour (*colorem nitidum*)'.

This passage calls for some explanation. Firstly, as regards wholeness or completeness, we can understand Aquinas's remarks to apply both to the case of natural objects and to the case of artefacts. In the former case, the wholeness or integrity of something will entail its not lacking features which are characteristic of things of that kind. As Armand Maurer puts it,

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> A thing is integral or whole that lacks nothing, taking into account the sort of thing it is: it exists perfectly or completely. In a second sense a thing is integral when it is perfect in its operation . . . wholeness, in short, demands perfection in being and action.[2]

In the case of artefacts, the completeness of something will be a matter of the extent to which it fulfils, or is capable of fulfilling, the intentions of its creator.

The second of Aquinas's conditions for something's being beautiful—right proportion or harmony—is partially elucidated in several passages. In 1a2ae.49.4, for example, Aquinas says that beauty involves a particular proportion between elements which may be variously combined and, elsewhere, offers as an example the case of the human body: 'if the members, such as the hand and foot, are in a state which accords with nature we have the disposition of beauty' (1a2ae.54.1). Again, we are told that 'Beauty (consists in) a due proportion of bodily members' (*ScG* III, 139) or in 'harmony of limbs and colours' (*ScG* II, 64).

As for the third aspect of beauty, the term *claritas* has been variously translated as brightness, brilliance and as luminosity. It is clear that brightness of colour is merely a special case, or perhaps sometimes a constituent, of *claritas*, the latter being a broader or richer notion than the former. Thus, having said in 2a2ae.180.2 that 'beauty consists in a certain clarity and due proportion', Aquinas goes on to say that each of these is 'rooted in the reason', implying, presumably, that *claritas* is something other than, or involves something in addition to, a merely sensible quality such as brightness of colour. In some contexts, perhaps, '*claritas*' is better translated as distinctness or perspicuity, rather than as radiance, brightness, brilliance or luminosity.

SPIRITUAL AND PHYSICAL BEAUTY

A problem with Aquinas's three-condition account of beauty is that it is somewhat unclear. Integrity or wholeness, harmony or proportion, and radiance or luminosity are difficult notions and Aquinas is short on both explanations and examples which would help elucidate these terms. A further difficulty is that the three-condition account is applied both to the physically beautiful and to the spiritually beautiful, Aquinas's term for which is '*honestum*' (*honestum est idem spirituali decori*). Thus, after saying that beauty or handsomeness arises when fine proportions and brightness (*claritas*) run together (as in the case of beauty of body which 'consists in shapely limbs and features having a certain proper glow of colour'), he continues: '*Et similiter pulchritudo spiritualis in hoc consistit quod conversatio hominis sive actio ejus sit bene proportionata secundum spirituales rationis claritatem*' (2a.2ae.145.2). The Blackfriars translation of this, 'So also beauty of spirit consists in conversation and actions that are well-formed and suffused with intelligence', tends, perhaps unavoidably, to obscure the fact that '*claritas*' is applied both to physical things *and* to actions and conversation, a fact which adds to the difficulty of elucidating these notions. Yet

another difficulty is that Aquinas says that images are called beautiful if they represent a thing, even an ugly thing, faithfully (1.39.8), a remark which is difficult to reconcile with the three-condition analysis of beauty.

THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE GOOD

An interesting, though puzzling, feature of Aquinas's account of beauty is the claim that the good and the beautiful are identical in the sense that something is good if and only if it is beautiful.

> Good and beautiful are not however synonymous. For good (being *what all things desire*) has to do properly with desire and so involves the idea of end (since desire is a kind of movement towards something). Beauty, on the other hand, has to do with knowledge, and we call a thing beautiful when it pleases the eye of the beholder. This is why beauty is a matter of right proportion, for the senses delight in rightly proportioned things . . . (1.5.4.*ad* 1).

The same point is made in 1a2ae.27.1.*ad* 3:

> 'Good' and 'beautiful' have the same reference but differ in meaning [The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only—Dominican Fathers translation].[3] For the good, being 'what all things want', is that in which the orexis comes to rest [that which calms the desire—Dominican Fathers translation]; whereas the beautiful is that in which the orexis comes to rest through contemplation or knowledge [that which calms the desire, by being seen or known—Dominican Fathers translation].

Thus, Aquinas's account of the nature of beauty falls into two distinct parts. First, the beautiful is that the mere knowledge or contemplation of which satisfies or calms desire. Further, and more specifically, those features of things the knowledge or contemplation of which produces such satisfaction in us are integrity or completeness, right proportion or harmony, and *claritas*.

2 THE SCOPE OF AESTHETIC APPRAISAL

Let us now turn to a claim which Aquinas regards as consequent upon the views outlined above. Since the apprehension of beauty involves the apprehension of form and proportion, which involves cognition,

> Those senses are therefore chiefly associated with beauty which contribute most to our knowledge, viz. sight and hearing when ministering to reason; thus we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds, but not of beautiful tastes and smells: we do not speak of beauty in reference to the other three senses (1a2ae.27.1.*ad* 3).

Apparently, then, not all the senses are relevant to aesthetic appraisal and the explanation of this fact has to do with the relative cognitive importance of the different senses. It is the cognitive importance of sight and hearing *vis-à-vis*

the other senses which is regarded as significant and as explaining their relevance to aesthetic judgements.

Notice, by the way, the omission of an explicit reference to the sense of touch in the passage just quoted—a point I return to below.

A number of questions now present themselves. First, in what does the cognitive importance of a sense consist? How, precisely, do sight and hearing contribute most to our knowledge?

Secondly, assuming that we can rank the senses in respect of cognitive importance, does Aquinas rank them in the correct order? Thirdly, given that there is such a ranking, what, if anything, does this imply about the scope of the word 'beautiful' and other words of aesthetic appraisal?

In connection with the first of these questions, consider some of Aquinas's remarks about the sense of sight. Sight is said (1.78.3. *Resp.*) to be of all the senses the most spiritual, the most perfect and the most universal [*communior*—Blackfriars translation: '(it has) the widest range of objects'].[4] In the same passage the senses are ranked as follows:

Sight
Hearing
Smell
Touch and Taste

Sight is said to perceive a greater range of the features of things than do other senses (*In Metaph* 1.L1: C6 ff). Again, in 1.91.3.*ad* 3, Aquinas remarks that sight in man (who alone among animals takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake) is finer [*subtilior*] and shows more distinctions between things than do the other senses.

When Aquinas says that sight and hearing contribute most to our knowledge, we can ask whether he means that, as a matter of contingent fact about us and our sensory capacities, the information we derive from these sources is in certain ways richer or more extensive than that derived from the other senses. Or does he mean that sight and hearing are *as such*, intrinsically, richer sources of knowledge than the other senses? There is a suggestion of the first of these views in 1.91.3.*ad* 1, where he explains that the sense of smell in humans, which is less keen than that in some animals, is impeded by the largeness of our brains which is required for our intellectual performances. However, the second view seems to be suggested by other passages. In fact the two claims are consistent with each other—that sight and hearing have, in general, a greater range of objects than the other senses is compatible with the claim that there are systematic species-related differences between the cognitive importance of the various senses.

Thus, I take Aquinas's claim to be that there is a certain richness or complexity in those visual and auditory features of the world perceptible by us which

exceeds that of the features accessible to us via the other senses. It is in this relative richness and complexity that the cognitive importance of sight and hearing is held to consist. This answers our first question.

AN APPARENT INCONSISTENCY IN AQUINAS

Before proceeding to the consideration of the two further questions mentioned above, I wish to draw attention to a puzzling apparent inconsistency in what Aquinas says about the cognitive ranking of the senses.

The problem is this. Although, as we have seen, in 1.78.3 and 1a.2ae.27.1 sight and *hearing* are ranked higher than the other senses in respect of cognitive importance, elsewhere he tells a different story. For example, in *In Metaph*, which was probably completed in 1271/1272 (date of origin uncertain), *ST* being written between 1266 and 1273,[5] Aquinas ranks sight and *touch* above the other senses in respect of cognitive importance, though, it should be noted, he does not in the relevant section go on to link cognitive importance to aesthetic relevance. He is here, of course, reporting and commenting on certain views of Aristotle, but the claim about the importance of sight and touch seems to be his: 'The (second) reason which [Aristotle] gives for the superiority of sight is that it gives us more information about things'.[6] However, Aquinas goes on, as well as the explanation of this fact given by Aristotle, there is a further reason:

> Sight informs us of many differences between things, for we seem to know sensible things best by means of sight and touch, but especially by means of sight. The reason for this can be drawn from the fact that the other three senses perceive those accidents which in a way flow from a sensible body and do not remain in it. Thus sound comes from a sensible body inasmuch as it flows away from it and does not remain in it. The same thing is true of the evaporation of volatile elements, with which and by which odor is diffused. But sight and touch [there is an error in J. P. Rowan's translation at this point, 'hearing' being wrongly given for 'tactus'] perceive those accidents which remain in sensible bodies, such as colour, warmth and coldness. Hence the judgment of sight and touch is extended to things themselves, whereas the judgment of hearing and smell is extended to those accidents which flow from things and not to things themselves. It is for this reason that figure and size and the like, by which a sensible being itself is disposed, are perceived more by sight and touch than by the other senses. And they are perceived more by sight than by touch . . .[7]

Now, this claim about sight and *touch*, which, incidentally, is not to be found in the relevant section of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, seems to be Aquinas's, and it is, on the face of it, incompatible with the claim in 1a2ae.27.1.*ad* 3, noted earlier, about the relative cognitive superiority of sight and *hearing*.

I do not at the moment have a satisfactory explanation of this apparent inconsistency and I shall therefore skirt around it and focus on the *ST* claim—a claim which is explicitly linked to the consequential claim about the aesthetic

irrelevance of the other three senses—about the superior status of sight and hearing. Aquinas's precise view about the status of touch must remain uncertain.

COMPLEXITY

Having established that Aquinas's ranking of the senses of sight and hearing is in respect of their cognitive importance—'Those senses are therefore chiefly associated with beauty which contribute most to our knowledge'—I now want to introduce a number of distinctions which I hope will contribute to the elucidation, or at least to the rational reconstruction, of these claims and help in the appraisal of them.

On the basis of the brief remarks I have quoted, we can, I suggest, ascribe to Aquinas a view about the relative complexity or richness of the information accessible by some senses in contrast to others. Let us take Aquinas's claim to be that the features of things *directly* (that is, non-inferentially) revealed by sight and hearing are in general more complex than the features directly revealed by the other senses (or, at least, by taste and smell). The reference here to direct perception is necessary since it is often possible, on the basis of the taste or smell of something, to detect, via an inference, the presence of precisely those same features of it which are revealed by the other senses. Hence, if Aquinas's distinction between the different senses is to be plausible, it had better be understood in terms of the relative complexity or richness of the information directly available to a sense.

Now let us consider what such complexity (or richness) might consist in in this context. Here is a sketchy and partial account of the matter.

First of all, let us distinguish the intrinsic descriptions which are true of a thing from the relational descriptions which are true of it (one could just as well distinguish intrinsic from relational *predicates or properties*. The difference between the different ways of speaking is not important here). For example, (i) 'Jack loves Jill' is a relational description whereas (ii) 'Jack is tired' is an intrinsic description of Jack, the point being that (i) involves Jack's relation to something other than Jack. As I shall use the term, however, (iii) 'Jack's left ear is bigger than his right ear' is an intrinsic description of Jack—it asserts a relation between two items, but both items are part of Jack. Similarly, descriptions of the relationships between the successive notes or chords in a piece of music will count as intrinsic features of the music, since all such items and their relationships are parts or aspects of the musical work. On the other hand, a description of the mood that a painting or the performance of a musical work evokes in someone would be a relational description of the painting or the performance. This account of 'intrinsic' is to some extent stipulative, but, I hope, unproblematic.

Further, let us take 'F is an S-discernible feature (or element) of X' to mean that the feature F of X is directly discernible by sense S (by sight, hearing

etc.). Thus, where X is a particular table, F its brown colour and S the sense of sight, the formula 'F is an S-discernible feature of X' is to be read as saying that its brown colour is a (directly) visually discernible feature of the table.

I now want to suggest that, in general, the intrinsic S-complexity of a thing, X, depends (partly, at least) on: (a) the number of S-discernible elements in X; (b) the complexity of the intrinsic descriptions true[8] of the S-discernible features of X; (c) what we may call the *dimensionality* of X's S-discernible features. For example, (a) A spotted dog is, other things being equal, more visually complex than a uniformly white one and a smooth circular disc is less tactually complex than a sufficiently heavily scratched but otherwise similar disc. Analogously, I take it that, since sounds (for example chords) and tastes are capable of intrinsic complexity, we can properly speak of their discernible 'elements'.

(b) Thus, descriptions of the form 'X is to the left of Y', 'X is brighter than Y' or 'X is higher-pitched than Y' are, *ceteris paribus*, more complex than descriptions of the form 'X is straight', 'X is red' or 'X is shrill'. One, though not the only, way in which one description can be more complex than another is for the first to instantiate an n-place predicate and the second an r-place predicate, where n is greater than r.

(c) What I have in mind is the fact that the visually discernible quality of colour can be characterized in more than one 'dimension'—as regards hue, saturation and brightness. Analogously, a sound can vary in pitch, loudness and timbre.

A further distinction relevant here is that between the non-temporal complexity of a single thing at a particular time and, on the other hand, the complexity of a temporal sequence of things, such as a tune.

What has just been said about complexity is very sketchy indeed and, though much more could be said about the notion than I have attempted to say, it seems implausible to suppose, and I do not suggest, that a neat or exhaustive account could be given. Nevertheless, it is possible to go some way in elucidating what I would claim to be an intuitively familiar notion and my purpose in attempting to do this is to facilitate the appraisal of Aquinas's claims, to which I now return, about the aesthetic relevance of tastes and smells.

The first of the questions raised earlier was: 'In what, precisely, does the cognitive importance of a sense consist?' The answer, we can take Aquinas as saying, is 'in its greater complexity *vis-à-vis* other senses'—the visual complexity of things exceeds their gustatory or olfactory complexity, for example.

The second question was: 'Assuming that we can rank the senses in respect of cognitive importance, does Aquinas rank them in the correct order?' Given that the ranking is determined by the intrinsic and non-temporal aspects of things, and that it is our actual (rather than any possible) senses of sight, smell, etc. which are in question, it seems correct to put vision at the top of

the ranking list with taste (and perhaps smell) at the bottom. The visually discriminable, non-relational and non-temporal features of things *are* in general more complex, and a richer source of information, than the corresponding features directly accessible to the senses of taste and smell. But what of touch and hearing? Touch reveals directly to us many of the intrinsic spatial features of things and should surely be ranked between sight on the one hand and taste and smell on the other. As for the sense of hearing, I will return to that in a moment.

The third question raised earlier was: 'Given that there is such a ranking, what, if anything, does this imply about the scope of the word 'beautiful' and other words of aesthetic appraisal?' At this point, it is worth noting that, thus far, the account of complexity has referred only to the intrinsic, non-relational, and the non-temporal features of things. But is this restriction appropriate? If Aquinas is claiming that beauty implies a certain degree of complexity in the relevant features of the beautiful thing, one might agree. Even a vase, for example, which is praised for its simplicity has, because of its spatial properties, a certain degree of intrinsic visual and tactual complexity.

However, it will be objected, even if it is conceded that the possibility of aesthetically appraising something implies some degree of complexity in the thing appraised, it is not in general necessary that the complexity be non-temporal. Musical works, or their performances at least, are constituted by *sequences* of sounds and, since such sequences are aesthetically appraisable on the basis of features directly revealed by hearing, it follows that the temporal as well as the non-temporal complexity of things is relevant to their aesthetic appraisal. This is true enough, but I do not think it affects Aquinas's case against tastes and smells. If we allow, somewhat oddly, that there could be individual items constituted, or partially constituted by, sequences of tastes and smells—a 'symphony' of perfumes, for example (something which, according to Roger Scruton,[9] is logically impossible)—and that there is therefore the possibility in principle of such items exhibiting temporal complexity, it might still be doubted whether such a sequence could attain a *degree* of complexity sufficient to warrant the application of aesthetic terms. Mere plurality of elements, whether successive or co-existing, is surely not enough.

I turn from these brief, and doubtless contentious, remarks about temporal and non-temporal complexity, to some equally brief remarks about the distinction between the intrinsic and the relational characteristics of things.

Aquinas's league table of complexity—with sight at the top and taste and smell lower down—is accurate, provided we restrict complexity to intrinsic complexity. If, however, we consider the relational characteristics of things, the situation looks very different. A smell can be powerfully evocative or suggestive. It can symbolize or represent or bring to mind a variety of things, attitudes and situations. The words 'evoke', 'suggest' and 'represent' signify relational characteristics of things and the possession of such characteristics

arguably constitutes a kind of complexity relevant to the question about the aesthetic relevance of tastes and smells. I believe I owe this point to Professor Frank Sibley. It seems to constitute a difficulty for Aquinas's claims about tastes and smells.

3 SCRUTON'S ARGUMENT

I have taken Aquinas's rejection of the aesthetic relevance of the senses of taste and smell as resting on his claim about their relative cognitive importance and this claim has been presented as resting on a thesis about complexity: this is the line of argument in *ST*.

Roger Scruton, who seems to suggest that he is following Aquinas in the matter, draws a line at the same point as Aquinas, excluding taste and smell, but offers in support of this considerations which are similar to those presented by Aquinas in *In Metaph*, where, it will be recalled, the ranking of the senses in respect of their cognitive importance differs from the ranking given in *ST*, and where too there is no link made between cognitive importance on the one hand and aesthetic relevance on the other. Scruton argues that:

> not every 'sense' lends itself to aesthetic pleasure. The experience must be such that, in attending to it, one attends also to its object. In particular, we should note how different in this respect are the eye and the ear from the other senses. It seems to me that there is probably no such thing as savouring a visual impression while remaining incurious about its object—as though one could savour the sensation of red, while remaining uninterested in the red thing that one sees. Visual experience is so essentially cognitive, so 'opened out', as it were, on to the objective world, that our attention passes through and seizes on its object to the exclusion of all impressions of sense. Now it is difficult to describe the difference here, between vision and hearing on the one hand, and taste, smell, perhaps even touch, on the other. But the fact in question is clear enough, and has been noticed by philosophers from Aquinas to the present day. Vision and hearing, unlike taste and smell, may sometimes be forms of objective contemplation. In tasting and smelling I contemplate not the object but the experience derived from it.[10]

Notice that this argument (a footnote to which refers to 1a.2ae.27.1, quoted above) is based on a claim similar to that made by Aquinas in *In Metaph* where he says that some judgements are 'extended to those accidents which flow from things and not to things themselves'. Let us call this the separability claim. Notice also, however, that, although in *In Metaph* Aquinas uses this claim to distinguish sight and *touch* from the other senses (in respect of cognitive importance), Scruton uses his similar claim to distinguish sight and *hearing*. So, somewhat puzzlingly, Scruton endorses a distinction made by Aquinas in *ST* but supports it with a claim similar to that used by Aquinas in *In Metaph* to support a different distinction.

4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Having commented on Aquinas's argument from complexity and distinguished it from what I shall call Scruton's argument from separability, I conclude with some observations about the latter argument.

First, the claim that in the case of taste and smell, unlike that of sight (or hearing or touch), one contemplates not the object but the experience, seems unconvincing. Even if it is true that I *can*, in the case of tasting or smelling, concentrate attention on the experience while at the same time remaining 'incurious about' or 'uninterested in' the object which is its source, it is surely not necessary that I do so. I may concentrate on and savour the taste or smell experience, but I may also take a keen interest in the fact that *this object* tastes or smells as it does. Which of these things I do—concentrate on the experience or focus my attention on the object which is its source—would clearly depend on what my purpose was in tasting or smelling it. Hence, given that a sense lends itself to aesthetic pleasure, as Scruton puts it, only if the relevant experiences are such that in attending to them, one attends also to their object, this separation argument provides no reason for denying that tasting and smelling can in principle be sources of aesthetic pleasure.

Secondly, even if the argument from separability is sound, it shows at most that tasting and smelling are not relevant to the aesthetic appraisal of objects out there in the world, which would leave untouched the claim that tastes and smells—in the sense of *experiences* of tasting and smelling—are themselves possible objects of aesthetic appraisal (though the complexity argument might exclude such a possibility). That is, there seem to be two distinct possible theses here: one concerning the relevance of tasting and smelling to the aesthetic appraisal of public objects; the other concerning the possibility of aesthetically appraising taste and smell experiences without essential reference to their sources. The argument from separability seems to be relevant only to the first of these theses.

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[2] Armand A. Maurer, *About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation* (Center For Thomistic Studies, University of St Thomas, Houston, 1983), page 12.

[3] *Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens.*

[4] *Visus autem, quia est absque immutatione naturali et organi et objecti est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et communior.*

[5] Dates of *In Metaph* according to Rowan. Dates of *ST* according to James A. Weisheipl, O.P., (*Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works* (1974; Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975)) who places the completion of part I in 1268 and that of the *prima secundae* at the end of 1270.

[6] *In Metaph* I. L1: C7.

[7] *In Metaph* I. L1: C8.

[8] Perhaps one should add 'or apparently true' here.

[9] Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (London: Methuen & Co., 1979), page 113.

[10] Op. cit., pp. 113–4.

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WALTER BENJAMIN AND THE MECHANICAL REPRODUCIBILITY OF ART WORKS REVISITED

Ian Knizek

THERE ARE essays which seem to have a perennial life; they are quoted again and again in spite of their questionable premisses. 'The Work of Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproducibility'[1] by Walter Benjamin is one of them. This is hard to explain because its main thesis is so obviously flawed. None the less its very title is so challengingly and provocatively intriguing that it invites dwelling on. Furthermore, Benjamin can always be counted on to provide a catchy turn of phrase, and it has behind it the not inconsiderable prestige of a gifted literary critic enhanced by the halo of martyrdom as victim of Nazism's anti-semitic fury.

It is easy to let oneself be seduced by the flow of Benjamin's oratory to accept his main postulate that mechanical reproduction destroys the aura of works of art. I have myself expressed my disagreement with some of its tenets in a Spanish-language paper.[2] I was then mainly interested in the ontological identity of Benjamin's Mechanical Reproductions because of his cavalier disregard of these categories.[3] I have subsequently re-read the two versions of Benjamin's essay, this time in their original German[4] including the French translation[5] and the accompanying copious 'observations'.[6]

Nevertheless, in what follows I want to dwell once more on the key issues of Benjamin's hypothesis, the art work's *aura* and particularly the mechanism of its withering and final destruction as a consequence of mechanical reproduction. The first concept and its aesthetic relevance has always been questionable but has been willy-nilly tolerated without much searching. As to the second point of my inquiry, Benjamin never made it quite clear as to how or why mechanical reproductions can extinguish the aura surrounding works of art.

I

For the proper understanding of the Benjaminian concept of aura, the knowledge of the conditions of its use by him are essential. The lexicographic meaning is obviously of little use here. Fortunately, Benjamin himself explains the meaning he intends to convey. First he introduces the concept of authenti-

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city, by which he means the 'essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced' (WAAMR, p. 284). Unfortunately, however, to clarify this concept of aura he only succeeded in blurring it through the introduction of an allegory or metaphor meant to evoke, communicate or stimulate a feeling putatively adhering to the concepts quoted in the preceding paragraph: 'the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be. If, while resting on a summer afternoon, you follow with your eyes a mountain range on the horizon or a branch which casts its shadow over you, you experience the aura of these mountains or that branch' (WAAMR, p. 285). In spite of my initially sympathetic attitude to the Benjaminian concept of aura, doubts about both its ontology and fitness for the purpose assigned to it by Benjamin increased. In general terms its existence as a psychological phenomenon can hardly be denied. It is its relevance in aesthetic apperception that is in doubt. It seems that Theodor Adorno, Benjamin's colleague in the Frankfurt School, was not quite happy with Benjamin's use of this term. It is significant that immediately after quoting *in toto* his poetic allegory of the aura, he claims that what Benjamin calls aura is something familiar to artistic experience.

And he identifies it with 'atmosphere',[7] and later stresses 'its objective signification beyond all subjective intention'. This amounts in fact to a philosophical upgrading of Benjamin's poetic but unhelpful definition. He also anticipates possible objections to Benjamin's explanation of the appeal of art by reference to that of nature; he identifies it as an element common to both, art and nature (AT, p. 386). In the same context he stresses its 'fleeting and elusive' character. A few lines later he clarifies his own understanding of aura still more, claiming that it is 'an objective signification beyond all subjective intentions'.

Since, however, some philosophers may wince at the idea of explaining the appeal of art by reference to that of nature, Adorno helps out by claiming that 'perceiving nature's aura means to become conscious of that quality in nature which is the defining element of a work of art' (AT, p. 386).

II

It is not to be doubted that Benjamin's kind of aura may actually enhance the enjoyment of art for viewers so inclined. But I came to distrust Benjamin's type of aura because it refers to something which is not in the work of art; it is, indeed, an extra-aesthetic feature. It differs in many important aspects from other imaginary products of contemplation of art works, as evocation and associations which are normally triggered by something in them. Benjamin's aura misleads and distracts the beholder from the true aesthetic values, formal, compositional, textural or structural and even from those that are volitional, i.e., attributable to the will of the artist.

Adorno might have felt something of the above. In an important passage (AT, p. 66) he warns against the artificial superimposition of aura which would amount to a falsification as happened so often with commercial film. It should go without saying that if such superimposition happens in connection with pictorial art, for instance, it can reduce even the greatest works of art to the category of entertainment.

III

For the proper understanding of Benjaminian aura, it is indispensable to discover its origin in his thoughts; in other words, we have to find the genesis of his use of the term. Hopefully, this could also provide us with an answer to the dilemma posed by the mechanism of the alleged withering and ultimate disappearance of the aura.

We can hardly do better than to refer to an essay which Benjamin published four years earlier (18 September 1931) under the title *A Little History of Photography*.[8]

The concept of aura occurs for the first time almost exactly at the middle point of the photographic essay. (KGP, p. 229.) Benjamin uses it here to characterize the tragic mood of the nineteenth-century *petit bourgeois salon portraiture* with all its ambience of false pretentiousness and ridiculous paraphernalia. Here, all references to aura are of pejorative nature and they clash with the allegorical and poetic definition which Benjamin offers two pages later (KGP, p. 239) and which he will four years later introduce into his Reproducibility essay. Subsequently, Benjamin identifies aura with the relative obscurity of these early photographs out of which, as he says, 'light makes its way out only with some difficulty' (KGP, p. 237) as a consequence of low-light intensity of the photographic lenses of that period. Benjamin then proceeds to praise Atget's photography for having 'disinfected the sticky atmosphere of the conventional portrait photography . . . he cleans this atmosphere: he prepares the liberation of the object from the aura' (KGP, p. 239). This liberation consists *inter alia* in the exclusion of humanity from his views of Parisian scenes. (KGP, p. 240.) 'Empty is the Port d'Arcueil, empty the fatuous stairways, the courtyards, the café terraces . . . they are not lonely but moodless'. What also seems meaningful to him is Atget's rejection of images associated with the romantic music of city names.

IV

Contemplating Atgetian plates in the New York Museum of Modern Art with all the attention they deserve, one is immediately tempted to dissent from Benjamin's dictum, because it seems that Atget's photographs possess something which they share with good paintings: this peculiar and ineffable

something which frequently confuses even sophisticated critics. Far from depriving them of *something* as Benjamin claims, Atget imparts to his views a quality which reality itself does not exhibit: the sometimes melancholic mood, the feeling of solitude which is not loneliness, a certain halo of associations and evocations which only an artist can impart to inanimate objects. And even the absence of human beings, which Benjamin correctly observes, is a gain rather than a loss because it allows the observer to transport himself to another dimension, unthought and devoid of human life.

In addition to all that, the Atgetian *oeuvre* has acquired in the course of the years an aura of its own and entirely fitting Benjamin's own characterization. (WAAMR, p. 284.) By now they don't even lack authenticity which is an obligatory component of Benjaminian aura, that is, if we are to consider Atget's plates as works of art. But Benjamin has to deny that these plates might have acquired an aura because the acceptance of such a view would be fatal to his theory.

V

If Benjamin's concept of aura is vague and problem-ridden, the notion of its *withering* (his term is *verkümmern*, literally to become stunted, to languish) and its ultimate destruction as a consequence of reproduction is nowhere explicated. It is the *why* and *how* this happens which Benjamin never makes clear. He mentions it several times in the first half of his essay but he seems to take it as a self-evident fact claiming, for instance, that aura withers in the age of mechanical reproduction (because) the technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. (WAAMR, pp. 284–285.)

Such and similar statements are not very enlightening in the sense sought above, even allowing for the fact that we quoted them out of context. He comes considerably closer to providing a reason when he implies that (at least in the eyes of some) the original art works might become 'cheapened' by unbounded copying. (WAAMR, p. 285.)

One may easily think in this context of Gresham's law, of the devaluation of currencies induced by uncontrolled operation of printing presses. Born in 1892 Benjamin was old enough to experience the effects of this kind of inflation in post-World-War I Germany of the twenties which every day rendered its currency practically worthless. But this psychological connection with the alleged decay of the art work's aura appears to be too pat and indeed trivial, and it might be unjust to attribute it to a man of Benjamin's intellectual sophistication.

We have to grant to Benjamin that mechanical reproductions of works of art may lack authenticity in the strict sense of his definitional allegory. (WAAMR, p. 285.) But this is not true in the broader sense of his earlier definition (WAAMR, p. 284) as 'all that is transmissible' including its perman-

ence and performance in history. Nor is there necessarily a conflict with Adorno's common-sensical identification of 'aura' with 'atmosphere' (AT, p. 386) of works of art.

Such features are imaginary and not perceptual, nor are they regional qualities. Rather, they are communicated through oral tradition or art-historical research. There is then no very good reason why even reproductions cannot appropriate for themselves the features composing the work's 'authenticity'. In other words, these features can be transmitted or transferred to reproductions by imagination.

VI

There is, however, an earlier clue to Benjamin's theory concerning the mechanism of de-aurating. It occurs in connection with his exaltation of Atget's photographs and of their auratic lack. Especially meaningful is the statement that Atget's images 'suck the aura of reality like water of a sinking ship'. (KGP, p. 239.)

It seems therefore that Benjamin could have easily arrived at his subsequent and so far-reaching conclusions by extrapolating from his above subjective judgement to generalize the putative de-aurating effect of photography as reproductive process *par excellence*. Unfortunately for Benjamin, he does not stop to entertain another and much more plausible alternative: conceding for the moment the claim that there has indeed been a loss of aura in Atget's transposition of the reality of certain city streets to his photographs, it was his, Atget's, wilful setting of the stage, i.e., exclusion of humanity or shunning city names (KGP, p. 240) and not the photography or the act of photographing that caused it.

There are no indications at the present time that the surge of mechanical reproductions has affected in any way the western cultural heritage. And curiously Benjamin himself provides some of the arguments to support the view that interest in great historical works of art should not decline as a consequence of mechanical multiplication but on the contrary is bound to flourish. (KGP, pp. 229 ff.)

We are perfectly aware of the fact that in times both long and not so long past, humanity at large has had few opportunities to contemplate and interiorize many of the great works of pictorial art, owing to their sequestration in museums and private collections spread over widely separate and generally privileged areas not easily accessible to all.

What adds to this disabling difficulty is the existence of thousands of canvases and fresco paintings decorating dark walls of blackened and distant vaults of innumerable churches and palaces, as well as rupestrial cave drawings, usually badly illuminated; here geographic inaccessibility is compounded with visual unapproachability.

We have to assume that the majority of art lovers get to know their works of art almost exclusively through their mechanical reproductions. And the enormous proliferation of art books and reproductions easily demonstrable through the existence of all those bookshops which today constitute an obligatory premium adjoining expositions, galleries or museums, testify to the increased interest in or consciousness of art, even if we cannot possibly vouch for a simultaneous enhancement of aesthetic sensibility. We may, indeed, speak of popularization through reproduction for which Benjamin himself provides a partial explication. He takes for granted that it is easier to grasp a painting, a sculpture and above all a work of architecture through a photograph. (KGP, p. 243.)

This is particularly true of pictorial works of large dimensions, both murals and vault decorations, which are hard to grasp and comprehend by means of a single undeviating glance, whereas scanning, which is necessarily involved in viewing large expanses of paint, loses the perception of continuity. What Benjamin claims here is undoubtedly true: that photographic reproductions are indissolubly linked with size reduction of the image which assists men to gain a dominion over the art work without which they could have had no use for it. It might be difficult to visualize a painting so abstruse as to require a mastery over it. We may accept the first half of Benjamin's statement without having to go along with the second. Significant and readily acceptable is his denial that the improved apprehendability of art works through their photographs as compared with a direct examination of the real thing, could be owing to a decay of aesthetic sensibility of contemporary humanity.

Although this last part of Benjamin's thesis is in general terms plausible, it is not easy to square it with the main postulate of the Reproducibility essay. Because photographic reproductions of art works facilitate their grasp and apprehension, their final effect should be one of making them more accessible and therefore enhance their universal appeal. This differs signally from the main conclusion of the Reproducibility text. We have to accept that while some of the conclusions of 'A Little History of Photography' help us to clarify certain obscure points of the Reproducibility text, there are others that make this task more difficult. Obviously, Walter Benjamin was not always a consistent thinker.

VII

An important feature connected with Benjamin's Reproducibility thesis is his disdain for photography as art or, better to say, his reluctance to concede to photography the category of art. Jerome Stolnitz (p. 346) has revealed Benjamin's overall strategy: 'Deflate the value of high art for aesthetic experience and all the other economia come tumbling down . . . (liquidated) without

further effort'.[9] In a similar fashion, Benjamin has to devalue photography, namely deny it the status of art because otherwise he would experience difficulties in grounding his main argument that reproduction, i.e., photography in this case, strips works of art of their aura and devalues them.

The development of this thought can be traced to the 'Little History of Photography'. Here (page 229) and in the context of the discussion of the aesthetic value of the discipline in question, he contrasts the *Art of Photography* with *Art as Photography*. And he extols the value of art works' reproductions for their function in art and attributes to them greater importance than to Art Photography. He dismisses this contemptuously 'as more or less artistic confection'.

And on the next page cites, with obvious satisfaction, part of Baudelaire's statement of 1875 that photography 'must return to its essential task to be the servant to the Arts and Sciences'. (KGP, p. 246.)

VIII

In his spirited refutation, Jerome Stolnitz (p. 350) answers his own question as to how Benjamin got himself into these messes. A partial answer is that Benjamin reasons the way he does under the compulsion of an ideology. Another set of explications exists however. Some of them are relatively free of Benjamin's all-embracing orthodox ideology.

Let's consider, for instance, the series of reasons why Benjamin has chosen to limit his endeavour to visual arts and the film and why after mentioning a phonograph record in the same breath as a photograph he refuses to occupy himself with the former again. Benjamin must have become aware that even in his lifetime mechanical reproductions of music had already reached a respectable level of technical perfection. This has resulted in an increased popularity of serious music. The case of print is similar as printed books may be considered a prima-facie example of reproduction. This Benjamin admits, but brushes it off claiming for it a special, though particularly important 'status'. Nevertheless, Benjamin must have been familiar with the historical effects of the Guttenbergian revolution.

I wish to propose here that Benjamin's refusal to support his main thesis by reference to the two most ubiquitous Reproducibility examples, books and phonographic records, is owing to his awareness that the historical evidence of their appearance and performance in time would contradict his a priori conclusions.

There might have been a second reason for his not following up on his initial hint initiated by coupling the phonographic record with a photograph. It could be that Benjamin did not feel himself at home in the realm of music. We have also observed that he was not quite fortunate in his excursion into the field of the visual art of painting. We may begin with his inept choice of

the works of Hans Arp as an example of those Dadaist works which 'became an instrument of ballistic' using an equally unfortunate metaphor. (WAAMR, pp. 296, 297.)

IX

A certain lack of feel for the visual art of painting informs almost every one of his ventures into that field. He betrays this weakness in his earlier essay (2 January 1929) about Surrealism[10] where his treatment is mostly literary. And when he comes to mention examples of pictorial art, his approach to the paintings of Chirico is again literary and entirely negative. While admitting the literary origin of surrealism we don't have to accept Benjamin's insinuation that this painter's aims were to represent the perceptual features of the scene painted by him (S, pp. 205–206).

Having been predominantly a literary critic, we should not perhaps blame him too much for this particular literary bias. But awareness of the pitfalls of indiscriminate generalization should not keep us from recalling Clive Bell's essay in which he points out the difficulties the literary man encounters in trying to grasp works of pictorial art and do them justice.[11]

Briefly, Benjamin falls short of presenting a theory or a hypothesis. And even if it were one, its truth value would be subject to verification by means of, among other things, matching it with empirical data. Whatever it is he offers, it is closer to a prophecy with all its fallacies and pitfalls or, perhaps better, a fanciful extrapolation from questionable premisses. Even such an extrapolation would not be exempt from the necessity of empirical verification. In this respect too it fails.

In the above sense even dissenting voices are of marginal importance especially when they come from those who disagree with him on ideological grounds. As to the critical views expressed by fellow-Marxist writers, we must take seriously Adorno's contradicting Benjamin's belief that mass reproduction will become the master art in the age of industrialization (AT, p. 309). On the other hand his castigating Benjamin for dialectic shortcomings in his work, while undoubtedly important in the context of historical materialism, is irrelevant for the judgement of the truth of his thesis.

X

Most damaging for Benjamin's Reproducibility thesis is the opinion of Bertolt Brecht for the simple reason that it comes from another Marxist colleague. In an almost sarcastic entry of 25 July in his Work Diary[12] Brecht writes that Benjamin has discovered aura in his analysis of the film where, together with the cultic, it decays owing to the reproducibility of art works. He qualifies it as full of mysticism within an anti-mystical posture. 'In this form is the con-

ception of historical materialism adapted' he writes. And then adds: 'It is quite horrible'.

The circumstances of this outburst, entered into the work journal on 25 July 1938, is not known. It seems, however, that it could have easily been the result of simple rivalry. Hannah Arendt writes in her 1968 introduction to Benjamin's work (Stolnitz, p. 237, n7), that he wrote his essay in order to outdo Brecht in radicalism.

Brecht's censure is important above all because it articulates doubts which many non-Marxist workers in the field of theoretical aesthetics and art history have developed while reading Benjamin's Reproducibility essay. In this context his doctrinal reprehension is only of marginal concern.

Nevertheless, concluding an essay on such a negative note leaves one with an ashy taste in the mouth. And it may be so because there *is* more in Benjamin's Reproducibility piece than what has been found objectionable. In fact, once he leaves the vulnerable issue of loss of aura owing to mechanical reproduction, he can be quite lucid. And so for instance he has many insightful things to say about film and film making. But to ponder about them I leave to more congenial minds.

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FILM, IDEOLOGY AND BOURDIEU'S CRITIQUE OF PUBLIC TASTE

John Blewitt

BOURDIEU'S WORK on public taste and aesthetic judgement complements the growing body of work on media literacy and cultural reproduction. His ideas are not always systematic or readily accessible but they do offer some interesting perspectives. His major book on cultural competencies, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*,[1] is an extension of a larger project addressing issues of power, dominance and socio-cultural reproduction within the sociology of education. However, Bourdieu's views have a much wider significance.

CULTURAL CAPITAL AND CULTURAL COMPETENCIES

For Bourdieu institutions tend to transmit and legitimize certain cultural practices which can be both at variance with the experiences of subordinate classes and translated, under certain circumstances, into economic capital, wealth and power. Class relations within capitalism are therefore reinforced and reproduced structurally and culturally. In an associated hierarchy of symbolic systems, competencies and tastes valued and legitimate cultural practices are contrasted with the popular, vulgar and routinized habits of the dominated classes. Using some empirical evidence Bourdieu suggests that these tastes and competencies have a political significance, a class correlation and an ideological effect involving processes of closure and (self)exclusion. In part they are expressed in the realms of appropriation and consumption.

Class/cultural structuration is determined by two significant factors: first, the unequal distribution of economic goods which objectively sets limits to the number of cultural excursions to galleries, concerts, theatres, cinemas(?), etc.; and secondly, 'the ways in which these objective class distinctions are internalised within the habitus as differing dispositions, differing attitudes towards culture and differing abilities to utilise cultural objects and practice, and thus result in a different logic of cultural practice'.[2]

Particular cultural fields are marked out by specific agencies and institutions—schools, universities, critics. Although the objects and practices of these cultural fields may have little use value their proper appreciation requires an investment of cultural capital—those learned competencies that enable us to decipher a Jackson Pollock or an Andrei Tarkovsky. 'Works of Art' require

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of the consumer 'an aesthetic disposition'. The subordinate classes, 'the less educated beholders of our society', lack this. They may be either unwilling or unable to play the intellectual critical game for they lack the credentials necessary to infiltrate those networks where the games are played. Their experience of and access to differential levels of education denied them the understanding of complex codes, textual and inter-textual knowledge. Woody Allen has beautifully satirized these games that contribute to the ideological processes of exclusion, closure and socio-cultural reproduction.

FILM AND PUBLIC TASTE

Bourdieu suggests people not only exhibit different approaches to art but also different tastes. Less educated persons will express a sensuous or naïve appreciation focusing on content, familiarity and the re-presentation of the real world (realism). They have a 'mutilated' perception of 'scholarly culture'. The more educated have a cerebral, intellectual, distancing or reflexive appreciation concentrating on form, style and relations to other arts. In terms of Film the unitiated will see *Police Academy IV* whereas the educated might also but would probably prefer Fellini, Bergman or Jarman. This rough distinction is to some extent confirmed by Docherty, Morrison and Tracey in their study of British cinema audiences. The Regional Film Theatre crowd attend the cinema more regularly than the average commercial punter expressing a deep commitment to Film as an art form.

> One way to make judgements about this is to look at the social and demographic profile of the audience. This is different from the general audience in several important respects, most importantly class and education. Over one-third of the RFT audience is in full time education, and if we add in the number of lecturers and teachers then over half the audience are connected to full-time education. There is clearly something about an arts or social science based education which leads to the perception of cinema as an art form.[3]

The inference from Bourdieu would be that Art House movies require a more sophisticated set of competencies than the mainstream Hollywood product. Only a refined perception may appreciate the full range of narrative nuances, filmic conventions and connotations and see eroticism where others would see porn. The unitiated 'barbarous' consumer would be either bored or confused by a Fellini, Bergman or Jarman.

The Art House audience invariably refers to films via their author, the director, and Bourdieu suggests a knowledge of directors varies in proportion to the amount of cultural capital a person possesses. To appreciate film as ART then you must know your directors. A knowledge of actors has no special significance beyond testifying to the universality of the star system. Auteurism dominates the aesthetic consciousness of the educated middle classes. They prefer humanist films with some intellectual bite. The rest want a bit of action.

> Where some only see 'a Western starring Burt Lancaster', others 'discover an early John Stuges' or 'the latest Peckinpah'. In identifying what is worthy of being seen and the right way to see it they are aided by their whole social group (which guides and reminds them with its 'Have you seen?' and 'You must see') and by the whole corporation of critics mandated by the group to produce legitimate classifications and the discourse necessarily accompanying any artistic enjoyment worthy of the name.[4]

Awareness of and access to critical writing is itself an aspect of the informal learning process initially stimulated by formal education's emphasis on the appropriate aesthetic dispositions, competencies, etc. These people have learnt to appreciate and enjoy difficult works which may lack the spectacle and immediacy of less formalized, less experimental entertainments. For Bourdieu the ability to distance oneself aesthetically has a political significance.

> Formal experiment—which in literature or the theatre, leads to obscurity—is, in the eyes of the working class public, one sign of what is sometimes felt to be a desire to keep the unitiated at arms length, or, as one respondent said about certain cultural programmes on TV, to speak to other initiates 'over the viewers' heads'.[5]

Aesthetic judgement is one aspect of economic and political power. The internalization of cultural practices into routines, habits and predispositions are key elements in the social reproduction of capitalist society. Cultural practices and the accumulation of cultural capital may serve an ideological function of masking class and power relations. This understanding underpins Bourdieu's discussions of habitus, symbolic systems, cultural codes, competencies and logics of cultural practices. His theoretical perspective correlates with Jorge Larrain's conceptualization of ideology:

> . . . ideological representation is not an immanent attribute of reality which deceives a passive consciousness, but the projection into consciousness of petrified appearances produced by men's (*sic*) practice. Ideology negates the inverted character of social relations; it takes an aspect of reality, the appearances, and gives them an autonomy and independence which they do not actually have. In this sense ideology fetishises the world of appearance, separates it from its real connections.[6]

Arguably, the narrative structure with its happy ending, the seamless continuity editing, the naturalistic acting style, the focus on individual heroes and heroines—Robin Hood and Maid Marion—are produced within the field of capitalist social relations and encode ideological structures and representation spectators may not perceive as being ideological. The competency or proclivity to deconstruct these ideological offerings may not be consonant with naïve appreciation and a 'barbarous' taste. Films and filmmakers that attempt to penetrate the masks and veils of the classic Hollywood style often fail in their demystifying project because only the converted will appreciate the clever manipulation of filmic codes and not be bored. You rarely see a season of

Jean Luc Godard's at the local Odean and even those who enjoy *A Room With a View*, a tasteful middlebrow film, will shy away from a rabid Film on Four.

IDEOLOGY AND FILM CRITICISM

Ideologically acceptable taste is institutionalized in two ways: firstly, through the public/critical reception of works of art prompting and priming the thoughts of filmgoers and other cultural consumers; and second, through the guardianship of public morality and the protection of public sensitivities via mechanisms of (self)censorship and classification. In large part, public taste conforms to the social and cultural values of the leading sectors of society. If the BBFC have qualms about *Sebastiane* (Derek Jarman, GB, 1976) then so would most of the commercial film audience. In a comparative study of Hitchcock's *Psycho* (USA, 1960) and Powell's *Peeping Tom* (GB, 1960) Lucy Moy-Thomas has shown how cultural competencies inform a person's reading of a film and how films produced for the commercial market HAVE to conform to certain predigested moral and aesthetic codes.[7] The materiality of public taste has an ideological and commercial imperative. Moy-Thomas shows that both films were initially perceived as disgusting and perverted but whereas one was shelved for over twenty years the other has become a classic, part of the regular Christmas TV fare. It takes a particularly sophisticated audience to appreciate and resist Powell's manipulation and incorporation of the spectator into the murder. We are simultaneously compelled and repelled. We are unable to experience the usually unconscious voyeuristic pleasure of watching a film. We cannot accept the pleasure of Mark (Carl Boehm) or intellectualize his pathology and we cannot share the horror of Helen (Anna Massey) as she sees as we see her own murder. We are implicated too much and can't do much about it. Whereas in *Psycho* we have stars, Janet Leigh and Antony Perkins, we have suspense we can deal with and we are shocked without necessarily being appalled or personally implicated, even in the shower scene where the point of view shifts in time with the rapid editing. In any case something a little nasty is expected with Hitchcock. Have you seen . . .? *Psycho* unlike *Peeping Tom* slotted neatly into an established genre and the *oeuvre* of an established and popular auteur.

Although Bourdieu's ideas have an intriguing quality they may imply a theoretical élitism. For instance, on the assumption that 'high' art necessitates a sophisticated conceptual competence and popular art ('low' art) requires something less sophisticated, Bourdieu is presenting us with a hierarchy of value judgements similar to those sanctioned by educational institutions. However, the cultural practices and products of (and for) the subordinate classes often provoke high levels of critical discussion requiring skills as complex but different to those required for *Prospero's Books* (Greenaway, GB, 1991). Processes of decoding may therefore have greater significance than encoding. Critical practice may 'elevate' *Ghostbusters* to the same plain as

Bergman's *Seventh Seal* (Sweden, 1957). Books and learned articles can be written about both. In this way, intellectuals may find the critical analysis more satisfying than the original film. A naïve appreciation of *The Seventh Seal* or *Mirror* (Tarkovsky, USSR, 1978) is probably impossible whereas it is not for *Duck Tales: The Movie*.

Bourdieu may also offer a tacit functionalism.[8] However, there are ways for him to elude this charge. Processes of 'symbolic transgression', he states, may neutralize the political and ideological implications of legitimated art, films, etc. The operation of a conceptual scheme and ethos at variance with that embedded in the art work may lead to radical readings and cultural appropriations reinforcing practices that challenge hegemonic values. Feature films frequently become rearticulated according to quite contrary precepts to those originally intended. Richard Dyer illustrates this excellently in relation to the practices of gay, black and women's groups.[9] The social reception and individual deciphering of films have a determinate influence on their aesthetic appreciation and political life. This may be as true for *Rambo* as it is for those films made with a self-conscious political purpose, for example, films by Marguerita von Trotta, Emile de Antonio and even Jean Luc Godard. The acquisition and application of cultural competencies, aesthetics and politics, are not easily separable.

CONCLUSIONS

One problem remains when the ideological operation of feature films is discussed. In Britain, at least, the cultural and artistic status of FILM is somewhat ambiguous and uncertain. It is debatable whether a knowledge of films and directors constitutes a significant aspect of an economically transferable cultural capital. It certainly is the case in France and maybe Russia where the battle for FILM as ART is won. Where film culture does have a legitimate cultural status Bourdieu's ideas have a direct significance. The activities of the BFI, Channel Four, RFTs may help to consolidate both Film's position in the cultural hierarchy and Bourdieu's standing in the academic/critical Film community. Nevertheless, taste and aesthetic judgement *is* an aspect of class inequality and its social, cultural and ideological reproduction. Film, even in Britain, is an important part of this process. *Peeping Tom* has been retrieved and to a large extent critically redeemed but it is still Art House and probably will remain so.

> Tastes (ie manifested preferences) are the practical affirmation of an inevitable difference. It is no accident that, when they have to be justified, they are asserted purely negatively, by the refusal of other tastes. . . . Aesthetic intolerance can be terribly violent. Aversion to different lifestyles is perhaps one of the strongest barriers between classes: class endogamy is evidence of this.[10]

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ICONS, PLOTS AND IDENTITY

J. A. Dooley

IN THIS article I should like to address certain points that arise from Peter Lamarque's title-question: 'How can we Fear and Pity Fictions?'. My argument will propose a possible solution to the nature of these 'fictions' he cites, and suggest how these come to their identity through the action system or plot they inhabit. He posits a number of interesting questions about the nature of 'fictions' as he sees them. 'What', he asks, 'are we responding *to* when we fear Othello and pity Desdemona?'[1] Lamarque notes Kendall Walton's observation that though such characters affect us, we cannot affect them; that is, make them feel fear, pity, delight, embarrassment, as we do for them.[2] Lamarque proposes that the latter figures 'enter our world' and it is here we interact with them. Characters obtain access to our minds in the guise of descriptions, whereafter they become the objects of our emotional responses as mental representations or fictions that form constellations of ideas that invite association not only with reality, but our imagination. This is a 'filling in process' which is reminiscent of '*coming to know another human being*'. The one-way traffic of their effect on us is because of this transformation of them into mental representations. Lamarque goes on to argue why our responses to such characters are bound up in the whole work we see them in:

> The answer lies partly in the shift from reference to sense in fictional names. It is not just that *someone* is killed by a jealous husband that gives the emotive power to *Othello* but that the description of the killing is connected in a quite particular way with a great number of other descriptions in the play, including those of Desdemona. The cluster of descriptions that give sense to the name 'Desdemona' will tend to issue in . . . those . . . clusters of thoughts which . . . can increase our involvement with a thought and thus the intensity of our response to it.[3]

It is the reference to the 'connections' of the 'descriptions' concerning Desdemona that my initial arguments will focus on, and I shall suggest that Saussure's notion of a juxtapositional system creating identities will help clarify Lamarque's point of enquiry.

Saussure's concept of signs is summed up by his proclamation that 'Language is form and not substance'.[4] For Saussure a sign does not have a particular significance by reason of what it is composed of; but rather because of its position in the whole system of signs to which it belongs, that is, its relation

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with other signs. Saussure's famous example of the manner in which the Simplon Express train gains its identity will elucidate. Thus the '8.25 Geneva to Paris Express's' identity is fixed, not because each morning it is the same material train, but because of the hour of its departure, its route, and its general circumstances. In this sense we see the train's identity is dependent on it belonging to an action system or plot, and the latter bestows the 'form'.

The notion of timing as an adjunct to an object's identity within a system is echoed by the timing of Desdemona's death, an end which contributes to her tragic stature as character. For, coming at the finish of the play, her death reminds us of the adage that a detective story is rarely a tragedy because the corpse comes usually at the beginning. In other words, as the formalist would maintain, verbs of action will be finally ordered according to an active process of *sjužet*, that is, the order of events as they are presented to the reader or spectator. This ordering will then be manipulated by the brain to compute the true chronological sequence of events of the *fabula*. This dynamic of the *sjužet* will not only broadly ensnare our pity or fear for Desdemona, but create the desired intensity of these. Desdemona killed at the beginning of *Othello* would be a vastly different proposition for our feelings than is her death at the end of the tragedy as we know it.

This question of identity is closely connected with the concept of role. Goldman, for example, remarks the fact that every role is a 'disguise for the actor'. It has also 'a rigid, inanimate mask-like quality', an 'iconic' quality which is quickly recognizable as 'the old, old king; the faded belle'. These icons remain proof against 'details and surprises'.[5] This mask-like quality of roles may be seen as a vestige from the use of masks in ritual with their mythological plots. They were the means by which divine and semi-divine personae could take over and imprint their identity on the shaman or actor depicting them; ruling out with their donning the personal and inessential and rendering the performer up to the ritual. The mask was an aid, a possessor which drew the shaman relievedly beyond himself into the absolute realm of the *illud tempus*.[6]

The details and surprises are present even in the scenario of the 8.25 express, which despite the change of engine, or even the addition of one, will retain its identity. However, if the train is late—very late, it will lose something of its identity for its would-be passengers before it arrives at the station. It will probably be greeted by mild signs of contempt or derision by them. After all the train has inconvenienced us; disappointed us by not living up to its name, one of its differences from other trains, by arriving, say, at 9.25. The train, in fact, constitutes one of the icons that Lamarque describes as 'entering our world', and which we interact with. As 'icon' it has attained access to our minds in the guise of descriptions that now reveal discrepancies. Its character is, after all, supposed to be that of a crack express—a fast, dependable train which to travel on is to enhance one's status. Lamarque's 'filling in process'

with regard to the train is similar to our coming to know another human being. Why else should passengers feel anger, contempt at the train's late arrival? Whatever cluster of ideas besets us at this time will concern the action-system of which the train is a part: the advertising, the extra supplement paid over and above the normal fare—these have to do with realities. Our imagination will be fed by our sense of superiority at the thought our train has priority over other trains in the matter of movement.

Similarly with Othello caught up in a plot in which his recognizable mask at the beginning of the play appears to be that of invincible warrior-chief. In departing from this image as we see the ease with which Iago tricks him—like our express train—he earns a degree of contempt and finally hatred from the audience as he reveals his true iconic-set as gullible, dangerous and doomed warrior chief—Macbeth is of the same ilk. In the plot of *Othello*, as usually the case, there is little deflection in the role of good, faithful, suffering wife that Desdemona encompasses. Lear, as another case in point, is caught up in the plot at the beginning, as a seemingly wise old king. In departing from this image he again gains the contempt of the audience, although this changes to sympathy as through intense suffering he comes back to his original icon: that of a wise, old if dying king. Obviously it is only as examples in the present argument that one would so simplistically tag these characters.

Both these dramatic plots and the Simplon Express's timetable or action system work to bring their respective 'ikons' onto what might be termed their correct course. Both systems pressurize their respective images until they have returned to their original and proper identities as they have been created by the system or plot.[7]

It is not difficult to sense that, even as the express careers ever more furiously to catch up on its timetable in order to reinforce its identity, there will be something like an ethical decision on its part to return to the order of the system which created it, and under which it needs operate. And whether or not the action towards the wisdom of correct identity is voluntary, or as with Othello and Lear, involuntary, it needs operate. And whether or not the action towards the wisdom of correct identity is voluntary or, as with Othello and Lear, involuntary, it may finally be seen as springing from a quasi-cosmic motivation reminiscent of Spinoza's *conatus*, which escaping from solely human limits can be seen as a striving for proper form, for proper identity, by any subject within any system which has created it. This striving of figures such as Othello, Desdemona, Lear or the Simplon Express to keep within their respective action-systems, Aristotle would surely dub an ethical one. And this term 'ethical' needs extending in order to include those characters who show no remorse for the role the plot has destined them to. Note Iago's final and defiant silence; Don Juan's consistency of choice in Hellfire.

Aristotle's notion that the dramatic plot must have a beginning, middle and end ensures that the figures in it are enhanced by their 'details and surprises',

that is, by their deviations from their true iconic identity. The same factors do not work for the express whose departure from its proper identity is governed by no aesthetic imperative which will ensure that it makes amends for its lateness. In fact the action of the train is *unframed*, is constantly under threat—like the action of the masked shaman—of being absorbed into what Heidegger refers to as the 'referential totality' of the world.

Aristotle's dismissal of 'character' and the motivation it will bring as so much rhetorical colouring is worth quoting here: 'character is included for the sake of action . . . a tragedy is impossible without an action, but there may be one without characters' (50a23–4). In other words, Aristotle is insisting that character, be it that of Desdemona or of Lear, as it emanates from the tragic imitation of an action, is reliant for its existence on this action. That there may be tragedy without character through quasi-cosmic motivation can be borne out by the following drama: a simple, sequential number of appearances of a garden seat on stage. Each appearance will show a graduated stage of age and decrepitude until the final curtain scene shows a shapeless heap of rotting wood. Here the human motivation is expunged so as to reveal the simple, off-stage process of ageing—the action, and the full force of Aristotle's assertion that character is not an essential part of drama, even though it is agreed the seat will have various human connotations by reason of its manufacture and supposed use. It is suggested that the sequence of these seat-scenes creates naïve tragedy in that it reflects the dissolute effect of time. Naïve tragic emotions on the part of the audience are called for by the appearance of decrepitude which is allegorized to coincide with their own ageing condition. A like scenario could be created from Hans Christian Andersen's story 'The Little Fir Tree'.[8]

The system or plot governing the chair's demise is its design. It is the last which allows the role of a disintegrating chair. It matters not at all that the mood of such drama is naïve. What is more important is that it indicates that character—and the intrinsic motivation many assume this gives to the action—cannot be relegated solely to the domain of the human. In a Schopenhauerian sense, indeed, motivation can begin with the will, an act of defecation being one of its cruder manifestations; a force such as gravity being another more subtle form of its workings. It is this latter force that our garden seat will finally succumb to. A collapse which is foreshadowed by its timbers' reaction to the destructive elements of damp and sunlight. This resistance will be intensified by the symbolic nature of the dramatic enactment. Moreover, up to the time of its collapse the seat will have clung to its remnants of identity. All along, as though bound to the system (its design) which has created it, the chair has been motivated to sustain its 'form', to stay with the plot.

In similar fashion the architecture of a building holds its identity by dissipating the threatening forces of gravity down its system of walls, columns and arches, and by this means allows itself to escape the 'inorganic quiescence'

which will otherwise be its lot. Hence, what we see in a Gothic cathedral sustained by its quasi-cosmic motivation is *frozen* action taking place within its system, plot or design. It is an action which—whether or not it is finally motivated by a non-human force such as gravity—is still capable of stimulating the identification of the observer. This process works, as Schopenhauer argues, by making the conflict between gravity and rigidity distinct. This is done 'by depriving these indestructible forces of the shortest way to their satisfaction, and conducting them to it by a circuitous route [via columns, arches, etc.], so that the conflict is lengthened and the inexhaustible efforts of both forces become visible in many different ways'.[9] The manner in which this suspension of forces stimulates the identification of the observer is well caught in L. P. Hartley's *Eustace and Hilda* which depicts the hero's fantasy at work on the gravitational play of buildings in Venice: 'That huge square palace opposite, with its deep windows like eye sockets in a skull was on you in a moment with its frontal attack. The building next to it, red, shabby . . . was withholding its fire, but the onslaught would come—Eustace could see it collecting its charm'.[10]

Peter Brooks would at once label Eustace's fears amid the personified facades of the buildings as a form of desire to survive amid the variegated nature of the threats offered him. Brooks would appear to see narrative in much the same way as Schopenhauer does architecture, except for him verbs take the place of columns and arches; gravity and rigidity, desire: 'verbs articulate the pressure and drive of desire. Desire is a wish for the end, for fulfilment, but fulfilment must be delayed so that we can understand it in relation to origin and desire itself'.[11] Likewise, in the tales in *Shahrāzad*, narration is seen to be life giving. It both arouses and sustains the desire of the Sultan to listen, while offering 'what we might call a lucid repose, desire both come to rest and set in perspective'.[12] This is also the eventual end of gravity after it has been prevented from 'short-circuiting' by the columns and arches conducting it to its rest.

In similar fashion do dancers play with gravity, delaying its repose by their lightness, leaps and turns. These are made possible by living muscle which like stone can be made rigid in order to form columns and arches in the body of the dancer according to an action-system, a choreographed plot.

From these examples it is possible to argue that a certain action is always present in anything that has been given *form*, because form and its accompanying identity presupposes that it belongs to a system from which it takes that identity, be it dramatic plot, an architectural design or the timetable of a train. In a word the notion of action is far more subtle than we normally think of it, and of itself is capable of imparting character of the type we may find in a cathedral, a train or a garden seat going to rack and ruin. In fact there is no need for human character in a drama at all—just as long as there is the human audience to project its universal expectations on the action it contains.

From where does the action-system or plot derive its power to both bestow and authorize identity on the forms or images moving within it? The answer is that they derive from the same archetypal—often mythic—plot as the set iconic images; from where the primitive mask emerges into ritual. By its enaction ritual creates an *illud tempus*, the place where the original events are always happening. The latter, Mircea Eliade has dubbed the 'paradigmatic acts', and these are nothing less than the acts of the gods as they moved about their work during the creation or cosmogony. These labyrinthine cosmogonic connections with drama I would hope to return to in a subsequent paper, when a closer look at Lamarque's significant query about the 'internal reference' of a character within a story would be due.[13]

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[1] Peter Lamarque, 'How Can We Fear and Pity Fictions?', *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 21 (1981).

[2] Kendall L. Walton, 'Fearing Fictions', *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 75 (1978), quoted by Lamarque, op. cit., p. 292. Walton's notion of a 'fictional world', which we must enter if we wish to interact with a character, has much to do with the notion of the *illud tempus*, the realm of the cosmogony where the original events are always happening. A playscript allows similar happenings.

[3] Lamarque, op. cit., p. 302.

[4] F. D. Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics* (Glasgow, 1979), pp. 108–9, 122.

[5] Michael Goldman, *The Actor's Freedom* (New York, 1975), p. 50. The term 'iconic' is a term of Muriel Bradbrook's (*English Dramatic Form*, London, 1965) which Goldman duly acknowledges.

[6] As David Cole reports in *The Theatrical Event* (Middletown, Connecticut, 1975) 'in societies where possession is a religion merely personal manifestations on the part of the possessed (shaman or actor) are not considered acceptable. . . . the man who is ritually possessed must correspond to the traditional concept of some mythical personage'. Each deity has a distinct personality and mode of behaviour—like repeated single acts or a course of action of a myth. In such cults anything may become a possession god: an animal, motor boat, etc. (Cole, 35–6.) This account should be compared to Peter Lamarque's comments in 'Expression and the Mask: the Dissolution of Personality in Noh', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 47, no. 2 (1989), pp. 157–68, where he argues that character can exist (e.g., in Noh plays) without personality.

[7] There is a hankering here for the notion that in some way—whether for good or evil—the 'forms' or 'images' owe some allegiance to the systems which spawn them.

[8] A typical case of such drama was the cult of ruins during the Romantic period when melancholia and obsessions with death encouraged people to identify with icons which were about to elude their identity or, as in the case of a 'skull', had already done so.

[9] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, Vol. 1 (London, 1883), p. 277.

[10] L. P. Hartley, *Eustace and Hilda* (London, 1952), p. 25. Obviously this is extremely overt identification through personification of the architecture. Identification can also manifest itself in the mood of the beholder.

[11] Peter Brooks, *Reading for the Plot* (Oxford, 1984), p. 111.

[12] Brooks, op. cit., p. 61.

[13] The implications of the cosmogony or cre-

ation on plots and action-systems are dealt with at length in Mircea Eliade's *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, 1959) and in Cole, op. cit.

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ART HISTORICALLY DEFINED: REPLY TO OPPY

Jerrold Levinson

GRAHAM OPPY, in the pages of this journal, has recently subjected my attempt to define art in intentional-historical terms to intense criticism.[1] Of the various critiques I have so far received, Oppy's came closest to persuading me that I might have been fundamentally mistaken on this topic. Having recovered from that healthy access of doubt, I now think the problems Oppy raises for my view are not so dire as they first appear, and in some cases are based on misreading.

There are five problems of substance in Oppy's critique. One concerns my view's appeal to the intentions of individuals. A second concerns my account of the notion of 'regarding-as-a-work-of-art'. A third concerns the intuition that art is necessarily backward-looking. A fourth is an a priori worry about any form of historical definition that aims at generality. And the last is a difficulty putatively posed for any relational definition of art by a certain variety of counter-example. I address these in turn.

(1) I begin with some general remarks on appealing to intentions in characterizing art, something I undoubtedly do. My proposal was that it is the way in which an object is or was projected, the attitude or aim that governs or governed its production, the point of its making or proferring—in short, the intention behind or around it—that determines arthood. Such intentions are not to be conceived as temporally localized, transient psychic states. What I claim arthood requires is a certain projective orientation for an object, grounded in some manner in the artist's mentality but not happily equatable with individual, datable mental states. That an object is intended for such and such treatment is not a fact generally traceable to or analysable into particular episodes of deciding or envisaging. Instead, artmaking intentions are psychologically and situationally embedded.

Now Oppy charges that intentions are cheap and easy, and thus unlikely to be sufficient for arthood. But the force of this charge is blunted if one keeps the above points in mind, and also one further thing about the intentions in question. An artmaking intention is necessarily *constitutive* in nature, i.e., a substantial intention that invests an object with a new status, making it something whose central identity is thenceforth: object to be regarded or done with

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in such and such a way. By no means every intention touching on a thing's treatment is of this type.[2]

Oppy offers as a *reductio* that on my view, if someone intends every single thing to be regarded as previous works of art have been regarded, then perforce every single thing is turned into art. But this is clearly a juncture at which a proprietary right condition, even if of limited relevance, must be invoked. Thankfully no one owns, or has the right to modify or remake the identity of, any more than a tiny percentage of all there is. The act of projection in Oppy's example could only result in a Conceptual art work, in which 'every single thing' is merely an intentional part of the work as complex mental gesture, and not in a Readymade art work, taking the whole world as its material basis, parallel to Duchamp's famous icons of *quincaillerie*.[3]

To cast doubt on the necessity of art status depending on an object's being intended for reception as some preceding art was, Oppy next revives my example of a solitary primitive engaged in aesthetic arrangement of coloured stones, and claims it could not matter to the art status of his product whether his activity is occurring now, which allows his intentions to connect, albeit in a way hidden to the agent, with the preceding body of art, or whether it occurred in isolated fashion aeons ago, at a time prior to the beginning of art as it in fact historically developed.

But it is not at all obvious that it could not matter, given the concept of art with which we operate. In the first instance, the product is art *as it is created*, it seems, because relatable to already existing objects that are art and were similarly projected. In the second instance, the product arguably was not art *when it was created*, even though involving the same intrinsic attitude towards materials, because neither knowingly nor unknowingly connecting to a pre-existing domain of art activity, there being by hypothesis none. However, and this is to temper the last judgement, perhaps the product of such 'before-the-beginning-of-art' activity can rightly be seen as art or reclassified as such *at some later time*, once the attitude with which it was fashioned emerges as canonical in the mainstream of art proper. We have some flexibility here in accommodating cases to our intuitions, within an intentional-historical paradigm for art, in virtue of a distinction we may choose to invoke between the time at which something becomes art, and the time, possibly earlier, at which it is constituted as an intentioned-object.[4]

(2) Oppy next raises the serious problem of whether I have provided an effective account of the 'relatively complete ways of regard' (hereafter, RCW's) that, intentionally invoked by a maker, are supposed to link art of a given time to art of an earlier time. He considers three construals of this notion, but finds none of them plausible. I concur in regard to the first two; the third, though, which is closest to what I had in mind, is given too short shrift.

What manner of RCW is such that intentional invocation of it in regard to something is enough to secure that thing's status as an art work? Is it one which merely includes a lot of individual ways that various art works have been correctly regarded in the past? Obviously not, since these could be bundled together in such haphazard fashion that intending something for such a farrago of regards wouldn't give any grounds for thinking the object of such intention was art as well. Is it one that includes some particular individual way of regarding deemed crucial for art works, such as attending to an object's relation to the history of art? Unfortunately not, since this would rule out by fiat art not self-consciously created under the aegis of art.

The right sort of RCW is a structured, inter-related ensemble of individual ways of regard that has been brought, as a whole, to some earlier art work or genre of art works. And something will be art if intended for *more or less* any such whole ensemble, whether identified as the ensemble proper to such and such art (i.e., relationally) or in purely descriptive terms (i.e., intrinsically).[5] Quantitative considerations enter, if one likes, in judging whether there is substantial overlap between a candidate intended RCW and any RCW normative for some past art, but not in the form of merely counting whether a candidate RCW contains among its component ways a large enough number or proportion of individual ways of regarding art works, drawn from any source and assembled in any combination.

Oppy claims that the requirement in artmaking of necessary invocation of an RCW even construed in this third way 'runs counter to the revolutionary nature of modern art'.[6] But I had already explained, in my original paper, two ways in which the intentional-historical approach to art can be accommodated to strongly revolutionary art such as that of Duchamp.[7]

One response is to insist that there must always be a phase in the intention of even the most avant-garde artmaker which connects his objects to the tradition against which he is rebelling or taking a stand, in order for it to be understood and reacted to as art at all, regardless of any more subversive intention for the object and its reception with which that ground-level one may be overlain. An avant-garde artmaker's intentions are thus plausibly two-levelled: the first level is concerned with in some way securing an object's conceptual identity as art, and the second, more radical, level is concerned with the repudiation or reversal of some aspect of the tradition of art bought into, of necessity, at a logically prior level. An alternative response to pointedly revolutionary art open to intentional-historicism is this: even were we to deny that an intention to hook up with earlier art via invoking an RCW accorded some art works in the past was present, at any level, in the artmaker's intentional stance, we could hardly deny that such an artmaker was concerned to have his work treated in some way Γ *in explicit contrast with* certain RCWs accorded some past art works or other. Thus at a minimum pre-existing constellations of art-regards are intentionally invoked in *negative* fashion, and

so the spirit of an intentional-historical requirement on artmaking, involving RCWs attaching to preceding art, is preserved.

(3) Oppy's charge that the theory wrongly makes art necessarily backward-looking seems based on not recognizing that only artmakers whose thoughts are of a certain form (e.g., 'regard as those earlier art works were regarded') and not others (e.g., 'regard as those prior things, which happen to be art works, were regarded') themselves have explicitly backward-looking stances in *art-theoretical terms*. My account is not committed to the proposition that artmakers must always be consciously concerned with the relation of present to past art, only that their acts of artmaking must establish such a relation to be recognizably such. The only thing all that we recognize as art today has in common is, roughly, modelling on or reaction to predecessors; I don't maintain that all artmakers must be thinking of earlier art as such, i.e., as art, but only that their intentions must connect, if not in a way transparent to them, to already existent art.

Oppy claims my view commits me to there having been a 'parallel development of art and the concept of art'.[8] I don't see why, for as he readily acknowledges, there are art-unaware artmakers as well as art-aware artmakers. He further fails to see how I 'can account for the fact that the painting of the fourteenth century was art *at that time* even though nothing like our concept of art had yet been developed'.[9] I don't see how I am in the least encumbered in doing so. Much quattrocento painting is something which, by our present, art-informed, reckoning counts as having been art at that time, even though the—grantedly modern—concept of art was not yet in place. Such painting *was* art at the time it was created, perhaps, though naturally it couldn't have been *judged* to be art at that time, since by hypothesis our modern, intentionalist-historicist concept of art hadn't yet crystallized. But this is no different, at base, from the last dinosaur's dying, unobserved by man, in the late Cretaceous period. We can *now* say that that was the case, certainly, whenever precisely it happened, but that couldn't have been said *at that time*; the concept of 'dinosaur', like that of 'art', was a post-Renaissance invention.[10] It may be, as Oppy confidently asserts, that 'painting of the fourteenth century was art *at that time*', but it is so by *our* present lights, and not according to *their*, by hypothesis absent, conceptualization of art.

(4) Oppy denies that 'the content of the notion *work of art* can be captured in some sort of recursive definition which recapitulates the history of art'. I quite agree. The schematic recursive definition of art I offered in my original essay was not intended as an explication of the concept of art, but only as a method by which the extension of 'art' in this world might be concretely generated and displayed, were one to have located all the ur-arts, and were one able to access all the intentional links leading from them to the present—which is very far from being the case. So surely, despite Oppy's scepticism, numerous counter-factuals regarding works of art are supported by my prim-

ary, non-recursive definition of 'art work', that which aims to elucidate the meaning of the term, if not by the recursive specification of the concrete domain of art that I outlined as well. What one has to imagine different just changes, relative to other attempts to characterize arthood. With respect to Duchamp's *Fountain*, for example, the urinal which is integral to it might not, it is true, have been turned into an art work; imagine only that it had not been projected for the complex and multi-levelled previous-art-invoking regard for which it was in fact projected.

Consider now Oppy's a priori reservations against a historicist theory being able to explicate *art* in general, rather than just *art in the actual world*, or *art in the West*. My theory defines 'art work' as currently employed in art-critical discourse in this, the actual, world. But my claim is that this is still a general definition of the concept, such as it is; according to the theory, 'art work' now is an essentially historical concept, and so any use of 'art work' to apply outside of this world and its concrete artworlds and art histories will of necessity be tethered in the historically conditioned application of 'art' as it has actually evolved. Elsewhere[11] I briefly sketch two ways in which we might ground extending the concept of art rooted in our culture and its history outside of that sphere. One asks that some of the same RCWs that have emerged in our own art history be in play; the other asks only that something like the same structure of backward invocation for regard in activities of making be discernible.

Oppy tentatively considers in this vein that perhaps something 'is a work of art in a world just in case it occupies the right niche in the history of art in that world', but stops short at this difficulty: 'how do we identify "the history of art" in a given world? It seems that we need some non-historical criteria which will tell us that a world has (or does not have) a history of art'.[12] The answer is that we do not; the criteria that do the job, on either of the two ways of grounding such extensions noted above, are unavoidably historical, since implicitly taken from our own art history. We might, for instance, say that planet X or possible world W has an art history if it has a history of successive makings governed by intentions invoking a number of the RCWs that figure prominently in our own art history, or alternatively, if it has at least a history of makings whose causal-intentional structure is sufficiently like that of art's history in our world.

(5) Lastly, Oppy offers a counter-example of his own devising to any intentional-historical account, but it is not one I find particularly trenchant. It concerns a would-be artist who regularly conceives paintings that he quickly, after a few strokes of execution, realizes will be dreadful, but which he forces himself to finish 'out of sheer bloody-mindedness',[13] never for a moment intending them to be regarded artistically, as is confirmed by his destruction of them immediately upon completion.

Oppy first suggests that my view entails, unintuitively, that there is already

art in the early, optimistic phase of such an agent's activity, since the agent 'intends to produce a work which will be regarded in the ways in which works of art have hitherto correctly been regarded',[14] but this is a mistake. The intentions determinative of arthood are ones directed towards *objects*, and moreover, ones that exist fully or that are regarded as finished; the agent's prospective intentions to *make* or *do* such and such, on the other hand, have no such determinative force. Oppy secondly, and more importantly, suggests that my view entails, unintuitively, that the completed canvases of the agent's bloody-minded phase are not cases of art at all. Here I accept the entailment, but deny it is unintuitive. Unless one is appealing to what I have allowed is a secondary, but distinct, notion of art with some purchase in our discourse—one based on the idea of identifiable artistic impulses, urges, or processes[15]—then I claim the canvases in question are at most artistic exercises, byproducts of self-therapy, and not works of art, even very bad ones. If all intent for potential regard of the sort I require in relation to objects is demonstrably absent, as I take it is so in Oppy's example, it seems natural to me to withhold classification of such objects as art rather than as propaedeutic to it.[16]

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[1] 'On Defining Art Historically', *British Journal of Aesthetics* (April 1992), 153–161. The two essays of mine on which Oppy focuses his critique, 'Defining Art Historically' and 'Refining Art Historically', are reprinted with minor alterations in my *Music, Art & Metaphysics* (Ithaca: Cornell U.P., 1990), and my references to them here will be to that volume.

[2] For more on this, and other anticipations of the present reply, see my 'Extending Art Historically', *Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism* (Summer 1993).

[3] I note that I have already conceded some ground on the matter of proprietary right conditions in artmaking. (See 'Extending Art Historically', op. cit.) But I would still insist on the relevance of such conditions at least in the sphere of strictly appropriational artmaking, whose ontology is not always clearly distinguished from that of conceptual art *per se*.

[4] See my discussion of the case of object Z, in 'Defining Art Historically', op. cit., p. 13.

[5] See 'Refining Art Historically', op. cit., pp. 39–40, for the distinction between relational and intrinsical modes of artmaking.

[6] Oppy, op. cit., p. 157.

[7] See 'Defining Art Historically', pp. 15–17.

[8] See Oppy, op. cit., p. 158.

[9] See Oppy, op. cit. p. 158.

[10] Of course it doesn't follow that art, or dinosaurs, themselves are post-Renaissance inventions!

[11] 'Extending Art Historically', op. cit.

[12] Oppy, op. cit., p. 161.

[13] Op. cit., p. 158.

[14] Op. cit., p. 159.

[15] See my discussion in sec. V of 'Refining Art Historically', op. cit.

[16] I would like to acknowledge correspondence with Stephen Davies and James Carney which was helpful in drafting this reply.

BOOK REVIEWS

Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinking Art. By RICHARD SHUSTERMAN. Blackwell. 1992. pp. 324. Paperback, £14.95.

RICHARD SHUSTERMAN is not one to shirk the larger issues, no matter how contentious they may be. Not only does he set out to enlarge our concept of art so as to include the best of popular culture, he attempts to show also how ethics can, to use an ugly word, be aestheticized. For good measure, Shusterman criticizes the analytic philosopher's belief that it is possible to pursue truth in a disinterested fashion (characterizing it as misguided and innately conservative), and recommends instead a radical pragmatist approach. I shall have something to say about these fashionable doctrines in the course of the review.

Unfashionably, Shusterman turns to Dewey and champions his neglected writings on aesthetics. He is particularly struck by Dewey's definition of art in terms of aesthetic experience. In spite of the difficulties besetting this overly broad definition, Shusterman believes that its merits far outweigh its defects. Its greatest merit is to be found in how it integrates the different aesthetic aspects of our culture, which the analytic philosopher is all too eager to separate out and even in some cases disparage. Equipped with such a responsive and fluid definition, Shusterman believes that he can effect a reconciliation between so-called high art and popular culture and thereby strike a blow at élitism.

It should be stressed at this point that for Shusterman a definition of art is not ideologically innocent. It seems to be his view (reading between the lines) that ideology inflects both philosophical and artistic discourses and practices. He certainly thinks that a definition may be treated as a 'persuasive rhetorical tool' (p. 58) with which the philosopher can try to shape, however subtly, the very thing he is engaged in defining.

It is in this spirit that Shusterman offers the reader a Deweyan definition of art: the spirit of pragmatism. I think there are three main objections to this definition and the programme of which it is the centrepiece.

The first was voiced by Pierre Bourdieu who feared that the kind of social practices associated with the 'aesthetic' of art are too well entrenched to be shifted by the dainty tools of philosophical analysis. In other words, even if Dewey's definition is illuminating, it is doubtful whether it would have the desired practical effect. Though Shusterman appreciates the force of this objection, he believes that there is too much to be gained not to make the attempt, and he is confident that American culture would prove far more receptive to his proposals than, say, French culture.

The second objection concerns the definition itself. To put it simply, the objection is that X's being aesthetically rewarding is not a sufficient condition of X's being an instance of art. Dewey's definition is the black hole of philosophy: anything which smacks of the aesthetic is likely to be swallowed up by it and never seen again. Shusterman of course is well aware that philosophers, especially of an analytic persuasion, have frequently criticized the definition for being too accommodating. He remarks that what mattered for Dewey was not the solving of 'abstract philosophical problems' *per se*, but rather 'bringing us closer to achieving more and better concrete goods in experience'. Good intentions, however, do not justify bad definitions. Shusterman makes it clear that he too has reservations about the scope of the definition, and argues for a more piecemeal approach. As we have seen, he wishes to extend the concept of art to cover certain forms of popular culture and the 'ethical art of fashioning one's life' (p. 59). Regardless of whether we happen to agree with these aims, the definition itself remains deeply suspect, for the

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question where to draw the line takes on too arbitrary an aspect.

This brings me to the third objection, which is to do with how we think of philosophy. For the pragmatist, the second objection is not a very serious one since definitions are to be judged in terms of their efficacy, rather than by the criteria favoured by analytic philosophers. In this sense, the question where to draw the line is not arbitrary or at least not intolerably so for the pragmatist. There is a second factor which has to be taken into consideration as well, namely the way in which a definition has to be adequately justified if it is to be accepted and adopted by the appropriate linguistic community. Again this makes the exercise far less arbitrary than the analytic philosopher might suppose.

The doubts I have about this pragmatist approach can be summoned up by Bourdieu's remark that 'every philosophia worth its salt is perennis'. It is in this sense that we might think of philosophy as the *attempt* to pursue truth in a disinterested fashion. This attempt may take different forms; the analytic philosopher, I think, looks first to the existing conceptual scheme and asks whether a proposed definition is consistent with it—at the very least the conceptual scheme is acknowledged as a constraint. Here we have a fundamental difference between the pragmatic and analytic traditions.

What is interesting about Shusterman is that he has an insider's familiarity with both traditions. This can be seen in how having justified his overall approach in pragmatist terms, Shusterman uses skills acquired as an analytic philosopher to argue the case for treating selected forms of popular culture as art. He does not deny that what popular culture gives us is very often inferior; his point is that it is not intrinsically so and that the best ought to be recognized as art. He makes a powerful case for treating 'funky rock' and rap (hip hop) as valid artistic forms, and includes a case study of a rap entitled *Talkin' All that Jazz* in order to illustrate his more general philosophical points.

The chapters in which Shusterman sets out to vindicate and celebrate 'popular art' are the best ones in the book, and contain many sharp insights. There are many other good things as well, though the final chapter in which he tries to show how ethics (as opposed to morality narrowly conceived) can be aestheticized is comparatively disappointing. Shusterman seems to get the balance wrong, and devotes too much space to criticizing Rorty's writings on the self (though with great acuity), and does not say enough himself on this obscure topic. I would have expected Shusterman, given his constructive approach to philosophy, to have been more positive here. As it is, the concluding chapter is an anti-climax.

The only other disappointing feature of the book worth mentioning is a stylistic one. Although Shusterman can write well when he chooses, his prose is larded with such phrases as, for example, 'socio-political', 'socio-cultural', and the like. These very quickly pall, as does the author's modish use of 'she' instead of the standard 'he'. Occasionally, Shusterman writes rather carelessly, referring, for example, to the ideologies of romanticism and art for art's sake in the plural (when surely there are not two separate systems of thought), while he speaks of the ideology of modernism in the singular (when arguably there are different modernisms which may or may not share an ideology).

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Art and Engagement. By ARNOLD BERLEANT. Temple U.P., Philadelphia. 1991. pp. 259. $44.95.

THE INFLUENCE of the aesthetic of disinterestedness has been persuasive and pervasive, according to Berleant, and in this book he presents a good case for not believing what our forbears told us aesthetics was all about: 'Disinterested contemplation has become an academic anachronism' (p. 33). Like many of the best courses in the subject, this book does not set out to teach us how to appreciate art works, but anyone who reads it will probably turn round afterwards and realize that they have been surreptitiously given the means to do so. In this respect, Berleant's latest book can be compared with Monroe Beardsley's *Aesthetics*, which also presented a coherent theory against a background of differing artforms. Thus, as in Beardsley, we find ourselves constantly up

against the author's main thesis, which—even if we don't entirely agree with it—engages us, and draws us into a debate with the text as we read.

Engagement, as the title suggests, is the key to this book. Texts do not stand alone, so just as a work of philosophy requires us to engage with its argument, and encourages us to assess what we read in the light of other theories, often producing an individual response, so too do novels and poetry. Literature, says Berleant, 'does not *tell* us [this] truth, it *confronts* us with it' (p. 128). The confrontation is a kind of challenge, and is a means through which the author seeks our involvement in, or engagement with, the text.

Music confronts us with ordered sounds, but our conception of any order is governed by memory. Without it, there could be no repetition, recapitulation, or even development. A consciousness of an auditory past which projects forward through the present into the future is required, and the exercise of this faculty is continually involving us in the sounds we hear. This is an active process—or rather it constitutes a *re*action to that to which we listen, but according to Berleant, this requires no 'mediation of knowledge or recognition' (p. 150). I would not necessarily agree with this, but his observations on the rôle of memory are attractive.

While music is the 'art of engagement *primus inter pares*' (p. 149), architecture has been the opposite—at least where drawings, aerial views and projections have been employed. These distance a 'viewer', making us spectators, rather than inhabitants. We find ourselves encouraged to look at our own environment 'from outside', as if that were possible. But we and our buildings inhabit an 'aesthetic environment', which helps to determine the scope of our perception, which affects our culture in turn. Hence architecture can be seen as the means by which we design our environment (or 'perform' it), and through it we define the space in which we live—which then becomes part of us. Our engagement with our environment depends upon perceptual recall, in that the conscious present is partly affected by past perception and expectation. In this respect the similarity between architecture and music becomes apparent, although Berleant does not explicitly draw it out.

If architectural plans exemplify the disinterested approach to art objects, then we might expect the same of painting. The two-hundred-year-old aesthetic of disinterestedness certainly fits painting, but this may be because 'traditional experience, traditional theory, and traditional practice combined to produce a pictoral object designed for contemplative appreciation' (p. 63). There are pictures which Berleant calls 'panoramic landscapes', and others which he labels 'participatory'. Canaletto's landscapes are documentations and, he observes, are painted from a position above eye level which removes the viewer from the scene. When we approach the canvas, it seems to flatten out. Following Sartre, and taking Guardi as an example, Berleant argues that there are also paintings which draw us into a situation 'as it has been experienced by everyone and seen by no-one' (p. 66). We look at panoramic landscapes disinterestedly, but there are paintings which require 'an aesthetic of engagement in which the experience of the body as it moves in space and time creates a functional order of perception that fuses participant and environment' (p. 73). When we interact with such paintings we are responding to art's invitation to enlarge our experience of the work.

Berleant also discusses dance, which he describes as the 'exemplary art of performance' (p. 172). Dance can actually invoke a physical, involuntary reflex, and there is a sense in which a perceiver participates empathetically in the dancer's movements. We enact the dance perceptually, 'making it a part of our own vital body' (p. 170). If there is a sense in which this is true, then it is hard to see how dance can be anything other than an art of engagement.

Where cinematic art is involved, we are apparently encouraged to abandon our daily existence and enter completely into the world of the film. Since film involves movement, a 'multi-sensory, kinesthetic engagement' (p. 181) occurs, to which our absorption into the world of the film is due. The sometimes worrying connection with fantasy must be mentioned, but film's ability to draw us into its perceptual universe makes it totally involving.

Berleant devotes most of his book to these

discussions of particular art forms. To precede them he discusses the rôle of perception, claiming that art is not so much a property of objects as the result of interactive perception. Disinterestedness is no longer an appropriate attitude—we must contribute to art in order to make it coherent. The advent of recent technology and the emancipation of art from devotional or historical purposes have removed art from its isolation—normal human activity has absorbed art, and art has absorbed human activity: 'Life and art have become inseparable' (p. 42).

The book concludes with a chapter entitled 'Art and the end of Aesthetics', in which the author argues that if art really does bring us close to the reality of our lives, then 'philosophy of art is the *heart* of philosophy'. Consequently Berleant wishes to replace the aesthetic tradition of the last two hundred years. This is a major challenge of course, but it is thrown out at the end of an attempt to construct a framework for such work. It is Berleant's claim that he has cleared the ground for such a revision (mostly by contradicting traditional conceptions of disinterestedness). There are, no doubt, areas where patches of the past will remain, but in writing this book he has not only cleared a substantial patch of land, he has left it very fertile indeed.

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Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim. Edited by JIM HOPKINS and ANTHONY SAVILE. Blackwell. 1992. pp. 383. £40.00.

DAN DENNETT'S scurrilous *Philosopher's Lexicon*, in which the names of philosophers provide nouns, verbs, etc., defines a *wollheim* as 'n. A leisurely investigation, well-intentioned to return home to the point, but always wandering off again'. The contributors to this Festschrift would certainly not concur. In their different ways, they show Richard Wollheim as the focused, systematic thinker many of us know him to be. The book contains twenty essays, organized into four sections, together with a select bibliography of Wollheim's publications. All the essays are either on Wollheim's work directly, or extend areas to which he contributed. But this last is easily achieved, since Wollheim wrote on almost every aspect of philosophy. The authors are friends, former colleagues and, in at least one case, former students of Wollheim's; and many of the contributions include memoirs of working with Wollheim, recalling (in a way familiar to all who have worked with him) his sensitivity, generosity of spirit, and supportiveness.

The essays in Part I (Psychoanalysis, Values and Politics), Part II, (Bradley and Green), and Part IV (Memory and Motive) are not of direct concern to readers of this journal, although they contain much that is valuable by important and influential thinkers (Wiggins, Pears, A. O. Rorty, Burnyeat, Cohen, Hopkins and others); and illustrate connections within Wollheim's thought which are by no means irrelevant for the aesthetician. Indeed, one virtue of Wollheim's work has been its unity: theses about Freud inform remarks about art as well as the mind—to recall the title of one collection of Wollheim's work. And it was unusual for aestheticians explicitly to pay as much attention to other areas of philosophy as Wollheim has done. So we glimpse the political philosopher and theorist of persons as well as the friend of the psychoanalytic and the aesthetician. Indeed, many readers may be surprised by the sheer variety of Wollheim's philosophical output. And his interests have not always followed the main stream: as W. D. Hart notes: 'First-rate analytic philosophers expert in Bradley and Freud . . . are not thick on the ground' (p. 235). Yet, as the essays make plain, he has graced every area of philosophy to which he has contributed.

Part III (Art and Vision) contains five essays, clustering around themes recently aired in Wollheim's *Painting as an Art* (recently reviewed in this journal), although, revealingly, most had some earlier life in other works. Each essay raises important issues clarifying Wollheim's positions as well as criticizing them. I shall concentrate on exposition of these papers.

Alexander Nehamas ('Painting as an art . . .') argues that, while Wollheim 'has helped us so much in our efforts to understand persons and roles, as well as artists' (p. 256), the role

of both artist and spectator 'is more viable and more subject to revision than *Painting as an Art* allows' (p. 255–6). The argument here invites us to consider Duchamp's last work, 'Given: 1 The Waterfall, 2. The Illuminating Gas' (p. 251), a work which represents 'a commentary on the art of the past, out of which, in a number of that word's senses, he himself came' (p. 253). This complex work surely does not offer its spectators the kinds of 'visual delight' (Wollheim, quoted p. 253) characteristic of some great art of the past. Instead, we are forcibly confronted with 'a new interpretation of the relation between the spectator and the painting' (p. 254), one which allows that art's beholders may resemble both voyeurs in a peep-show world, and active interpreters, construing painters and their works in ways that may not have been open to the painters themselves (see p. 255).

To consider the plausibility of such a broad 'historicism', especially given Wollheim's other philosophical commitments, we may turn to another of the pieces here. For Anthony Savile ('Painting, Beholder and the Self') argues too that Wollheim's account of the experience of painter and spectator—although rich—requires augmentation, in particular in its placing of the internal spectator. Savile's argument, which may usefully be seen as an extension of his discussion with Wollheim in *Proceedings of Aristotelian Society* 1986, grows from a discussion of 'Michael Fried's widely acclaimed reading of Diderot's thought about painting' (p. 292) to which—as Savile acknowledges (p. 314)—Wollheim refers in the footnotes to *Painting as an Art*. Diderot-style cases are those where 'the imagined artist [purports] . . . to make the correct understanding of his work one that involves description of its contents in terms of the beholder's own adjacent world' (p. 301). As Savile reports it, Wollheim's objection to that position is that it 'will open up the possibility of a painting having a different content in different circumstances, and having a different content without there being any change of marks on the surface of the canvas' (p. 303). Like Wollheim, Savile concludes that such a possibility must be ruled out, although he may not agree 'that it is incoherent in and of itself' (p. 303). Wollheim's rejection is rooted in general objections to such 'historicism'. Yet, according to Savile, the (supposed) possibility can be met in a more small-scale fashion: we do not see 'the beholder's own adjacent world' as, for example, London in 1992. Rather, a particular work is 'a picture of the painter seated ten feet or so in front of the spectator (wherever that may be)' (p. 303). Savile thinks of this as a 'qualificational interpretation' (p. 303) of the reference to the beholder's time and place. The central thought, then, is that 'the painter has . . . to intend of any spectator . . . that he . . . refer the beholder he understands as entering into the content of the work to himself' (p. 312).

This is intended as an elucidation of the nature of the painting, aimed at clarifying what (some) artists are doing. A related topic, of major interest to Wollheim and also connecting artists' concerns to those of spectator, is pictorial representation. Thus Malcolm Budd ('On Looking at a Picture') and Kendall Walton ('Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally') explore, in very different ways, Wollheim's conception of pictorial representation in terms of the notion of *seeing-in*. As might be expected, Walton begins from his own analysis of pictorial representation, where depictions are 'things whose function in a given social setting is to serve as props in sufficiently rich and varied perceptual games of make-believe' (p. 284). He urges that on Wollheim's view, by contrast, the 'perception of what is represented' (quoted p. 286) does not involve imagination: instead, it is explained in terms of a visual capacity'—'seeing-in'. It is revealing to see Walton paying attention to this notion since, in his *Mimesis as Make-Believe* (Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 300, p. 302, p. 311), he made light of the differences (as urged by Wollheim) between seeing-in and seeing-as. However, Walton claims that Wollheim's account cannot possibly be complete since, at best, it allows us to point out the phenomenon of *seeing-in*, but without explaining it: 'We have no right to assume that *seeing-in* does not involve imagining; that in order to explain it, rather than merely point it out . . . one would not bring in imagining' (p. 286). When we turn to the explanation of seeing-in, Walton urges, what is required is—guess what!—the make-believe theory: 'Paint-

ing is a visual art, and depiction is a visual medium. The make-believe theory explains how this is so' (p. 289). Whether such a conclusion is accepted will depend on whether or not one accepts that Wollheim's own account of seeing-in requires supplementation in some such fashion: might he not reply that Walton is here asking for an unnecessary layer of explanation?

Budd's paper may be seen as addressing that point. In it he urges 'a reasoned rejection of one of [Wollheim's] . . . key ideas' (p. 278), namely the founding of the account of pictorial representation on the notion of seeing-in. This notion is 'an elusive amalgam of two will-o'-the-wisps' (p. 272). Budd considers both Wollheim's initial account of seeing-in (in the Supplementary Essay to *Art and Its Objects* and the revised version in *Painting as an Art*). The first characterized seeing-in as involving two experiences; the second as an experience with two aspects (a recognitional and a configurational, p. 270). But, Budd argues, in neither case can Wollheim explain how one sees what is 'not present to the eyes' (p. 269)—at least, he cannot do so given his long-standing opposition to illusionistic accounts (p. 269). And this seems a requirement of the 'two-foldness' of seeing-in which requires us to talk of seeing the woman (in the picture) as well as seeing the painted surface. In effect, Budd has concluded that Wollheim's account might survive if elaborated in a way similar to that Walton suggests; but that it would then cease to be Wollheim's account.

One of Wollheim's most important, yet elusive, contributions to aesthetics is his inaugural lecture, 'On Drawing an Object'. Antonia Phillips ('Drawing From Life') extends the methodology of that paper as well as exploring some of its themes. She considers the life-drawing class, with a view to discovering whether it has 'just the potential we need for showing what the artist saw and how it looked to him' (p. 315). The result is a 'definition' of the activity of drawing from life which allows that the 'concept of a drawing from life now becomes definable in terms of the activity which produces it' (p. 328). Comments then supplement the definition, to point out its specificities. As Phillips comments, '[n]otions of likeness and intention, even when reinforced by reference to causal connections, cannot by themselves provide for a fine-grained enough account of what it is for pictures to be of objects' (p. 334). What is needed, she urges (following Wollheim), is 'to take into account the variety of processes by which pictures can be produced' (p. 334), for here we may learn not only 'what the draughtsman saw' but also its relation to the artistic.

My remarks do not, of course, do justice to the complexity of the arguments mentioned here nor to the richness of the examples employed. And most papers contain themes not even mentioned here. Moreover, a much longer review would be required for adequate critical comment on each paper. None the less, this is clearly a significant volume, raising important questions for aesthetics, not least because its recipient, Richard Wollheim, has done so with consistent originality. In that sense, it is a fitting homage. It illustrates Wollheim's sensitivity to the complexity and diversity within philosophical problems and, taken as a whole, the unity and sustained character of his responses.

The book is attractively presented, with few typographical errors (and a dust jacket with Wollheim's photograph). Although not inexpensive, its price is typical of today's hardbacks in philosophy, and most of them will prove less rewarding! Further, it will be difficult to begrudge the money when the royalties go 'to an educational or charitable cause' (Preface). Cavils as to the selection of topics or contributors would only be 'sour grapes' by one who would have been proud to contribute to such a handsome tribute to an important philosopher.

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Anthropology, Art, and Aesthetics. Edited by JEREMY COOTE and ANTHONY SHELTON. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1992. pp. 281. £45.00.

THE FACT that one's taste in art is relative to the society in which one lives has had consequences for aesthetics, both in discouraging a strong realism concerning taste, and in inspiring questions pertinent to the artist, gallery-goer and philosopher. Should we try to see a

primitive mask through its maker's eyes, or through our own? Does the fact that the mask has a non-aesthetic function in the society which produced it entail that it is not art? Is there a natural human need to produce works of art? Anyone interested in these questions would do well to read this book, as the blend of philosophical discussion and anthropological case study serves both to enlighten and to discourage rash a priori theorizing.

The book has ten essays which are grouped into four sections. The first section, an introduction to the anthropology of art, has Raymond Firth tracing the history of the subject and Alfred Gell trying to throw some spanners into its works. In the second there are three essays which discuss the function art objects have in their home communities. The third discusses how traditional art mixes with the modern demand for works to sell for profit. The final section is the most explicitly philosophical, looking at an anthropology of aesthetics rather than an anthropology of art.

It is demanding to expect the conceptual arguments of a book such as this always to satisfy a philosopher. However, there are a few places where such argument obscures rather than illuminates the point; something which I hope will emerge in the following brief discussions of the most philosophical essays in the collection.

It makes sense, if one is trying to give an account of how art objects work in their country of origin, not to investigate them for the sake of the enjoyment of an aesthetic experience they afford the observer. This point is well made by Alfred Gell (although there is no evidence of anyone holding a contrary view in the other essays in the book). The alternative, Gell argues, is to treat art as a component of technology. He gives a case study of a 'work of art' (a canoe prow) which is used to dazzle trading partners, so as they make a deal which is advantageous to the owner of the canoe. He generalizes these thoughts to the claim that the value of all art works lies in our being impressed by the technical powers of the creator. I found Gell's argument deficient in a number of respects. I agree that an anthropologist might need a 'non-aesthetic' attitude to observed works of art, and will accept Gell's diagnosis that there are cultures where people are impressed by the technical difficulties involved in producing such works. But these are two quite specific cases which provide no grounds for the generalization. I can see no reason for believing, and plenty of reasons for not believing, the claim that the value of art for us (or many other cultures) stems largely from our admiration of the fact that the difficulties involved in producing it have been overcome.

Howard Morphy and Anthony Shelton (both in section four) discuss whether the cultures they study have a practice similar to ours of aesthetic appreciation. Morphy's case study is of the Yolngu people in Australia. His conclusion is that the selection of ritual components for a ceremony is centrally concerned with matters of content as well as form. But, as he argues, this need not exclude aesthetic considerations. Firstly, the shimmering effect of Yolngu art (*bir'yun*) is something which enables a European observer to appreciate Yolngu art aesthetically, in a way which overlaps with how the Yolngu appreciate it themselves. Secondly, just because something is done as a ritual, does not mean that there is not an aesthetic component—'the successful aesthetic act is also successful theatre' (p. 204). Such a conclusion is independent of whether the Yolngu themselves conceive of what they are doing in aesthetic terms.

Shelton comes to the more sceptical conclusion that the people about whom he writes, the Huichol in Mexico, have no concept akin to ours of aesthetics. 'Huichol aesthetics has no existence independent of the religious and ritual contexts for which traditional objects were and are made, and which both provide the rules for their manufacture and use and supply the criteria for their evaluation' (p. 235). But how, if there is no concept of art or aesthetics, did Shelton know which traditional objects to study? Surely any would do? Shelton answers this point by agreeing with Leach that 'the context and emotional value which an object evokes can partly be used to define something as art'. This would give us something to study without entailing that the Huichol themselves see these objects in anything but religious and ritualistic terms. I hesit-

antly venture the opinion that this conclusion remains too strong. Looking at the excellent plates of the objects in question, it is difficult to believe that they were not produced with the intention of inducing aesthetic experiences in the observer. Even if the Huichol conceptualization of this is completely different, that would be recognizably similar to our practices for our concept of 'the aesthetic' to get a grip.

Shelton's essay contrasts with the other essay in section four, that of his co-editor, Jeremy Coote. Shelton's general approach is reminiscent of a rather uncritical Wittgensteinianism, while Coote's is clear, dry and sceptical of usual anthropological argumentative practice. He shows, using the cattle-keeping Nilotes of Sudan, that it is possible to have a highly developed aesthetic independently of having works of art. Coote's argument is compelling and his paper sets a high standard which is, in general, characteristic of the book. Anyone interested in the anthropology of aesthetics ought to read it, and anyone interested in aesthetics will find it interesting if they do.

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Beauty and Revelation in the Thought of Saint Augustine. By CAROL HARRISON. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1992. pp. 289. £35.00.

CAROL HARRISON has done us a great service by drawing together the aesthetic strands of Augustine's thought in a stimulating examination of original sources. It is, therefore, primarily a theological work before an aesthetic one and is concerned with Augustine's 'theological analysis of the beautiful in the context of Christian doctrine' (p. 273). To some, this might appear as a reversal of a more familiar methodology but Harrison argues that Augustine's aesthetic considerations cannot be understood apart from his theology; indeed, to attempt to do so would be to undermine the whole enterprise. The work is therefore a marked departure from an earlier study by K. Svoboda (1933) which is criticized by Harrison precisely for its separation of aesthetics from theology.

The entire work, which grew out of Harrison's doctoral thesis, seeks to place aesthetics firmly within Augustine's ministry as a bishop and pastor. This is stressed again and again for it is her belief that the classic misunderstandings of Augustine's aesthetic stands have arisen from either a consideration of only his early work or of a reading of his output as essentially Neo-Platonic rather than Christian. There is certainly no shortage of evidence for those who would wish to prove such a point and Harrison makes no attempt to conceal Augustine's tendency to dwell on beauty as being essentially concerned with form and proportion. This preoccupation with the rational at the expense of the emotional and affective runs through all of Augustine's work, although in Chapter 6 Harrison considers the connection between beauty and love. Augustine's dictum that 'to enjoy something is to cling to it with love for its own sake' (p. 248) highlights the need for beauty to evoke a response. But it is also quite clear that one cannot love what is unknowable and it is here that the book's central thesis becomes apparent.

Humankind can know and respond to beauty only if it is revealed and at the heart of this revelation is the belief in the Incarnation of Christ. Harrison frequently refers to the work of R. J. O'Connell (1978) which she treats with some sympathy in that 'he is searching for an incarnate aesthetic that is more positive as regards the created realm, man's body, symbolism and art in all its forms' (p. 33). O'Connell's work is cited as being fundamentally flawed, however, by an insistent belief in the pre-existence of the soul. To perceive beauty is therefore essentially to know God, not just as 'the Mind that has baulked the profoundest of mortals' (to borrow Kavanagh's poetic phrase) but as a similar way of knowing to Truth and Goodness. Theologically, this has sometimes proved difficult since theologians are happier with terms which concern the Rational and Moral. For Augustine, Beauty is what will save the world since Beauty is a whole way of knowing God. Essentially it is that God, who is Beauty, will save the world by drawing to Himself men who are attracted to Beauty.

There is rather less in the book about exactly what it means to say that God is Beauty/beautiful although Harrison points to a continuum between the beauty of the living

object and the beauty of its source, an idea which she traces back to Plotinus and in this way she is truly able to identify an aesthetic which is incarnate by the identification of beauty and existence orientated towards God—the origin of the immanent within the transcendent Divine Beauty (p. 39). Furthermore, within this continuum, she points to Augustine's reaction to the Manichean belief in the supremacy of reason by constantly stressing the need for authority and revelation.

Words and language are the central paradigm in the book and Harrison stresses the way in which the unity that exists between a word and its meaning in some sense reflects the Incarnation of the Word of God. In terms of human language it is clear that Augustine sees words as a punishment because they can never fully reflect the fullness of the reality they express. And yet this concern with expression is not something which appears in Augustine's thought to any great extent. Indeed, human ability to express what is beautiful is almost entirely conceived in formalistic terms. Lip-service is paid to the need to 'please the ear in order to move the mind and heart' (p. 70) and Augustine's background must have left him with an affective appreciation of the power of words. Harrison is not able to produce any reference to the power of poetry to express feeling; poetry is valued by Augustine for its metre, form and rational progression. Similarly, music is valued by him as an aural representation of numberit must be seen in the context of Augustine's elevation of geometry to the 'highest aspiration of the soul' in *De Ordine*.

But the paradigm of words and language is vital to Harrison's account of the centrality of the Incarnation. The use of words in Scripture is an incarnation of God's beauty and Harrison's thesis is that to understand what Augustine means by Beauty is to embody a theology of revelation. The Word must be made flesh in order to inspire human devotion. Augustine is clear that we are drawn to what is beautiful (and in that sense Beauty has an obvious moral content) and this seems to emphasize the belief that Beauty will save the world. The beauty of the Incarnate Christ will draw men to Him. It is not clear to what extent this beauty is formal, physical, mystical or simply essentially divine and it is here that we are lacking the earlier discussion of what it means to say that God is beautiful.

Harrison devotes a chapter to Creation and one is instantly aware of Augustine's fear of Christians worshipping the creation rather than the Creator. In this he is echoing St Paul's concerns in Romans 1. It is easy therefore to see how the sacramental idea of worshipping through the creation can easily lapse into idolatry. Creation is not, on this basis, an act of expression, indeed Harrison does not dwell on the artistic qualities of the creation. Pre-eminently, she argues it is 'the triad of measure, number and weight which provides a trinitarian structure in which to regard Augustine's thought on the revelation of creation and its beauty' (p. 109). The creation is pronounced 'very good' not out of satisfaction with the act of creating (although paradoxically it is the self-expression of the Word of God) but because it is a proportional, unified whole. But it surely contains expression because it is a revelation of God's truth and an incarnate aesthetic involves seeing the hand of God in it.

Carol Harrison's book is concerned with both Beauty *and* Revelation in Augustine's thought and to that end it is perhaps unfair to criticize it for not exploring more thoroughly the nature of beauty in more abstract terms. It is true to say, however, that the aesthetic of Augustine's writing, on this account although clearly one of Incarnation recognizes only as beautiful those elements of the moral and rational which reflect the perfect proportion of God and His creation. Her account of this is exemplary and accessible and will provide a benchmark for scholars seeking to trace the role of aesthetics in the Patristic era, though the comparison with other ideas of beauty in this period would provide interesting research.

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The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment. By JOHN H. ZAMMITO. University of Chicago Press. 1992. pp. 479. £15.25; clothbound, £51.95.

THOUGH NEARLY twenty years have passed since the first appearance of book-length studies in English on Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, the fifteen or twenty volumes published in the last two decades may be divided—and one need not even qualify the division as rough—into two sorts. On the one side are books in the vein of Donald Crawford's *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*, or Paul Guyer's *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, or Eva Schaper's *Studies in Kant's Aesthetics*, all of which pursue an epistemological or cognitive description of the project of the Third Critique. The other side receives its most lucid and compelling expression in Salim Kemal's *Kant and Fine Art*, and also includes Rudolf Makkreel's *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, and Paul Crowther's *Kantian Sublime*; on this side of the divide Kant's aesthetics is elaborated as a primarily cultural and indeed moral project. In short, the expanding bulk of recent work on the *Critique of Judgement* has persisted in portraying that book either as some sort of culmination of the epistemological programme of the *Critique of Pure Reason* or as the final fruition of the ethical programme of the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

The most remarkable feature of John Zammito's *Genesis of Kant's 'Critique of Judgment'* is its attempt to argue both sides of the divide. And though Zammito does not ultimately succeed in this attempt—or perhaps one might say he succeeds all too well—his book none the less is to be recommended as a watershed in the recent history of the reception of the Third Critique.

Zammito divides his book into three parts—corresponding to what he argues are three decisive 'turns' in the development of the *Critique of Judgement*: the first part, entitled *The Genesis of the 'Critique of Judgment'*, explains how Kant was brought back (i.e., the first 'turn' is a return) in September 1787, by 'both a contextual and an immanent' cause, to the questions of taste and aesthetics. The immanent cause of Kant's return (he had already published in 1764 his *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*) was a change of heart from his First-Critique belief in the impossibility of a transcendental ground of taste. In a letter to K. L. Reinhold in late 1787 Kant waxes enthusiastic about his 'discovery' of a priori principles for all three faculties of mind: cognition (First Critique), desire (Second Critique), and 'the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure'. It is this third discovery, Kant relates, that fuels the writing of his 'Critique of Taste', in the late summer of 1787. The contextual cause of Kant's return to aesthetics was his increasingly public quarrel against Herder and the influence of the nascent *Sturm und Drang* sentiment. And though Zammito on occasion reduces the forces at play in the 1780s to a rather simple battle between a Kantian Enlightenment and a Herder-driven Romanticism, this diminishes very little his erudite and intriguingly written intellectual history of that rich and complicated decade. Throughout his treatment of the whole corpus of Kant's texts and letters, and within his detailed discussions of Herder, Lessing, Hamann, and the resurgence of Spinozism in the so-called 'Pantheism Controversy', Zammito consistently displays the acuity and breadth of a very fine intellectual historian.

Part two, *The Genesis of the 'Critique of Teleological Judgment'*, consists of an explication of the second of the three 'turns' Zammito claims were decisive in the composition of the Third Critique. The second of these is the 'cognitive turn', and what Zammito means by this is, as he well explains, Kant's elaboration of the faculty of judgement as not only determinant, but more importantly—and crucial for the exposition of the Third Critique—reflective. The idea of a reflective judgement posits the independence of the faculty of judgement from determination by concepts of the understanding. That is, the idea of a reflective rather than merely determinant judgement thereby entails the possibility of the faculty of judgement being potentially self-producing; judgement is thus elevated from simply playing the role of a regulative function within rational beings to a central, constitutive faculty of human existence in general. The entire middle section of Zammito's book is to be recommended both for its extensive discussion of the often neglected second half of the Third Critique, as well

as for its treatment of teleology against the backdrop of Kant's critique of contemporary science and its attendant concept of hylozoism. This central section concludes with a discussion of Kant's position in the Pantheism Controversy, which prepares the ground for the third and final section—and third and final 'turn' of the book. As Zammito himself puts it in the introduction: 'My most important claim is that there was yet a third turn, occurring in late summer or early fall 1789, which I designate the *ethical* turn. That ethical turn resulted directly from Kant's struggle with pantheism, and introduced a much more metaphysical tone into the whole work, emphasizing the idea of the supersensible as the ground of both subjective freedom and natural order' (p. 7).

With this final turn the last third of Zammito's book, entitled *The Final Form of the Critique of Judgement*, becomes a platform for a series of speculations on the ultimate place and meaning of the Third Critique in Kant's *oeuvre*. It is here that Zammito makes his boldest and most provocative claims about the importance and centrality of the Third Critique within the Kantian architectonic, but it is also here that his interpretation of some of the key notions of Kant's aesthetics is faultiest. One might well be inclined to cheer Zammito's arrival at the recognition of the importance of the Third Critique without, however, thereby wishing to follow the path of an occasional heavy-footed argument or stumbling interpretation which delivers him to that summit. In short, I want to suggest that Zammito's conclusion is laudable and correct, though both his method of attaining it and what he attempts to append to it are questionable.

The clue to the use Zammito would like to put Kant's *Critique of Judgement* is perhaps best contained in the assertion, 'Aesthetics was the key to anthropology' (p. 292). On the face of it, this assertion is not at all suspect until one investigates just what sort of anthropology is to be served by Kant's aesthetics. And the anthropology envisaged by Zammito is one wholly constrained by the images of an at once rational, and moral, human being, culled respectively from the First and Second Critiques. Although Zammito introduces the concept of anthropology in the concluding section of his study in order to present the Third Critique as the means for constructing a unified theory of human being, unfortunately this unification occurs at the cost of excluding any and all mention of anything remotely aesthetic, which is after all the ostensible content of Kant's book. In short, the price for explicating aesthetic judgement in terms of *both* reason and morality is the wholesale reduction of taste and the absence of its most immediate and obvious component.

The most poignant loss is that of pleasure. This loss is all the more perplexing if we recall Kant's claim, in his letter to Reinhold, that it was the discovery of 'the faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure' that motivated his return to the problems of aesthetic judgement. But in Zammito's study we find only a handful of scattered remarks on pleasure, such as the following: 'If, as I infer, the object of transcendental explanation is to transpose into a cognitive key all (or as much as possible) of human experience, then to find any rendering of pleasure—for Kant the most recalcitrantly irrational component of that experience—in a transcendental form must have been an extremely heady accomplishment, and one that would indeed confirm Kant in his view of the aptness of his system' (p. 63). In so far as pleasure is here described as something that requires 'transposition' into a form of cognition in order for its transcendental aspect to be revealed, pleasure thereby still exists as something independent of its rational reformulation. When, however, some fifty pages later Zammito writes that 'What the transcendental philosopher thus discursively establishes, the subject experiences as pleasure . . .' (p. 118), we have lost any distinction between reason and pleasure. One might quite reasonably object here that the foundational premiss of the *Critique of Judgement* is that aesthetic pleasure is neither synonymous nor interchangeable with reason.

In sum, *The Genesis of Kant's 'Critique of Judgment'*, is to be recommended both for its engaging intellectual history of the context in which Kant formulated the problems of the Third Critique, and perhaps more importantly, as the summation and symptomatic expression of the insistent portrayal of Kant's aesthetics in

the terms of *both* the First and Second Critiques.

THOMAS HUHN

Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of Illusion. *By* LAMBERT ZUIDERVAART. MIT Press. 1991. pp. 388. £33.75.

ADORNO'S WORKS on aesthetic are among the most profound contributions yet made to the discipline. Their influence in the English-speaking world, however, has not been of a magnitude to match this profundity. The reasons for this are complex. Adorno's work reaches beyond the Marxism which is its professed orientation, but it does so through a searching utilization of concepts from Hegel—notably those found in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This results in a formidable array of seemingly impenetrable terminology.

An even more testing obstacle (to those versed in the analytic tradition) is Adorno's fundamental philosophical position itself. This centres on the notion of the non-identical, which—putting it in the crudest terms—holds that there is always an element of incongruence between thought and its objects. The concrete particular exceeds the conceptual framework in terms of which we seek to assign it an identity. This means that any neat system of concepts will distort the particular objects which it is seeking to explain. In the case of art, of course, this is disastrous, given that we are here dealing with artefacts which are especially rich in terms of both semantic content and sensuous particularity. It is considerations of this sort which lead Adorno to adopt a 'paratactical' strategy. This involves an elliptical approach to exposition and analysis, based on, as it were, dialectically significant conjunctions of concepts in relation to specific aspects of art and aesthetic discourse. Special care is also taken to consider both art work and discourse in relation to the social context of their production.

Now in stressing this dimension of Adorno's approach, I am not only seeking to show why his work has not been more accessible to the English-speaking world, I am also showing the particular demands which are placed on those who wish to expound and analyse his work. Indeed, if one is sympathetic to Adorno, this amounts almost to paradox. For a systematic exposition of his work will be at odds to some degree with Adorno's own most cherished insight. Yet if one is not systematic in exposition and analysis, one runs the risk of simply mimicking the master and remaining at a level of obscurity.

Lambert Zuidervaart has faced this problem with both insight and ingenuity. Rather than offer a blow-by-blow unpacking and analysis, he first situates Adorno's aesthetics within the broader context of debates within Marxist philosophy, and in relation to concepts employed in Adorno's own more general philosophy. The result is an extended overview which orientates the reader to those strategies and subtleties which characterize the body of Adorno's work on aesthetics. Part II of Zuidervaart's book provides a detailed commentary on this body of work, and is especially illuminating in its treatment of autonomy—a key theme both in itself, and in defining the major differences between Adorno's approach to aesthetics and those of other Marxist thinkers.

Part III represents Zuidervaart's most substantial achievement. For here he tellingly deploys Adorno's work in the context of major contemporary debates, notably those initiated by Peter Bürger, Fredric Jameson and Albrecht Wellmer. The result is a critical exchange of the most illuminating kind, wherein the strengths and weaknesses of both Adorno's position and those of the writers whom Zuidervaart addresses are fully manifest. Zuidervaart declares that: 'The book's extended argument is that Adorno's idea of artistic truth content is vitiated by his assumptions of autonomism, cognitivism, and modernism. Yet critics of Adorno who ignore or reject his idea of artistic truth content risk losing insights that are important for philosophical aesthetics' (p. xxiv). Zuidervaart's argument in these respects is viable and well made, if not decisive. This last qualification is important. For while Zuidervaart's mode of exposition is one which does justice to Adorno's 'paratactic' strategies, and which brings out his contemporary relevance, it remains in some respects worryingly narrow. The most obvious aspect of this is that if—as Zuidervaart suggests—Adorno's emphasis on truth is of key significance, then it would surely

have been profitable to relate this idea to the widespread scepticism about truth which characterizes much post-structuralist thought. Again, while Zuidervaart expounds Adorno with commendable lucidity, it would have been useful to have had some of his most striking and distinctive concepts explained in a way which was more accessible to analytic philosophers. A particularly telling example here is that group of concepts which pertain to the 'apparitional' or 'imageless image' aspect of the art work. Zuidervaart gives the reader a basic orientation towards these extraordinarily striking concepts, but they could have been developed so much more. Indeed given the sometimes turgid quality of analytic philosophy's recurrent debate about pictorial representation and its ramifications, Adorno's group of concepts has a deeply illuminating potential.

My main grumble, then, is that in the final analysis, Zuidervaart's treatment of Adorno is one which locates him a little too closely within the family of debates inaugurated by, or surrounding, the Marxist tradition. This grumble aside, however, it can be said that Zuidervaart's book is a fine achievement. It articulates Adorno with verve and lucidity, and shows much of the potential which his work continues to offer.

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Pierre Bourdieu. By RICHARD JENKINS. Routledge. 1992. pp. 190. Paperbound, £8.99.

PIERRE BOURDIEU emerges from this introductory text as being primarily a sociologist though not essentially one. Like other prestigous French academics, and here Michel Foucault springs readily to mind, Bourdieu is part sociologist, part philosopher and part something else—in this case anthropologist. However, unlike some of his contemporaries, he has not attained the celebrity status of a Foucault or a Baudrillard. His prose style is as obtuse and his conceptualization as dense as the best of them so this failure must be due to other factors. These other factors are probably related to the nature of the subjects he has addressed. They are not conspicuously controversial or fashionable. Educated as a philosopher, his first published works were anthropological studies of Algeria. He later turned his attention to the concept of social reproduction and the education system. He is still possibly best known in Britain as the co-author of *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture* first published in 1970. Since then he has published two important books, one on Aesthetics, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1984) and the other, an acute sociological analysis of the system of higher education in France, *Homo Academicus* (1988). Jenkins states that his importance lies in his significant contribution to the debate concerning the relationship between structure and action in sociology and social anthropology, his reflexive engagement with empirical research and the epistemological questions he has raised about the adequacy of social scientific knowledge. These are not attention grabbers.

For over thirty years Bourdieu has actively addressed the fundamental problems affecting the relationship between theoretical and empirical research. His early anthropological study of the Kabyle house is a model of structuralist analysis but his theoretical work from the late 1960s has been an attempt to transcend the subjectivism/objectivism dichotomy that characterized this anthropology and a great deal of French philosophy and sociology. The tensions evoked by the dual and contradictory influences of Sartre and Lévi-Strauss are apparent and as Jenkins clearly argues largely unresolved. However much he tries or professes to have gone beyond a structuralist or functionalist conceptual framework a lurking determinism remains. For Jenkins this is a major flaw in Bourdieu's work and one which he outlines and interrogates rigorously in a number of contexts. *Pierre Bourdieu* is in fact exceptionally critical in places and in highlighting Bourdieu's weaknesses he sometimes detracts from his achievements which are, despite suggestions to the contrary, presented almost as an afterword.

What is probably most significant about Bourdieu is that he has provided others with 'tools to think with'. His research is a form of philosophical fieldwork which has offered to others albeit repetitively or obliquely a number of concepts whose value has not been fully appreciated or applied. This is particularly the

case with the trio of concepts: 'practice', 'habitus' and 'field'. Jenkins rightly points out the incongruities and confusions implicit in their formulation but does not expand upon their heuristic usefulness. They do make sense in a number of contexts and it is genuinely difficult to escape from determinist assumptions as that we are all in some way in our practical and intellectual lives determined and determining. This is the value of 'practice' and 'habitus' and it is perhaps for others to develop the concepts more effectively. His work on education and his best-selling tome on aesthetic judgement and taste are beset by similar difficulties and frustrations and Jenkins's discussion of these are again apposite and acute. Bourdieu again fails to recognize his inability to escape the determinist problematic. This is compounded by a refusal or reluctance to develop a theorized model of institutions—including their operation and relationship to the organization of social life. There is also a strong tendency or disposition in Bourdieu's work to offer ahistorical analyses and to assert that what is true for France is also true for other advanced and civilized nations. This is not necessarily the case. *Distinction* often reads as a study of a specifically French articulation of power, culture and class struggle. His argument is essentially an extension of that in *Reproduction* and the flaws, as Jenkins shows, are very similar although he fully accepts Bourdieu's rejection of the Kantian transcendental aesthetic.

The final section of *Pierre Bourdieu* deals with his use of language. Notoriously difficult and sometimes quite incomprehensible, Jenkins wonders more than once what the ulterior purpose of this style is. Most people would agree that the social world is not an easy thing to make sense of and that difficult issues or problems do not always lend themselves to simple linguistic explanations. However, as Jenkins notes, it is possible not to be, or at least not to seem to be, wilfully obscure. His own prose style and his own explications are models of clarity and good sense. So why be so obscure? Partly, Jenkins suggests, this is a result of playing the French academic game and winning, of successfully striving towards some intellectual distinction of one's own. On the other hand, Bourdieu could simply be a bad writer and this in itself could be the reason why Jenkins, and others, detect so many flaws in Bourdieu's thought. This raises interesting questions concerning the relationship between thought and expression in academic work.

Richard Jenkins has produced an excellent undergraduate guide to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. The book is characterized by a determined clarity, an intellectual honesty and reflexivity that has redeemed a great deal of contemporary Sociology. His guide as to how best read Bourdieu is a most useful conclusion to the book.

JOHN BLEWITT

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Artists under Vichy: A Case of Prejudice and Persecution. By MICHÈLE C. CONE. Princeton U.P. 1992. pp. 264. £27.50.

WHETHER CONSCIOUSLY or not, everyone working on Occupied France is influenced by *Le Silence de la Mer*. The sound of silence that speaks volumes in its refusal of Nazism, echoes across the decades of scholarly analysis which followed the first realizations that Resistance was more than military, and Collaboration more than treason; more *and* less. Jean Bruller (Vercors) was a graphic artist and satirist before he wrote what has become the most celebrated piece of Resistance literature to emerge from the French experience of Occupation, but it is less the actual novel than the idea of silence which has haunted commentators on the period ever since. The notion that silence was the only honourable reaction to the presence of the brutal occupiers was never more than a half-truth at best, and Vercors qualified its historic necessity by the very act of writing and producing the novel as an underground publication. The Editions de Minuit and all the Resistance press loudly asserted this related necessity that clandestine voices should be heard. The poet Pierre Seghers went further and celebrated the obstinacy of poets who continued to publish openly in the belief that French creativity should be seen to survive. Indeed the determination to continue doing all the things in which you believed has been one of the motivations most often mentioned in the memoirs and oral testimonies of Resisters.

And yet the suspicion attached to published writings, art products, exhibitions, films made and shown, the staging of plays and almost any continuation of aesthetic endeavour during the Occupation, lingers on in the collective moral memory. And so it should, for if continuity was one motivation for Resistance among some, it was also a reason for indifference, negativity and Collaboration among others. There is no empirical resolution to this obvious paradox. The tendency is to categorize artistic production (and any other production) into variants of the three main behavioural scenarios of the period, Resistance, *attentisme* (passivity or ambivalence) and Collaboration, and in arriving at these categories there has never ceased to be a role for moral and political judgements. In this fascinating exploration of visual artists under the Occupation, the author Michèle Cone is perhaps more honest than many others in acknowledging the judgemental edge to her research and conclusions: the Preface sets out a stimulating mix of intellectual theory and morality. I found it refreshing and promising. There is an absorbing but meandering eclecticism in the rest of the book which sometimes threatens to blunt the socio-political reading of artistic forms which she promises, and much is left to our own sense of what is acceptable or not, but in the end there is more a feeling of opening than closure in her handling of the categories, and this too I enjoyed and admired. To the perennial question 'What did so-and-so do during the war?' the book provides a large number of individual answers from Picasso to Louis Hautecoeur, and Matisse to Paul Dupuy. In this respect alone it is a book which will be warmly welcomed.

Artists under Vichy begins with the assertion that artists cannot, and should not, be abstracted from any of the contexts in which they operate, whether social, moral, political or material. Those who sponsor, administer and police the arts are not the only ones of whom pertinent moral and political questions can be asked. There is nothing new in this critical position, though it is always controversial in any form of art history to give priority to context over product. But Michèle Cone is admirably pluralistic in her presentation of context, and although the Germans and anti-semitism are rightly seen as jointly the dominating presence, the book allows other factors, such as Vichy's own National Revolution and hostility to foreigners, and the varying constraints of place and time, to emerge as equally important contexts to the aims and achievements of artists. In terms of the German presence Vichy France contained within it not only the dubious patronage of German culture which took Charles Despiau, André Dunoyer de Segonzac, Maurice de Vlaminck, Kies von Dongen, André Derain and others on a much publicized visit to the Nazi art displays in Munich and Hitler's Chancellery in Berlin, but also the surprising German acceptance of much of the avant-garde art of early Twentieth-Century France, including Braque, Matisse, Dufy, Rouault and Picasso. If Picasso was not permitted to exhibit it was more a result of pressure from Franco than any lack of aesthetic interest by German art connoisseurs, several of whom Picasso received at his unmolested studio in Paris.

To what extent Picasso should be seen as morally compromised by his relative freedom to paint and by the visits of these admiring Germans, and to what extent he is exonerated by his generosity to refugees and victims of persecution, becomes a pivotal issue in the book and he is the artist to be given the most extensive study of form and content as well as context. In the end Cone allows his Resistance claims to have the last word, but some doubts must remain. Among other judgements in the book it is made clear that moral ambivalence at least must be attached to the many artists who signed declarations of French nationality when not to do so would have signified sympathy for Jews and other immigrants excluded from exhibitions. Throughout the book the miserable lives and tragic deaths of the victimized form the backdrop to the art permitted by the authorities. Matisse is critically examined for the verbal expressions which suggested sympathy with Vichy nationalism and Cone concludes that he shared the widespread bourgeois belief in the apolitical sanctity of the artist, adding to this his own ill-tempered exasperation at the shortages which affected the quality of his aesthetic life, hidden away in the hills of Nice. As for the conventional Salon

artists, they are seen to be courting Vichy approval but only variably submitting their work to the clichés of family and soil, discipline and leadership exalted in Pétain's speeches. They had their own traditionalist forms which Vichy kept at a discreet distance from its own, giving over half of the painting commissions in 1941 to non-Salon artists. In this respect, as in its attitude to family pressure groups and Catholic educators, Vichy seemed less concerned to create single-minded organizations to act as standard bearers than to radiate a polemical moral concern, which attempted to be all-pervading but was ultimately nebulous.

Vichy came closer to a specific programme in its promotion of folk and decorative art, and some of the author's most scholarly insights are contained in the chapter devoted to those areas; some of her most pungent criticisms also. The Vichy programme for art, she concludes, 'was always going to be viciously and profoundly antiforeigner' and she shows how Louis Hautecoeur as Secretary General of the fine arts department within the Education Ministry personified the xenophobia rampant in the corridors of Vichy.

The images of compromise and culpability, which give this book what many will see as a provocative thrust, are focal points in a canvas rich with detail and miniature portraits, not the least of which is the sketch of Breton's subversive exhibition of Max Ernst's work held in the gardens of Air Bel, a villa in the suburbs of Marseille. Several artists led the life of clandestine Resisters, but their names tend to be less well-known than those who went as guests to Nazi Germany. The problem was how to make art speak for the Resistance, though an album of drawings was published by the Front National des Arts in 1944 and sold for the benefit of Resistance activity. Michèle Cone gives the names of the contributors, adding that Desnoyer, Gromaire and Jean Lurçat, perhaps even Marquet in Algiers, might have sent contributions had circumstances not prevented them. Lurçat's work, in his hiding place in the Lot, I have found on two occasions, paintings left on the walls of fellow Resisters, exotic flames and plumes of hope which marked his conviction of the phoenix which would rise with the Liberation. There was shame and a good deal of self-satisfaction among artists in Vichy France, but there was also rebellious action and expression, and, assuredly, silence.

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Architect's Choice: Art in Architecture in Great Britain since 1945. By EUGENE ROSENBERG. Text by RICHARD CORK. Thames & Hudson. 1992. pp. 176. Paperbound, £16.95.

THIS BOOK is based on research and archive material collected by architect Eugene Rosenberg, who believed that modern art and architecture were mutually complementary. It contains over two hundred photographs of art and sculpture, designed in many cases to fit into a specific architectural context. This is the realization of one of the original ideals of Britain's modern-movement pioneers; to make art accessible to everyone, through its inclusion in new public building projects.

The book comprises eight sections broadly divided into different types of public buildings and spaces. These deal with schools, housing, universities, hospitals, ecclesiastical buildings, art for interiors and public sculpture. Each section of images is prefaced by a short description giving a background to the work and a brief survey of the key buildings which benefited from the inclusion of contemporary art and sculpture.

In addition to a short preface by Eugene Rosenberg, there is an excellent introductory essay by Richard Cork. This describes in some detail the cultural and ideological basis of the early work, particularly in the immediate post-war years up to the end of the nineteen fifties. In a quotation taken from *Circle, the International Survey of Constructive Art* produced in 1937, a manifesto is defined based on 'a new cultural unity . . . slowly emerging out of the fundamental changes which are occurring in our present day civilisation'. *Circle* wanted to enable painters, sculptors, architects and writers 'the means of expressing their views and maintaining contact' and to provide the medium for the interchange of ideas between the disciplines.

Eugene Rosenberg had worked as an assist-

ant in Le Corbusier's atelier in Paris and for Harlicek & Honzig in Prague. He came to Britain in Spring 1939, and became an essential part of this movement in post-war British architecture. In his partnership with F. R. S. Yorke and Cyril Mardall (YRM) he was responsible for many influential buildings which brought art and architecture together. Through a mixture of charm and great conviction, Rosenberg often managed to persuade his clients against their better judgement to commission artists and sculptors to enliven their buildings, both inside and out.

In his introduction to *Architect's Choice*, the author states that 'art should be part of the enjoyment of every-day life' and this idea touches the ideological basis of the new alliance. Visionaries such as Rosenberg saw the new architecture as more of a science with a social purpose than a polite synthesis of the arts and crafts. The architecture was by definition often tough and uncompromising, being primarily based on functionalist and scientific principles. Materials such as concrete, glass and steel were used as an honest testimony to the bright new future of post-war Britain. This style often created an appropriately neutral 'back-drop' for the art itself.

It is clear that architects such as YRM at St Thomas's Hospital, David Aberdeen at the Trades Union Congress Building in Bloomsbury and much of the work at the 1951 Festival of Britain achieved a true and memorable alliance between great modern art and architecture. This was the generation influenced by a sense of optimism and hope, which for a time saw the flowering of significant public building projects which in their alliance with modern art represented the true spirit of the modern movement.

However, the ideal was undoubtedly corrupted by some developers and their architects, often to alleviate the uncompromising starkness of their buildings, while the section on the new universities explains how modern sculpture was seen as a manifestation of 'cultural vitality'. It can therefore be understood as a highly complementary addition to the modern campus. The justification or more precisely, meaning, behind the placement of semi-representational sculpture in shopping centres and outside certain office blocks is not really explained in the same terms.

One views the image of 'Totem' for example, placed arbitrarily in the Arndale Shopping Centre, Manchester, with some scepticism. It raises very interesting questions which are not really answered; why is it there, beyond the broad wish to bring art to the masses? What was in the artist's mind when designing the piece which may have connected the object to its context? Or was the piece selected at random by the developer or his architect without consultation with the artist? Given the largely photographic format of the book it is understandable that detailed information is so short. However, the images provoke these questions and would have benefited from further detail explaining more fully the relationships between artist, architect and client.

This is a critique particularly of those large commercial projects of the nineteen sixties and seventies which often appear to have used the art to detract from rather than complement the architecture. For example works by sculptors such as Jesse Watkins at the Royal Free Hospital Hampstead and Eduardo Paolozzi at Leicester Royal Infirmary fail to raise the spatial quality of the environment above the mediocrity of the architecture itself; whereas works by Paolozzi of a more decorative nature, at Tottenham Court Road tube station and at the Police Training Headquarters at Pimlico Station (not featured here) certainly improve the quality of the environment, and could be said to achieve a more complementary relationship with the architecture.

This is an important book, not only because it records the profound influence Eugene Rosenberg had on this area (he died in 1990), but also because it reminds us of this original principle which helped to make modern architecture more humane. It should not be forgotten how many seminal modern-movement buildings are 'decorated' with art and sculpture. If we try to imagine Lubetkin's Highpoint 1 flats without the caryatids supporting the porch, or Mies's Barcelona Pavilion without the furniture and statuary, we are reminded that great modern architecture is a subtle balance between line and form. Eugene Rosenberg

worked towards this end throughout his life.

MARK DUDEK

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Sentimental Education: Schooling, Popular Culture and the Regulation of Liberty. By JAMES DONALD. Verso. 1992. pp. 203. £10.95; clothbound, £35.00.

SENTIMENTAL EDUCATION is an interesting example of what I take to be the 'New Left' approach to cultural studies. Gone are the 'instant answers' of structuralist Marxism and psychoanalysis with their often insensitive 'sociologizing of the Other', as Donald aptly describes it (p. 101). In their place, the uncertainties and possibilities of post-structuralist inquiry are embraced. This means the rejection of both foundations and 'closure' from which follows a fascination with 'the unknown' and also 'the view from the margins', or rather, to be strictly correct, a refusal to be drawn into marginal/central distinctions (as when Donald attempts to deal with the Kantian sublime and the popular tradition of horror films in one and the same breath). At the same time, following Lyotard's search for 'a politics that would respect both the desire for justice and the desire for the unknown' (p. 114), Donald is only too aware that as social beings we cannot avoid judgemental acts however problematic their justification in an anti-foundational climate. In this respect, Kant's well-known struggles with the 'antinomy of taste' may be seen to prefigure the wider political problem that runs through this book: 'If aesthetic thought is characterized by the need to judge in the absence of determinable laws', says Donald, echoing Kant, 'and if Lyotard is right that there are no determinable laws in ethics and politics either, then the question of the *authority* for calculation within these spheres itself becomes the nub of the problem' (p. 115).

However, whereas philosophers of art have mainly sought for answers in those aspects of aesthetic discourse which make it *distinctive* from other areas of human experience, Donald, as a sociologist, naturally looks to the institutional setting and the relationships of power that underly it. For Donald, 'communication can never be free from domination' (p. 140), although the ever-present problem of self-reference that all such global claims must entail probably goes a long way to explaining why it is so hard to get a purchase on any clear central thesis in this book beyond, of course, the obvious one with which he ends, namely that 'it always remains important to deflate claims of authority . . . as they threaten to become too monological' (p. 178). Now while one could hardly disagree with this in relation to the arbitrary imposition of power in whatever form (in the artworld, for example, one thinks of the abuses to which Dickie's 'institutional theory' opens itself), one could not get very far in any direction without distinguishing between this kind of 'authority' and the 'authority' of a persuasive argument reflecting wide experience of and care for the matter in hand—the 'authority' of Donald's own arguments, for example, or those of the often quoted Lyotard and Foucault.

In so far as one *can* detect a pattern in the very loose-knit layout of this book, it is as follows: firstly, the role and history of such institutions as popular (i.e., state) education, English Literature and the BBC are examined to expose how they engineer our conformity to a culture in ways which 'depend less on coercion than on the self-policing of free citizens' (p. 7) and also how we are fed the myths of 'nationhood', as when, in the eyes of Tory educationists, our literature is naïvely seen 'to articulate the nation's shared imaginative past' (p. 49). However, Donald is also concerned to examine how aspects of popular culture 'resist this sort of closure and submission' (p. 118) through their very heterogeneity. In particular, in the chapter entitled 'What's at Stake in Vampire Films' (*sic*), he is concerned to show how 'the abject, the despised, the obscene, the hybrid and the monstrous . . . this dark side of modernity' are represented in such popular genres as the classic horror films of vampires and robots which may all be seen as signs of 'the modern fear of the irruption of the irrational within everyday normality' (p. 60). While this fear seems hardly unreasonable, given the current level of irrational violence at home and abroad, Donald's main concern here is rather with the value such films have in making us aware of the precar-

iousness of our own cultural identity, which is seen to rely for its very existence on 'a horror of difference' (p. 68), as represented by the 'alien' cultures and ideologies at our gates exemplified in popular fiction such as *Fu Manchu* or the 'enemy within' as in *Jekyll and Hyde* (p. 68). Donald also links this to the Kantian 'sublime' whose feature of 'limitlessness', as with the 'modern sublime' of Dracula and Frankenstein movies, enables us 'to conceive the unrepresentable' (p. 111). I shall not even attempt here to enter the philosophical problems to which this gives rise!

As I read on, I found myself getting more interested in Donald's idea of a 'community' not as something imposed but as what we continually strive to create. Here, the Kantian notion of bringing a 'community of taste' into being as a 'regulative ideal' (p. 142) seems to provide him with a kind of *model* for approaching the wider political problems of our age—an age in which, for Donald, we must all learn to live with 'the impossibility of government' and cultivate 'a certain pragmatic modesty' (p. 121). This is because 'indeterminacy is at the heart of democracy' (p. 137) as it is also at the heart of aesthetic judgement. It is the lure of the 'unknown' to which this gives rise that drives us on and in this respect, we must always 'create a space for marginal and emergent views' (p. 170), just as art lovers need to respond in an open way to the avant-garde *and* to the 'endless, disorderly dialogue' of popular culture (p. 120).

There are some aspects of Donald's book that I found tiresome not least of which is the obscurity of the reference to Flaubert's novel which gives the book its title. The lengthy analysis of the manipulative role of popular education adds little to what has been stated many times before by sociologists and historians of education. Furthermore, although he talks of the heterogeneity of 'popular culture', it is given remarkably little coverage, many of the examples being drawn from 'classic' horror films of the twenties and thirties (*Fu Manchu*, *Fantomas*, Dreyer's *Vampire*, *Metropolis* and *The Cabinet of Dr Caligari*) which one would be more likely to see nowadays in an 'art' cinema than on at the local. None the less, there were also times when I felt that Donald was feeling his way towards insights that can perhaps only be expressed in this rather oblique and unsystematic form. I also warmed to his refreshing lack of dogmatism, as when he concedes that 'the old images of popular culture as either repressed voices in need of liberation or false consciousness being inscribed onto dopey readers are both equally condescending and inaccurate' (p. 57). I also welcomed those moments when he balances phenomenological awareness against reductionist theorizing, as when he says of the latter approach to analysing horror films that 'what seems to be missing from such accounts is any sense of eeriness, that disorientation of perception, which Tzvetan Todorov identifies as the key to the literary "fantastic" '. Finally, who could disagree with Donald's plea that we should be 'sensitive to the need for responsibility in the aspiration towards community that always remains to be brought into being' (p. 121)? This seems to me to be as relevant to the formation of aesthetic communities as it is to the wider political world of which they are a part.

NICK McADOO

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Foucault and Literature: Towards a Genealogy of Writing. By SIMON DURING. Routledge. 1992. pp. 259. £10.99; clothbound, £35.00.

SIMON DURING introduces his book as 'an interpretation of Foucault's analysis of modern society and culture for students of literature' (p. 2). As such, he sets himself a dual task: on the one hand of providing an introductory commentary, and on the other, of tracing Foucault's relation to the institution of literature and its relevance to contemporary criticism. Since Foucault's direct engagement with literature is limited to a small part of his career, the second task is inevitably the more difficult. It is with a neglect of Foucault within literary theory that During is concerned, attempting to locate him within its institution at the same time as demonstrating the vigilance a Foucauldian literary criticism would take towards that institution as such. Here, During takes care to explain Foucault's relation to academic and social institutions and the problems of applying his work to that of Anglo-Saxon literary theory. His

attempt to provide a 'genealogy of writing' thus takes the form of a genealogical tracing of the literary in a commentary outlining Foucault's *oeuvre*. Aware of the difficulties of such an undertaking, During employs a variety of strategies in order to reveal a literary Foucault. In his final chapters During outlines the theoretical constructs of a genealogical literary criticism.

For During Foucault's relation to literature can be divided into four parts. First, the early literary theory of works such as *Death and the Labyrinth* and the so-called 'transgressive essays'. Second, the literary history of these essays provided by Foucault's engagement with the work of writers such as Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski. The third stage of Foucault's literary concerns is with the operation of literary realism in the production of 'the docile society' and is analysed in terms of *The Birth of the Clinic*, its relation to English medical development and novels concerned with public health by Flaubert, Eliot, and James. Finally, there are the literary concerns of the questions of authorship and modern power relations. Throughout, During attempts to locate the literary both alongside and within Foucault's work, not simply as exemplary cases of other institutional concerns, but in terms of the development and changes within the notion of the literary itself. This is more fully explored when During has covered the commentary on Foucault's work and literature and addresses the polemic of what a genealogy of literature might look like.

Here During begins by examining the work of Ian Hunter and Stephen Greenblatt as exemplary of a genealogy of literature that attempts to move away from presuppositions of mimesis and representation, unlike most other Foucauldian accounts. Even so, it is on the very problem of representation that During finds fault. In Hunter's *Culture and Government* he finds an analysis of the history of literary education that works, as in Foucault's model of power, 'from the bottom up' only to flounder in its neglect of important historical developments in education and the implicit claim to speak from outside of history (a problem During identifies with Foucault's archaeological stage). For During Hunter misses some of these historical complexities by regarding literature as 'merely representational'—something transparently appropriated as a form of government outside of those resistances in which the institution of literature developed. Greenblatt is more sensitive to the Foucauldian enterprise 'in aiming to analyse representations through non-mimetic categories' (199). Thus, in *Shakespearean Negotiations*, Greenblatt develops Foucault's understanding of power in terms of 'transactional notions': the circulation of representations throughout the social body inseparable from their processes of production. However, this 'cultural circulation' is also not without problems for During. Like Foucault's own work on power there is a conflict between localized specificity and the provision of a general theory. Thus, Greenblatt is caught between the historical specificity of an age which is 'a hybrid of absolutist and modern formations' (p. 202) and the demands of a general theory allowing what During describes as a mirroring of our own post-modernity within Shakespeare's theatre. This is to presuppose the mimetic relation between theory and its object that During wants to avoid. Despite these shortcomings in both Hunter and Greenblatt, During develops from their work an account of the technologies of literary production that is aware of cultural exchange and circulation, without recourse to mimetic categories. This method is then explored in genealogical readings of *Hamlet* and the fiction of Theodore Dreiser. In the former During traces the discursive formations of ghosts and haunting in relation to questions of identity and representation. In the latter similar questions are addressed through the novelist's sustained assault against genre boundaries. For During it is Dreiser's continual interplay of discursive constructs that exemplifies the possibilities of a genealogy of literature.

However, the question of how an analysis of interactions and exchanges within different 'discursive practices' may lead to a genealogy of literature is never fully answered. What is left is the notion of a general direction that Foucauldian literary criticism might take: 'After Foucault, literary history comes to mean not just an attention to past contexts or to the story of reception and circulation, but the connection

of old books to the problematizations or "undecidabilities" in which they were both written and continue to be read' (238). Of course, the subtitle of this book, 'Towards a Genealogy of Literature', marks the impossibility of any arrival. In part this is due to the difficult demands of a book that is between commentary and polemic. More serious is a question concerning During's theoretical constructs. Discussing Dreiser as exemplary of literary genealogy he says: 'One message that we must take from the relative failure of Foucault's archaeological project is that each discursive practice must be considered in terms of its exchanges with other such practices' (231). As such, it is interesting to note the way that Derrida's work circumscribes much of what During has to say, particularly on the important question of representation. (Important aspects of During's argument here depend on Derrida's papers 'Envoi' and 'Plato's Pharmacy'.) Derrida is invoked at crucial points to provide theoretical clarity but is never engaged with in questions of the literary, institutionality or genealogy. Such an exchange would inevitably make During's project appear very differently. One must then ask to what extent this non-engagement with Derrida (while representing him on the question of Foucault and representation) problematizes During's overtures towards a genealogy of literature.

SCOTT COOKE

Illustration. By J. HILLIS MILLER. Reaktion Books. 1992. pp. 168 including colour plates. £25; paperbound, £11.95.

BECAUSE THE objects of cultural studies are now found in a wide range of media—including film, television, illustrated books, captioned pictures and advertising—new techniques are needed to read them. This is the gist of *Illustration*, the new book by J. Hillis Miller, professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California at Irvine. Although there may be nothing new in Miller's basic premiss that different ways of reading are needed, the techniques he proposes to this end seem fresh enough.

Given that neither word nor image takes priority in collaboration between the two, Miller argues, vigilant rhetorical readings of both are needed, if differences between them are to be recognized. How is this to be done? Well, one answer is the computer. The first section of *Illustration*, then, deals with the practice of cultural criticism in the age of digital reproduction. In order to understand art, Miller asks, do you really have to understand its roots in a specific language, nation, moment in history, class and gender structure, ideological formation and technological level of production, distribution and consumption? He thinks not, and suggests, instead, that through using computers, such as that used in the IRIS project at Brown University, scholars will be able to move at will from one region of the textbase to another, executing sophisticated search commands that will allow the instant juxtaposition of pictures, sounds and texts which are widely separated in origin.

Someone working at a junior college out in the sticks, Miller opines further, will have at his or her fingertips the equivalent of the Widener Library and the British Library combined. From the point of view of the old-fashioned scholar of canonical texts, the élite works of literature, music or art will seem to melt into an indefinitely large context that will be on the same plane of digital availability.

All well and good. But, as I was reading this, I began to feel uncomfortable with his logic. First, if the electronic book is really going to be as democratic and anti-canonical as Miller claims, is that really such a healthy thing? What, after all, is wrong with canons? Without them, we must accord the latest semi-literate bestseller from Shirley Conran the same status as, say, a work by Joseph Conrad. And if 'culture' is to be the focus of a liberal arts education, as opposed to literature or art on the assumption that there is a timeless pantheon of classics, then 'popular culture', such as the latest single by Madonna, or film starring Arnold Schwarzenegger, becomes just as profound, spiritually elevating, significant and multi-faceted in terms of scholarship as Wagner's *Ring* cycle. Plainly this is nonsense. And those, such as the self-styled iconoclasts who try desperately hard to be controversial in *The Modern Review*, claiming it to be true, are guilty

of the worst kind of culturally divisive pretentiousness and inverted snobbery. Besides, vehicles for studying these forms of popular culture, such as the rock press or film magazines, already exist and are much better financed than many university departments.

So will it work? Can technical devices modulate our representations of both past and present cultural forms and enable us to read texts differently? Computers, Miller argues, are more than glorified typewriters; they are a tool of extraordinary range and power to the scholar. Pictures, music and words are all treated the same way by a computer. All are stored in the same file, which is then no longer really a text because it is as much to be seen and heard as to be read. Theses written in the new multi-media will be able to reproduce photographs, film and video clips, paintings, music and sound tracks and any other material that can be digitized in order to corroborate their argument. In other words, he seems to be saying, the evidence that it will work remains to be seen.

In the second part of his book, Miller draws on the writing of Goethe, Ruskin, Benjamin and Heidegger in order to analyse works of art that involve the interplay of word and image. The examples he uses are Holbein's woodcuts of *The Dance of Death*, Phiz's etchings for Dickens's *Pickwick Papers*, and the solar imagery in Turner's later paintings. This section begs another question: to what extent is captioning and illustrating an example of the intentional fallacy? Further, if the assemblage and juxtaposition allows the writing of new histories that are created on the computer, even though they never happened, where do you draw the line?

Miller gives an example of how he thinks such links will work. Tennyson's *Lady of Shalott*, he writes, can be explained through links to Tennyson's biography and to historical changes, such as the building of canal systems in the nineteenth century.

But what if juxtaposition is also made with some natural disaster, such as an earthquake, that happened in, say, Mexico in 1833? Tennyson may never have even heard about it, but, by 'deliberately' ignoring the event, his political intentions may be questioned. Such are the dangers of politicizing aesthetics and aestheticizing politics. My example may not be entirely apt, but if the computer software is to connect materials the same way discerning scholars do—by association, by accident, by analogy, by metaphor or metonym—then it could easily happen.

A few other gripes. First, Miller makes the interesting point that the word evokes, while the illustration presents, but then does not go on to discuss what implications this distinction has for the interpretation of narrative painting, or for the differences between a painting as a work of art and as an illustration? The somewhat confusing comment that: 'Each of my illustrations means itself, like any other configuration of signs, any design in picture or in word. What they bring to light they also hide' is the closest he gets to explaining this difference.

Second, Miller has structured his argument in such a way as to make it difficult to follow. After one divertimento, for instance, he writes 'All this may seem a long way from the question of illustrations for novels' and, as a reader, you find yourself nodding vigorously in agreement.

Were his asides merely attempts to illustrate juxtaposition? Whatever his motives, the lucidity of his argument suffers. At the end he admits: 'My essay is less a continuous argument than an array or constellation of examples . . . but without an inscribed act of reading such as I have tried to provide, all the data in the biggest of databases would be little more than just that, raw data'. And you are left mouthing the line beloved of report-writing school teachers: 'Could have tried harder'.

NIGEL FARNDALE

Intimate Conflict: Contradiction in Literary and Philosophical Discourse: A Collection of Essays by Diverse Hands. Edited by BRIAN G. CARAHER. State University of New York Press. 1992. pp. 208. Paperbound, $14.95.

AN EDITOR'S life is not without its problems. Some of them, however, can be self-inflicted. As regards the present volume, it seems that the contributors have been issued with a brief of such flexibility that it is difficult to determine

what kind of audience is the intended target. Perhaps one should not read too much into titles. However, on the face of it, a reader might judge that they are being presented with yet another instance of what is a fairly established genre, one which explores the affinities between the subjects and their rhetorical devices and strategies. After all, the word 'discourse' appears in the title. The six essays do not quite conform to such expectations, and Brian Caraher's introduction is inevitably something of a patchwork. There are predictable elements featured, such as Escher's lithographs, and the by now mandatory references to Derrida. But Caraher also lurches into a four-page aside on Heidegger, who is not so much as mentioned by the other contributors. After eighteen pages, he provides a summary overview, announcing with an amusing immodesty that 'each of the following essays can stand as an excellent contribution to literary critical and philosophical thought'.

The first paper, by Henry Johnstone Jr., is a rather dense three-page discussion note, which conspicuously is the only piece to make explicit use of formal logic, in this case to elucidate a passage from Hesiod on the theme of lying and truth-claims. Johnstone prefaces his brief analysis with the observation: 'An important aspect of Western civilisation is its concern with contradiction. The experience of being faced with a contradiction is typically western'. No argument or evidence is offered in support of this contention. By contrast, the next two items together account for nearly half the total text. Charles Altieri's essay deals with the issue of self-evasion and sophistic rhetoric illustrated in Plato's dialogues. He counterposes this with Freud's attempts to overcome self-evasion and contradiction in his own investigations. Altieri deploys the term 'subsumption' to capture the sense of self-scrutiny which he sees as central to Plato's vision. Mili Clark's essay is an equally prolix discussion of a theological problem which features in *Paradise Lost*. Early on, she says: 'Poetically the epic succeeds in convincing us that characters who really are sufficient to stand nevertheless choose to fall'. From this remark one might have expected a demonstration of how Milton *qua* poet solves a theological conundrum but this is precisely what we do not get. There is more textual citation of the posthumously published treatise *Christian Doctrine* than of the epic, and although Clark exhibits a commendable patience with her material, the sharpness of the main issue gets lost in the detail. Milton is supposed to solve the problem by deploying the principle of Non-Contradiction, but it remains obscure exactly how this is achieved.

Marc Shell's 'Money of the Mind' sets out to demonstrate 'the historical fact of the internalisation of economic form in philosophy'. This is meant to have a specific bearing on what he describes as 'formalistic logic' via the thesis that it is indebted to metaphors derived from monetary practices. Although Shell provides a few interesting examples from different cultural and historical contexts, it would in fact take rather more than this anecdotal evidence to sustain the reductive stance he adopts. He nowhere engages with the more technical aspects of formal logic as such, and the only principle repeatedly mentioned though not clearly stated, is *modus tollens*. No major logician is discussed. (Kant hardly qualifies.) One suspects Shell is in some haste to get to his own Hegelian-cum-Marxist conclusions. Caraher himself provides the next piece, on contradiction and metaphor, arguing that one needs to appeal beyond syntax to context in accounting for poetic metaphor. This has the smell of old news about it, although Caraher makes some reasonable critical comments on the work of both Brooke-Rose and I. A. Richards. He makes some interesting use of actual poetical examples, but at least some acknowledgement of more recent work besides that of Lakoff and Johnson might have been helpful.

Finally, Richard Kuhns deals with paradox in narration. This is a very mixed affair. The second two sections on Melville's *Confidence Man*, while a little compressed, are an insightful addition to Melville criticism. The first two sections are less fortunate, appealing to a precarious analogy between Russell's treatment of logical paradoxes and Freud's treatment of negation. Interesting and suggestive though this might be, the exposition of Russell was less than clear. With this piece, as with all the others, one cannot help feeling that with modi-

fications it might have been more happily located elsewhere. The six papers have gained little by appearing within the same set of covers.

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Music and Text: Critical Inquiries. Edited by STEVEN PAUL SCHER. Cambridge U.P. 1992. pp. 327. £40.00.

THIS BOOK arose out of a symposium at Dartmouth College (New Hampshire) in 1988. Five of the fourteen contributors were professors of comparative literature which, according to a book quoted by the editor in his Preface, demands an interdisciplinary approach that brings together all 'human sciences' under a late-twentieth-century overview called simply 'theory' (p. xiii). But seven were professors of music, for whom 'theory' tends to mean something much older.

It is not surprising that musical scholarship in the United States, looking to Germany rather than France, and concerned chiefly with technical matters, should be a late-comer to this modern 'theory', but the first thing to emerge from this book is that musicology is now a flourishing academic discipline, inclined to ignore non-specialists, whose rights I feel compelled to defend. Musical studies are a specialized field; musical scholarship is more so, and musicology most of all. The contributors to *Music and Text* are perhaps insufficiently aware that even professionally trained musicians don't necessarily want or need to read words about music. What can be read in a score needs putting into sounds, not words, and harmonic analysis isn't necessarily profitable either to people who can read the score or people who can't. Serious western music is enjoyable and intelligible to far more listeners than can understand harmonic analysis, a procedure that defines elements of a work and relationships among them which, when the music is performed, are capable of evoking appropriate responses without being defined. Therefore that specialized way of using words about music isn't the only kind of music criticism, nor the only aim of academic musical education, nor perhaps the best use of musical scholarship. This is relevant to much of the book, perhaps most notably to the feminist and deconstructive study of Schumann's *Frauenliebe und Leben* by Ruth Solie. Given that everyone finds the words, by the poet Chamisso, unacceptable, what was Solie's aim as a music critic, in deploying detailed harmonic analysis? Was it to 'defend the indefensible', as one fellow-contributor says (p. 92)? Or to attack it—as White suggests (pp. 300–1) and I thought—until I began to understand how musicologists view ideology.

The *practical* limitations of harmonic analysis are recognized only in 'Chord and discourse: listening through the written word' by Peter Rabinowitz (comparative literature), who illustrates its bearing on sonata form. For some, this is a structure of themes; for others, of key-relations. (This is familiar, and Rabinowitz cites evidence about it.) He says, perhaps too boldly, that the two kinds of listeners' responses are 'mutually incompatible' and 'each takes as the figure what the other takes as ground' (p. 51).

It must be admitted that harmonic analysis, chiefly of standard works, is here embedded in scholarly and noticeably well-written essays; e.g., 'Musical analysis as stage direction' by David Lewin, which (though its title seems so general) takes only a few bars of Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro*, and shows that their harmonic relations have a specific dramatic importance, and thus a practical use in directing a singer-actor playing the Count. Lawrence Kramer writes well on Haydn's *Creation*, especially its rendering of Chaos and the coming of light; (but also its text, for Kramer is a professor of comparative literature as well as a musicologist). The contributions of Anthony Newcomb, Thomas Grey, Ellen Rosand are all interesting even to a non-musicologist, and I shall return to them.

Only two contributors deal with recent music. Charles Hamm, an academic expert on popular music, presents a strange case-history about a song from Lionel Richie's album 'All Night Long' (Motown, ca. 1980) and its reception among black South Africans. The other, Claudia Stanger, writes on a song-cycle *The Flower-Fed Buffaloes* by a composer John Harbison; the essay is entitled 'The semiotic elements

of a multiplanar discourse' and is over-ambitious: by choosing to champion Harbison's very unusual composition, Stanger is led to bring to bear on music two contemporary accounts of language, that need to be kept apart.

Saussure, Hjelmslev, Lévi-Strauss, Greimas, Derrida all figure in Stanger's pages. Other contributors introduce (e.g.) Propp, Todorov, Barthes, because they find that structuralist narrative theory has a place in understanding extended musical works; see Rabinowitz (pp. 49–50) and Grey (notably p. 96). (Earlier critics, who described music more empirically, found *drama*, now elbowed out.) Newcomb uses narrative theory as the basis for finding in Mahler's Ninth Symphony a detailed spiritual biography of an imaginary protagonist, told by the music as seen (and I don't mean *heard*) through Newcomb's harmonic analysis; he shows imagination, taste and literary knowledge, but not enough awareness of using technical detail to generate *fiction*.

Not surprisingly, some structural principles—contrast, closure, convention in general—can be seen at work more clearly in music than in narrative. This applies especially to contrast, as Stanger quite fails to recognize, and Newcomb forgets, but Brown, I think gets it right (pp. 79–80); he also deals with closure (or cadence, pp. 77–8). Brown's essay, comparing literary modernism to atonal composition, is very acute about the 'language' of music. Convention is tackled head-on and well by Rosand ('Operatic madness'); less successfully by Neubauer in 'Music and literature: the institutional dimensions'; and obliquely by Alpers, who barely touches on music in 'Lyrical modes'. Metaphor is a frequent topic, treated loosely not only by Stanger, but also by Newcomb (p. 127), Kramer (p. 161) and Grey. The latter in 'Image, narrative and idea' confidently regards these as three 'metaphorical modes' found in his interesting selection of writings on Beethoven by nineteenth-century critics.

A strange feature of the book is the last and longest contribution, by Hayden White, an interdisciplinary historian, who comments in some detail on all the others (in a manner the blurb calls 'magisterial'), thus usurping the function of the editor—without seeming to know much about music. He offends not only by his doctrinaire approach as a historicizing neo-Marxist but by pompous verbiage and rambling arguments (pp. 293, 297) about 'narrativization' and 'ideologization', quite irrelevant to music; also by his contemptuous abuse of the Romantics (pp. 296, 298, 311) and his scorn for music critics who (as their calling requires) show imaginative sympathy with Romantic attitudes, e.g. (p. 310) Edward Cone, who writes on the conventions of Lieder, and Newcomb (pp. 297–8).

White introduces technical terms from linguistic poetics, glossematics, rhetoric, Greimassian semiotics, all frequently and superficially employed in literary theory, but he doesn't document any systematic technical semiotic inquiries into music. One urgent question, I suggest, is whether western music can or should be viewed as 'text', as White does without comment at pp. 296, 316. Only Neubauer views it so (e.g. p. 13). For the other contributors, the terms 'music' and 'text' simply contrast, as in the title and in common parlance. To view music as 'discourse', as Stanger does throughout, and White on pp. 295, 304, doesn't present the same difficulties, but isn't trouble-free either.

When White (following whom?) adapts Hjelmslev's concept 'the substance of the content' to signify a hidden content 'latent' (i.e., unconscious) in a text (pp. 304, 307), or when he offers a dissertation on power (pp. 313–4), to supplement Lewin's view of the Count in *Figaro*, he is interesting, but again high-handed and not close to music. It appears from Rabinowitz's bibliographical note (p. 40) that musicologists have had their own controversy about the 'formalism' of harmonic analysis; if White could have written a fair and informed review of *that*, he would have justified his place in the book.

The volume is well produced. Musical illustrations, which are not the only ones, occupy roughly forty of its pages. There is a rather sketchy index.

OLGA McDONALD MEIDNER

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